Molina-Martinez v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14–8913. Argued January 12, 2016—Decided April 20, 2016

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines first enter the sentencing process

when the United States Probation Office prepares a presentence re-

port containing, as relevant here, an advisory Guidelines range based

on the seriousness of a defendant’s offense and the extent of his crim-

inal history. A district court may depart from the Guidelines, but it

“must consult [them] and take them into account when sentencing.”

United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 264. Given the Guidelines’

complexity, a District Court’s use of an incorrect Guidelines range

may go unnoticed. That error can be remedied on appeal pursuant to

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), provided that (1) there is

an error that was not intentionally relinquished or abandoned, Unit-

ed States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 732–733; (2) the error is plain, i.e.,

clear or obvious, id., at 734; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s

substantial rights, ibid., which in the ordinary case means he or she

must “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,” the out-

come of the proceeding would have been different, United States v.

Dominguez Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 82. Once these three conditions

have been met, the court of appeals should exercise its discretion to

correct the forfeited error if the error “ ‘seriously affects the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Olano, 507

U. S., at 736 (brackets omitted).

Petitioner Molina-Martinez pleaded guilty to being unlawfully pre-

sent in the United States after having been deported following an ag-

gravated felony conviction. The Guidelines range in his presentence

report was 77 to 96 months. He requested, and the Probation Office

recommended, a 77-month sentence, while the Government requested

96 months. The District Court, with little explanation, sentenced

him to the lowest end of what it believed to be the applicable Guide-

2 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

lines range—77 months. On appeal, Molina-Martinez argued for the

first time that the Probation Office and the District Court miscalcu-

lated his Guidelines range, which should have been 70 to 87 months,

and noted that his 77-month sentence would have been in the middle

of the correct range, not at the bottom. The Fifth Circuit agreed that

the District Court used an incorrect Guidelines range but found that

Molina-Martinez could not satisfy Rule 52(b)’s requirement that the

error affect his substantial rights. It reasoned that a defendant

whose sentence falls within what would have been the correct Guide-

lines range must, on appeal, identify “additional evidence” showing

that use of the incorrect Guidelines range in fact affected his sen-

tence.

Held: Courts reviewing Guidelines errors cannot apply a categorical

“additional evidence” rule in cases, like this one, where a district

court applies an incorrect range but sentences the defendant within

the correct range. Pp. 8–16.

(a) The Guidelines establish the essential framework for sentenc-

ing proceedings. Sentencing courts “ ‘must begin their analysis with

the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentenc-

ing process.’ ” Peugh v. United States, 569 U. S. ___, ___. Sentencing

Commission statistics confirm that the Guidelines inform and in-

struct the district court’s determination of an appropriate sentence.

In the usual case, the systemic function of the selected Guidelines

range will affect a defendant’s sentence. As a result, a defendant who

shows that the district court mistakenly deemed applicable an incor-

rect, higher range will, in the ordinary case, have demonstrated a

reasonable probability of a different outcome. That showing will suf-

fice for relief if Rule 52(b)’s other requirements are met. Pp. 9–12.

(b) The unworkable nature of the Fifth Circuit’s “additional evi-

dence” rule is evident here, where the record shows that the District

Court gave little explanation for the sentence it selected, rejected the

Government’s request for a sentence at the top of the erroneous

Guidelines range, and chose the sentence requested by the defendant

and recommended by the Probation Office—a sentence at the bottom

of the erroneous Guidelines range. This demonstrates that the

Guidelines served as the starting point for the sentencing and were

the focal point for the proceedings that followed. Given the sentence

the District Court chose, and because the court said nothing to sug-

gest that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the

Guidelines range, there is at least a reasonable probability that the

court would have imposed a different sentence had it known that 70

months was the lowest sentence the Commission deemed appropri-

ate. Pp. 12–13.

(c) Rejection of the Fifth Circuit’s rule means only that a defendant

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3

Syllabus

can rely on the application of an incorrect Guidelines range to show

an effect on his substantial rights, not that the Government will have

to prove that every Guidelines error was harmless. And the Govern-

ment’s concern over the judicial resources needed for the resentenc-

ing proceedings that might result from today’s holding is unfounded

because the holding is consistent with the approach taken by most

Courts of Appeals and because remanding for resentencing is less

costly than remanding for retrial. Pp. 13–15.

588 Fed. Appx. 333, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–8913

_________________

SAUL MOLINA-MARTINEZ, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[April 20, 2016]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

In sentencing petitioner, the District Court applied a

Guidelines range higher than the applicable one. The

error went unnoticed by the court and the parties, so no

timely objection was entered. The error was first noted

when, during briefing to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, petitioner himself raised the mistake. The Court

of Appeals refused to correct the error because, in its view,

petitioner could not establish a reasonable probability that

but for the error he would have received a different sen-

tence. Under that court’s decisions, if a defendant’s ulti-

mate sentence falls within what would have been the

correct Guidelines range, the defendant, on appeal, must

identify “additional evidence” to show that use of the

incorrect Guidelines range did in fact affect his sentence.

