Opinion

Acacia E. Davis, individually v. Deborah Hengen, as Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of Clifford Davis, Acacia E. Davis, as Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of Clifford Davis, and The Estate of Clifford Davis

  • 191 So. 3d 957
  • 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 7191
  • 2016 WL 2745217
Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed
May 11, 2016
Status
Published
Author
May
On the bench
Ciklin, Taylor
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 43.5%

The opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ACACIA E. DAVIS, Individually

Appellant,

v.

DEBORAH HENGEN, as Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of

CLIFFORD DAVIS, ACACIA E. DAVIS, as Co-Personal Representative of

the Estate of CLIFFORD DAVIS, and THE ESTATE OF CLIFFORD

DAVIS, deceased,

Appellees.

No. 4D15-966

[May 11, 2016]

CORRECTED OPINION

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm

Beach County; Meenu Sasser, Judge; Howard H. Harrison and Roger B.

Colton, Senior Judges; L.T. Case No. 2014CA010928XXXXMB.

Douglas H. Reynolds and Jeffrey M. Fauer of Tripp Scott, P.A., Fort

Lauderdale, for appellant.

Julie H. Littky-Rubin and Christa L. McCann of Clark, Fountain, La

Vista, Prather, Keen & Littky-Rubin, LLP, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

MAY, J.

Does a child, who has reached the age of majority, have standing to

bring a claim for unpaid child support owed pursuant to a marital support

agreement if the parent has filed a claim? The answer: no. We therefore

affirm.

The parents entered into a marital and property settlement agreement,

which was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution. Pursuant

to the agreement, the father was obligated to pay the mother monthly child

support for their daughter. The father died intestate, survived by his

daughter, the mother, and his current wife. At the time of his death, the

father owed child support arrearages.

The daughter and current wife were appointed co-personal

representatives of the father’s estate. The mother filed a statement of claim

against the estate for the child support arrearages. The mother later filed

an amended statement of claim and an independent complaint against the

co-personal representatives and estate for the arrearages.

The daughter also filed a statement of claim against the estate for the

child support arrearages. The current wife, as co-personal representative,

objected to the daughter’s claim. The daughter also filed an independent

complaint against the co-personal representatives and the estate for the

child support arrearages.

The current wife moved to dismiss the daughter’s complaint, arguing

she lacked standing to pursue the child support arrearages because the

rights vested solely in her mother. The daughter then moved to consolidate

her action with the mother’s action. The daughter also petitioned the

probate court for appointment of an administrator ad litem because she

was unable to represent the estate as a co-personal representative due to

her statement of claim against it.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for three reasons: (1) a

conflict in counsel representing the mother and daughter for the same

arrearages; (2) a conflict in the daughter as co-personal representative and

claimant; and (3) the mother having the vested right to the child support,

citing Kranz v. Kranz, 661 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The trial court

denied the daughter’s motion to consolidate, and her motion for rehearing.

The daughter now appeals.

The daughter argues the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for

lack of standing and conflicts of interest. The current wife responds that

only the mother has the vested right to collect the child support

arrearages. The daughter replies that her mother’s vested right does not

prevent her from pursuing the same claim.

We have de novo review. Agee v. Brown, 73 So. 3d 882, 885 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2011).

“Parents have a legal duty to support their children.” Dep’t of Revenue

v. Jackson, 846 So. 2d 486, 492 (Fla. 2003); see § 61.09, Fla. Stat. (2015).

“An obligation to pay accrued support is not extinguished even when the

child reaches majority, notwithstanding that the parent’s obligation to

support normally ends when a child reaches eighteen.” Kranz, 661 So. 2d

at 878 (citation omitted).

2

We have held that a child has standing to enforce rights that ripen after

the child reaches the age of majority. Brown v. Brown, 484 So. 2d 1282

(Fla. 4th DCA 1986). But we have never held, nor has any other court

held, that the rights that accrue during the age of minority can be enforced

by anyone other than the child’s legal representative.1

We affirm. We do not reach the conflict of interest issues raised as they

are unnecessary to our holding.

Affirmed.

CIKLIN, C.J., and TAYLOR J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 We are aware the Third District Court of Appeal has stated in dicta that a child

can pursue child support arrearages as a third party beneficiary. See Newman

v. Newman, 459 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Nevertheless, the court

actually held the custodial parent of an emancipated child retained the right to

enforce child support arrearages that accrued before the child’s emancipation.

Id. Our opinion should not be read to prevent an emancipated child from

pursuing child support arrearages if the parent is unable or unwilling to pursue

them.

3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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