indicating that the “court must ensure that the judgment is supported by express factual findings that are based on record evidence, are sufficient to support the result, and are sufficient to inform the parties and any reviewing court of the basis for the decision”
How later courts described this case
- indicating that the “court must ensure that the judgment is supported by express factual findings that are based on record evidence, are sufficient to support the result, and are sufficient to inform the parties and any reviewing court of the basis for the decision”
- explaining that “when a motion for findings has been timely filed and denied, we cannot infer findings from the evidence in the record” (quotation marks and alteration omitted)
- explaining that when a court denies a motion for further findings of fact, we cannot infer any findings the court did not expressly include in its judgment
- confining appellate review to the trial court’s explicit findings that are supported by the record when a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law has been filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 43
Docket: Yor-15-188
Submitted
On Briefs: September 28, 2015
Decided: March 24, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
JAMES A. EHRET
v.
DEBORAH B. EHRET
JABAR, J.
[¶1] James A. Ehret appeals from a judgment of divorce from Deborah B.
Ehret entered by the District Court (York, Janelle, J.). He contends that the court
erred in determining his gross income and abused its discretion in awarding
spousal support and distributing the parties’ marital property. We vacate the
judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶2] The trial court’s supported factual findings provide the following
limited background for this appeal. James and Deborah were married in July 1988.
They are the parents of an adult son, an adult daughter, and a minor son. James is
an airline pilot and has a greater earning capacity than Deborah. Due to her
2
physical and mental health issues, Deborah has a limited ability to work and has
worked little in recent years.
[¶3] In April 2013, James filed a complaint for divorce. The court held a
contested three-day hearing in January 2015, during which Deborah requested an
award of spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per month. On March 4, 2015,
the court entered a judgment of divorce and parental rights and responsibilities
regarding the parties’ minor son.
[¶4] In its judgment, the court recited the parties’ agreement that their minor
son needed to be placed in a residential program to treat his behavioral and mental
health issues, and it crafted a parental rights order that allocated the right to
provide primary residence of the minor son based upon the contingencies of the
son’s placement. During an “interim period”—commencing on the date of the
judgment and terminating upon the son’s completion of or discharge from a
residential treatment program—primary residence was granted to James. The court
approved a deviation from the child support guidelines and imposed no child
support obligation upon Deborah during this period. During a “post-residential
treatment period”—commencing on the son’s completion of or discharge from a
residential treatment program, or on March 15, 2015, if the son was not placed in a
program—the parties were to share primary residence of the minor son. The court
ordered James to pay Deborah weekly child support of $225 during this period
3
“based on the incomes set forth in the . . . Child Support Worksheet and
Child Support Order” attached to the judgment. The worksheet indicates that the
court found that James’s annual gross income is $95,000 and that Deborah’s is
$25,000.
[¶5] The court awarded Deborah three bank accounts and the marital
residence and mortgage, and set aside to her a 2013 Jeep Rubicon as non-marital
property. James was awarded two all-terrain vehicles, two bank accounts, and the
equity in and debt on a 2009 Toyota Tacoma. The court assigned James
responsibility for the outstanding loan against his retirement account and divided
the balance of that account evenly between the parties. James was also assigned
responsibility for two credit card debts and $28,000 in annual college tuition
expenses for the parties’ adult son. Deborah was assigned responsibility for one
credit card debt, a utility debt, and an orthodontic debt.1
[¶6] The court ordered James to pay Deborah $550 per week in general
spousal support until the death of either party “to allow both parties to maintain a
reasonable standard of living after the divorce.” In arriving at this award, the court
cited the length of the parties’ marriage; Deborah’s “limited earning capacity given
1
The judgment does not set forth the court’s property distribution in table form. It assigns a monetary
value to only one of the allocated liabilities and indicates the marital or non-marital nature of only two of
the allocated assets.
4
the state of her physical and mental health, her age and her recent employment
history”; and James’s relatively greater earning capacity as an airline pilot.
[¶7] The judgment was entered on the docket on March 4, 2015. Two days
later, on March 6, the court granted the parties’ motion to withdraw $51,000 from
James’s retirement account for the purpose of funding the minor son’s placement
in a residential treatment program. With the parties’ consent, the court ordered the
parties to share liability for that withdrawal in equal proportions. On March 18,
2015, James filed a motion for specific findings and conclusions, see M.R.