Absent that evidence, in the Court of Appeals’ view, a

defendant who is sentenced under an incorrect range but

whose sentence is also within what would have been the

correct range cannot demonstrate he has been prejudiced

by the error.

2 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Most Courts of Appeals have not adopted so rigid a

standard. Instead, in recognition of the Guidelines’ cen-

tral role in sentencing, other Courts of Appeals have con-

cluded that a district court’s application of an incorrect

Guidelines range can itself serve as evidence of an effect

on substantial rights. See, e.g., United States v. Sabillon-

Umana, 772 F. 3d 1328, 1333 (CA10 2014) (application of

an erroneous Guidelines range “ ‘runs the risk of affecting

the ultimate sentence regardless of whether the court

ultimately imposes a sentence within or outside’ ” that

range); United States v. Vargem, 747 F. 3d 724, 728–729

(CA9 2014); United States v. Story, 503 F. 3d 436, 440

(CA6 2007). These courts recognize that, in most cases,

when a district court adopts an incorrect Guidelines

range, there is a reasonable probability that the defend-

ant’s sentence would be different absent the error. This

Court granted certiorari to reconcile the difference in

approaches.

I

A

The Sentencing Guidelines provide the framework for

the tens of thousands of federal sentencing proceedings

that occur each year. Congress directed the United States

Sentencing Commission (USSC or Commission) to estab-

lish the Guidelines. 28 U. S. C. §994(a)(1). The goal was

to achieve “ ‘uniformity in sentencing . . . imposed by dif-

ferent federal courts for similar criminal conduct,’ as well

as ‘proportionality in sentencing through a system that

imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal

conduct of different severity.’ ” Rita v. United States, 551

U. S. 338, 349 (2007). To those ends, the Commission

engaged in “a deliberative and dynamic process” to create

Guidelines that account for a variety of offenses and cir-

cumstances. USSC, Guidelines Manual §2, ch. 1, pt. A,

intro. comment., p. 14 (Nov. 2015) (USSG). As part of that

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3

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process, the Commission considered the objectives of

federal sentencing identified in the Sentencing Reform Act

of 1984—the same objectives that federal judges must

consider when sentencing defendants. Compare 28

U. S. C. §991(b) with 18 U. S. C. §3553(a). The result is a

set of elaborate, detailed Guidelines that aim to embody

federal sentencing objectives “both in principle and in

practice.” Rita, supra, at 350.

Uniformity and proportionality in sentencing are

achieved, in part, by the Guidelines’ significant role in

sentencing. See Peugh v. United States, 569 U. S. ___, ___

(2013) (slip op., at 10). The Guidelines enter the sentenc-

ing process long before the district court imposes the

sentence. The United States Probation Office first pre-

pares a presentence report which includes a calculation of

the advisory Guidelines range it considers to be applicable.

Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 32(d)(1)(A)–(C); see generally 18

U. S. C. §3552(a). The applicable Guidelines range is

based on the seriousness of a defendant’s offense (indicated

by his “offense level”) and his criminal history (indi-

cated by his “criminal history category”). Rules

32(d)(1)(B)–(C). The presentence report explains the basis

for the Probation Office’s calculations and sets out the

sentencing options under the applicable statutes and

Guidelines. Rule 32(d)(1). It also contains detailed infor-

mation about the defendant’s criminal history and personal

characteristics, such as education and employment his-

tory. Rule 32(d)(2).

At the outset of the sentencing proceedings, the district

court must determine the applicable Guidelines range.

Peugh, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 10). To do so, the court

considers the presentence report as well as any objections

the parties might have. The court then entertains the

parties’ arguments regarding an appropriate sentence,

including whether the sentence should be within the

Guidelines range or not. Although the district court has

4 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

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discretion to depart from the Guidelines, the court “must

consult those Guidelines and take them into account when

sentencing.” United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 264

(2005).

B

The Guidelines are complex, and so there will be in-

stances when a district court’s sentencing of a defendant

within the framework of an incorrect Guidelines range

goes unnoticed. In that circumstance, because the defend-

ant failed to object to the miscalculation, appellate review

of the error is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-

cedure 52(b).

Rule 52, in both its parts, is brief. It states:

“(a) HARMLESS ERROR. Any error, defect, irregularity,

or variance that does not affect substantial rights

must be disregarded.

“(b) PLAIN ERROR. A plain error that affects substan-

tial rights may be considered even though it was not

brought to the court’s attention.”

The starting point for interpreting and applying para-

graph (b) of the Rule, upon which this case turns, is the

Court’s decision in United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725

(1993). Olano instructs that a court of appeals has discre-

tion to remedy a forfeited error provided certain conditions

are met. First, there must be an error that has not been

intentionally relinquished or abandoned. Id., at 732–733.

Second, the error must be plain—that is to say, clear or

obvious. Id., at 734. Third, the error must have affected

the defendant’s substantial rights, ibid., which in the

ordinary case means he or she must “show a reasonable

probability that, but for the error,” the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different, United States v.

