Opinion

Marietta Robinson v. Sarah Pezzat

  • 818 F.3d 1
  • 422 U.S. App. D.C. 35
  • 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5965
  • 2016 WL 1274044
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Apr 1, 2016
Status
Published
Author
Tatel
On the bench
Garland, Tatel, Silberman
Cited by
122 cases
Authority
More cited than 90.6%

concluding that reports of dog shootings did not provide a basis for a jury to conclude that the District had notice of a pattern of likely unconstitutional conduct adequate to prove deliberate indifference where many of the reports indicated that officers shot dogs for reasons that were not unconstitutional, such as when they were being attacked, and because the police department gave officers training *255about how to identify and control dangerous dogs

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that reports of dog shootings did not provide a basis for a jury to conclude that the District had notice of a pattern of likely unconstitutional conduct adequate to prove deliberate indifference where many of the reports indicated that officers shot dogs for reasons that were not unconstitutional, such as when they were being attacked, and because the police department gave officers training *255about how to identify and control dangerous dogs
  • concluding that “police reports of dog shootings provide no basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that the District had notice of a pattern of likely unconstitutional conduct adequate to prove deliberate indifference” because reports did not demonstrate that situations were similar to the one at issue
  • explaining that a plaintiff’s testimony that is “contradicted by multiple disinterested witnesses” and “by the plaintiff herself” can be excluded from consideration on summary judgment, because the testimony is “so undermined as to be incredible”
  • holding that homeowner’s uncorroborated depo- sition testimony created an issue of fact as to the circumstances sur- rounding the shooting of the family’s dog: “Corroboration goes to credibility, a question for the jury, not the court.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 8, 2016 Decided April 1, 2016

No. 15-7040

MARIETTA ROBINSON,

APPELLANT

v.

SARAH PEZZAT, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00302)

Tobias S. Loss-Eaton argued the cause for appellant.

With him on the briefs was Frank R. Volpe.

John D. Martorana, Assistant Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor

General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General.

Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, entered an

appearance.

2

Before: GARLAND,* Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge,

and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: We return once again to the

familiar yet significant issue of the proper role of the district

court at summary judgment. In this section 1983 action,

plaintiff sought to hold police officers liable for unlawfully

seizing her property in violation of the Fourth Amendment

when the officers shot and killed her dog while executing a

search warrant. The district court granted summary judgment

to the officer who first shot the dog on the grounds that

plaintiff’s eyewitness account of the shooting was

uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence. Because

the district court improperly assumed the “jury functions” of

making “[c]redibility determinations, . . . weighing . . . the

evidence, and . . . drawing . . . legitimate inferences from the

facts,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986), we reverse this portion of the judgment. We affirm the

grant of summary judgment to another officer who shot the

dog, as well as to the District of Columbia.

I.

In the summer of 2010, the Metropolitan Police

Department (MPD) obtained a warrant to search appellant

Marietta Robinson’s home after her grandson was arrested

while in possession of marijuana. Around 9 p.m. on the

evening of June 15, a police squad consisting of nine officers

*Chief Judge Garland was a member of the panel at the time the

case was argued but did not participate in this opinion.

3

arrived at Robinson’s house to execute the warrant. In her

deposition, Robinson testified that when she heard someone

“knocking very hard” on the door, her dog Wrinkles, a

thirteen-year-old female pit bull/German shepherd mix,

“barked to let [her] know that somebody was there.”

Robinson Dep. at 15, 24. Having owned Wrinkles since she

was a puppy, Robinson acknowledged that the dog would

sometimes bark and growl when “stranger[s] [came] in the

house.” Id. at 16–17.

