The opinion
FILED
Apr 26 2016, 9:13 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joe Duepner Gregory F. Zoeller
Noblesville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Chris Evans Aaron T. Craft
Noblesville, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Richard Scott Lambert, April 26, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
89A01-1508-MI-1253
v. Appeal from the Wayne Superior
Court
Michael Shipman and Kent The Honorable Darrin M.
Abernathy, Dolehanty, Judge
Appellees. Trial Court Cause No.
89D03-1507-MI-65
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Richard Lambert appeals the denial of his verified petition seeking rescission of
a lifetime suspension of his driving privileges. Lambert presents two issues for
our review, which we restate as:
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1. Does a trial court have authority to deny a petition for
rescission of a lifetime suspension of driving privileges brought
under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-14.1?
2. Did the trial court err in denying Lambert’s petition?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] Lambert was born on June 29, 1968. His driving privileges were initially
suspended around 1987 or 1988 as a result of “a couple speeding tickets” and
other minor traffic violations. Transcript at 4. Despite the suspension of his
driving privileges, Lambert continued to drive and was caught driving on a
suspended license on several occasions. He was ultimately determined to be a
habitual traffic violator (HTV).1 Since the initial suspension of his driving
privileges, Lambert has been issued three additional lifetime suspensions as a
result of having driven on a suspended license after having been determined to
1
Broadly speaking, a driver who accumulates multiple judgments for traffic offenses within a ten-year period
may be deemed an HTV depending on the type and number of judgments. See I.C. § 9-30-10-4. Once the
driver is determined to be an HTV, his or her driving privileges are suspended for anywhere from five years to
life, depending on the nature and quantity of the HTV-qualifying offenses. See I.C. § 9-30-10-5. A person
who knowingly continues to drive while his or her license is suspended under the HTV statute commits a
Level 6 (formerly a Class D) felony. I.C. § 9-30-10-16(a).
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be an HTV.2 The most recent lifetime suspension occurred in July 2011 in
Johnson County.3
[4] On July 6, 2015, Lambert filed a verified petition for rescission of the lifetime
suspension of his driving privileges. The trial court held a hearing on August 3,
2015. Lambert testified that he owns a construction company in Wayne
County and that all of his convictions and lifetime suspensions stemmed from
him driving to or from work. He also informed the court that he has two
children, ages fifteen and eleven, and that he and his wife take care of his
disabled mother-in-law. According to Lambert, he has never been in trouble for
anything except the speeding violations and driving on a suspended license as
an HTV. Lambert asserts that none of his traffic convictions resulted in injury
or death to an individual or involved operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
[5] After the presentation of evidence, the trial court expressed its concerns as
follows:
It bugs me. Now I think it would bug any judge that you’ve got
three (3) lifetime suspensions, you know? The good part for you
is the way that you ended up – the snowball started for you with
piddly stuff, nothing horrible. You know, if there are drunk
driving cases and convictions out there, that’s a pretty easy no
under those circumstances. I don’t consider this an easy no. I
don’t consider it an easy yes, either. But I want to think about it.
2
Prior to July 1, 2015, a person convicted of a felony pursuant to I.C. § 9-30-10-16(a) had his or her
privileges suspended for life. See I.C. § 9-30-10-16(c) (amended by P.L. 188-2015, effective July 1, 2015).
3
Lambert did not introduce his driving record into evidence so all such evidence is taken from his petition
and his testimony during the hearing on his petition.
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It does bug me that you’ve been suspended for life three (3)
times, because that means you’ve had different judges tell you,
“Now [Lambert], no more driving.” And it’s part of your
sentence that you don’t drive, and you did anyway. That bugs
me, but I think it’d bug any judge. But those are the things that I
want to think about.
Transcript at 14-15. The court then took the matter under advisement. Later
that same day, the court issued an order denying Lambert’s petition.
Specifically, the court concluded:
[Lambert]’s driving privileges have been suspended for life, on
three separate occasions. The most recent lifetime suspension
was ordered by the Johnson Superior Court #3, on or about July
6, 2011. Given the fact that [Lambert] has only served four years
of suspension, for his third lifetime suspension, the Court
concludes simply that not enough time has passed since the entry
of that third suspension, and that it is not in the best interest of
society for [Lambert]’s driving privileges to be reinstated at this
time. The Court further concludes that there has not been a
substantial change in [Lambert]’s circumstances such as to make
unreasonable the lifetime forfeiture of his driving privileges.
Appellant’s Appendix at 3. Lambert now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
Effective July 1, 2015, the legislature added I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1 to provide an
avenue for a person whose driving privileges have been suspended for life to
seek rescission of the suspension and reinstatement of driving privileges. The
statute authorizes certain individuals to bring a petition after ten years of the
lifetime suspension have elapsed (see I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1(b)), but other
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individuals who meet certain additional requirements may bring a petition after
three years of the lifetime suspension have elapsed. See I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1(f).
Five days after this statute went into effect, Lambert filed his petition pursuant
to subsection (f). Specifically, the statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(c) A petition for rescission and reinstatement under this section
must meet the following conditions:
(1) Be verified by the petitioner.
(2) State the petitioner’s age, date of birth, and place of
residence.
(3) Describe the circumstances leading up to the lifetime
suspension of the petitioner’s driving privileges.
(4) Aver a substantial change in the petitioner’s
circumstances of the following:
(A) That indicates the petitioner would no longer
pose a risk to the safety of others if the petitioner’s
driving privileges are reinstated.
(B) That makes the lifetime suspension of the
petitioner’s driving privileges unreasonable.
(C) That indicates it is in the best interests of society
for the petitioner’s driving privileges to be
reinstated.
(5) Aver that the requisite amount of time has elapsed
since the date on which the order for the lifetime
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suspension of the person’s driving privileges was issued as
required under subsections (b)[4] and (f).
(6) Aver that the petitioner has never been convicted of a
violation described in section 4(a) of this chapter.
(7) Be filed in a circuit or superior court having jurisdiction
in the county where the petitioner resides. If the petitioner
resides in a state other than Indiana, the petition must be
filed in the county in which the most recent Indiana
moving violation conviction occurred.
(8) If the petition is being filed under subsection (f), aver
the existence of the conditions listed in subsection (f)(1)
through (f)(3).
***
(f) A person whose driving privileges have been suspended for life
may petition a court in a civil action for a rescission of the
suspension order and reinstatement of driving privileges if all of
the following conditions exist:
(1) Three (3) years have elapsed since the date on which
the order for lifetime suspension of the petitioner’s driving
privileges was issued.
(2) The petitioner’s lifetime suspension was the result of a
conviction for operating a motor vehicle while the person’s
4
Subsection (b) authorizes an individual to bring a petition after ten years of the lifetime suspension has
elapsed so long as the individual has not been convicted of any violation that resulted in death or any
conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death or injury.
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driving privileges were suspended because the person is a
habitual violator.
(3) The petitioner has never been convicted of a violation
described in section 4(a) or 4(b) of this chapter other than a
judgment or conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while the person’s driver’s license or driving privileges
were revoked or suspended as a result of a conviction of an
offense under IC 9-1-4-52 (repealed July 1, 1992), IC 9-24-
18-5(b) (repealed July 1, 2000), IC 9-24-19-2, or IC 9-24-
19-3.
[6] On appeal, Lambert argues that I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1 confers no judicial
discretion, and thus, because he made a prima facie case as to the conditions
listed in subsections (c) and (f), he was entitled to relief. Lambert also argues
that the trial court misinterpreted the requirements of I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1 in
concluding that “not enough time has passed since the entry of that third
suspension.” Id. Finally, Lambert argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that there was no substantial change in circumstances.
[7] We first consider Lambert’s argument that the trial court was without authority
to deny his petition. Lambert asserts that I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1 affords no
discretion to the trial court in determining whether to rescind the lifetime
suspension of his driving privileges. Thus, Lambert asserts that after he
presented a prima facie case, the trial court was required to grant his petition.
We disagree with Lambert’s interpretation of the statute.
[8] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.
Richardson v. Town of Worthington, 44 N.E.3d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The
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primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s intent.
Crowel v. Marshall County Drainage Bd., 971 N.E.2d 638, 645 (Ind. 2012). The
best indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, and where the
statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as drafted without resort to the
nuanced principles of statutory construction. Id. at 646; see also Hutchinson v.
City of Madison, 987 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We
also examine the statute as a whole and presume that the legislature intended
the language used to be applied logically so as to avoid an unjust or absurd
result. Id.
[9] As noted above, I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1 was created to provide an avenue for relief
for a person who has had his or her driving privileges suspended for life. The
language of I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1(a) clearly provides that a person “may petition”
a court in a civil action for a rescission of the suspension order. I.C. § 9-30-10-
14.1(f). Subsection (c) and, as applicable herein, subsection (f), identify specific
averments that must be contained in a petition. Some of the conditions for
obtaining relief under I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1 are straightforward and easily
established. For example, an averment that the petitioner has never been
convicted of an offense under I.C. § 9-30-10-4(a) or that the requisite amount of
time has passed since the date on which the order for the lifetime suspension
was issued can easily be established by submitting into evidence the petitioner’s
driving and/or criminal record or testimony regarding the same.
[10] Other conditions for obtaining relief, however, are not so readily established.
For example, the petitioner is required to aver that there has been a “substantial
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change” in circumstances such that (1) the petitioner no longer poses a risk to
the safety of others if the privileges are reinstated; (3) the lifetime suspension is
unreasonable; and (3) it is in the best interest of society for the petitioner’s
driving privileges to be reinstated. I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1(c)(4)(A-C). Inherent in
each of these conditions is that the trier of fact—the trial court—must exercise
its discretion and draw inferences from the averments made and evidence
presented to determine whether a substantial change has been shown and then
whether such change weighs in favor of the petitioner. It is the trier of fact, not
the petitioner, who is required to make a judgment call as to what is
unreasonable, whether the petitioner poses a safety risk to others, or what is in
the best interests of society. This decision necessarily involves a weighing of a
variety of factors and a consideration of the specific circumstances. To simply
allow a petitioner to make averments as to each of these conditions and require
a trial court to accept them was clearly not the intent of the legislature. The
most logical interpretation of the statute is that it is the petitioner’s burden to
persuade the factfinder to draw inferences in his or her favor based on the
specific averments and evidence presented.
[11] We recognize that I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1 does not include language similar to I.C.
§ 9-30-16-35 that specifically affords a trial court discretion to stay a suspension
and grant a specialized driving privilege. Noticeably absent from I.C. § 9-30-10-
5
“If a court orders a suspension of driving privileges under this chapter, or imposes a suspension of driving
privileges under IC 9-30-6-9(c), the court may stay the suspension and grant a specialized driving privilege.”
I.C. § 9-30-16-3(a) (emphasis supplied).
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14.1, however, is any mandate that the trial court must grant a petition based
on the averments contained therein. Rather, I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1 delineates a list
of conditions that must be met, some of which a trial court must determine
within its discretion, before rescission of a lifetime suspension may be had.
[12] Given the language employed in the statute and the nature of the conditions
that must be met before relief may be granted, we conclude that the legislature
intended to afford the trial court discretion in determining whether to rescind a
lifetime suspension of driving privileges. Thus, contrary to Lambert’s assertion,
the right to petition the court with specific averments relating to the required
conditions does not equate to an automatic right to relief.
[13] Lambert also argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition. Lambert
first argues that the trial court misapplied the law by concluding that “not
enough time has passed since entry of that third suspension.” Appellant’s
Appendix at 3. There is no dispute that Lambert’s petition was made pursuant
to I.C. § 9-30-10-14.1(f), which permits the filing of a petition if, in relevant
part, “[t]hree (3) years have elapsed since the date on which the order for
lifetime suspension of the petitioner’s diving privileges was issued.” It is also
undisputed that Lambert’s last lifetime suspension was issued four years prior to
the filing of his petition. Nonetheless, our consideration of the record before us
leads us to conclude that Lambert’s argument is misplaced because he
misinterprets the trial court’s conclusion.
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[14] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court expressed its concern that
Lambert refused to obey prior court orders that he not drive as evidenced by the
fact that Lambert had been issued three separate lifetime suspensions. In light
of this concern, we find that the trial court’s conclusion that “not enough time
has passed” was an expression of the trial court’s determination that Lambert’s
lifetime suspension had not been in effect for a sufficient amount of time given
his history. In other words, the statement was not directed to the three-year
statutory requirement for filing the petition. The statute does not preclude the
trial court’s consideration of the time elapsed since the suspension order as part
of its determination whether rescission is in society’s best interest, particularly
where the petitioner has multiple lifetime suspensions. We therefore conclude
that the trial court did not err in this regard.
[15] Lambert also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that there had not
been a substantial change in his circumstances. We begin by noting that
although Lambert testified he owned a construction business, had two children,
and helped care for his disabled mother-in-law, Lambert did not explain how
these circumstances were any different than in the past. Lambert noted that his
lifetime suspensions resulted from him driving to and from work (after he was
determined to be an HTV) and Lambert’s children are simply older now.
Lambert did not elaborate on how he helps with his mother-in-law. In short,
Lambert failed to establish that there was any change in circumstances, let
alone a substantial one.
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[16] Moreover, as noted above, the trial court, in concluding that not enough time
had passed, indicated that it was persuaded more by the fact that Lambert had
accumulated three lifetime suspensions and that after each suspension, he chose
to ignore court orders that he not drive. The significance the trial court put on
Lambert’s history was a matter within its discretion and supported its
determination that rescission of Lambert’s lifetime suspension was not in the
best interests of society and that his lifetime suspension was not unreasonable.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
Lambert’s petition for rescission of the lifetime suspension of his driving
privileges.
[17] We affirm.
[18] Robb, J. and Barnes, J. concur.
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