Vaughn v. City of Carbondale

2016 IL 119181

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 119181)

JEFFREY W. VAUGHN, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF CARBONDALE,

Appellant.

Opinion filed March 24, 2016.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Karmeier, Burke, and

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 At issue in this case is whether defendant, the city of Carbondale, Illinois, is

obligated to continue to pay the entire premium of its health insurance plan for

plaintiff, Jeffrey W. Vaughn, and his family, pursuant to section 10 of the Public

Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2012)). The circuit

court of Jackson County denied plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief, which

sought to prevent defendant from terminating plaintiff’s section 10 health insurance

coverage. The Appellate Court, Fifth District, reversed. 2015 IL App (5th) 140122.

This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff.

Jan. 1, 2015). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the appellate court.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Because this case has a lengthy history leading to the instant action, some of

which overlaps with this case, we will set forth the background in some detail. On

June 28, 2005, plaintiff was employed as a police officer for defendant’s police

department. Plaintiff was on duty that morning, driving his patrol car in the

University Mall parking lot. A motorist stopped plaintiff and asked him for

directions, so plaintiff parked his patrol car by the curb of an island in the parking

lot and went over to talk to the motorist. Plaintiff left the driver’s side door of his

vehicle open. While plaintiff was outside his patrol car talking to the motorist, a

Carbondale police department dispatcher called for plaintiff to respond over the

radio. Plaintiff had a portable radio on his uniform when he received the call from

dispatch, but the portable radio was turned off. Plaintiff returned to his patrol car to

answer the call, reaching headfirst through the driver’s side door in order to reach

the microphone. As plaintiff was reaching inside the vehicle, he struck the top of

his head on the door frame, causing him to “see stars” and experience a sharp pain

in his arm. Plaintiff did not sustain an abrasion or blood loss.

¶4 Plaintiff reported the incident to his shift supervisor. The next day, plaintiff

went to see his primary care physician. Plaintiff was off work from June 28, 2005,

to July 4, 2005. On July 19, 2005, plaintiff returned to his primary care physician

because his left arm and back were giving him pain. An MRI showed a

compression fracture of plaintiff’s T1-T3 vertebrae. Plaintiff never returned to

work with the police department following his second appointment with his

primary care physician.

¶5 On April 11, 2007, plaintiff filed an application with the Carbondale Police

Pension Board (Board) for a line-of-duty disability pension under section 3-114.1

of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-114.1 (West 2008)). The Board found

that plaintiff’s disability was not the result of an on-duty injury and also found that

plaintiff was not disabled to the extent that he was unable to return to work as a

patrol officer.

¶6 Plaintiff then filed a complaint for administrative review, and the circuit court

of Jackson County reversed the Board’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the

circuit court. Vaughn v. Carbondale Police Pension Board, No. 5-10-0293 (2011)

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

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¶7 On January 26, 2012, plaintiff sent defendant a letter requesting that defendant

provide plaintiff with health insurance coverage in accordance with section 10 of

the Act. Defendant thereafter began providing plaintiff and his family with health

insurance coverage.

¶8 Also in 2012, the Board directed plaintiff to submit to a physical examination,

as required by the Illinois Pension Code. See 40 ILCS 5/3-115, 3-116 (West 2012).

Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Jeffrey Ripperda in May 2012. Following his

examination of plaintiff, Dr. Ripperda concluded that plaintiff was physically able

to return to work as a police officer. Dr. Ripperda submitted his findings to the

Board.

¶9 On June 26, 2012, at a previously scheduled meeting, the Board discussed

whether plaintiff’s disability pension should be terminated. The Board voted to

accept Dr. Ripperda’s report and to terminate plaintiff’s disability pension in light

of Dr. Ripperda’s reported findings. On or about July 9, 2012, the Board notified

plaintiff by letter that it had voted to terminate plaintiff’s pension benefits effective

June 26, 2012.

¶ 10 On August 3, 2012, plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing with the Board,

alleging that he had a meritorious defense to the termination of his pension benefits,

and that he had not received notice of the meeting where the Board had voted to

terminate his pension benefits. On August 7, 2012, plaintiff also filed a complaint

for administrative review of the Board’s decision in the circuit court of Jackson

County. On August 31, 2012, the Board sent plaintiff’s counsel a letter advising

that the Board had voted to deny plaintiff’s petition for rehearing.

