Opinion

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation

  • 822 F.3d 1327
  • 118 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1684
  • 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8699
  • 2016 WL 2756255
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
May 12, 2016
Status
Published
Author
Hughes
On the bench
Hughes, Moore, Taranto
Cited by
650 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.2%

finding that the asserted claims satisfied Step One where the proposed “self-referential table” was “a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory,” so the claims were “directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts,” and therefore were “not directed to an abstract idea”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that the asserted claims satisfied Step One where the proposed “self-referential table” was “a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory,” so the claims were “directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts,” and therefore were “not directed to an abstract idea”
  • recognizing that in some cases “involving computer-related claims, there may be close calls about how to characterize what the claims are directed to”; in such cases, “an analysis of whether there are arguably concrete improvements in the recited computer technology [may] take place under step two”
  • finding that software patent claims are not directed to abstract idea because they are not merely “added post-hoc to a fundamental economic practice,” but rather “are directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts”
  • finding that the claims at issue were not directed to an abstract idea because "the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

ENFISH, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, FISERV, INC.,

INTUIT, INC., SAGE SOFTWARE, INC., JACK

HENRY & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________

2015-1244

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of California in No. 2:12-cv-07360-MRP-

MRW, Senior Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer.

______________________

Decided: May 12, 2016

______________________

ORION ARMON, Cooley LLP, Broomfield, CO, argued

for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JAMES P.

BROGAN, JANNA FISCHER.

CHAD S. CAMPBELL, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, AZ,

argued for all defendants-appellees. Defendants-appellees

Microsoft Corporation, Fiserv, Inc., Intuit, Inc., Jack

Henry & Associates, Inc., also represented by DAN L.

BAGATELL, THEODORE H. WIMSATT; ELIZABETH M.

BANZHOFF, AMANDA D.W. TESSAR, Denver, CO.

2 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

WILLIAM J. BROWN, JR., Brown, Wegner & Berliner

LLP, Irvine, CA, for defendant-appellee Sage Software,

Inc. Also represented by MATTHEW K. WEGNER, YUANJUN

LILY LI.

______________________

Before MOORE, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge.

Enfish sued Microsoft for infringement of several pa-

tents related to a “self-referential” database. On sum-

mary judgment, the district court found all claims invalid

as ineligible under § 101, some claims invalid as antici-

pated under § 102, and one claim not infringed. Enfish

appeals. We find that the claims are not directed to an

abstract idea, so we reverse the summary judgment based

on § 101. We find that the “pivot table” feature of the

prior art Excel product does not contain the “self-

referential” feature of the claims, so we vacate the sum-

mary judgment based on § 102. Lastly, we find no error

in the district court’s determination on non-infringement,

so we affirm the summary judgment of non-infringement.

We remand the case for further proceedings.

I

Microsoft develops and sells a variety of software

products, including the product ADO.NET. At least

through the late 1990s and early 2000s, Enfish developed

and sold software products, including a new type of data-

base program.

Enfish received U.S. Patent 6,151,604 and U.S. Pa-

tent 6,163,775 in late 2000. Both claim priority to the

same application filed in March 1995.

The ’604 and ’775 patents are directed to an innova-

tive logical model for a computer database. A logical

model is a model of data for a computer database explain-

ing how the various elements of information are related to

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 3

one another. A logical model generally results in the

creation of particular tables of data, but it does not de-

scribe how the bits and bytes of those tables are arranged

in physical memory devices. Contrary to conventional

logical models, the patented logical model includes all

data entities in a single table, with column definitions

provided by rows in that same table. The patents de-

scribe this as the “self-referential” property of the data-

base. ’604 patent, col. 2 ll. 44–52.

This self-referential property can be best understood

in contrast with the more standard “relational” model.

With the relational model, each entity (i.e., each type of

thing) that is modeled is provided in a separate table. For

instance, a relational model for a corporate file repository

might include the following tables:

document table,

person table,

company table.

The document table might contain information about

documents stored on the file repository, the person table

might contain information about authors of the docu-

ments, and the company table might contain information

about the companies that employ the persons.

4 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

Each table in the relational model contains columns

defining that table. In the corporate file repository exam-

ple, the relational model might have the following tables: 1

Using this relational model, if a database were to store

information about a document called proj.doc, a person

called Scott Wlaschin, and a company called DEXIS, then

the result might be:

1 The figures that follow in this Background section

are adaptations of the example tables illustrated in the

patents on appeal. See, e.g., ’604 patent, Figures 3, 5, 9.