Dominguez Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 76, 82 (2004). Once

these three conditions have been met, the court of appeals

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 5

Opinion of the Court

should exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error

if the error “ ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Olano, supra,

at 736 (brackets omitted).

II

The petitioner here, Saul Molina-Martinez, pleaded

guilty to being unlawfully present in the United States

after having been deported following an aggravated felony

conviction, in violation of 8 U. S. C. §§1326(a) and (b). As

required, the Probation Office prepared a presentence

report that related Molina-Martinez’s offense of convic-

tion, his criminal history, his personal characteristics, and

the available sentencing options. The report also included

the Probation Office’s calculation of what it believed to be

Molina-Martinez’s Guidelines range. The Probation Office

calculated Molina-Martinez’s total offense level as 21. It

concluded that Molina-Martinez’s criminal history war-

ranted 18 points, which included 11 points for five aggra-

vated burglary convictions from 2011. Those 18 criminal

history points resulted in a criminal history category of VI.

That category, combined with an offense level of 21, re-

sulted in a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months.

At the sentencing hearing Molina-Martinez’s counsel

and the Government addressed the court. The Govern-

ment acknowledged that the Probation Office had “rec-

ommended the low end on this case, 77 months.” App. 30.

But, the prosecution told the court, it “disagree[d] with

that recommendation,” and was “asking for a high end

sentence of 96 months”—the top of the Guidelines range.

Ibid. Like the Probation Office, counsel for Molina-

Martinez urged the court to enter a sentence at the bottom

of the Guidelines range. Counsel asserted that “77

months is a severe sentence” and that “after the 77

months, he’ll be deported with probably a special release

term.” Id., at 32. A sentence of 77 months, counsel con-

6 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

tinued, “is more than adequate to ensure he doesn’t come

back again.” Ibid.

After hearing from the parties, the court stated it was

adopting the presentence report’s factual findings and

Guidelines calculations. It then ordered Molina-

Martinez’s sentence:

“It’s the judgment of the Court that the defendant,

Saul Molina-Martinez, is hereby committed to the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for

a term of 77 months. Upon release from imprison-

ment, Defendant shall be placed on supervised release

for a term of three years without supervision.” Id.,

at 33.

The court provided no further explanation for the

sentence.

On appeal, Molina-Martinez’s attorney submitted a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967).

The attorney explained that, in his opinion, there were no

nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Molina-Martinez, how-

ever, submitted a pro se response to his attorney’s Anders

brief. In it he identified for the first time what he believed

to be an error in the calculation of his criminal history

points under the Guidelines. The Court of Appeals con-

cluded that Molina-Martinez’s argument did not appear

frivolous. It directed his lawyer to file either a supple-

mental Anders brief or a brief on the merits of the Guide-

lines issue.

Molina-Martinez, through his attorney, filed a merits

brief arguing that the Probation Office and the District

Court erred in calculating his criminal history points,

resulting in the application of a higher Guidelines range.

The error, Molina-Martinez explained, occurred because

the Probation Office failed to apply §4A1.2(a)(2) of the

Guidelines. See USSG §4A1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2012). That

provision addresses how multiple sentences imposed on

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 7

Opinion of the Court

the same day are to be counted for purposes of determin-

ing a defendant’s criminal history. It instructs that, when

prior sentences were imposed on the same day, they

should be counted as a single sentence unless the offenses

“were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defend-

ant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the

second offense).” Ibid.

Molina-Martinez’s presentence report included five

aggravated burglary convictions for which he had been

sentenced on the same day. The Probation Office counted

each sentence separately, which resulted in the imposition

of 11 criminal history points. Molina-Martinez contended

this was error because none of the offenses were separated

by an intervening arrest and because he had been sen-

tenced for all five burglaries on the same day. Under a

correct calculation, in his view, the burglaries should have

resulted in 5 criminal history points instead of 11. That

would have lowered his criminal history category from VI

to V. The correct criminal history category, in turn, would

have resulted in a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months

rather than 77 to 96 months. Had the correct range been

used, Molina-Martinez’s 77-month sentence would have

been in the middle of the range, not at the bottom.

Molina-Martinez acknowledged that, because he did not

object in the District Court, he was entitled to relief only if

he could satisfy Rule 52(b)’s requirements. He neverthe-

less maintained relief was warranted because the error

was plain, affected his substantial rights, and impugned

the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial

proceedings.

The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that Molina-

Martinez had not established that the District Court’s

application of an incorrect Guidelines range affected his

substantial rights. It reasoned that, when a correct sen-

tencing range overlaps with an incorrect range, the re-

viewing court “ ‘do[es] not assume, in the absence of addi-

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tional evidence, that the sentence [imposed] affects a

defendant’s substantial rights.’ ” 588 Fed. Appx. 333, 335

(CA5 2014) (per curiam); see also United States v. Blocker,

612 F. 3d 413, 416 (CA5 2010). Molina-Martinez, the

court ruled, had not put forth the additional evidence

necessary to show that the error affected his substantial

rights. “The mere fact that the court sentenced Molina-

Martinez to a low-end sentence,” the Court of Appeals

reasoned, “is insufficient on its own to show that Molina-

Martinez would have received a similar low-end sentence

had the district court used the correct Guidelines range.”

