discussing qualified immunity and noting that a right is clearly established only if “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- discussing qualified immunity and noting that a right is clearly established only if “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUN 23 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
QUINTON P. BROWN, No. 15-35194
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00192-RMP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LARRY L. ADAMS, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Rosanna Malouf Peterson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 14, 2016**
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Quinton P. Brown, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal
claims arising from defendants’ refusal to provide Brown with his personal
religious texts. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any
basis supported by the record. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020,
1030 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Brown’s First
Amendment claim on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have
been clear to every reasonable official that denying Brown’s religious texts for a
temporary period of time would place a substantial burden on Brown’s free
exercise of his religion. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 741 (2011)
(discussing qualified immunity and noting that a right is clearly established only if
“every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates
that right” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Summary judgment was proper on Brown’s free speech claim because
Brown failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the prison
policy denying personal property in a four man cell involved censorship of the
content of communications made by Brown. See Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166,
1172 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey (a prison
policy that does not involve “censoring the content of communications” cannot
form the basis of a First Amendment free speech claim).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
2 15-35194
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 15-35194