Robinson testified that after the police identified

themselves, she opened the inner door to her home, leaving

the screen door in place. Wrinkles barked again, then “sat

down and [was] quiet.” Id. at 23. According to several

officers, however, Wrinkles “lunge[d] out,” “showing [her]

teeth” in an aggressive manner. McLeod Dep. at 42; see also

Selby Dep. at 94; Boteler Dep. at 112. Both Robinson and the

officers agree about what happened next: Robinson asked the

lead officer, appellee Sergeant James Boteler, if she could put

Wrinkles “in the back yard or . . . in the bathroom” while the

police executed the warrant and, in response, Boteler

instructed her to place the dog in the bathroom, which was

immediately adjacent to and visible from the front door.

Robinson Dep. at 26, 31.

Boteler testified that he “yelled pretty loud” to the officers

behind him to warn them that there was a “dog in the

bathroom.” Boteler Dep. at 73–74. Officer Sarah Pezzat,

another appellee, testified that although she never heard a

warning, she knew that a dog was in the house because she

“could easily hear the dog barking and growling.” Pezzat

Dep. at 69. Pezzat also testified that she heard Boteler and

4

Robinson discussing where to put the dog and “something

about the dog being in a backroom.” Id.

When Robinson opened the front door after securing

Wrinkles, the officers rushed inside. Pezzat, with gun drawn,

was at least the fifth officer to enter the home. After several

others bypassed the bathroom, Pezzat opened the door, which

Boteler testified violated police protocol. Typically, Boteler

explained, the first officer to encounter a door would “stop,

clear that area, and then move to the next area,” unless there

was a reason not to do so, such as the presence of a dog,

which was “why several officers passed that door and did not

open that door.” Boteler Dep. at 100–02. Other officers

warned that there was a “[d]og on the left” as the search team

entered, Ledesma Dep. at 23, 46–47, and heard Wrinkles

barking. Pezzat recalled hearing no such warnings.

Robinson testified that while standing near the entryway,

she saw Pezzat open the bathroom door, “sho[o]t once, and

then Wrinkles comes running out, got up and ran out the

bathroom. Then [Pezzat] shot again. Then she backed out my

door.” Robinson Dep. at 44. Repeating the point, Robinson

testified that “[w]hen [Pezzat] shot the first time, Wrinkles got

up. And when Wrinkles got up to come towards her, then she

shot again.” Id. at 45–46. When the District of Columbia’s

attorney asked whether it was Robinson’s testimony “that

Wrinkles was on the floor—lying on the floor” in the

bathroom, Robinson replied, “Yes.” Id. at 46. Asked how she

knew that, Robinson explained, “Because when she first

opened the door—when she had the gun in her hand, at first I

. . . thought she was going to shoot me. But then when she . . .

turned the [k]nob and pushed the door, . . . it wasn’t pointed

5

towards me no more.” Id. Robinson then testified—for the

third time—that “the first shot, Wrinkles got up. . . . The

second shot, Wrinkles ran out the bathroom.” Id. at 47.

After Wrinkles made it out of the bathroom, Robinson

testified, the dog ran to her and collapsed on the ground.

Although Robinson never saw Wrinkles bite Pezzat, she

acknowledged that Wrinkles would have bitten the officer

“[i]n defense of herself, after being shot at . . . . [I]f you shoot

a dog, most likely they’re going to attack you.” Id. at 55.

Officer Pezzat had a very different view of what

happened. She testified that after opening the bathroom door,

she “saw that there was a dog inside of the room. I tried to

close the door, but it was too late. The dog was already

coming out of the room at me. And I picked up my leg to

protect myself, and the dog bit down on my foot” once “the

dog was already most of the way out of the room.” Pezzat

Dep. at 73, 81. According to Pezzat, it was at that point—after

the dog bit her—that she shot the animal. Echoing Pezzat,

another officer, appellee Christian Glynn, testified that before

Pezzat fired, Wrinkles “was barking, very angry and charged

at Officer Pezzat,” then “latched on and bit Officer Pezzat’s

foot and started shaking her” and “pulling her down and into

the bathroom.” Glynn Dep. at 58–59. Sergeant Boteler

testified that before hearing any gunfire, he too saw Wrinkles

biting Pezzat “just outside the bathroom in the hallway.”