588 Fed. Appx., at 335. Instead, Molina-Martinez needed

to identify “ ‘additional evidence’ ” in the record showing

that the Guidelines had an effect on the District Court’s

selection of his sentence. Ibid. The court noted that “the

district court made no explicit statement suggesting that

the Guidelines range was a primary factor in sentencing.”

Ibid. And the court did not view as probative “the parties’

anchoring of their sentencing arguments in the Guide-

lines” or “the district court’s refusal to grant the govern-

ment’s request for a high-end sentence of 96 months.”

Ibid.

This Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagree-

ment among Courts of Appeals over how to determine

whether the application of an incorrect Guidelines range

at sentencing affected the defendant’s substantial rights.

See 576 U. S. ___ (2015).

III

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stands gener-

ally apart from other Courts of Appeals with respect to its

consideration of unpreserved Guidelines errors. This

Court now holds that its approach is incorrect.

Nothing in the text of Rule 52(b), its rationale, or the

Court’s precedents supports a requirement that a defend-

ant seeking appellate review of an unpreserved Guidelines

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 9

Opinion of the Court

error make some further showing of prejudice beyond the

fact that the erroneous, and higher, Guidelines range set

the wrong framework for the sentencing proceedings. This

is so even if the ultimate sentence falls within both the

correct and incorrect range. When a defendant is sen-

tenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or

not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the

correct range—the error itself can, and most often will, be

sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different

outcome absent the error.

A

Today’s holding follows from the essential framework

the Guidelines establish for sentencing proceedings. The

Court has made clear that the Guidelines are to be the

sentencing court’s “starting point and . . . initial bench-

mark.” Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 49 (2007).

Federal courts understand that they “ ‘must begin their

analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of

them throughout the sentencing process.’ ” Peugh, 569

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). The Guidelines are “the

framework for sentencing” and “anchor . . . the district

court’s discretion.” Id., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 11, 18)

“Even if the sentencing judge sees a reason to vary from

the Guidelines, ‘if the judge uses the sentencing range as

the beginning point to explain the decision to deviate from

it, then the Guidelines are in a real sense the basis for the

sentence.’ ” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11).

The Guidelines’ central role in sentencing means that

an error related to the Guidelines can be particularly

serious. A district court that “improperly calculat[es]” a

defendant’s Guidelines range, for example, has committed

a “significant procedural error.” Gall, supra, at 51. That

same principle explains the Court’s ruling that a “retro-

spective increase in the Guidelines range applicable to a

defendant creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence to

10 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

constitute an ex post facto violation.” Peugh, 569 U. S., at

___ (slip op., at 13).

The Commission’s statistics demonstrate the real and

pervasive effect the Guidelines have on sentencing.

In most cases district courts continue to impose “either

within-Guidelines sentences or sentences that depart

downward from the Guidelines on the Government’s

motion.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12); see USSC, 2014

Annual Report and 2014 Sourcebook of Federal Sen-

tencing Statistics S–50 (19th ed.) (Table N) (2014 Source-

book). In less than 20% of cases since 2007 have district

courts “imposed above- or below-Guidelines sentences

absent a Government motion.” Peugh, supra, at ___–___

(slip op., at 12–13); see also 2011 Annual Report and 2011

Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 63 (16th ed.)

(Figure G); 2015 Annual Report and 2015 Sourcebook of

Federal Sentencing Statistics (20th ed.) (Figure G), on-

line at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-

and - publications / annual - reports - and - sourcebooks / 2015/

FigureG.pdf (as last visited Apr. 15, 2016). As the Court

has recognized, “when a Guidelines range moves up or

down, offenders’ sentences [tend to] move with it.” Peugh,

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 13); USSC, Final Quarterly Data

Report, FY 2014, pp. 32–37 (Figures C to H). These reali-

ties have led the Court to observe that there is “consider-

able empirical evidence indicating that the Sentencing

Guidelines have the intended effect of influencing the

sentences imposed by judges.” Peugh, supra, at ___ (slip

op., at 12).

These sources confirm that the Guidelines are not only

the starting point for most federal sentencing proceedings

but also the lodestar. The Guidelines inform and instruct

the district court’s determination of an appropriate sen-

tence. In the usual case, then, the systemic function of the

selected Guidelines range will affect the sentence. This

fact is essential to the application of Rule 52(b) to a Guide-

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 11

Opinion of the Court

lines error. From the centrality of the Guidelines in the

sentencing process it must follow that, when a defendant

shows that the district court used an incorrect range, he

should not be barred from relief on appeal simply because

there is no other evidence that the sentencing outcome

would have been different had the correct range been

used.

In most cases a defendant who has shown that the

district court mistakenly deemed applicable an incorrect,

higher Guidelines range has demonstrated a reasonable

probability of a different outcome. And, again in most

cases, that will suffice for relief if the other requirements

of Rule 52(b) are met. There may be instances when,

despite application of an erroneous Guidelines range, a

reasonable probability of prejudice does not exist. The

sentencing process is particular to each defendant, of

course, and a reviewing court must consider the facts and

circumstances of the case before it. See United States v.

Davila, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 13) (“Our

essential point is that particular facts and circumstances

matter”). The record in a case may show, for example,

that the district court thought the sentence it chose was

appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range. Judges

may find that some cases merit a detailed explanation of

the reasons the selected sentence is appropriate. And that

explanation could make it clear that the judge based the

sentence he or she selected on factors independent of the

Guidelines. The Government remains free to “poin[t] to

parts of the record”—including relevant statements by the

judge—“to counter any ostensible showing of prejudice the

defendant may make.” United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S.

55, 68 (2002). Where, however, the record is silent as to

what the district court might have done had it considered

the correct Guidelines range, the court’s reliance on an

incorrect range in most instances will suffice to show an

effect on the defendant’s substantial rights. Indeed, in the

12 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ordinary case a defendant will satisfy his burden to show

prejudice by pointing to the application of an incorrect,

higher Guidelines range and the sentence he received

thereunder. Absent unusual circumstances, he will not be

required to show more.

The Court of Appeals’ rule to the contrary fails to take

account of the dynamics of federal sentencing. In a signif-

icant number of cases the sentenced defendant will lack

the additional evidence the Court of Appeals’ rule would

require, for sentencing judges often say little about the

degree to which the Guidelines influenced their determi-

nation. District courts, as a matter of course, use the

Guidelines range to instruct them regarding the appropri-

ate balance of the relevant federal sentencing factors.

This Court has told judges that they need not provide

extensive explanations for within-Guidelines sentences

because “[c]ircumstances may well make clear that the

judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own rea-

soning.” Rita, 551 U. S., at 356–357. In these situations,

reviewing courts may presume that a sentence imposed

within a properly calculated Guidelines range is reason-

able. Id., at 341. As a result, the cases where the Guide-

lines are most likely to have influenced the district court’s

sentencing decision—those where the court chose a sen-

tence within what it believed to be the applicable Guide-

lines range—are also the cases least likely to provide the

defendant with evidence of the Guidelines’ influence be-

yond the sentence itself. The defendants in these cases

should not be prevented by a categorical rule from estab-

lishing on appeal that there is a reasonable probability the

Guidelines range applied by the sentencing court had an

effect on their within-Guidelines sentence.

B

This case illustrates the unworkable nature of the Court

of Appeals’ additional evidence rule. Here the court held

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 13

Opinion of the Court

that Molina-Martinez could not establish an effect on his

substantial rights. Yet the record points to a different

conclusion. The District Court said nothing specific about

why it chose the sentence it imposed. It merely “adopt[ed]

the . . . guideline applications in the presentence investi-

gation report,” App. 33, which set the range at 77 to 96

months; rejected the Government’s argument for a sen-

tence at the top of the Guidelines range; and agreed with

the defendant’s request for, and the Probation Office’s

recommendation of, a sentence at the bottom of the range.

As intended, the Guidelines served as the starting point

for the sentencing and were the focal point for the proceed-

ings that followed.

The 77-month sentence the District Court selected is

conspicuous for its position as the lowest sentence within

what the District Court believed to be the applicable

range. As Molina-Martinez explained to the Court of

Appeals, the District Court’s selection of a sentence at the

bottom of the range, despite the Government’s request for

the maximum Guidelines sentence, “evinced an intention

. . . to give the minimum recommended by the Guidelines.”

Brief for Appellant in No. 13–40324 (CA5), p. 18. The

District Court said nothing to suggest that it would have

imposed a 77-month sentence regardless of the Guidelines

range. Given these circumstances, there is at least a

reasonable probability that the District Court would have

imposed a different sentence had it known that 70 months

was in fact the lowest sentence the Commission deemed

appropriate.

IV

The Government contends that permitting a defendant

to establish prejudice through the fact of a Guidelines

error alone eliminates the main difference between Rules

52(a) and 52(b)—which party must prove whether the

complained-of error had an effect. Brief for United States

14 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

21. As noted, Rule 52(a) states: “Any error, defect, irregu-

larity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights

must be disregarded.” When a defendant makes a timely

objection, the Government can rely on Rule 52(a) to argue

that the error does not warrant correction because it was

harmless. Although Rules 52(a) and (b) both require an

inquiry into whether the complained-of error was prejudi-

cial, there is “ ‘one important difference’ ” between the

subparts—under (b), but not (a), “ ‘[i]t is the defendant

rather than the Government who bears the burden of

persuasion with respect to prejudice.’ ” Brief for United

States 18 (quoting Olano, 507 U. S., at 734). In the Gov-

ernment’s view, ruling for Molina-Martinez will require

the Government to prove the harmlessness of every Guide-

lines error raised on appeal regardless of whether it was

preserved. Brief for United States 27–28.

The holding here does not lead to that result. The deci-

sion today simply states that courts reviewing sentencing

errors cannot apply a categorical rule requiring additional

evidence in cases, like this one, where the district court

applied an incorrect range but nevertheless sentenced the

defendant within the correct range. Rejection of that rule

means only that a defendant can rely on the application of

an incorrect Guidelines range to show an effect on his

substantial rights.

The Government expresses concern over the judicial

resources needed for the resentencing proceedings that

might result from the Court’s holding. It is doubtful to-

day’s holding will result in much of an increased burden.

As already noted, today’s holding is consistent with the

approach taken by most Courts of Appeals. See, e.g.,

Sabillon-Umana, 772 F. 3d, at 1333 (collecting cases). Yet

only a small fraction of cases are remanded for resentenc-

ing because of Guidelines related errors. See 2014

Sourcebook S–6, S–153 (Tables 2 and 62) (of the roughly

75,000 cases sentenced in 2014, only 620 resulted in a

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 15

Opinion of the Court

remand for resentencing because of a statutory or Guide-

lines related error). Under the Olano framework, appel-

late courts retain broad discretion in determining whether

a remand for resentencing is necessary. Courts have, for

example, developed mechanisms short of a full remand to

determine whether a district court in fact would have

imposed a different sentence absent the error. See, e.g.,

United States v. Currie, 739 F. 3d 960, 967 (CA7 2014)

(ordering “limited remand so that the district judge [could]

consider, and state on the record, whether she would have

imposed the same sentence . . . knowing that [the defend-

ant] was subject to a five-year rather than a ten-year

statutory minimum term of imprisonment”). And even

when a Court of Appeals does decide that resentencing is

appropriate, “a remand for resentencing, while not cost-

less, does not invoke the same difficulties as a remand for

retrial does.” United States v. Wernick, 691 F. 3d 108,

117–118 (CA2 2012); see also Sabillon-Umana, supra, at

1334 (noting that the “cost of correction is . . . small” be-

cause “[a] remand for sentencing . . . doesn’t require that a

defendant be released or retried”). The Government’s

concern about additional, burdensome procedures appears

unfounded, and, in any event, does not warrant reading

into Rule 52(b) a requirement that does not exist.

* * *

In the ordinary case the Guidelines accomplish their

purpose. They serve as the starting point for the district

court’s decision and anchor the court’s discretion in select-

ing an appropriate sentence. It follows, then, that in most

cases the Guidelines range will affect the sentence. When

that is so, a defendant sentenced under an incorrect

Guidelines range should be able to rely on that fact to

show a reasonable probability that the district court would

have imposed a different sentence under the correct range.

That probability is all that is needed to establish an effect

on substantial rights for purposes of obtaining relief under

16 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Rule 52(b).

The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1

Opinion of ALITO, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–8913

_________________

SAUL MOLINA-MARTINEZ, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[April 20, 2016]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the Fifth Circuit’s rigid

approach to unpreserved Guidelines errors is incorrect.

And I agree that petitioner has shown a reasonable proba-

bility that the District Court would have imposed a differ-

ent sentence in his case if his recommended Guidelines

sentence had been accurately calculated. Unlike the

Court, however, I would not speculate about how often the

reasonable probability test will be satisfied in future cases.

The Court’s predictions in dicta about how plain-error

review will play out are predicated on the view that sen-

tencing judges will continue to rely very heavily on the

Guidelines in the future, but that prediction may not turn

out to be accurate. We should not make predictions about

the future effects of Guidelines errors, particularly since

some may misunderstand those predictions as veiled

directives.

I

“ ‘No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court

than that a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other

sort, ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by

the failure to make timely assertion of the right before the

tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” United

2 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of ALITO, J.

States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 731 (1993) (quoting Yakus

v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444 (1944)). Consistent

with this principle, Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-

nal Procedure treats defendants who preserve their claims

much more favorably than those who fail to register a

timely objection. When the defendant has made a timely

objection to an error, the Government generally bears the

burden of showing that the error was harmless. Olano,

507 U. S., at 734. By contrast, when a defendant has

failed to make a timely objection, “[i]t is the defendant

rather than the Government who bears the burden of

persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Ibid.; see also id.,

at 741–742 (KENNEDY, J., concurring).

This framework applies to errors in the calculation of an

advisory Guidelines sentence. If the defendant does not

call the error to the attention of the sentencing judge, the

defendant may obtain relief on appeal only if he or she

proves that the error was prejudicial—specifically, that

there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for the error,

the sentence would have been different. United States v.

Dominguez Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 81–83 (2004). Meeting

this burden “should not be too easy for defendants.” Id., at

82. Instead, the standard should be robust enough to

“enforce the policies that underpin Rule 52(b) generally, to

encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals

by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpre-

served error.” Ibid. By placing this burden on the defend-

ant, Rule 52(b) compels defense counsel to devote careful

attention to the potential complexities of the Guidelines at

sentencing, thus providing the district court—which “is

ordinarily in the best position to determine the relevant

facts and adjudicate the dispute”—with “the opportunity

to consider and resolve” any objections. Puckett v. United

States, 556 U. S. 129, 134 (2009); see also ibid.

(“[A]ppellate-court authority to remedy” unpreserved

errors “is strictly circumscribed” in order to “induce the

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3

Opinion of ALITO, J.

timely raising of claims and objections”); United States v.

Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 73 (2002) (“[T]he value of finality

requires defense counsel to be on his toes, not just the

judge, and the defendant who just sits there when a mis-

take can be fixed cannot just sit there when he speaks up

later on”); Olano, supra, at 742–743 (KENNEDY, J., concur-

ring) (“[T]he operation of Rule 52(b) does not permit a

party to withhold an objection . . . and then to demand

automatic reversal”).

Whether a defendant can show a “reasonable probabil-

ity” of a different sentence depends on the “particular facts

and circumstances” of each case. United States v. Davila,

569 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at 13–14). “We

have previously warned against courts’ determining

whether an error is harmless through the use of manda-

tory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific

application of judgment, based upon examination of the

record.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U. S. 396, 407 (2009)

(citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 760

(1946)). Instead of relying on presumptions, a court of

appeals must “engage in [a] full-record assessment” to

determine whether a defendant who forfeited a claim of

Guidelines error has met his case-specific burden of show-

ing of prejudice. Davila, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14).

The answer may be affected by a variety of factors, includ-

ing any direct evidence, the nature and magnitude of the

error, the sentencing judge’s view of the Guidelines,1 the

——————

1 See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Report on the Con-

tinuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing 3

(2012) (Booker Report) (“[T]he Commission’s analysis of individual

judge data showed that the identity of the judge has played an increas-

ingly important role in the sentencing outcomes in many districts”);

Bowman, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines, 51 Houston L. Rev. 1227, 1266 (2014) (“Inter-

Judge Disparity Has . . . Increased Since Booker”); Scott, Inter-Judge

Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 30

(2010) (“[I]n their guideline sentencing patterns, judges have responded

4 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of ALITO, J.

approach of the circuit in question,2 and the particular

crime at issue.3

Under the specific circumstances here, Molina-Martinez

met his burden. As the Court points out, Molina-Martinez

demonstrated that the Guidelines “were the focal point for

the proceedings”; that “[t]he 77-month sentence the Dis-

trict Court selected is conspicuous for its position as the

lowest sentence within what the District Court believed to

be the applicable range”; and that “the District Court’s

selection of a sentence at the bottom of the range, despite

the Government’s request for the maximum Guidelines

sentence, ‘evinced an intention . . . to give the minimum

recommended by the Guidelines.’ ” Ante, at 13. This

evidence establishes a “reasonable probability that the

District Court would have imposed a different sentence

had it known that 70 months was in fact the lowest sen-

tence the Commission deemed appropriate.” Ibid.

In concluding otherwise, the Fifth Circuit applied exactly

the sort of strict, categorical rule against which we have

warned. Under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, Molina-

Martinez could not satisfy his burden with circumstantial

evidence regarding the parties’ sentencing arguments or

the District Court’s selection of a sentence at the very

bottom of the range. See 588 Fed. Appx. 333, 335 (CA5

——————

in starkly different ways to Booker, with some following a ‘free at last’

pattern and others a ‘business as usual’ pattern”).

2 See, e.g., Booker Report 6 (“The influence of the guidelines . . . has

varied by circuit”); Bowman, supra, at 1261 (“Different Districts Have

Had Very Different Post-Booker Experiences”); Yang, Have Interjudge

Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime?

Evidence from Booker, 89 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1268, 1277, 1319–1323

(2014) (presenting “evidence of substantial interdistrict differences in

sentencing outcomes”).

3 See, e.g., Booker Report 5 (“The influence of the guidelines . . . has

generally remained stable in drug trafficking, firearms, and immigra-

tion offenses, but has diminished in fraud and child pornography

offenses”).

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 5

Opinion of ALITO, J.

2014) (per curiam). Rather, the Fifth Circuit would re-

quire a defendant to produce direct evidence, such as an

“explicit statement suggesting that the Guidelines range

was a primary factor in sentencing.” Ibid. But there is no

good reason to preclude defendants from showing preju-

dice via the type of circumstantial evidence at issue here.

As this case illustrates, the manner in which a district

court applies an incorrect Guidelines range can itself serve

as evidence of an effect on substantial rights. I thus con-

cur in the Court’s opinion insofar as it rejects the Fifth

Circuit’s misguided approach and finds that Molina-

Martinez demonstrated a reasonable probability of a

different sentence absent the Guidelines error.

II

I cannot, however, join the Court’s dicta speculating

that “most” defendants who forfeit a Guidelines error will

be able to show a reasonable probability of prejudice.

