Shaddonna Miles v. Housing Authority of Texarkana

Case: 16-40118 Document: 00513575039 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/30/2016

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-40118 United States Court of Appeals

Summary Calendar Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 30, 2016

SHADDONNA DIANE MILES, Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF TEXARKANA, TEXAS; VICKI NELSON,

Employee,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:15-CV-37

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff–Appellant Shaddonna Miles filed suit against Defendants–

Appellees Housing Authority of Texarkana, Texas, (HATT) and Vicki Nelson,

alleging that HATT discriminated against her under the Fair Housing Act

(FHA). The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Case: 16-40118 Document: 00513575039 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/30/2016

No. 16-40118

because Miles failed to allege facts supporting a prima facie case of

discrimination. We agree and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

HATT, a government entity in Bowie County, Texas, operated the

Affordable Homeownership Program (the Program) to allow qualified

applicants to buy or build a new home in a specified neighborhood. The

Program received funding through the Hope VI grant provided by the United

States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Eligible

applicants for the Program must obtain a first mortgage to purchase a home

from an independent lender, and then the Program provides a second mortgage

for the difference between the first mortgage and the price of the home. As the

district court noted, the Program requires applicants, in addition to satisfying

other requirements, to “have sufficient creditworthiness to be able to secure a

30-year fixed market rate loan from a private lender at the maximum level

commensurate with [the applicant’s] income and the lender’s underwriting

criteria.” Miles enrolled in the Program in 2008, and Nelson began working

for HATT in 2013. In May 2014, Nelson informed Miles that she was ready to

begin the process of being prequalified for a mortgage through an independent

lender. However, Miles was denied a loan for a home by Farmer’s Bank, the

independent lender, because of Miles’s low credit score.

On April 27, 2015, Miles filed suit against HATT and Nelson, asserting

a discrimination claim based on Miles’s disability. In her complaint, Miles

alleged that she has a disability—though she never identified that disability—

and that HATT failed to provide assistance to her through the Program,

resulting in damages of $5,000,000. The defendants moved to dismiss Miles’s

complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that they did not discriminate

against Miles because she failed to satisfy all of the criteria for home-buying

assistance through the Program and that Miles failed to identify a qualifying

2

Case: 16-40118 Document: 00513575039 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/30/2016

No. 16-40118

handicap under the FHA. Nelson also moved for dismissal based on qualified

immunity.

The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge who

recommended dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

for two reasons. The magistrate judge found that because Miles never disputed

that she failed to meet all of the eligibility criteria for assistance under the

Program—she never received a mortgage from an independent lender—the

defendants had not discriminated against her. The magistrate judge further

found that Miles had failed to allege that her disability constituted a handicap

under the FHA. The magistrate judge also concluded that Nelson was entitled

to qualified immunity, as Miles alleged no “acts indicating Nelson violated a

clearly established right or that her actions were objectively unreasonable.”

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations

and dismissed Miles’s cause of action with prejudice. Miles timely appealed.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d

180, 185 (5th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This court

“accept[s] all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret[s] the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” United States ex rel.

Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 2014).

In her complaint, Miles alleged that HATT and Nelson discriminated

against her based on her disability by denying her assistance in purchasing a

3

Case: 16-40118 Document: 00513575039 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/30/2016

No. 16-40118

home. 1 Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), “it [is] unlawful . . . [t]o discriminate in

the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any

buyer . . . because of a handicap” of the buyer. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford

House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 728 (1995) (“The . . . FHA . . . prohibits discrimination

in housing against, inter alios, persons with handicaps.”). The FHA defines a

handicap as “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one

or more of [a] person’s major life activities, . . . a record of having such an

impairment, or . . . being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 3602(h). Although Miles stated throughout her complaint that she has a

disability, she never identified this disability, alleged that this disability has

any effect on her major life activities, alleged that there was a record of a

qualifying impairment, or alleged that she was regarded as having a qualifying

impairment. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, we agree with the district

court that Miles failed to state a claim for discrimination under the FHA

because she failed to allege that she has a handicap as defined by the FA.

We further agree with the district court that Miles failed to state a

discrimination claim because she failed to establish that she was qualified to

receive assistance under the Program. In Petrello v. Prucka, 484 F. App’x 939,

942 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished), this court explained that one of

the elements of “a prima facie claim of housing discrimination under . . . the

FHA” is that the plaintiff “applied for and was ‘qualified to purchase’ the

housing.” Here, the district court determined that Miles could “not establish a

claim . . . based on discrimination [because] she never qualified for assistance.”

1 In her briefing on appeal, Miles alludes to an intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim against Nelson and a negligence claim against HATT. “Although we liberally

construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require that arguments must be briefed to be

preserved.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Price v. Digital Equip.

Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988)). Miles has not sufficiently briefed these

arguments, so they are waived.

4

Case: 16-40118 Document: 00513575039 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/30/2016

No. 16-40118

We see no error in this determination. Obtaining a first mortgage from an

independent lender was a stated condition of assistance under the Program,

and Miles alleged nowhere in her complaint that she satisfied this condition.

Because she has not alleged that she was qualified to purchase the housing,

she has failed to state a claim of discrimination under the FHA.

Finally, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Nelson

was entitled to qualified immunity. Nelson pleaded qualified immunity, and

once a defendant has pleaded a good-faith entitlement to qualified immunity,

“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut it.” Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d

312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007). “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials

from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 735 (2011). As we discussed above and as the district court correctly

recognized, Miles “fail[ed] to allege any specific facts indicating that Nelson

violated a clearly established right.” Therefore, Miles has not abrogated

Nelson’s qualified immunity.

Because Miles failed to state a claim against HATT or Nelson and

because Nelson is entitled to qualified immunity, the district court committed

no error in dismissing Miles’s cause of action. The judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

5