Boteler Dep. at 104.

Although Robinson testified that Wrinkles collapsed next

to her feet after the shooting, Officer Richard McLeod, also

an appellee, testified that Wrinkles began “coming towards”

6

him, deeper into the house. McLeod Dep. at 43. Another

officer testified that McLeod fired at least a half-dozen shots

at Wrinkles, toward the front of the house. According to

Robinson, Wrinkles fled up the stairs to get away from the

shots, but McLeod kept firing. In the end, officers blocked

Wrinkles from climbing the stairs, and she died on the

landing.

According to Robinson, officers then took her clean

laundry from the top of the washing machine and “cover[ed]

the dog up and the blood up with my clean clothes.” Robinson

Dep. at 77–78. Officer Adrian Ledesma testified that they

covered Wrinkles “with like a white sheet or something like

that,” Ledesma Dep. at 33, and Boteler confirmed that he

placed one of Robinson’s sheets over Wrinkles’ body. While

searching the house, officers left bloody “fingerprints on

[Robinson’s] curtains”; “two whole [bloody] handprints” and

a third partial print on Robinson’s sofa, which she had to

throw away; bloody handprints on the walls and doors,

“inside the closet,” and “[o]n the two fans . . . in the living

room”; “smudges of blood on . . . [e]very picture that was on

the wall that came down”; and blood “splattered all over” a

painting made by Robinson’s brother, which looked like

“somebody had just took and threw blood.” Robinson Dep. at

62, 66–73. Robinson kept a water cooler “at [her] front door,”

and after the officers left, “you could see the blood where they

washed their hands. Blood there and fingerprints all over.” Id.

at 80. Robinson also saw officers “jumping on” her clothes

dryer multiple times, breaking the door. Id. at 79. Boteler

acknowledged that the police did nothing to clean up the

house, and recalled a captain saying that “the dog’s blood is

7

her property. It’s going to be up to her or her family to clean it

up, not us.” Boteler Dep. at 130–31.

Mrs. Robinson filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court

for the District of Columbia against Officers Pezzat and

McLeod, several other officers involved in the shooting and

the search, and the District of Columbia, seeking damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various D.C. statutes. Robinson

alleged, among other claims, that the officers had made illegal

seizures under the Fourth Amendment both by shooting

Wrinkles and by damaging her property during the subsequent

search.

The district court granted summary judgment for

defendants on all claims. It first found that “[t]here is no

genuine dispute that Wrinkles posed an imminent threat” to

the officers and that their conduct was thus reasonable.

Robinson v. Pezzat, 83 F. Supp. 3d 258, 267–68 (D.D.C.

2015). The court explained:

Plaintiff argues that her uncorroborated version of events

creates a genuine dispute of material fact precluding

summary judgment. I disagree. To withstand summary

judgment, a plaintiff must advance more than a scintilla

of doubt as to her claims. Unsubstantiated allegations of

harm fall short of this standard, making dismissal

imminently [sic] more likely where, as here, a plaintiff’s

claims are contradicted, and overborn, by a record of

credible evidence.

Id. (internal citations omitted). According to the court,

“several undisputed facts corroborate defendants’ account”:

8

(1) “that Wrinkles had a history of aggression,” as evidenced

both by Robinson’s statements that Wrinkles would

sometimes “bark and growl” at strangers and a veterinarian

report from 2006, which stated that Wrinkles was

“aggressive”; (2) that “Wrinkles barked and growled at the

search team, prompting plaintiff to place the dog in the

downstairs bathroom”; (3) that “Wrinkles bit, shook, and

attempted to bodily drag Officer Pezzat into the bathroom,”

injuring her; and (4) that “even after being shot, the dog

charged two other police officers stationed on the staircase,

prompting them to take cover behind a protective shield.” Id.

at 262, 267. The court concluded that “given Wrinkles’

threatening behavior, the government’s interest in

safeguarding the lives of its officers, and the pressure of split-

second decision making,” Pezzat’s and McLeod’s decisions

were “eminently reasonable.” Id. at 267.