¶ 11 Thereafter, on June 14, 2013, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision to

terminate plaintiff’s pension benefits, holding that the Board’s finding that the

plaintiff was no longer disabled was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider in the circuit court, noting that the

circuit court’s decision did not address plaintiff’s claim that the Board had denied

him procedural due process when it failed to give him adequate notice of the

meeting at which his benefits were terminated. The circuit court denied plaintiff’s

motion to reconsider on August 28, 2013.

¶ 12 Plaintiff then filed an appeal of the Board’s decision terminating his pension

benefits. The appellate court reversed the circuit court in an order entered on June

30, 2014, finding that the Board had violated plaintiff’s due process rights by

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unilaterally voting to terminate plaintiff’s disability pension without notice or a

proper hearing. Vaughn v. Carbondale Police Pension Board, 2014 IL App (5th)

130457-U. The appellate court did not address whether the Board’s determination

that plaintiff was no longer disabled was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 13 Relevant to the instant appeal, following the Board’s finding that plaintiff was

no longer disabled, defendant sent plaintiff a letter dated July 17, 2012, notifying

him that his coverage under the defendant’s group health benefit plan would end on

August 31, 2012, and informing him of his rights and obligations regarding

continuation of group health coverage pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) (29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (2012)).

¶ 14 On September 4, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the

circuit court of Jackson County, asking the court to preserve his right to health

insurance coverage under section 10 of the Act. The circuit court entered an order

granting plaintiff’s petition for preliminary injunction on September 17, 2012.

However, on February 21, 2014, while the appeal of the circuit court’s order

affirming the termination of plaintiff’s pension benefits was pending, the circuit

court entered an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and denying plaintiff’s

request for a permanent injunction.

¶ 15 In its order denying the complaint for injunctive relief, the circuit court noted

that plaintiff asserted he was entitled to insurance coverage for life under section 10

of the Act, and that he began receiving insurance benefits based upon a letter sent to

defendant citing the Act. In response, defendant submitted an affidavit denying that

it had provided insurance pursuant to the Act. Defendant’s affidavit claimed that

insurance was provided pursuant to plaintiff’s disability pension.

¶ 16 The circuit court then observed that in order to be covered by section 10 of the

Act, a police officer must meet two requirements. First, the officer must suffer a

catastrophic injury in the line of duty. Second, the injury must have occurred as a

result of the officer’s response to a fresh pursuit, a response to what is reasonably

believed to be an emergency, in response to an unlawful act perpetrated by another,

or during the investigation of a criminal act. The circuit court held that plaintiff

could not establish a clear and palpable right to insurance coverage because he

could not meet the first requirement of section 10: a catastrophic injury in the line

of duty. The circuit court stated that plaintiff’s injury could not be catastrophic,

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given the Board’s finding that plaintiff was able to return to work. The circuit court

found that even if plaintiff’s insurance benefits had been provided under the Act, it

did not follow that plaintiff and his family were entitled to continued benefits under

the Act, in light of the fact that plaintiff had been found to have recovered from his

disability.

¶ 17 Plaintiff appealed the circuit court’s decision denying his complaint for

injunctive relief. The appellate court reversed the circuit court. 2015 IL App (5th)

140122. In reversing the circuit court, the appellate court first noted that the circuit

court’s reason for denying health insurance benefits under the Act was no longer

applicable. Id. ¶ 10. The circuit court had reasoned that, given the Board’s

termination of plaintiff’s line-of-duty pension benefits on the ground that plaintiff

had recovered from his disability, plaintiff had not suffered a catastrophic injury for

purposes of section 10. However, the appellate court in the termination of benefits

appeal had since reversed that decision and had reinstated plaintiff’s line-of-duty

pension benefits, finding that plaintiff had been denied procedural due process.

¶ 18 Because plaintiff’s line-of-duty pension benefits had been reinstated, the

appellate court in this case looked to the decisions in Krohe v. City of Bloomington,

204 Ill. 2d 392 (2003), and Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills, 2011 IL 111838,

where the courts held that a “catastrophic injury” as used in section 10 of the Act

was synonymous with an injury resulting in the awarding of a line-of-duty

disability pension under section 4-110 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS

5/4-110 (West 2012)). 2015 IL App (5th) 140122, ¶¶ 9, 10. Based upon those

decisions, plaintiff had suffered a catastrophic injury within the meaning of section

10(a) of the Act because he currently was receiving a line-of-duty disability

pension under section 4-110 of the Illinois Pension Code. Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 19 The appellate court next held that plaintiff’s work-related injury occurred as a

result of his response to what he reasonably believed was an emergency, one of the

circumstances set forth in section 10(b) of the Act. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff, therefore, met

the requirements of section 10 of the Act, and was entitled to the health benefits

therein. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and

remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision.

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¶ 20 ANALYSIS

¶ 21 Our analysis in this case is governed by section 10 of the Act. That statute

provides, in relevant part:

“(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or

correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, on or after the effective date

of this Act suffers a catastrophic injury *** shall pay the entire premium of the

employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured

employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee ***.

***

(b) In order for the law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation

officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible for insurance

coverage under this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of

the officer’s response to fresh pursuit, the officer or firefighter’s response to

what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by

another, or during the investigation of a criminal act.” 820 ILCS 320/10 (West

2012).

¶ 22 As noted, the instant case arose from plaintiff’s appeal of the circuit court’s

order denying his complaint for injunctive relief. Generally, a reviewing court will

not overturn a trial court’s order concerning a permanent injunction unless that

order is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Swigert v. Gillespie, 2012 IL

App (4th) 120043, ¶ 28. However, when the appeal of an order granting or denying

a permanent injunction involves a question of law, the standard of review is

de novo. Id.

¶ 23 The issue in this case is whether, under the facts of the case, plaintiff was

entitled to benefits under section 10 of the Act. Accordingly, because the appeal

involves a question of fact, the standard of review is whether the trial court’s order

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. A judgment is against the manifest

weight of the evidence only when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary,

or not based on evidence, or when an opposite conclusion is apparent. Leonardi v.

Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106 (1995).

¶ 24 In this court, defendant does not dispute that plaintiff suffered a catastrophic

injury for purposes of section 10(a) in this case. As the court recently reiterated, “a

pension board’s award of a line-of-duty disability pension establishes that the

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public safety employee suffered a catastrophic injury as required by section 10(a)

of the Act.” Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 25.

¶ 25 Defendant, however, notes that section 10 not only requires a catastrophic

injury, but also provides that the injury must have occurred in one of the four

situations specified in section 10(b) of the Act. The parties agree that plaintiff’s

injury did not occur in response to fresh pursuit, an unlawful act perpetrated by

another, or during the investigation of a criminal act. Therefore, the only applicable

situation is if plaintiff’s injury occurred in response to what is reasonably believed

to be an emergency.

¶ 26 The court in Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection

District, 2012 IL 110012, addressed the meaning of the term emergency for

purposes of section 10(b). Gaffney involved two consolidated cases where plaintiff

firefighters sought continuing health insurance coverage benefits under section 10

of the Act.

¶ 27 The plaintiff in the Gaffney case was injured during a training exercise

involving a live fire on the third floor of a building. Id. ¶ 8. Gaffney’s crew

responded to the exercise with their engine’s lights and sirens activated. Id.

Gaffney’s crew was instructed to advance a hose line to the seat of the fire and to

search for victims along the way. Id. ¶ 9. The hose became entangled as Gaffney’s

crew was advancing from the second floor to the third floor, with no visibility,

through smoke and obstacles. Id. ¶ 8. Gaffney followed the hose back to where it

was entangled, in what turned out to be a “loveseat type chair.” Id. ¶ 6. Gaffney

flipped the loveseat backward and injured his shoulder, resulting in a catastrophic

injury. Id. ¶ 8.

¶ 28 The plaintiff in the case consolidated with Gaffney’s case, Lemmenes, also was

injured while participating in a training exercise. The training did not involve a live

fire, but the firefighters’ masks were blacked out to simulate live fire conditions. Id.

¶ 23. The firefighters were instructed to advance a hose line into the building along

a predetermined path and to rescue a “downed firefighter.” Id. ¶ 24. Lemmenes was

injured while “ ‘twisting and turning and pulling this [downed firefighter] trying to

free him’ from an unknown obstacle.” Id. ¶ 22. Lemmenes also suffered a

catastrophic injury as a result of the exercise. Id.

¶ 29 Both Gaffney and Lemmenes claimed that they were entitled to continuing

health insurance benefits under section 10 of the Act because they each had

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suffered catastrophic injuries, and those injuries occurred “in response to what is

reasonably believed to be an emergency” as set forth in section 10(b). As in this

case, the parties agreed that each plaintiff had suffered a catastrophic injury, and

disputed only whether the injuries occurred in response to what was reasonably

believed to be an emergency.