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 5

To indicate that Scott Wlaschin is the author of proj.doc

and that he is employed by DEXIS, the relational model

uses relationships as follows:

Here, the top-most relationship explains that the value

for “Author” in the Document table refers to the “ID”

column of the Person table. Because the row for proj.doc

has AUTHOR = 1, the row in the Person table that has

ID = 1 is the author of proj.doc. By this technique, the

relational model captures information about each type of

entity in a separate table, with relationships between

those tables informing the relationships between rows in

different tables.

6 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

In contrast to the relational model, the patented self-

referential model has two features that are not found in

the relational model: first the self-referential model can

store all entity types in a single table, and second the self-

referential model can define the table’s columns by rows

in that same table. For example, a self-referential model

corresponding to the example relational model discussed

above might look like the following: 2

This self-referential table stores the same information

that is stored by the example relational model shown

above. However, all of the information about documents,

persons, and companies are stored in a single table.

Further, an additional row is included in the self-

referential table: the row beginning with ID = #4. This

row has values of TYPE = “field” and LABEL = “Employed

By.” Such a row with TYPE = “field” is a special row,

because it defines characteristics of a column in that same

table. In this case, the row with ID = #4 corresponds to

the penultimate column, which is denoted by also mark-

ing that column with the ID of #4. The row with ID = #4

defines a single characteristic of the corresponding col-

umn, viz., its label. Because the row with ID = #4 has

LABEL = “Employed By,” we know that the corresponding

column is labeled “Employed By,” as seen in the penulti-

mate column. In other situations, the row might define

other characteristics of the column, such as the type of

2 The following diagram is a simplified version of

Figure 3 of the ’604 patent.

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 7

data that the column can hold, e.g., text, integer numbers,

or decimal numbers. Because the patent describes a

model where the table’s columns are defined by rows in

that same table, it is “self-referential.” See ’604 patent,

col. 2, ll. 59–65.

The patents teach that multiple benefits flow from

this design. First, the patents disclose an indexing tech-

nique that allows for faster searching of data than would

be possible with the relational model. See, e.g., ’604

patent, col. 1 ll. 55–59; id. at col. 2 l. 66–col. 3 l. 6. Sec-

ond, the patents teach that the self-referential model

allows for more effective storage of data other than struc-

tured text, such as images and unstructured text. See,

e.g., ’604 patent, col. 2 ll. 16–22; col. 2 ll. 46–52.

Finally, the patents teach that the self-referential

model allows more flexibility in configuring the database.

See, e.g., ’604 patent, col. 2 ll. 27–29. In particular,

whereas deployment of a relational database often in-

volves extensive modeling and configuration of the vari-

ous tables and relationships in advance of launching the

database, Enfish argues that the self-referential database

can be launched without such tasks and instead config-

ured on-the-fly. See Oral Argument at 1:00–2:15

http://oralarguments.cafc.ucsourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

15-1244.mp3; see also ’604 patent, col. 7 ll. 10–22. For

instance, the database could be launched with no or only

minimal column definitions. Then, as a new attribute of

information is encountered, such as an email address, an

“Email” column could be added simply by inserting a new

row of TYPE = “field” and LABEL = “email.” The addition

of this new row can then instigate the database to create

a new, corresponding column. The addition of a new row-

defining-a-column to the previous example might result in

the following:

8 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

In 2012, Enfish filed suit against Microsoft in district

court in California, alleging that Microsoft’s ADO.NET

product infringes the ’604 and ’775 patents. ADO.NET

provides an interface by which software applications can

store, retrieve, and otherwise manipulate data stored in a

database. Enfish alleges that ADO.NET creates and

manipulates self-referential tables as part of its opera-

tion.

Five claims are at issue in this appeal: claims 17, 31,

and 32 of the ’604 patent; and claims 31 and 32 of the ’775

patent. The district court entered summary judgment on

these claims as follows: all claims invalid under 35 U.S.C.

§ 101 as directed to an abstract idea; claims 31 and 32 of

both patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as antici-

pated by the prior public sale and use of Microsoft’s Excel

5.0 product; and claim 17 not infringed by ADO.NET.

Enfish appeals each of these summary judgments.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment un-

der the standard of review of the regional circuit. See

Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306,

1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit reviews a grant

of summary judgment de novo. See Oswalt v. Resolute

Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2011). Summary

judgment is only appropriate if “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In

reviewing summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-

movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are

to be drawn in [the non-movant’s] favor.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

On appeal, Enfish challenges the district court’s grant

of summary judgment on § 101 invalidity, § 102 invalidi-

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 9

ty, and non-infringement. We address each argument in

turn.