The district court also rejected Robinson’s property-

damage claim, ruling that “[t]he damage here was reasonable

under the circumstances.” Id. at 268. The court first concluded

that “the immediate damage to plaintiff’s clothing, furniture,

and walls from Wrinkles’ shooting was incident to a

reasonable seizure and, therefore, is within the realm of

constitutionality.” Id. “[A]ny subsequent damage to plaintiff’s

personal items,” the court continued, “was the product of a

reasonable search” because, by virtue of a “broadly-worded

warrant authoriz[ing] defendants to search plaintiff’s

residence for concealed drugs,” the officers “had every

reason, indeed, every right, to search in closets, beneath sofas,

and behind picture frames for concealed drugs.” Id. As for the

bloody handprints, the court concluded that “[the] blood made

its way onto plaintiff’s fixtures as the officers turned on light

9

switches, lifted furniture, and removed wall hangings is

neither remarkable nor unduly destructive.” Id.

In granting summary judgment to the District of

Columbia, the court ruled that Robinson had failed to show

that the District could be held liable under Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The

court explained that Robinson could “point to no formal

policy sanctioning the indiscriminate killing of household

pets, let alone one that catalyzed the shooting here,” and that

MPD policy “restrict[ed] the use of deadly force to self-

defense.” Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 269. And although

Robinson had provided the court with twenty-one police

reports documenting dog shootings during home searches

between 2002 and 2009, the court found those reports

insufficient to demonstrate that the District was deliberately

indifferent to a risk of constitutional violations because “even

if these incidents placed the District on notice of domestic

animal shootings, plaintiff has tendered no evidence

suggesting that the majority of these shootings were

unconstitutional.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted). Nor, the court concluded, had Robinson “articulated

how improved training would have prevented Wrinkles’

death.” Id. at 270.

Having rejected Robinson’s federal claims, the court

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her

District of Columbia law claims. Accordingly, it dismissed

those claims without prejudice. Id. at 271.

Robinson appeals, arguing that the district court

improperly rejected her sworn testimony, which she believes

10

raises a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether

Wrinkles posed an imminent threat to Pezzat before the

shooting. Robinson raises four additional arguments: (1) that

even if her testimony could be disregarded, a jury could find

unreasonable Pezzat’s decision to open the door, which

sparked the confrontation with Wrinkles; (2) that the district

court erred in granting summary judgment on her property-

damage claim because the seizure of Wrinkles, which caused

much of the blood damage, was unreasonable, and the other

damage following the dog’s death was independently

unreasonable; (3) that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of McLeod because his decision

to shoot the dog was unreasonable; and (4) that the District of

Columbia should be liable for the officers’ actions under

Monell because it failed to provide adequate training for

police officers who encounter dogs during home searches.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo.” DeGraff v. District of Columbia, 120 F.3d 298, 301

(D.C. Cir. 1997).

II.

We begin with the demise of Wrinkles. “Every circuit

that has considered the issue has held that the killing of a

companion dog constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment.” Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th

Cir. 2008); see also Carroll v. County of Monroe, 712 F.3d

649, 651 (2d. Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). Those circuits

have invariably concluded that “the use of deadly force

against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an

immediate danger and the use of force is unavoidable.” Viilo,

547 F.3d at 710; see also San Jose Charter of the Hells

Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962,

11

975–78 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the killing of guard dogs

was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where “the

officers were not presented with exigent circumstances that

necessitated killing the dogs”); Brown v. Muhlenberg

Township, 269 F.3d 205, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

state’s interest in protecting life and property may be

implicated when there is reason to believe the pet poses an

imminent danger. In the latter case, the state’s interest may

even justify the extreme intrusion occasioned by the

destruction of the pet in the owner’s presence. This does not

mean, however, that the state may, consistent with the Fourth

Amendment, destroy a pet when it poses no immediate danger

and the owner is looking on, obviously desirous of retaining

custody.” (footnotes omitted)). As in any Fourth Amendment

case, “[w]e analyze [the] question [of whether a pet

constitutes an imminent threat] from the perspective ‘of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20

vision of hindsight.’” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012,

2020 (2014) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396

(1989)). This analysis “allow[s] for the fact that police

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.

The question for the district court, then, was whether,

given all of the circumstances and viewed from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, Wrinkles

posed an imminent threat to Officer Pezzat before the

shooting. Because the District of Columbia moved for

summary judgment, Robinson must point to admissible

evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact—that

12

is, a dispute that would allow “a reasonable jury [to] return a

verdict” in her favor—on this precise question. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248. As noted above, Robinson testified that Wrinkles

posed no threat to the police because Pezzat shot the dog

while she was lying on the floor: “[T]he first shot, Wrinkles

got up. . . . The second shot, Wrinkles ran out the bathroom.”

Robinson Dep. 47. For her part, Pezzat testified that Wrinkles

represented a threat because—before she fired her gun—the

dog “was already coming out of the room at me” and “bit

down on my foot.” Pezzat Dep. at 73. The district court

concluded that Pezzat acted reasonably because Robinson’s

“uncorroborated” testimony failed to create a genuine dispute

as to whether Wrinkles constituted an imminent threat.

Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 267. As District counsel wisely

conceded at oral argument, this was error. Oral Arg. Tr. 32

(“The Court: [T]hat the district judge said her testimony is

uncorroborated, that’s irrelevant, isn’t it? Counsel: It is.”).

In order to determine whether the moving party is entitled

to summary judgment, we, like the district court, “examine

the facts in the record and all reasonable inferences derived

therefrom in a light most favorable to” the nonmoving party,

here Mrs. Robinson. DeGraff, 120 F.3d at 299–300 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, “[t]he

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255. This mode of analysis serves to separate the “jury

functions” of making “[c]redibility determinations, . . .

weighing . . . the evidence, and . . . drawing . . . legitimate

inferences from the facts” from the district court’s role as the

arbiter of legal questions. Id. Thus, “[a]lthough a jury might

ultimately decide to credit the version of the events described

by the defendants over that offered by the plaintiff, this is not

13

a basis upon which a court may rest in granting a motion for

summary judgment.” Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d

329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Indeed, the summary judgment standard requires us to credit

the plaintiff’s version of events, even if “directly

contradictory” to other testimony. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct.

1861, 1867 (2014). The Supreme Court, rejecting a lower

court’s refusal to credit a plaintiff’s uncorroborated testimony,

recently explained it this way:

The witnesses on both sides come to th[e] case with their

own perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases.

It is in part for that reason that genuine disputes are

generally resolved by juries in our adversarial system. By

weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences

contrary to [the nonmoving party’s] competent evidence,

the court below neglect[s] to adhere to the fundamental

principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable

inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving

party.

Id. at 1868.

Given these standards, we think it quite obvious that the

uncorroborated nature of Robinson’s testimony had nothing at

all to do with the question before the district court: did

Robinson present a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether Wrinkles posed an imminent threat to Pezzat’s

safety? Corroboration goes to credibility, a question for the

jury, not the district court. Perhaps a jury will disbelieve

Robinson because her testimony was uncorroborated, but at

this stage of the litigation, the district court must “believe[]”

14

her testimony and must not make “[c]redibility

determinations.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Our decision in Arrington v. United States illustrates this

point. There, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action

alleging excessive force, claiming that “he was beaten by

police officers after he was captured, restrained, disarmed,

and handcuffed.” 473 F.3d at 331. According to the police

officers, “force was used to subdue [the plaintiff] while he

was armed and before he was in handcuffs.” Id. at 336. The

government argued that the plaintiff’s “conclusory,

unsubstantiated statements . . . unsupported by specific facts

[were] insufficient to overcome a summary judgment

motion.” Id. We rejected that argument, holding that “a

plaintiff may defeat a summary judgment granted to a

defendant if the parties’ sworn statements are materially

different.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing

Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). It made no

difference that the plaintiff’s testimony was uncorroborated.

All that mattered was that the testimony created a genuine

issue of material fact. Although acknowledging that “‘some

statements are so conclusory as to come within an exception

to that rule,’” we concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations

“f[ound] support in sworn deposition testimony filed in the

District Court.” Id. at 336, 338 (quoting Greene, 164 F.3d at

675). “Possessed of this testimony,” we explained, “a jury can

assess the validity of [the plaintiff’s] claims.” Id. at 338; see

also Harris v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 776 F.3d

907, 914–15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that conflicting

statements from plaintiff and police officers raised genuine

disputes of material fact in excessive force case); Ayissi-Etoh

v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per

15

curiam) (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate

when the plaintiff’s account of what happened during a

meeting differed from his supervisor’s recollection); Johnson

v. District of Columbia, 528 F.3d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(holding that “[s]ummary judgment was premature because

there exists a genuine issue of material fact” that could “only

be resolved by evaluating the conflicting testimony of” two

people involved in an altercation). As in Arrington, it is up to

the jury, not the district court, to “assess the validity of”

plaintiff’s uncorroborated version of events. 473 F.3d at 338.

Although the District of Columbia agrees with all of this,

it nonetheless argues that we can sustain the district court’s

rejection of Robinson’s testimony for two independent

reasons. First, the District contends that the court properly

refused to credit Robinson’s testimony because she never

expressly stated that she saw Wrinkles lying on the bathroom

floor. This, the District argues, “demonstrate[s] that Robinson

lacked personal knowledge for her allegation that the dog was

simply lying on the floor when Officer Pezzat shot it and that

it was not in fact attacking Officer Pezzat.” Appellees’ Br. 31.

We disagree. As explained above, at summary judgment we

“examine the facts in the record and all reasonable inferences

derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

DeGraff, 120 F.3d at 299–300 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Given Robinson’s testimony that she saw Pezzat

open the door, her answering “yes” to the question whether

she intended to testify that “Wrinkles was . . . lying on the

floor” in the bathroom, Robinson Dep. at 46, and her repeated

statements that Wrinkles “got up” after Pezzat fired, a jury

could reasonably infer that Robinson saw Wrinkles lying on

the bathroom floor.

16

The District insists that such an inference is unjustified

because when its lawyer asked Robinson how she knew

Wrinkles was lying down, Robinson “refused to say she

actually saw these events,” and instead gave an answer not

directly responsive to counsel’s question. Appellees’ Br. 30.

Again, we disagree. Accepting the District’s argument would

require that we draw an inference against Robinson

notwithstanding her testimony explaining that she witnessed

the scene and describing the precise order of events. We may

not draw such an inference at summary judgment.

The District of Columbia next argues that we can sustain

the district court’s rejection of Robinson’s testimony because,

according to the District, the weight of evidence corroborating

the officers’ accounts fatally undermined Robinson’s

credibility. In support, the District invokes our decision in

Johnson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,

in which we recognized that a district court may “lawfully put

aside testimony that is so undermined as to be incredible.”

883 F.2d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1989), abrogated on other

grounds by Robinson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1255,

1258 (D.C. 1990). This circumstance, we explained, was

“most likely when a plaintiff’s claim is supported solely by

the plaintiff’s own self-serving testimony, unsupported by

corroborating evidence, and undermined either by other

credible evidence, physical impossibility or other persuasive

evidence that the plaintiff has deliberately committed

perjury.” Id. Evidence satisfying this standard, such as a video

tape that “quite clearly” demonstrates the falsity of the

plaintiff’s statement, rarely exists. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 378 (2007). Indeed, in Johnson we identified only two

instances in which this circuit rejected a plaintiff’s testimony

17

as “so undermined as to be incredible,” both of which

involved testimony contradicted by multiple disinterested

witnesses and, in one case, by the plaintiff herself. See

Johnson, 883 F.2d at 128–29 (citing Law v. Virginia Stage

Lines, 444 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Washington,

Marlboro & Annapolis Motor Lines v. Maske, 190 F.2d 621

(D.C. Cir. 1951)).

In this case, the district court rejected Robinson’s

testimony because, in addition to it being uncorroborated,

Wrinkles had a “history of aggression” (based primarily on

the 2006 veterinary report), “barked and growled at the search

team,” bit Pezzat, and “charged” the officers standing on the

stairs after McLeod shot the dog. Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at

262, 267. In our view, however, none of this evidence is

remotely compelling enough to require a jury to disregard

Robinson’s testimony as “so undermined as to be incredible.”

Johnson, 883 F.2d at 128. A jury could regard the years-old

veterinary report and Wrinkles’ barking at the police—as

would most any self-respecting dog—to be of limited

probative value to the question of exactly what happened

when Pezzat opened the bathroom door. If the jury believed

Robinson’s testimony that Wrinkles was lying down, it could

reasonably conclude that the dog acted aggressively toward

Pezzat only after being shot. Finally, a jury could either credit

Robinson’s testimony that the dog ran up the stairs to escape

McLeod or conclude that Wrinkles’ behavior after being shot

was of limited probative value.

To sum up, then, viewing the facts and all reasonable

inferences most favorably to Robinson, we believe that a jury

18

could conclude that Pezzat acted unreasonably in shooting

Wrinkles. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

Seeking to avoid this result, the District urges us to affirm

on an alternative ground, i.e., that Pezzat is entitled to

qualified immunity because she violated no clearly

established law. “[Q]ualified immunity protects government

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

This argument comes too late. In the district court, the District

of Columbia argued only that Robinson suffered no

constitutional injury; it never argued that the officers were

entitled to qualified immunity on clearly established law

grounds. See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 16–18, 23–25. This

argument is thus forfeited. See, e.g., District of Columbia v.

Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“It is

well settled that issues and legal theories not asserted at the

District Court level ordinarily will not be heard on appeal.”).

Given that we are reversing the grant of summary

judgment to Officer Pezzat, we shall also reverse the grant of

summary judgment in favor of the officers on Robinson’s

claim that they violated the Fourth Amendment by

unreasonably destroying her personal property during the

shooting. As the district court observed, this claim is

intertwined with Wrinkles’ seizure. See Robinson, 83 F. Supp.

3d at 268. And because the district court will have to

reconsider its property-damage analysis, we think it unwise at

this point to consider whether the post-shooting damage was

19

independently unreasonable. Finally, because the district court

never addressed Robinson’s argument that a reasonable jury

could find that Pezzat acted unreasonably when she opened

the bathroom door, we decline to consider that issue as well.

III.

We can easily dispose of Mrs. Robinson’s claim that

Officer McLeod acted unreasonably when he shot Wrinkles.

Robinson does not dispute that Wrinkles had bitten Officer

Pezzat and had run out of the bathroom by the time McLeod

began firing. Nor does she dispute that events unfolded

quickly—within a matter of seconds. Even were a jury to

credit Robinson’s testimony that Wrinkles ran to her and

collapsed on the floor, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount

of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham,

490 U.S. at 396–97. Given that Wrinkles bit Officer Pezzat

hard enough to puncture her leather boots, McLeod’s belief—

just seconds later—that the dog continued to pose an

imminent threat even absent additional aggressive behavior

was hardly unreasonable. We shall thus affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer McLeod on this

issue.

Mrs. Robinson’s claim against the District requires a little

more discussion. She argues that the District may be held

liable for Pezzat’s conduct under Monell because the MPD

“failed to provide training to address a clear risk of

constitutional violations” arising from dog shootings.

Appellant’s Br. 57. According to Robinson, this lack of

20

training contributed to a constitutional violation because “the

search team arrived at Mrs. Robinson’s home with no plan to

deal with any animals they might encounter” or “protocol for

ensuring that each officer knew where Wrinkles was

secured.” Id. at 64.

A plaintiff may establish a “policy or custom” under

Monell by “the failure of the government to respond to a need

(for example, training of employees) in such a manner as to

show deliberate indifference to the risk that not addressing the

need will result in constitutional violations.” Baker v. District

of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Deliberate indifference is

determined by analyzing whether the municipality knew or

should have known of the risk of constitutional violations, an

objective standard.” Id. at 1307. Because a finding of liability

in the context of a failure to train amounts to a judicial

determination that “the city itself [decided] to violate the

Constitution,” the Supreme Court has imposed “a stringent

standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor

disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62 (2011) (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted). “A pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is

ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for

purposes of failure to train,” although there are rare

circumstances in which “the unconstitutional consequences of

failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city could

be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern

of violations.” Id. at 62, 64 (internal quotation marks

omitted). In the case of police officers, it will not

21

suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have

been avoided if an officer had had better or more training,

sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-

causing conduct. Such a claim could be made about

almost any encounter resulting in injury, yet not condemn

the adequacy of the program to enable officers to respond

properly to the usual and recurring situations with which

they must deal.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).

In this case, the district court found that the seven years’

worth of police reports of dog shootings were insufficient to

establish deliberate indifference because they gave no

indication “that the majority of these shootings were

unconstitutional.” Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 269. Robinson

nonetheless contends that the district court disregarded the

risk that officers would encounter dogs during home searches

and that some of those encounters would result in unnecessary

shootings. In support, she relies on our decision in Smith v.

District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in

which we held the District liable under Monell where it had

failed to establish any standards at all for selecting

independent living programs with which it placed at-risk

youth, leading to a situation in which children “could be sent

to totally inappropriate programs run by unqualified

counselors and located in unsafe areas,” risks that “were

realized” when a substandard provider “failed to react to the

murder of one youth and the armed robbery of another.”

Under those circumstances, the jury “may infer deliberate

indifference from the District’s failure to have adequate

safeguards for dealing with situations fraught with risk.” Id.

22

The situation here is very different from the one we

confronted in Smith. Unlike there, the District has municipal

regulations governing the conduct at issue. Those regulations

allow police officers to discharge their firearms only in

specified circumstances, including “[t]o kill a dangerous

animal” and “[t]o defend him or herself or another from an

attack which the officer has reasonable cause to believe could

result in death or serious bodily injury.” 6A DCMR §

207.2(a), (c). The MPD manual likewise authorizes the use of

deadly force only “[w]hen it is necessary and objectively

reasonable . . . [t]o defend [the officer] or another from an

actual or threatened attack that is imminent and could result in

death or serious bodily injury.” Metropolitan Police, General

Order GO-RAR-901.07, at 7 (2002). Unlike in Smith,

moreover, where the District had provided employees with no

relevant training, here the MPD gives officers specific

training about how to identify and control dangerous dogs.

Even if, as Robinson insists, the MPD could improve its

training, Monell requires a plaintiff to do more than “prove

that an injury or accident could have been avoided if an

officer had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him

to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct.” City of

Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. We also agree with the district court

that the police reports of dog shootings provide no basis for a

reasonable jury to conclude that the District had notice of a

pattern of likely unconstitutional conduct adequate to prove

deliberate indifference. Indeed, the reports that contain any

detail at all invariably indicate that the dogs attacked the

police officers, and thus fail to establish “[a] pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees” or

demonstrate such a risky environment that “the

unconstitutional consequences of failing to train [were] so

23

patently obvious” that the city’s reaction rises to “the

functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate

the Constitution.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61–64.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the grant of

summary judgment to Officer Sarah Pezzat and affirm as to

Officer Richard McLeod and the District of Columbia.

Because we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Officer

Pezzat, we also reverse the court’s dismissal of Mrs.

Robinson’s District of Columbia law claims.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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