Ante, at 9, 11, 15. Things may turn out that way, but I see

no reason to prejudge an empirical question that is unnec-

essary to our decision in this case and that will be worked

out by the lower courts on a case-by-case basis.4

——————

4 Some of the Court’s dicta could perhaps be interpreted not as predic-

tions, but as instructions to lower courts to side with the forfeiting

defendant unless the Government can point to “unusual circum-

stances.” See ante, at 11–12 (“[I]n the ordinary case a defendant will

satisfy his burden to show prejudice by pointing to the application of an

incorrect, higher Guidelines range and the sentence he received there-

under. Absent unusual circumstances, he will not be required to show

more”). For several reasons, however, I do not think the opinion can be

fairly viewed as requiring such a result. First, the Court makes clear

that today’s decision does not shift the burden of persuasion from a

forfeiting defendant to the Government. See ante, at 14 (Under Rule

52(b), “ ‘[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the

burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice,’ ” and “[t]he holding

here does not” shift the burden). Second, the opinion acknowledges

that a “court’s reliance on an incorrect range” will not always “suffice to

show an effect on the defendant’s substantial rights”—even where “the

6 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of ALITO, J.

The Court’s proclamations about what will occur in

“most” cases are based on Sentencing Commission statis-

tics indicating that the Guidelines tend to influence sen-

tences. See ante, at 10. Perhaps these statistics are pro-

bative of the Guidelines’ current impact on sentencing.

But they provide an unstable and shifting basis for the

Court’s prophecies about the future. The Guidelines are

now entirely advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543

U. S. 220, 245 (2005), and in time the lower courts may

increasingly drift away from the Guidelines and back

toward the sentencing regime that prevailed prior to their

issuance.5 As circumstances change, and as judges who

——————

record is silent as to what the district court might have done had it

considered the correct Guidelines range.” Ante, at 11. It follows that

even where the Government fails to identify any direct evidence of

harmlessness, the defendant cannot automatically satisfy his burden

simply by pointing to the application of an incorrect Guidelines range.

Instead of employing a strict presumption against the Government, the

Court emphasizes, “a reviewing court must consider the facts and

circumstances of the case before it.” Ibid.; see also ibid. (“ ‘Our essen-

tial point is that particular facts and circumstances matter’ ” (quoting

United States v. Davila, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 13))).

Given these caveats, I do not read the Court’s opinion as replacing the

Fifth Circuit’s inflexible pro-Government presumption with an equally

inflexible pro-defendant presumption. Rather, I take the Court at its

word: “The decision today simply states that courts reviewing sentenc-

ing errors cannot apply a categorical rule requiring additional evidence

in cases, like this one, where the district court applied an incorrect

range but nevertheless sentenced the defendant within the correct

range.” Ante, at 14.

5 See, e.g., Assessing Booker and Its Aftermath, Practice Under the

Federal Sentencing Guidelines §1.02(C)(1), pp. 1–14 to 1–16 (D. Debold

ed., 5th ed. 2016) (Debold) (“Since the first weeks after Booker, district

courts have been engaged in a dynamic debate over the precise weight

to be given the now advisory Guidelines,” and “there are reasons to

expect continued evolution in sentencing norms”); id., §1.02(C)(2)

(“[D]istrict courts can be expected to continue to test the boundaries of

their discretion. . . . Accordingly, while it is clear that district courts

now enjoy more discretion at sentencing, the proper bounds of that

discretion will continue to be explored”).

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 7

Opinion of ALITO, J.

spent decades applying mandatory Guidelines ranges are

replaced with new judges less wedded to the Guidelines,

the statistics underlying the Court’s forecasts may change

dramatically.6 Because I cannot join the Court’s question-

able predictions, I concur only in part and in the judgment.

——————

6 See, e.g., Yang, 89 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 1277 (finding that “Judges

who have no prior experience sentencing under the mandatory Guide-

lines regime are more likely to depart from the Guidelines-

recommended range than their pre-Booker counterparts, suggesting

that newer judges are less anchored to the Guidelines”); id., at 1318–

1319 (“The ‘anchor’ effect of the Guidelines sentence may be more

prominent for pre-Booker appointees because these judges are more

acculturated to and experienced with constraining their sentences to

the dictates of the Guidelines. In contrast, the ‘anchor’ effect is less

prominent for post-Booker appointees. These potential anchoring

differences . . . may ‘increase as the years go by and the bench is filled

with individuals who have no history with binding guidelines’ ”); see

also, e.g., Debold §1.02(C)(1), at 1–16 (“Sentencing judges, particularly

more recent appointees, are also growing increasingly skeptical of the

Guidelines as they become more comfortable viewing the Guidelines as

advice and look deeper into the reasoning supporting (or failing to

support) the Guidelines’ recommendations”); Gertner, Supporting

Advisory Guidelines, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 261, 270 (2009) (describing

continued Guideline sentencing as the result of “the habits ingrained

during twenty years of mandatory Guideline sentencing”); Stith, The

Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discre-

tion, 117 Yale L. J. 1420, 1496–1497 (2008) (“[A]s a new generation of

prosecutors and judges enters into service, the pendulum may swing

back toward the local exercise of informed discretion, if Booker lasts

that long. But incumbent sentencing decision makers may be reluctant

to regard as unreasonable the sentences they were obliged to seek and

impose for two decades under the command and the conceit of law”).