III

We turn first to the district court’s determination that

the claims at issue do not claim patent-eligible subject

matter, which we review de novo. See OIP Techs., Inc. v.

Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained

for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,

or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-

ment thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. This court, as well as the

Supreme Court, has long grappled with the exception that

“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas

are not patentable.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.

Myriad Genetics, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116

(2013) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus

Labs., Inc., --- U.S. ----, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).

Supreme Court precedent instructs us to “first determine

whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-

ineligible concept.” Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,

--- U.S. ----, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). If this threshold

determination is met, we move to the second step of the

inquiry and “consider the elements of each claim both

individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine

whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of

the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting

Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298, 1297).

The Supreme Court has not established a definitive

rule to determine what constitutes an “abstract idea”

sufficient to satisfy the first step of the Mayo/Alice in-

quiry. See id. at 2357. Rather, both this court and the

Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare claims

at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an

abstract idea in previous cases. “[The Court] need not

labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’

category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there

10 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk

hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated set-

tlement at issue here.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; see also

OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362. For instance, fundamental

economic and conventional business practices are often

found to be abstract ideas, even if performed on a comput-

er. See, e.g., OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–63.

In setting up the two-stage Mayo/Alice inquiry, the

Supreme Court has declared: “We must first determine

whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-

ineligible concept.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. That formu-

lation plainly contemplates that the first step of the

inquiry is a meaningful one, i.e., that a substantial class

of claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept.

The “directed to” inquiry, therefore, cannot simply ask

whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept,

because essentially every routinely patent-eligible claim

involving physical products and actions involves a law of

nature and/or natural phenomenon—after all, they take

place in the physical world. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293

(“For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect,

rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or

abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies

a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the

specification, based on whether “their character as a

whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Internet

Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346

(Fed. Cir. 2015); see Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C.,

2016 WL 1393573, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (inquiring into

“the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art”).

The Supreme Court has suggested that claims “pur-

port[ing] to improve the functioning of the computer

itself,” or “improv[ing] an existing technological process”

might not succumb to the abstract idea exception. See

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–59. While it is true that the

Court discussed improvements to computer-related tech-

nology in the second step of its analysis in Alice, see id. at

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 11

2355–60, that was because the Court did not need to

discuss the first step of its analysis at any considerable

length, see id. at 2356 (“Petitioner acknowledges that its

claims describe intermediate settlement . . . .”), id. at

2357.

We do not read Alice to broadly hold that all im-

provements in computer-related technology are inherently

abstract and, therefore, must be considered at step two.

Indeed, some improvements in computer-related technol-

ogy when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not

abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, and

the like. Nor do we think that claims directed to software,

as opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract and

therefore only properly analyzed at the second step of the

Alice analysis. Software can make non-abstract im-

provements to computer technology just as hardware

improvements can, and sometimes the improvements can

be accomplished through either route. We thus see no

reason to conclude that all claims directed to improve-

ments in computer-related technology, including those

directed to software, are abstract and necessarily ana-

lyzed at the second step of Alice, nor do we believe that

Alice so directs. Therefore, we find it relevant to ask

whether the claims are directed to an improvement to

computer functionality versus being directed to an ab-

stract idea, even at the first step of the Alice analysis.

For that reason, the first step in the Alice inquiry in

this case asks whether the focus of the claims is on the

specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities

(i.e., the self-referential table for a computer database) or,

instead, on a process that qualifies as an “abstract idea”

for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. As

noted infra, in Bilski and Alice and virtually all of the

computer-related § 101 cases we have issued in light of

those Supreme Court decisions, it was clear that the

claims were of the latter type—requiring that the analysis

proceed to the second step of the Alice inquiry, which asks

12 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

if nevertheless there is some inventive concept in the

application of the abstract idea. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at

2355, 2357–59. In this case, however, the plain focus of

the claims is on an improvement to computer functionali-

ty itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a com-

puter is used in its ordinary capacity.

Accordingly, we find that the claims at issue in this

appeal are not directed to an abstract idea within the

meaning of Alice. Rather, they are directed to a specific

improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in

the self-referential table. See supra at 6. Specifically,

claim 17 of the ’604 patent recites:

A data storage and retrieval system for a comput-

er memory, comprising:

means for configuring said memory according

to a logical table, said logical table including:

a plurality of logical rows, each said logi-

cal row including an object identification

number (OID) to identify each said logical

row, each said logical row corresponding to a

record of information;

a plurality of logical columns intersecting

said plurality of logical rows to define a plu-

rality of logical cells, each said logical column

including an OID to identify each said logical

column; and

means for indexing data stored in said table.

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 13

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (2006), the district

court construed the “means for configuring” language as

requiring a four-step algorithm: 3

1. Create, in a computer memory, a logical table

that need not be stored contiguously in the com-

puter memory, the logical table being comprised of

rows and columns, the rows corresponding to rec-

ords, the columns corresponding to fields or at-

tributes, the logical table being capable of storing

different kinds of records.

2. Assign each row and column an object identifi-

cation number (OID) that, when stored as data,

can act as a pointer to the associated row or col-

umn and that can be of variable length between

databases.

3. For each column, store information about that

column in one or more rows, rendering the table

self-referential, the appending, to the logical table,

of new columns that are available for immediate

3 “Construction of a means-plus-function limitation

includes two steps. ‘First, the court must determine the

claimed function. Second, the court must identify the

corresponding structure in the written description of the

patent that performs the function.’” Noah Sys., Inc. v.

Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting

Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d

1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). And “the corresponding

structure for a function performed by a software algo-

rithm is the algorithm itself.” EON Corp. IP Holdings

LLC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 621 (Fed. Cir.

2015). The parties do not dispute this construction on

appeal.

14 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

use being possible through the creation of new

column definition records.

4. In one or more cells defined by the intersection

of the rows and columns, store and access data,

which can include structured data, unstructured

data, or a pointer to another row.

J.A. 325.

The district court concluded that the claims were di-

rected to the abstract idea of “storing, organizing, and

retrieving memory in a logical table” or, more simply, “the

concept of organizing information using tabular formats.”

J.A. 321 (emphasis omitted). Likewise, Microsoft urges

the court to view the claims as being directed to “the

concepts of organizing data into a logical table with

identified columns and rows where one or more rows are

used to store an index or information defining columns.”

Appellee’s Br. 17. However, describing the claims at such

a high level of abstraction and untethered from the lan-

guage of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to

§ 101 swallow the rule. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354

(noting that “we tread carefully in construing this exclu-

sionary principle [of laws of nature, natural phenomena,

and abstract ideas] lest it swallow all of patent law”); cf.

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981) (caution-

ing that overgeneralizing claims, “if carried to its ex-

treme, make[s] all inventions unpatentable because all

inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of

nature which, once known, make their implementation

obvious”).

Here, the claims are not simply directed to any form

of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically di-

rected to a self-referential table for a computer database.

For claim 17, this is reflected in step three of the “means

for configuring” algorithm described above. For both

pairs of claims 31 and 32, this is reflected in other claim

language, discussed infra at 20. The necessity of describ-

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 15

ing the claims in such a way is underscored by the specifi-

cation’s emphasis that “the present invention comprises a

flexible, self-referential table that stores data.” ’604

patent at Abstract; see also id. at col. 2 ll. 44–46 (“The

present invention improves upon prior art information

search and retrieval systems by employing a flexible, self-

referential table to store data.”).

The specification also teaches that the self-referential

table functions differently than conventional database

structures. According to the specification, traditional

databases, such as “those that follow the relational model

and those that follow the object oriented model,” ’604

patent, col. 1 ll. 37–40, are inferior to the claimed inven-

tion. While “[t]he structural requirements of current

databases require a programmer to predefine a structure

and subsequent [data] entry must conform to that struc-

ture,” id. at col. 2 ll. 10–13, the “database of the present

invention does not require a programmer to preconfigure

a structure to which a user must adapt data entry.” Id. at

col 2 ll. 27–29. Moreover, our conclusion that the claims

are directed to an improvement of an existing technology

is bolstered by the specification’s teachings that the

claimed invention achieves other benefits over conven-

tional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster

search times, and smaller memory requirements. See id.

at col 2 ll. 23–27; see also Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Apple

Inc., 808 F.3d 509, 513–14 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that a

specification’s disparagement of the prior art is relevant

to determine the scope of the invention).

In finding that the claims were directed simply to “the

concept of organizing information using tabular formats,”

J.A. 321 (emphasis omitted), the district court oversimpli-

fied the self-referential component of the claims and

downplayed the invention’s benefits. The court deter-

mined that the patents’ self-referential concept could be

satisfied by creating a table with a simple header row.

But that is simply not the case. For example, step three

16 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

of the algorithm described above explains that the table

stores information related to each column in rows of that

very same table, such that new columns can be added by

creating new rows in the table. See J.A. 325 (describing

four-step algorithm); see also ’604 patent, col. 2 ll. 53–65

(describing “the present invention”, including a descrip-

tion where “columns are entered as rows in the table and

the record corresponding to a column contains various

information about the column,” thereby “render[ing] the

table self-referential”). It is beyond debate that this is

more than simply a header row.

Moreover, we are not persuaded that the invention’s

ability to run on a general-purpose computer dooms the

claims. Unlike the claims at issue in Alice or, more re-

cently in Versata Development Group v. SAP America,

Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015), which Microsoft

alleges to be especially similar to the present case, Appel-

lee’s Br. 18, see also Oral Argument at 15:40–18:15, the

claims here are directed to an improvement in the func-

tioning of a computer. In contrast, the claims at issue in

Alice and Versata can readily be understood as simply

adding conventional computer components to well-known

business practices. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–60;

Versata Dev. Grp., 793 F.3d at 1333–34 (computer per-

formed “purely conventional” steps to carry out claims

directed to the “abstract idea of determining a price using

organization and product group hierarchies”); see also

Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc.,

811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims attaching

generic computer components to perform “anonymous

loan shopping” not patent eligible); Intellectual Ventures I

LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367–69

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (claims adding generic computer compo-

nents to financial budgeting); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at

1362–64 (claims implementing offer-based price optimiza-

tion using conventional computer activities); Ultramer-

cial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714–17 (Fed. Cir.

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 17

2014) (claims applying an exchange of advertising for

copyrighted content to the Internet); buySAFE, Inc. v.

Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

(claims adding generic computer functionality to the

formation of guaranteed contractual relationships). And

unlike the claims here that are directed to a specific

improvement to computer functionality, the patent-

ineligible claims at issue in other cases recited use of an

abstract mathematical formula on any general purpose

computer, see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93

(1972), see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357–58, or recited a

purely conventional computer implementation of a math-

ematical formula, see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594

(1978); see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358, or recited gener-

alized steps to be performed on a computer using conven-

tional computer activity, see Internet Patents, 790 F.3d

1348–49 (claims directed to abstract idea of maintaining

computer state without recitation of specific activity used

to generate that result), Digitech Image Techs., LLC v.

Electrs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir.

2014) (claims directed to abstract idea of “organizing

information through mathematical correlations” with

recitation of only generic gathering and processing activi-

ties).

Similarly, that the improvement is not defined by ref-

erence to “physical” components does not doom the claims.

To hold otherwise risks resurrecting a bright-line ma-

chine-or-transformation test, cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 561

U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (“The machine-or-transformation test

is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a

patent-eligible ‘process.’”), or creating a categorical ban on

software patents, cf. id. at 603 (“This Court has not indi-

cated that the existence of these well-established excep-

tions gives the Judiciary carte blanche to impose other

limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the

statute’s purpose and design.”). Much of the advancement

made in computer technology consists of improvements to

18 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

software that, by their very nature, may not be defined by

particular physical features but rather by logical struc-

tures and processes. We do not see in Bilski or Alice, or

our cases, an exclusion to patenting this large field of

technological progress.

In sum, the self-referential table recited in the claims

on appeal is a specific type of data structure designed to

improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in

memory. The specification’s disparagement of conven-

tional data structures, combined with language describing

the “present invention” as including the features that

make up a self-referential table, confirm that our charac-

terization of the “invention” for purposes of the § 101

analysis has not been deceived by the “draftsman’s art.”

Cf. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360. In other words, we are not

faced with a situation where general-purpose computer

components are added post-hoc to a fundamental econom-

ic practice or mathematical equation. Rather, the claims

are directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a

problem in the software arts. Accordingly, we find the

claims at issue are not directed to an abstract idea.

Because the claims are not directed to an abstract

idea under step one of the Alice analysis, we do not need

to proceed to step two of that analysis. See id. at 2355.

We recognize that, in other cases involving computer-

related claims, there may be close calls about how to

characterize what the claims are directed to. In such

cases, an analysis of whether there are arguably concrete

improvements in the recited computer technology could

take place under step two. Here, though, we think it is

clear for the reasons stated that the claims are not di-

rected to an abstract idea, and so we stop at step one. We

conclude that the claims are patent-eligible.

IV

Alternatively, Microsoft encourages us to affirm the

invalidity of claim 17 on the ground of indefiniteness.

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 19

According to Microsoft, the previously-recited four-step

algorithm is not a sufficient structure for the claimed

function of “configuring said memory according to a

logical table.”

For a claim element recited in means-plus-function

format, “the specification must contain sufficient descrip-

tive text by which a person of skill in the field of the

invention would ‘know and understand what structure

corresponds to the means limitation.’” Typhoon Touch

Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir.