Civ. P. 52(a),2 and a motion for a new trial and to alter or amend the judgment,
see M.R. Civ. P. 59(a), (e), asserting that the court had abused its discretion by
imposing a spousal support obligation that exceeded his ability to pay and by
allocating Deborah a larger share of the marital estate. The court summarily
denied the motions and James appealed.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
[¶8] On appeal, James contends that the court erred or abused its discretion
in arriving at its finding of his gross income as indicated on the child support
worksheet. He argues that the court abused its discretion by imposing a spousal
support obligation that (a) is not supported by adequate findings, (b) does not
2
M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) was amended after James filed his post-judgment motion, see 2015 Me. Rules 15
(effective Sept. 1, 2015), but not in any way that affects this appeal.
5
reflect a consideration of all relevant statutory factors, and (c) exceeds his ability to
pay. He also challenges the court’s unequal distribution of the parties’ marital
property. Finally, he contends that the court exceeded its statutory authority by
assigning him liability for the college tuition expenses of the parties’ adult son.
Before addressing these contentions, we consider the impact of the court’s denial
of James’s Rule 52 motion on the standard of appellate review.
[¶9] After the entry of a judgment, if an affected party timely moves for
findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52,3 the trial court must ensure that the judgment
is supported by express factual findings that are based on record evidence, are
sufficient to support the result, and are sufficient to inform the parties and any
reviewing court of the basis for the decision. Douglas v. Douglas, 2012 ME 67,
¶ 26, 43 A.2d 965. In the absence of a motion for specific factual findings, we
ordinarily assume that a trial court found all of the facts necessary to support its
judgment. Bayley v. Bayley, 602 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Me. 1992). However, “when a
motion for findings has been [timely] filed and denied, we cannot infer findings
from the evidence in the record.” Douglas, 2012 ME 67, ¶ 27, 43 A.3d 965. In
these circumstances, if the judgment does not include specific findings that are
3
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a), the deadline for filing a motion for findings is seven days “after the
statement of the decision in open court, or the entry of the decision or judgment on the docket, whichever
comes first.” Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), the deadline for filing a motion for amended or additional
findings is fourteen days after entry of the judgment.
6
sufficient to support the result, appellate review is impossible and the order
denying findings must be vacated. See id.
[¶10] Fourteen days after entry of the judgment, James filed a motion,
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a), for specific factual findings that (1) his income in
2014 was consistent with the figures shown on his financial statement; (2) the
court’s property division allocated more than three times as much debt to him than
to Deborah; (3) the value of Deborah’s nonmarital bank accounts exceeded
$400,000; (4) the court’s spousal support award exceeded Deborah’s request for
spousal support by more than $10,000 per year; and (5) the spousal support award
exceeded his ability to pay. To the extent that the motion requested findings on the
issue of James’s income, we disregard its caption and treat it as a timely Rule 52(b)
motion for further findings because the court made an express finding about this
issue. See Dube v. Dube, 2016 ME 15, ¶ 10 n.8, --- A.3d ---.
[¶11] To the extent that the motion requested findings regarding the values
of the assets and liabilities subject to the distributive order and an explanation of
how those facts affected the court’s award of spousal support, the motion was not
timely filed because the court’s judgment contained no findings on these issues.
See id. However, the determination of James’s income necessarily plays a role in
(1) the economic reality of James’s post-divorce circumstances—a factor that the
court must have considered in distributing the marital estate—and (2) James’s
7
ability to pay any award of spousal support—a factor that the court must have
considered in awarding spousal support. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 951-A(5)(B),
953(1)(C) (2015). Therefore, if we conclude that the court erred by failing to
provide the findings requested on James’s income, the court, on remand, would
have to reconsider the relationship between James’s income, the order of property
distribution, and the order of spousal support.
[¶12] Because this appeal follows the denial of James’s timely motion for
additional findings on the issue of his income, we confine our review to the court’s
explicit findings on that issue and consider whether those findings are both
supported by the record and adequate to support the contested provisions of the
judgment.
A. James’s Gross Income
[¶13] James contends that the trial court either clearly erred in finding that
he has annual gross income of $95,000, or abused its discretion by imputing
income to him without first determining that he was voluntarily underemployed.
[¶14] If a divorce court finds that a party is voluntarily underemployed, the
court may impute income to that party for the purpose of calculating that party’s
child or spousal support obligations. Koszegi v. Erickson, 2004 ME 113, ¶ 14,
855 A.2d 1168; Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 18, 818 A.2d 1005 (citing
19-A M.R.S.A. § 951-A(5)(B), (D), (E) (Supp. 2002) and 19-A M.R.S.A.
8
§ 2001(5)(D) (1998)). When a divorce court imputes income to a party and takes
judicial notice of facts for that purpose, its judgment should contain findings
regarding the amount of and basis for the income imputed. See Payne v. Payne,
2006 ME 73, ¶ 11, 899 A.2d 793. “A court’s determination of a party’s income in
a divorce proceeding is a factual finding that we review for clear error.” Id. ¶ 7. In
applying the clear error standard, we will vacate a factual finding if it is not
supported by sufficient, competent record evidence. See id. ¶¶ 7, 9-11.
[¶15] The divorce judgment contains no findings regarding James’s income.
The only indication of the court’s income determinations is found in the child
support worksheet attached to the judgment, which lists James’s annual gross
income as $95,000. We are unable to determine how the court arrived at this
figure. James’s financial statement indicates that he has an annual gross income of
$87,012. At trial, some evidence was presented that may have raised a question of
whether James was voluntarily underemployed, and whether his
employment-related expense reimbursements should be included in his income.
See 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(B), (D) (2015); Dumas v. Milotte, 2016 ME 3,
¶ 9, --- A.3d ---. However, in the absence of explicit findings and conclusions
regarding the factual and legal basis for the court’s gross income determination, we
cannot review that determination effectively. Williams v. St. Pierre, 2006 ME 10,
¶ 9, 889 A.2d 1011.
9
[¶16] Because the court denied James’s motion for specific findings
regarding his income, we cannot assume that the court implicitly found facts
sufficient to support its income determination, and we cannot decide whether the
court’s findings were clearly erroneous. See id. ¶¶ 9-10. We therefore vacate the
court’s child support order and underlying gross income determination, and
remand for the issuance of findings and conclusions on the income issues raised in
James’s motion for further findings. See Dumas, 2016 ME 3, ¶ 10, --- A.3d ---.
B. Spousal Support
[¶17] Because the determination of James’s income provides a factual
foundation for any award of spousal support, see 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(B), (E)
(2015), we must also vacate the order of spousal support. On remand, the court
must consider—and should explain how it considered—all of the relevant factors
set forth in the spousal support statute, 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5) (2015). This
explanation should include, at a minimum, a discussion of how the court assessed
Deborah’s earning capacity, and findings regarding the effect of the child support
order and property distribution order on James’s ability to pay any award of
spousal support. See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(B), (D)-(E).
C. Property Distribution
[¶18] Finally, because the court must consider the determination of James’s
income in crafting an equitable distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities,
10
see 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(C), and because the court must consider the
consequences of its distributive order in assessing any award of spousal support,
see 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(P)(1), we must also vacate the order distributing the
parties’ property. On remand, the court shall classify the parties’ property as
marital or nonmarital, see Ramsdell v. Worden, 2011 ME 55, ¶ 11, 17 A.3d 1224;
assign monetary values to the property subject to the distributive order to the extent
that the parties offered credible information on that property, see Laqualia v.
Laqualia, 2011 ME 114, ¶ 12, 30 A.3d 838; display the property distribution in
table form;4 and explain its rationale for the ultimate distribution of the parties’
marital estate.
The entry is:
Order denying motion for further findings with
regard to James’s income vacated. Child support
order, spousal support order, and property
distribution vacated. Remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
4
“We have consistently encouraged courts to include tables in their judgments demonstrating the
overall distribution of property to the divorcing parties.” Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 54, ¶ 19, 17 A.3d 1219.
“Such a table is valuable to the parties and facilitates appellate review because it demonstrates that the
court considered the overall allocation of property and debts, and under[stood] the ultimate effect of the
divorce judgment.” Id.
11
On the briefs:
Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Tara A. Rich, Esq., Libby O’Brien
Kingsley & Champion, Kennebunk, for appellant James A.
Ehret
Wendy Moulton Starkey, Esq., Rose Law, LLC, York, for
appellee Deborah B. Ehret
York District Court docket number FM-2013-58
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY