Trumbull County Bar Association v. Masek

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Masek, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-3350.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-3350

TRUMBULL COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. MASEK.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Masek, Slip Opinion No.

2016-Ohio-3350.]

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Public

reprimand.

(No. 2015-2003—Submitted January 6, 2016—Decided June 14, 2016.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme

Court, No. 2015-045.

_______________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Raymond John Masek of Warren, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0041023, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1977. On

August 7, 2015, relator, Trumbull County Bar Association, charged Masek with

professional misconduct after he was retained by a client to handle a wrongful-

termination-of-employment case. After filing a lawsuit against the client’s former

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

employer, Masek made a $7,000 settlement demand. A disagreement subsequently

arose between Masek and his client as to whether Masek had authority to settle the

client’s case for only a monetary settlement instead of also demanding that the

client get his job back. After the client rejected the monetary offer, the former

employer made a motion to the court to enforce the settlement that Masek had

tendered. During a hearing on the motion, Masek requested, and was allowed, to

withdraw as the client’s attorney.

{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Professional Conduct considered this cause

on the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. See Gov.Bar R. V(16).

{¶ 3} In the consent-to-discipline agreement, Masek stipulates to most of

the facts alleged in relator’s complaint and agrees that his conduct violated

Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer withdrawing from representation to take

steps reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interest). In addition, the parties

agree to the dismissal of the alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a

lawyer to provide competent representation to a client), 1.6(a) (prohibiting a lawyer

from revealing confidential client information without informed consent), 1.6(c)

(requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or

unauthorized disclosure of information related to the representation of a client), and

1.7(a)(2) (prohibiting representation if a lawyer’s personal interests will materially

limit the lawyer’s ability to carry out appropriate action for the client).

{¶ 4} The parties stipulate that the mitigating factors include the absence of

a prior disciplinary record, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, Masek’s

full and free disclosure to the board and his cooperative attitude toward the

proceedings, the absence of any prejudice or damage to his client, and his

willingness to accept responsibility for his actions. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1),

(2), and (4). The parties agree that there are no aggravating factors. Based on

Masek’s stipulated misconduct and the mitigating factors, the parties stipulate that

the appropriate sanction for Masek’s misconduct is a public reprimand.

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January Term, 2016

{¶ 5} The panel and the board found that the consent-to-discipline

agreement conforms to Gov.Bar R. V(16) and recommend that we adopt the

agreement in its entirety. In support of this recommendation, the parties cited

Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Leneghan, 117 Ohio St.3d 103, 2008-Ohio-506, 881

N.E.2d 1241 (public reprimand was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who

failed to either pursue a client’s criminal appeal or properly withdraw from the

case), Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Ballou, 109 Ohio St.3d 152, 2006-Ohio-2037,

846 N.E.2d 519 (public reprimand was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who

failed to appear on his client’s behalf at an eviction proceeding without having

provided prior written confirmation of his decision to withdraw), and Lake Cty. Bar

Assn. v. Kubyn, 121 Ohio St.3d 321, 2009-Ohio-1154, 903 N.E.2d 1215 (public

reprimand was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who, upon his discharge

from employment, failed to take reasonably practicable steps to protect his client’s

interests and failed to promptly return any unearned portion of his fee). In addition,

the panel relied on Columbus Bar Assn. v. Smith, 143 Ohio St.3d 436, 2015-Ohio-

2000, 39 N.E.3d 488 (public reprimand was the appropriate sanction for an attorney

who failed to keep two brothers informed about the status of their respective habeas

corpus cases and failed to take reasonable steps to protect their interests upon her

withdrawal from representation).

{¶ 6} We agree that Masek violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(d) and, as stated in

the parties’ agreement and as indicated by the cited precedents, that this conduct

warrants a public reprimand. Therefore, we adopt the parties’ consent-to-discipline

agreement, including the agreed dismissal of certain alleged violations.

{¶ 7} Accordingly, Raymond John Masek is hereby publicly reprimanded

for his misconduct.

{¶ 8} Costs are taxed to Masek.

Judgment accordingly.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and

FRENCH, JJ., concur.

O’NEILL, J., dissents and would dismiss the cause.

_________________

Randil J. Rudloff, for relator.

Gallagher Sharp, Alan M. Petrov, and Matthew T. Norman, for respondent.

_________________

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