2011) (quoting Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523

F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). “[W]hile it is true that

the patentee need not disclose details of structures well

known in the art, the specification must nonetheless

disclose some structure.” Biomedino LLC v. Waters Techs.

Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Default

Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412

F.3d 1291, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

The district court found that the four-step algorithm

sufficiently identified a structure for a person of skill in

the art to implement the function of “configuring said

memory according to a logical table.” We agree. Step one

of the four-step algorithm relies on well-known techniques

in the database arts for setting up a table in computer

memory. Microsoft does not allege that an ordinary

artisan would not understand the algorithm. Steps two

through four then provide particular details for modifying

some such well-known configuration in accordance with

the disclosed invention. The fact that this algorithm

relies, in part, on techniques known to a person of skill in

the art does not render the composite algorithm insuffi-

cient under § 112 ¶ 6. Indeed, this is entirely consistent

with the fact that the sufficiency of the structure is

viewed through the lens of a person of skill in the art and

without need to “disclose structures well known in the

art,” Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 952.

20 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

Therefore, we do not find claim 17 invalid on this al-

ternative ground.

V

Because we find the claims patent-eligible under

§ 101, we now turn to the issue of validity under § 102.

The district court found claims 31 and 32 of both patents

anticipated under § 102. Claim 31 of the ’604 patent is

exemplary:

A method for storing and retrieving data in a

computer memory, comprising the steps of:

configuring said memory according to a logical

table, said logical table including:

a plurality of logical rows, each said logi-

cal row including an object identification

number (OID) to identify each said logical

row, each said logical row corresponding to a

record of information;

a plurality of logical columns intersecting

said plurality of logical rows to define a plu-

rality of logical cells, each said logical column

including an OID to identify each said logical

column; and

wherein at least one of said logical rows

has an OID equal to the OID to a correspond-

ing one of said logical columns, and at least

one of said logical rows includes logical col-

umn information defining each of said logical

columns.

As seen, claim 31 recites a method involving configuring a

memory “according to a logical table,” with that logical

table specified in some detail. Notably, the logical table

must have a row and a column that have the same ID

value. This language of the “wherein” clause embodies

the self-referential property explained supra at 6.

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 21

The district court found the claims anticipated under

§ 102(b) by the Microsoft Excel 5.0 software program.

Excel 5.0 is a version of the well-known spreadsheet

program that was in public use at latest by early-1994.

The district court focused on the “pivot table” feature of

Excel 5.0 as anticipating the claims. A pivot table is a

type of data-summarization table that a user can prompt

the Excel program to generate, based on a preexisting

table of raw data. For instance, a user may begin with a

table of raw sales data as follows (only a subset of the

entire table is shown below):

J.A. 7722. The example table has rows for sales by a

particular salesperson of a particular product in a particu-

lar region, among other attributes. The user can prompt

Excel to create a pivot table, such as the following:

J.A. 7722. This pivot table has row labels corresponding

to salespersons and column labels corresponding to types

of product. The cells of the pivot table sum the “Sales”

column of the raw data table based on its intersection of a

particular salesperson and a particular type of product.

22 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

For instance, salesperson Buchanan has sold $67,566

worth of dairy products.

The district court found this pivot table feature of Ex-

cel 5.0 to anticipate claim 31, including the self-

referential property embodied in the language of “wherein

at least one of said logical rows has an OID equal to the

OID to a corresponding one of said logical columns.” The

district court noted that a cell in the row of the raw data

table, (e.g., “Dairy”) was also the label of a column in the

pivot table, (again, “Dairy”). J.A. 283–84. Microsoft’s

expert exemplified this position by showing that the

addition of the “Housewares” row to the raw data table,

like so:

J.A. 7723, would result in the addition of a “Housewares”

column to the pivot table, like so:

J.A. 7724. On its face, this would seem to have the effect

of adding a column based on a newly added row, which is

in some ways a characteristic behavior of the self-

referential table disclosed in the patents.

But finding this feature to anticipate the claims re-

quires an inappropriately broad reading of the claims.

Claim 31 is directed to configuring memory “according to

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 23

a logical table.” While we have held that the use of a

singular indefinite article with a claim feature may sup-

port an interpretation of “one or more” of those claim

features, see, e.g., Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l,

Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the context of

claim 31 shows that this is not such a case. The remain-

der of claim 31 describes rows and columns without

providing any suggestion that a second table has been

introduced. The specification makes clear that the inven-

tion is directed to the arrangement of a single, logical

table, particularly, a row defining a column in that same

table. See, e.g., ’604 patent, col. 2, ll. 31–41; id. at col. 2,

ll. 44–52; id. at col. 7 ll. 10–22; id. at Figure 3; see also

Oral Argument at 1:45–2:15; id. at 27:00–29:30. There-

fore, the “at least one of said logical rows” and the “corre-

sponding one of said logical columns” must both be in the

same logical table. 4

But the district court read the features of claim 31 on

a row from the raw data table and a column from the

pivot table. This fails to show the feature of claim 31

having identical IDs for a row and a column in the same

table. Fundamentally, having a row in one table refer-

ence a column in another table is not a “self-referential”

table at all, but something more like “referential tables”

or “tables that refer to one another.”

The fact that the raw data table and the pivot table

are present on the same spreadsheet is of no consequence.

The district court appears to have grounded its reasoning

4 To be clear, we do not hold that the claims are di-

rected exclusively to a database with a single, self-

referential table. Rather, the claims recite a single, self-

referential table, regardless of any other tables that may

be present in the same database.

24 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

on the fact that the two tables show up together on a

single spreadsheet:

J.A. 7724. But the spreadsheet is no more than the

medium on which the two separate tables are presented.

Two separate tables drawn on one sheet of paper are still

two separate tables.

Therefore, Excel 5.0 fails to include the claimed single

table having a row defining a column in that same table.

Identification of one element, the row, in one table and

another element, the column, in another table is insuffi-

cient for anticipation. Anticipation requires “that the

reference describe not only the elements of the claimed

invention, but also that it describe those elements ‘ar-

ranged as in the claim[.]’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign,

Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Finisar

Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir.

2008)).

For this reason, the district court erred in granting

summary judgment of anticipation. Given our claim

construction and the disclosure in Excel 5.0, the pivot

table feature of Excel 5.0 does not anticipate claim 31 of

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 25

the ’604 patent. Claim 32 of the ’604 patent and claims 31

and 32 of the ’775 patent require the same “self-

referencing” feature by way of the matching-ID language.

Therefore, we find that the pivot table feature of Excel 5.0

also does not anticipate those claims.

***

Enfish encourages us to consider whether Microsoft is

estopped from asserting an Excel 5.0 invalidity defense

due to an inter partes review instituted at the U.S. Patent

and Trademark Office at Microsoft’s request. Because we

find that Excel 5.0 does not anticipate the claims, we see

no reason to address this issue. If on remand the district

court permits a new invalidity contention based on a

different feature of Excel 5.0 or some other related prior

art, then we leave the estoppel issue to the district court

to consider in the first instance.

VI

We now turn to the issue of infringement. The dis-

trict court found that Microsoft’s accused product,

ADO.NET, does not infringe claim 17 of the ’604 patent.

The district court reached this conclusion by finding that

ADO.NET does not perform the “means for indexing”

recited in that claim. Claim 17, in abbreviated form,

recites as follows:

A data storage and retrieval system for a comput-

er memory, comprising:

means for configuring said memory according

to a logical table . . . and

means for indexing data stored in said table.

Enfish raises two arguments against the district

court’s summary judgment of non-infringement: first

against the claim construction for “means for indexing,”

and second for the application of that claim construction

to the ADO.NET product.

26 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

A

The district court interpreted the “means for index-

ing” under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (2006). Such a claim

element “shall be construed to cover the corresponding

structure, material, or acts described in the specification

and equivalents thereof.” § 112 ¶ 6. And, as noted above,

“the corresponding structure for a function performed by a

software algorithm is the algorithm itself.” EON, 785 F.3d

at 621. The district court identified the function of the

“means for indexing” as “indexing data stored in the

logical table.” J.A. 270. The district court accepted

Enfish’s proposal of the following algorithm as the corre-

sponding structure:

1. Extract key phrases or words from the applicable

cells in the logical table.

2. Store the extracted key phrases or words in an in-

dex, which is itself stored in the logical table.

3. Include, in text cells of the logical table, pointers to

the corresponding entries in the index, and in-

clude, in the index, pointers to the text cells.

J.A. 270, 338, 2543–49.

On appeal, Enfish now contests the district court’s re-

liance on this three-step algorithm as the corresponding

structure for the “means for indexing.” Enfish argues

that it never meant for all three steps to be required, but

instead that some of the steps or parts of the steps may be

optional. Specifically, Enfish argues that the correspond-

ing structure does not necessarily require both “pointers

to the . . . index” and “pointers to the text cells” in step 3,

i.e., “bi-directional” pointers. Appellant’s Br. 61–63.

Enfish asserts that because the specification shows both

an embodiment with uni-directional pointers and an

embodiment with bi-directional pointers, the district court

erred in identifying the three-step algorithm with bi-

directional pointers as the only corresponding structure.

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 27

The district court did not err in its construction. En-

fish’s primary support for its position is the fact that

Figure 11 of the patents shows uni-directional pointers

(i.e., from the index to the text cells), whereas Figure 14

shows bi-directional pointers (i.e., in both directions

between the index and the text cells).

’604 patent, Figure 11 (“TEXT CELLS” and “LIST”

markup our own).

’604 patent, Figure 14 (“TEXT CELLS” and “INDEX”

markup our own). Although Figures 11 and 14 do in fact

illustrate a sort of dichotomy akin to that proffered by

Enfish, the discussion of those figures in the specification

reveals that any such dichotomy is false. The list 250 in

Figure 11 is not an index at all; it is an intermediate

compilation of keyword values used in the process of

forming the index. See generally ’604 patent, col. 12–14.

The specification notes that, even at the stage of forming

list 250, the text cells contain references to the keywords

28 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

contained therein, in the form of “anchors.” Id. at col. 12

ll. 16–34. When the index is ultimately formed, as illus-

trated in Figure 14, the index entries contain references

to the text cells, and the text cells, through the use of the

anchors, contain references to the index. See id. at col. 14

ll. 10–17. That is, the specification presents Figure 14 as

index entries in the self-referential table that result from

a process that began with the keyword extraction step

illustrated in Figure 11. The figures are not alternative

embodiments.

Therefore, we find no error in the district court’s use

of Enfish’s own-identified three-step algorithm as the sole

equivalent structure for the “means for indexing.”

B

Using the three-step algorithm, the district court de-

termined that ADO.NET does not perform either step two

or step three. For step two, the district court determined

that there was no genuine issue of fact that ADO.NET

does not store the text value of a keyword in the index,

but rather just a reference to that value. For step three,

the district court determined that there was no genuine

issue of fact that ADO.NET does not store a pointer from

the text value to the index, but stores a pointer to some

other object. Enfish argues that the district court erred in

its findings as to both step two and step three.

For an accused product to practice a claim element in-

terpreted under § 112 ¶ 6, the accused product must

perform the identical function using an identical or equiv-

alent structure. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp.,

185 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Step two requires

storing the “extracted key phrases or words” in an index.

However, as the district court explained, it is uncontested

that ADO.NET does not store the actual text values in the

index, but rather stores references to the cells containing

those text values. J.A. 340–41; Appellant’s Br. 66. Step

three requires including, in the cells with the text values,

ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 29

pointers to the “corresponding entries in the index.”

Again, it is uncontested that ADO.NET does not store

pointers as such. Instead, it stores pointers to other

objects that, by use of a further chain of pointers, may be

resolved to the index. J.A. 341–43; Appellant’s Br. 69.

Therefore, ADO.NET does not use the identical “corre-

sponding structure,” i.e., the three-step algorithm, dis-

closed in the specification.

As such, ADO.NET can only infringe claim 17 if its

algorithm for performing indexing is an equivalent to the

three-step algorithm identified above. An accused struc-

ture is “equivalent” to a disclosed structure if the differ-

ences between the two are insubstantial. See Odetics, 185

F.3d at 1267. The district court concluded that the failure

to store actual text values in the index (i.e., the difference

at step two) combined with the failure to use pointers

from the text values to the index (i.e., the difference at

step three) render the three-step algorithm and the

ADO.NET indexing algorithm substantially different.

J.A. 343–44. The district court found that at least one

disclosed organization scheme for the index, i.e., alphabet-

ically for fast name searching, may not be possible if the

actual text values are not stored in the index. The district

court found that the bi-directional pointers allow the

performance of associative queries, which the patents

describe as being a key benefit of the invention. On

appeal, Enfish attempts to argue that the differences in

step two and step three do not exist, but fails to explain

how those differences are insubstantial if we agree with

the district court that they do exist, which we do. There-

fore, finding no argument to the contrary, we conclude

that ADO.NET’s indexing algorithm is not an equivalent

of the three-step algorithm of claim 17.

Because ADO.NET does not use the identical or

equivalent structure as disclosed in the patents for the

“means for indexing,” we find that ADO.NET does not

infringe claim 17.

30 ENFISH, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

VII

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the district court’s

grant of summary judgment based on § 101 and conclude

that all five claims on appeal are patent-eligible. We

vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment

based on § 102 and conclude that both pairs of claims 31

and 32 are not anticipated by Excel 5.0 pivot tables.

Lastly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment of non-infringement and conclude that

ADO.NET does not infringe claim 17. We remand the

case to the district court for further proceedings.

REVERSED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART,

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

No costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.