X.F. Lin v. The Board of Revision of Taxes of The City of Philadelphia

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Xun F. Lin, Xian Mei Chen, Xun :

Jing Lin, Mei L. Liu, Bao Yin :

Huang, Jian Zhen Liu, and :

Chang Pine Yang, :

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

The Board of Revision of Taxes : No. 1261 C.D. 2015

of The City of Philadelphia : Argued: February 8, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE PELLEGRINI FILED: February 24, 2016

Xun F. Lin, Xian Mei Chen, Xun Jing Lin, Mei L. Liu, Bao Yin

Huang, Jian Zhen Liu, and Chang Pine Yang (Landowners) appeal the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County’s (trial court) order affirming the Board of

Revision of Taxes of the City of Philadelphia’s (Board) denial of their petition

nunc pro tunc for tax abatement with regard to certain real properties situated in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

In April 2012, Landowners purchased the real properties situated at

916, 918, 920, 922 and 924 Green Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, by individual

deeds subdividing the property previously deeded as 916924 Green Street. On

October 1, 2012, the Department of Licenses and Inspections issued Lin Xun Fu

separate building permits for each of the properties for “construction of a 3rd floor

addition with related interior/exterior improvements for use as a two dwelling units

[sic] and commercial.” (Reproduced Record [R.R.] at 21a25a.) Each of the

permits stated, “construction to be in accordance with Permit/Plans 414212.” (Id.

at 22a24a.) Regarding applications for exemptions, each permit provided, “Tax

Exemption (Abatement): …Applications for all new construction and

commercial improvements are due within sixty (60) days of permit issuance.

Residential rehab and builder/developer applications are due by December 31 st of

the year of permit issuance.” (Id. at 21a24a.)

Subsequently, on July 30, 2013, the Department of Licenses and

Inspections issued Lin Xun Fu a revised building permit with respect to 918 Green

Street describing the permit as “Revise[d] Permit 414215 to document floor plan

layout changes to residential portion of building.” (Id. at 26a.) The revised permit

contains the same language as the original permits regarding the deadline for filing

exemption applications.

On December 23, 2013, the following applications for property tax

abatements were filed in the City of Philadelphia’s Office of Property Assessment

(Assessment Office): Xun Fu Lin for 916 Green Street; Xian Mei Chen and Xun

2

Jing Lin for 918 Green Street; Mei L. Liu and Bao Yin Huang for 920 Green

Street; Jian Zhen Liu for 922 Green Street; and Chang Pine Yang for 924 Green

Street. The Assessment Office denied the applications as untimely filed,

determining that they did not comply with the December 31st deadline governing

applications for residential rehabs.

Landowners then appealed to the Board, seeking nunc pro tunc

approval1 of the tax abatement applications on the basis that they were filed

pursuant to Section 19-1303(2) of the Philadelphia Code2 to which no deadline

1

“[A]n appeal nunc pro tunc is intended as a remedy to vindicate the right to an appeal

where that right has been lost due to certain extraordinary circumstances.” Commonwealth v.

Stock, 679 A.2d 760, 764 (Pa. 1996).

2

Section 19-1303(2) of the Philadelphia Code, which was created for purposes of

preserving and improving the City’s residential neighborhoods, states in pertinent part:

B. Eligible Neighborhoods.

***

(2) Therefore, person making improvements to eligible

residential properties within the definition contained in this

ordinance within any of the foregoing eligible neighborhoods, may

apply for, and the Board of Revision of Taxes may grant, a real

estate tax exemption upon such improvements in the amount and in

the manner hereinafter provided.

C. Definitions.

(1) In this Section the following definitions shall apply:

(a) Eligible residential property shall be any

property containing one or more dwelling units located in an

eligible neighborhood; or any property containing one or more

dwelling units which has been, or, upon request, is, certified by the

(Footnote continued on next page…)

3

(continued…)

Department of Licenses and Inspections or by the Department of

Health as unfit for human habitation; or any property containing

one or more dwelling units which has been the subject of any order

to be vacated, condemned, or demolished by reason of

noncompliance with laws, ordinances, or regulations of the City of

Philadelphia.

(b) Reserved.