¶ 30 In addressing the emergency requirement set forth in section 10(b) of the Act,

the Gaffney court held:

“the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘emergency’ in section 10(b) is an

unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or property

requiring an urgent response. To be entitled to continuing health coverage

benefits under section 10(b), the injury must occur in response to what is

reasonably believed to be an unforeseen circumstance involving imminent

danger to a person or property requiring an urgent response.” Gaffney, 2012 IL

110012, ¶ 64.

¶ 31 The Gaffney court concluded that Gaffney’s belief that he was responding to an

emergency during the training exercise was reasonable and fell within the purview

of the Act. Id. ¶ 69. The court noted that after Gaffney’s training exercise began, the

hose line became tangled in an unseen object, which was an unforeseen

circumstance. Id. ¶ 65. Further, the response to that event also was unforeseen,

because Gaffney was required to follow the hose line back to the obstruction and

free the hose, with no visibility and with the risk of becoming disoriented in the

smoke filled building. Id. Those unforeseen circumstances involved imminent

danger to a person or property requiring an urgent response, because the crew was

stranded on the stairwell to the third floor of the burning building with no visibility

and no water to put out the fire, given the tangled hose line. Id. ¶ 66. The court

concluded that in those minutes, when something went wrong in the training

exercise, the training exercise turned into an emergency, so that Gaffney’s injury

fell within section 10(b) of the Act. Id. ¶ 67.

¶ 32 In contrast, the Gaffney court found the facts in Lemmenes’ case did not

establish any unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or

property requiring an urgent response. Id. ¶ 77. Lemmenes understood he was

participating in a training exercise, which was conducted under planned, controlled

conditions. Id. The training exercise did not involve a live fire, nor was there any

smoke in the structure. Id. ¶ 78. No one was in imminent danger during the

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exercise. Id. No unexpected or unforeseen developments arose during that training

exercise. Id. ¶ 77. Therefore, the circumstances in Lemmenes’ case did not satisfy

the requirements of section 10(b). Id. ¶ 79.

¶ 33 In reversing the circuit court, the appellate court in this case cited Gaffney, as

well as the appellate court decisions in Springborn v. Village of Sugar Grove, 2013

IL App (2d) 120861, and Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 2014 IL App

(1st) 123402.

¶ 34 Springborn was a consolidated case concerning whether two police officers

were responding to emergencies for purposes of section 10(b) of the Act when they

suffered catastrophic injuries. Officer Springborn had observed a mass of asphalt

chunks on a major highway, so he activated his emergency lights and parked

behind the chunks of asphalt in the highway. Springborn, 2013 IL App (2d)

120861, ¶¶ 8-10. While clearing the highway of the asphalt chunks, Springborn

slipped and injured his back, suffering a catastrophic injury. Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 35 Officer Cecala, the officer whose case was consolidated with Springborn’s

case, was dispatched to investigate a traffic accident and possible case of driving

under the influence. Id. ¶ 15. Cecala headed to the scene with his emergency lights

and siren activated. Id. When he arrived on the scene, Cecala observed a traffic

signal lying in the road and a truck against a tree at a corner of the intersection. Id.

Cecala was concerned not only because the pole posed a roadway obstruction, but

also because its wires had been pulled out of the ground and were still live. Id.

Cecala parked his squad car behind the signal pole and activated his emergency

lights, as well as his squad car’s directional signal. Id. ¶ 16. Cecala was

catastrophically injured as he was manually moving the pole off the roadway.

¶ 36 The Springborn court found that both Officer Springborn and Officer Cecala

believed that they were facing emergencies, and that their subjective beliefs about

the presence of an emergency were reasonable. Id. ¶ 36. The Springborn court also

found that each situation presented imminent danger, requiring an urgent response,

and that the particular circumstances of each event were not foreseeable. Id.

Accordingly, both officers were entitled to benefits under section 10 of the Act.

¶ 37 In Pedersen, the plaintiff firefighter responded to a call regarding a tanker truck

on fire on an Illinois toll road. After the fire was extinguished, plaintiff was

cleaning the scene and packing equipment. Pedersen, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402,

¶ 7. The fire engine remained positioned to protect the firefighters, with its

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emergency lights still activated. Id. Plaintiff was moving a reflective triangle from

the tanker truck, within feet of the fire engine, when the fire engine’s siren

inadvertently and unexpectedly activated, causing plaintiff to become

catastrophically disabled due to hearing loss. Id.

¶ 38 The Pedersen court found that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to believe the

emergency was ongoing and that the scene remained dangerous. Id. ¶ 60.

Therefore, the plaintiff was injured as a result of an unforeseen circumstance

involving imminent danger to a person or property, requiring an urgent response, so

that the plaintiff was entitled to benefits under section 10 of the Act. Id.

¶ 39 Based upon the preceding cases, the appellate court in this case concluded that

plaintiff was entitled to benefits under section 10 of the Act. The appellate court

noted that plaintiff was returning to his patrol car in order to answer a call from

dispatch when he suffered his work-related injury. The court stated:

“The plaintiff’s affidavit indicated that a call from dispatch was one means

in which the officers are notified of an emergency. Although we recognize that

there was no evidence presented that this dispatch call resulted in an emergency

situation, it is an officer’s duty to respond to dispatch calls in a timely manner

and be prepared for any eventuality. An officer cannot know the nature of the

call until he responds. Therefore, until the officer is able to eliminate the

possibility that the dispatch call is an emergency, the officer treats the call as if

it were such. Like Springborn, the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s

injury are no less dire because it fell within the kinds of events that police

officers anticipate encountering in their daily duties. The evidence established

that the plaintiff was engaged in the act of responding to what he believed was a

potential emergency that could have, based on the fact that a radio call from

dispatch was a means of communication concerning an emergency situation,

involved imminent danger to a person or property and therefore required an

urgent response. Accordingly, we conclude that these facts establish that the

plaintiff’s injury was incurred as a result of his response to what he reasonably

believed was an emergency.” 2015 IL App (5th) 140122, ¶ 19.

¶ 40 Defendant argues that the appellate court’s holding essentially has added a fifth

basis for recovery to section 10(b): an injury occurring while responding to any call

by a superior, until such time as that call is determined not to be an emergency.

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Defendant maintains that the appellate court’s reading of the statute improperly

expands section 10(b).

¶ 41 Plaintiff responds that he was injured when he was responding to what he

reasonably could have believed was an emergency call. Plaintiff states that all

actions that he took, which resulted in his injury, were before he had any

knowledge of the nature of dispatch’s call. Plaintiff asserts that this court should

review the facts from his subjective perspective at the time of the call and at the

time he made his response, not at a later time.

¶ 42 We agree with defendant that the facts of this case do not fit within the

emergency situation set forth in section 10(b). The facts of this case are more

analogous to the facts in Lemmenes’ case than the facts of Gaffney’s case, or the

fact situations presented in Springborn and Pedersen. That a call from dispatch

potentially could evolve into an emergency situation for purposes of section 10(b)

of the Act does not mean that every call from dispatch is an emergency until proven

otherwise. Answering a call from dispatch is not an unforeseen circumstance. No

unexpected or unforeseen developments arose while plaintiff was answering the

call from dispatch. Moreover, there are no facts establishing any imminent danger

to a person or property requiring an urgent response surrounding the call from

dispatch. For those reasons, there is no evidence that plaintiff’s injury was suffered

in response to what was reasonably believed to be an emergency. Accordingly, the

circuit court’s order denying plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence, as plaintiff was not eligible for

insurance coverage under section 10 of the Act.

¶ 43 In so holding, we note that although the appellate court acknowledged that this

case arose from the circuit court’s denial of plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive

relief, the appellate court simply cited the black letter law concerning permanent

injunctions, and did not otherwise analyze whether plaintiff was entitled to a

permanent injunction. The appellate court’s order simply held that the facts

established that plaintiff’s injury was incurred as a result of his response to what he

reasonably believed was an emergency. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the

judgment of the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with

its decision, presumably finding that plaintiff had established the elements

necessary to issue a permanent injunction.

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¶ 44 To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a party “must demonstrate (1) a clear

and ascertainable right in need of protection, (2) that he or she will suffer

irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, and (3) that no adequate remedy at

law exists.” Swigert, 2012 IL App (4th) 120043, ¶ 27. Because we find that

plaintiff’s injury did not occur as a result of one of the conditions of section 10(b) of

the Act, it follows that plaintiff did not demonstrate a clear and ascertainable right

in need of protection, and therefore was not entitled to a permanent injunction. We

find that the circuit court correctly denied plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief,

albeit for different reasons than those set forth by the circuit court. As a reviewing

court, this court can sustain the decision of a lower court on any grounds called for

in the record, regardless of whether the lower court relied upon those grounds, or

whether the lower court’s reasoning was correct. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 97.

¶ 45 In his complaint for injunctive relief, plaintiff also alleged that defendant

cannot terminate the payment of plaintiff’s section 10 benefits except as set forth in

sections 10(a)(2) and (3) of the Act. Those sections provide:

“(2) It is unlawful for a person to willfully and knowingly make, or cause to

be made, or to assist, conspire with, or urge another to make, or cause to be

made, any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement to obtain

health insurance coverage as provided under this Section. A violation of this

item is a Class A misdemeanor.

(3) Upon conviction for a violation described in item (2), a law

enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or other beneficiary

who receives or seeks to receive health insurance benefits under this Section

shall forfeit the right to receive health insurance benefits and shall reimburse

the employer for all benefits paid due to the fraud or other prohibited activity.”

820 ILCS 320/10(a)(2), (3) (West 2012).

¶ 46 Plaintiff maintains that the provisions of section 10 set forth the sole basis for

termination of section 10 benefits. Plaintiff argues that because he has not been

convicted of any charge or allegation as set forth in section 10, his benefits, having

been provided, cannot now be terminated.

¶ 47 As the court noted in Gaffney, the Act does not provide any guidance on the

proper procedure for seeking section 10 benefits. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 44.

The statute “only mandates that an employer shall provide the benefits if the

specified requirements are met.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Those requirements are that

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the party seeking benefits suffered a catastrophic injury and that the injury or death

occurred in one of the four situations specified in section 10(b). Section 10

expressly states that, “[i]n order *** to be eligible for insurance coverage under this

Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of *** the officer or

firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency.”

(Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2012). Here, plaintiff’s injury did

not occur as the result of a response to what was reasonably believed to be an

emergency. Consequently, plaintiff was not eligible for insurance benefits under

section 10 of the Act in the first place. Defendant, therefore, was not statutorily

mandated to provide those benefits, and was not prohibited from terminating

payment of those benefits.

¶ 48 Finally, plaintiff argues that defendant is equitably estopped from terminating

plaintiff’s health insurance benefits under section 10. Equitable estoppel may apply

against municipalities in extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Patrick

Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 35. In order to apply

equitable estoppel against a municipality, a plaintiff “must plead specific facts that

show (1) an affirmative act by either the municipality itself or an official with

express authority to bind the municipality; and (2) reasonable reliance upon that act

by the plaintiff that induces the plaintiff to detrimentally change its position.” Id.

¶ 40. The usual elements of estoppel are further supplemented with the additional

restriction that a public body will be estopped only when necessary to prevent fraud

or injustice, particularly when public revenues are involved. Rockford Life

Insurance Co. v. Department of Revenue, 112 Ill. 2d 174, 185-86 (1986).

¶ 49 Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s provision of health insurance to plaintiff,

without objection, was an affirmative act. Moreover, plaintiff states that he

reasonably relied upon defendant’s provision of health insurance benefits, which

induced him to detrimentally change his position and drop the health insurance he

had at the time. Plaintiff maintains that defendant is thereby equitably estopped

from now terminating plaintiff’s health insurance.

¶ 50 We disagree with plaintiff that he detrimentally changed his position when he

dropped his health insurance in reasonable reliance on defendant’s provision of

health insurance benefits. The fact that defendant will no longer pay the entire

premium of its health insurance plan for plaintiff and his family does not prevent

plaintiff from continuing his health insurance coverage under COBRA, or from

obtaining his own health insurance pursuant to the Patient Protection and

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Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2012)). The fact that plaintiff now

will have to pay some or all of his health insurance premiums does not constitute a

detrimental change in position for purposes of equitable estoppel, let alone rise to

the level of fraud or injustice. Considerations of equitable estoppel do not bar

defendant from terminating plaintiff’s section 10 health insurance benefit.

¶ 51 We therefore reverse the appellate court’s decision, which reversed the circuit

court’s order denying plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief. We find that

plaintiff was not entitled to a permanent injunction, and, for the reasons set forth

herein, affirm the circuit court’s order denying plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive

relief.

¶ 52 Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 53 Circuit court judgment affirmed.

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