(c) Improvements shall be any repairs,

constructions, or reconstruction, including additions and

alterations, which have the effect of rehabilitating a structure so

that it becomes habitable or attains a higher degree of housing

safety, health or amenity, or is brought into compliance with the

laws, ordinances, or regulations of the City of Philadelphia.

Ordinary upkeep and maintenance shall not be deemed an

improvement.

***

F. Procedure for Obtaining Exemption.

(1) At the time a building permit for the construction of an

improvement, for which exemption is desired, is approved, the

permit issuing division of the Department of Licenses and

Inspection [sic] shall notify, in writing, the taxpayer of the

possibility of an exemption under this ordinance, the taxpayer shall

apply to the Board of Revision of Taxes for such exemption. The

application shall be in writing upon forms prescribed by the Board

of Revision of Taxes.

(2) The Board of Revision of Taxes shall determine

whether the exemption shall be granted. A copy of the approved

request for exemption shall be forwarded by the Board of Revision

of Taxes to the taxpayer.

(3) The Board of Revision of Taxes in determining whether

the exemption shall be granted shall inquire of the Department of

Revenue of the City of Philadelphia whether the taxpayer is

indebted to the City or School District of Philadelphia for or on

(Footnote continued on next page…)

4

applies. The Board, after reviewing the parties’ memoranda of law, affirmed

without further explanation, and an appeal was taken to the trial court.

On the civil cover sheet that was filed in the trial court, the plaintiff’s

name is listed as “XUN F. LIN,” and the total number of plaintiffs is denoted as

one. (Certified Record [C.R.], Civil Cover Sheet.) The notice of appeal filed with

the trial court also listed Xun Fu Lin as the sole appellant and stated, in pertinent

part: “Appellant, Xun Fu Lin, hereby appeals the adjudication of the BOARD OF

(continued…)

account of any delinquent taxes, charges, fees, rents or claims.

The Board of Revision of Taxes shall withhold approval of the

application until the taxpayer pays or enters into an agreement with

the City of Philadelphia to pay the tax, charge, fee, rent or claim.

The Board of Revision of Taxes shall withdraw approval where the

taxpayer fails to pay delinquent taxes, charges, fees, rents or claims

during the exemption period or fails to comply with his agreement

to pay as provided herein. Any withholding or withdrawal of the

exemption by the Board of Revision of Taxes pursuant to this

subsection shall not be construed to stay the tolling of the

exemption period for which a taxpayer would otherwise qualify.

(4) Upon completion of the improvement, the taxpayer

shall notify the Board of Revision of Taxes, so that the Board may

assess the improvements separately for the purpose of calculating

the amount of assessment eligible for exemption.

(5) The Board of Revision of Taxes shall notify the

taxpayer of the amount of assessment eligible for exemption.

(6) Appeals from the reassessment and the amount eligible

for the exemption may be taken by the City or by the Taxpayer as

provided by law.

Philadelphia Code §19-1303(2).

5

REVISION OF TAXES made on November 31, 2013….” (C.R., Notice of

Appeal.) Nonetheless, the properties at issue were indicated to be 916924 Green

Street.

During oral argument, Landowners’ counsel presented argument with

regard to all five properties, stating “This is a little complicated because it was one

property subdivided into five recently, so there’s five building permits here, but

somehow the [Board] denied it under one account number for the unsubdivided

property, but there’s five.” (R.R. at 105a.) At no time before the trial court did

opposing counsel object or otherwise suggest that the other Landowners were not

parties to the appeal.

Ultimately, the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision, reasoning

that pursuant to Philadelphia Code Section 19-1303(2), the Department of Licenses

and Inspection was required to and did notify Landowners of the possibility of an

exemption, including the requirement that applications be filed by December 31st

of the year in which the permits were issued—that is, December 31, 2012.

Because Landowners’ applications were not filed until December 2013, nearly one

year after they were due, the trial court found them untimely. Because the trial

court determined that the Philadelphia Code vests the grant or denial of tax

abatements with the Board, as well as the manner in which they are reviewed and

granted, the trial court upheld the Board’s imposition of the December 31 st

deadline, despite the fact that the deadline did not expressly appear in Section 19-

1303(2) of the Code. Further, the trial court determined that Section 8-407 of the

Philadelphia Code, which was once a component of the Plumbing Code, no longer

6

existed as it was repealed in the 1990s and, at any rate, it was inapplicable. With

respect to nunc pro tunc relief, the trial court found that regardless of whether

Landowners were confused and, therefore, believed that a 60-day deadline applied,

they did not satisfy even that deadline. This appeal followed.3

II.

A.

On appeal,4 we first address the School District of Philadelphia’s

(District)5 contention that because Xun F. Lin is the only Landowner who is

properly a party to this appeal, the only issues before us are those involving 916

3

Mr. Lin filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting the following, additional

arguments: (1) because the application for 918 Green Street was revised on July 30, 2013, the

appropriate deadline for that property was December 31, 2013; (2) because all of the building

permits are related, the revised permit for 918 Green Street effectively revised all permits,

thereby providing a deadline of December 31, 2013, for all properties; and (3) nunc pro tunc

relief is appropriate because, in addition to being confused by the lack of a deadline in Section

19-1303(2)(F)(1) of the Philadelphia Code, that section was amended sometime during 2012 to

change the deadline from 60 days to December 31st, thereby compounding Landowners’

confusion. In a supplemental memorandum of law, Mr. Lin also asserted that Section 8-407 of

the Philadelphia Code “prohibits administrative agencies such as [the Assessment Office] from

legislating or promulgating regulations without notice and public hearings thereon.”

(Supplemental Memorandum of Law, at 2.) Although Mr. Lin cited Section 8-407 of the

Philadelphia Code, he actually relied upon and quoted the language contained in Section 8-407

of the Philadelphia Home Charter. Regardless, the trial court denied this motion.

4

In cases where the trial court does not permit an untimely appeal to be filed nunc pro

tunc, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or

committed an error of law. Maxion v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver

Licensing, 728 A.2d 442, 444 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).

5

By order dated December 29, 2015, this Court granted the District’s motion to be

deemed a party in the action, noting that it was a party before the trial court.

7

Green Street. Specifically, the District claims that although all Landowners were

parties to the appeal before the Board, only Mr. Lin appealed the Board’s decision

to the trial court and, therefore, only he is a proper party in the instant appeal.

This argument was not raised before the trial court. Normally,

“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first

time on appeal.” Pa. R.A.P. 302(a); see Siegfried v. Borough of Wilson, 695 A.2d

892, 894 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (“The appellate court may sua sponte refuse to

address an issue raised on appeal that was not raised and preserved below….”).

Despite the fact that Mr. Lin was the only appellant listed on the civil cover sheet,

his counsel, who represented all Landowners, advanced both written and oral

arguments in favor of all of his clients. Indeed, during oral argument, he made

clear that five properties were at issue, and the trial court issued a ruling and

opinion which substantively addressed all of the properties. At no point in time did

opposing counsel object.

Countervailing the normal argument that issues not raised below will

not be considered, a party’s failure to file a timely appeal “renders [its] subsequent

appeals untimely and deprives [our Supreme Court] and the lower courts of

jurisdiction to grant the relief requested in those appeals.” Lincoln Philadelphia

Realty Associates I v. Board of Revision of Taxes of City and County of

Philadelphia, 758 A.2d 1178, 1192 (Pa. 2000). As such, where a jurisdictional

issue is present, a court may raise the matter sua sponte, and it is clear that

jurisdiction may not be conferred by the parties’ failure to raise the issue below.

Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 417 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa. Cmwlth.

8

1980) (en banc); see also Pheasant Run Civic Organization v. Board of

Commissioners of Penn Township, 430 A.2d 1231, 1233 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).

In this case, it is clear from the caption and from the civil cover sheet that Mr. Lin

is the only Landowner who appealed to the trial court. Because the other

Landowners were not parties to the appeal pending before the trial court, they

cannot now join the appeal pending before this Court.

B.

Having determined that only Mr. Lin is a party to the instant appeal,

we next address his argument that the tax abatement application with respect to

916 Green Street was timely filed in December 2013 because a revised permit was

issued for the work in July of that year. In support of this argument, Mr. Lin

highlights the language of the revised permit, stating: “Applications for all new

construction and commercial improvements are due within sixty (60) days of

permit issuance. Residential rehab and builder/developer applications are due by

December 31st of the year of permit issuance.” (R.R. at 26a.) In other words, Mr.

Lin suggests that each time a permit upon which a tax abatement application is

based is amended, the deadline for filing the application extends.

1.

Notably, this argument was not presented before the Board and was

raised before the trial court for the first time in Mr. Lin’s motion for

reconsideration, after the trial court issued its decision. This Court has previously

held that where an issue which could have been raised earlier is raised for the first

time in a motion for reconsideration, it is not preserved for appellate review. See

9

Bedford Downs Management Corporation v. State Harness Racing Commission,

926 A.2d 908, 924 (Pa. 2007) (“[I]ssues raised for the first time in a

reconsideration request, after the agency has issued its adjudication, cannot be

regarded as raising the issues while the matter was before the agency.”); Ramsey v.

Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board, 572 A.2d 21, 25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990);

Frankford Hospital v. Department of Public Welfare, 466 A.2d 260, 262 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1983); see also Rabatin v. Allied Glove Corporation, 24 A.3d 388, 391

(Pa. Super. 2011) (“While the issue was included in the subsequently filed motion

for reconsideration, issues raised in motions for reconsideration are beyond the

jurisdiction of this Court and thus may not be considered by this Court on

appeal.”). But see Cagnoli v. Bonnell, 611 A.2d 1194, 119596 (Pa. 1992)

(suspending this general rule where an “appellant’s first opportunity to raise these

issues was at the time of filing his [m]otion for [r]econsideration.”). Not only did

Landowners fail to raise this issue before the Board, Mr. Lin also failed to raise it

before the trial court until after a decision was issued in the matter, despite the fact

that there was ample opportunity to do so from the outset.

2.

Regardless, we find the argument without merit. Article VIII, Section

2(b)(iii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to

“[e]stablish standards and qualifications by which local taxing authorities may

make uniform special tax provisions applicable to a taxpayer for a limited period of

time to encourage improvement of deteriorating property or areas by an individual,

association or corporation, or to encourage industrial development by a non-profit

corporation.” Pa. Const. art. VIII, §2(b)(iii). Pursuant to this authorization, the

10

General Assembly enacted the Local Economic Revitalization Tax Assistance Act

(Act)6, Section 6(a) of which sets forth the procedure for obtaining an exemption:

Any person desiring tax exemption pursuant to

ordinances or resolutions adopted pursuant to this act,

shall notify each local taxing authority granting such

exemption in writing on a form provided by it submitted

at the time he secures the building permit, or if no

building permit or other notification of new construction

or improvement is required, at the time he commences

construction. A copy of the exemption request shall be

forwarded to the board of assessment and revision of

taxes or other appropriate assessment agency. The

assessment agency shall, after completion of the new

construction or improvement, assess separately the new

construction or improvement and calculate the amounts

of the assessment eligible for tax exemption in

accordance with the limits established by the local taxing

authorities and notify the taxpayer and the local taxing

authorities of the reassessment and amounts of the

assessment eligible for exemption. Appeals from the

reassessment and the amounts eligible for the exemption

may be taken by the taxpayer or the local taxing

authorities as provided by law.

72 P.S. §4727(a) (emphasis added).

Further, Section 2 of the Act, 72 P.S. §4723, provides, “This act shall

be construed to authorize local taxing authorities to exempt new construction in

deteriorated areas of economically depressed communities and improvements to

certain deteriorated industrial, commercial and other business property thereby

6

Act of December 1, 1977, P.L. 237, as amended, 72 P.S. §§47224727.

11

implementing Article VIII, section 2(b)(iii) of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.”

72 P.S. §4723.

The plain language of Section 6(a), pursuant to which the Philadelphia

City Council enacted Section 19-1303(2) of the Philadelphia Code, makes clear

that applications for exemptions must be submitted “at the time [an applicant]

secures the building permit.” 72 P.S. §4727(a). It contains no language providing

for extensions based upon the issuance of revised permits. Carried to its logical

end, Mr. Lin’s interpretation would enable an applicant who is time-barred from

filing an application to set the deadline anew, simply by making a trivial change to

its plans.

There may well be circumstances, including those of the instant case,

in which a revised permit is issued based upon plans amended in good faith.

However, both Section 6(a) of the Act and Section 19-1303(2)(F)(4)(6) of the

Philadelphia Code account for this situation. Specifically, Section 6(a) of the Act

provides that after completion of the improvement, the assessment agency must

assess the improvement and calculate the amount of the assessment eligible for tax

exemption. If the landowner disagrees with the assessment, he may appeal to the

local taxing authority. In this way, assessments are based on the improvement as

actually completed, not as envisioned in the original plans.

In the event an assessment is calculated based on the latter instead of

the former, a landowner’s remedy is to file an appeal, during which a revised

building permit would certainly be relevant for purposes of establishing the nature

12

of the improvement and, therefore, the calculation of the exemption-eligible

assessment. However, the fact that a revised permit is issued has no relevance to

the due date of an application, as that application is not acted upon until

completion of the work—be it pursuant to the original permit or a revised permit.

C.

In passing, Mr. Lin compares Section 19-1303(2) of the Philadelphia

Code to Section 19-1303(3) regarding real-estate tax exemptions on improvements

to deteriorated industrial, commercial and other business properties. He claims

that because Section 19-1303(3) specifies a 60-day deadline for filing abatement

applications,7 whereas Section 19-1303(2) is silent, no deadline governs the filing

of applications for abatements with regard to improvements on residential

properties. This position implies that a residential property owner who makes an

improvement may file an application for abatement at any time, including after the

exemption period began and after the associated tax years have ended.

7

Section 19-1303(3)(D)(3)(a) applies to improvements to deteriorated industrial,

commercial and other business properties and provides, in pertinent part:

At the time a building permit for the construction of an

improvement is applied for, the Department of Licenses and

Inspections shall notify the applicant by a printed notice of the

possibility of a tax exemption under this bill. Within sixty (60)

days of the date the building permit is issued, the taxpayer shall

apply to the Board of Revision of Taxes for such exemption. The

application shall be in writing upon forms prescribed by the Board

of Revision of Taxes and must be filed within the specified time

period.

Philadelphia Code §19-1303(3)(D)(3)(a).

13

The absence of a provision in the Philadelphia Code regarding when

applications for residential exemptions must be filed does not mean that there are

no filing deadlines. Section 6(a) of the Act, pursuant to which Section 19-1303(2)

of the Philadelphia Code was enacted, requires abatement applications to be

“submitted at the time [one] secures the building permit.” 72 P.S. §4727(a). Mr.

Lin’s submission nearly 15 months after he obtained a building permit does not

satisfy this criteria alone.

D.

Next, Mr. Lin asserts that in interpreting Section 19-1303(2) of the

Philadelphia Code to impose a 60-day deadline or a December 31st deadline, the

Assessment Office has violated Section 8-407 of the Philadelphia Home Charter8

8

Specifically, Section 8-407 of the Philadelphia Home Charter states, in pertinent part:

§ 8-407. Regulations.

Except as otherwise provided in this charter, in the adoption of

regulations, the following procedure shall apply:

(a) The department, board or commission promulgating the

regulations shall first submit them for approval to the Law

Department and upon receiving such approval file them with the

Department of Records where they shall be available for public

inspection for thirty days;

(b) The Department of Records shall give public notice of

such filing by advertising in the three daily newspapers of the City

having the largest paid circulation the fact that regulations relating

to a particular subject have been filed with it, and that any person

affected thereby may request a hearing. Council may by ordinance

adopted by a vote of two-thirds of all of its members specify

different or additional requirements for providing public notice of

the filing of regulations and the availability of a hearing, in

(Footnote continued on next page…)

14

prohibiting administrative agencies from legislating and from promulgating

regulations outside of the proper rulemaking procedures.

Essentially, Mr. Lin argues that because Section 19-1303(2)(F)(4)(6)

of the Philadelphia Code does not provide for a specific deadline, the Assessment

Office has “legislated” by imposing a deadline of either 60 days from the date on

which a permit was issued or on December 31st of the year in which a permit was

issued. However, as we discussed above, this issue is waived because it was not

presented in any context before the Board, and it was raised before the trial court

for the first time in Mr. Lin’s motion for reconsideration. See Bedford Downs

Management Corporation, 926 A.2d at 924; Ramsey, 572 A.2d at 25; Frankford

Hospital, 466 A.2d at 262.

Further, the record is devoid of any evidence supporting the argument

that the deadlines were not established in accordance with Section 8-407 of the

Philadelphia Home Charter—not unsurprising given that this argument was not

raised until after the trial court rendered its decision. The only statements

regarding the violation of the Home Charter which, albeit, at times, was incorrectly

(continued…)

accordance with applicable law. Any such ordinance may include

a requirement that notice be posted on the City’s website….

Philadelphia Home Charter §8-407(a)(b); see also Philadelphia Home Charter §8-407 ann. 2

(“Administrative agencies may not legislate. However, they may when appropriately authorized

by this Charter, or by statute or ordinance, define and apply through administrative regulations

standards established by this Charter or by legislation. Thus regulations afford a means for an

administrative agency to exercise powers and to perform duties of law administration and

enforcement imposed upon and vested in it by this Charter or by statute or ordinance.”).

15

identified as the Philadelphia Code, appear in the supplemental memorandum of

law filed with the trial court, the statement of errors complained of on appeal, and

in Mr. Lin’s brief before this Court. However, it is axiomatic that statements in

briefs or legal memoranda do not constitute evidence of record upon which

decisions can be based. See Erie Indemnity Company v. Coal Operators Casualty

Company, 272 A.2d 465, 467 (Pa. 1971) (“[B]riefs are not part of the record, and

the court may not consider facts not established by the record.”); Sanders v.

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Marriott Corporation), 756 A.2d 129, 133

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (“[B]riefs filed in this [C]ourt are not part of the evidentiary

record and assertions of fact therein which are not supported in the evidentiary

record created below may not form the basis of any action by this [C]ourt.”).9

E.

Insofar as Mr. Lin claims that he was entitled to nunc pro tunc relief

because the Assessment Office’s permit form, advising of the deadlines, was

confusing and misleading, we disagree. While a notice which is confusing with

regard to deadlines for seeking administrative relief may serve as a basis for

granting nunc pro tunc relief, see Dwyer v. Department of Transportation, Bureau

9

Moreover, it is questionable whether Mr. Lin’s statement of errors complained of on

appeal was sufficient to preserve this issue for our review in that it incorrectly relied upon

Section 8-407 of the Philadelphia Code rather than the Philadelphia Home Charter. Vague

statements of errors complained of on appeal are waived because “[w]hen a trial court has to

‘guess’ what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review.” Caln

Nether Co. v. Board of Supervisors, Thornbury Township, 840 A.2d 484, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth.),

appeal denied, 856 A.2d 835 (Pa. 2004). Here, it is clear that the trial court had to “guess”

which provision Mr. Lin relied upon, as it noted that the relevant portion of the Plumbing Code

was previously repealed. Ultimately, however, we need not address this issue as Mr. Lin

otherwise failed to preserve it.

16

of Driver Licensing, 849 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (en banc), here, any

alleged confusion is immaterial. As the trial court highlighted, it is irrelevant

whether Mr. Lin mistakenly believed that a 60-day deadline applied to his

application rather than the December 31, 2012 deadline, because he failed to

satisfy either deadline and, in fact, did not file an abatement application until

December 23, 2013, nearly a year after it was due.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or

commit an error of law in interpreting the deadlines imposed pursuant to Section

19-1303(2) of the Philadelphia Code and, therefore, we affirm its decision denying

Mr. Lin’s appeal.

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

17

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Xun F. Lin, Xian Mei Chen, Xun :

Jing Lin, Mei L. Liu, Bao Yin :

Huang, Jian Zhen Liu, and :

Chang Pine Yang, :

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

The Board of Revision of Taxes :

of The City of Philadelphia : No. 1261 C.D. 2015

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of February, 2016, the order of the Court

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-referenced matter is hereby

affirmed.

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge