Opinion

Maria De Lourdes Torres v. Police Officer Jones

  • 26 N.Y.3d 742
  • 27 N.Y.S.3d 468
  • 47 N.E.3d 747
Court
New York Court of Appeals
Filed
Feb 23, 2016
Status
Published
Author
Abdus-Salaam
On the bench
Abdus-Salaam, DiFiore, Fahey, Garcia, Pigott, Rivera, Stein
Cited by
252 cases
Authority
More cited than 97.7%

explaining that under New York law, “a defendant other than a public prosecutor may be liable [for malicious prosecution] for supplying false information to the prosecutor in substantial furtherance of a criminal action against the plaintiff,” including, in this case, police officers who “provided a falsified confession to prosecutors”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that under New York law, “a defendant other than a public prosecutor may be liable [for malicious prosecution] for supplying false information to the prosecutor in substantial furtherance of a criminal action against the plaintiff,” including, in this case, police officers who “provided a falsified confession to prosecutors”
  • noting that a plaintiff may show malice and rebut the presumption of probable cause “with proof that the defendant falsified evidence in bad faith and that, without the falsified evidence, the authorities’ suspicion of the plaintiff would not have fully ripened into probable cause” (emphasis added)
  • explaining that probable cause makes the act of confinement privileged, defeating a common law false arrest and imprisonment claim
  • "Probable cause consists of such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances to believe plaintiff guilty."

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

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No. 21

Maria De Lourdes Torres,

Appellant,

v.

Police Officer Jones, et al.,

Defendants,

City of New York,

Respondent.

(And Another Action.)

David H. Perecman, for appellant.

Devin Slack, for respondents.

New York State Trial Lawyers Association, amicus

curiae.

ABDUS-SALAAM, J.:

In a false arrest action under federal and state law,

evidence that the defendant police officers arrested the

plaintiff without probable cause, after inventing a patently

false confession, may establish the officers' liability for

detaining the plaintiff without any lawful privilege. Evidence

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that the officers forwarded the false confession to prosecutors

can satisfy the commencement element of a malicious prosecution

cause of action, and the proof of the absence of probable cause

for the prosecution and the police's transmission of the

fabricated evidence can overcome the presumption of probable

cause arising from a grand jury's indictment of the plaintiff.

The same proof can support an inference that the police acted

with actual malice in commencing the prosecution. Applying these

principles to the consolidated appeals now before us, we hold

that the courts below improperly granted summary judgment to the

individual defendants on plaintiff's false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims under New York common law and 42 USC § 1983.

We further conclude that, although plaintiff maintains triable

state law claims against defendants the City of New York and the

New York City Police Department, the lower courts properly

granted summary judgment to those governmental entities on

plaintiff's claims under 42 USC § 1983 in accordance with Monell

v New York City Dept. of Social Servs. (436 US 658 [1978]) and

its progeny.

I.

A

On the night of September 24, 2002, Einstein Romeo

Acuna's son found Acuna's dead body in front of the doorway to

the apartment that they shared in Queens. Acuna's son called the

police and reported the death. As later recounted by the

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individual defendants in their depositions in the instant civil

actions, defendants Detective Michael McEntee and Detective

Daniel Corey responded to the scene. There, the detectives saw

Acuna's naked corpse in a pool of blood in the hallway in front

of Acuna's apartment. Evidently, Acuna had been stabbed

repeatedly.1 The detectives went inside the apartment, in which

there were no signs of forced entry. As the detectives examined

the apartment, they observed some blood stains on the walls of

the interior hallway, dining area and kitchen. However, the

majority of the blood at the scene had pooled near the entrance

to the apartment. Additionally, the police found some blood in a

nearby stairwell.

Detective Corey, defendant Detective Erik Hendricks and

other officers canvassed the building for suspects, but found

none. Corey and Hendricks interviewed Acuna's neighbors about

the crime, and some of the neighbors reported that they had heard

screaming and someone falling to the floor in the hallway.2

1

On the day after the crime, the Office of the Chief

Medical Examiner (OCME) completed an autopsy report, in which the

medical examiner determined that Acuna had over 20 stab wounds,

including some that were between five and seven inches deep.

With the exception of Detective Corey's deposition testimony, the

record does not indicate whether or when the detectives learned

of the autopsy results. At his deposition in the eventual civil

action here, Detective Corey revealed that he had become aware of

the autopsy results at some unspecified point in time.

2

In opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion in

the instant civil actions, plaintiff submitted a police report

indicating that a neighbor had told the detectives that, on the

night of the crime, the neighbor had heard footsteps on the roof.

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Meanwhile, another detective assigned to the case, defendant Irma

Santiago, contacted Acuna's sister-in-law, who stated that she

had spoken to Acuna via telephone at about 7:30 p.m. on the night

of his death. This information placed Acuna's time of death at

approximately 8:00 p.m.

On a return trip to the apartment on or shortly after

the date of the crime, Detective McEntee discovered a woman's

crucifix necklace on the nightstand in Acuna's bedroom. When

interviewed by the police, however, Acuna's relatives essentially

stated that, to their knowledge, Acuna did not have a girlfriend.

Additionally, Acuna's family and neighbors did not identify

anyone who had a motive to murder Acuna.

B

According to the police witnesses' testimony at a

suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution that led to the

instant lawsuit, developments following the police's initial

investigation led them to contact plaintiff Maria De Lourdes

Torres. Specifically, Detectives Santiago and McEntee eventually

learned that Acuna's telephone records showed that, on the day of

the murder, someone had called Acuna's cellular telephone from a

telephone located at plaintiff's residence. The records further

reflected that Acuna had repeatedly received calls from that

telephone on various occasions.

On October 11, 2002, Detective McEntee went to the

apartment. There, McEntee met the couple who owned the

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apartment, and in response to his inquiries, they said that they

did not know Acuna and had not called him. The couple further

explained that, besides themselves, only plaintiff, who rented a

room from them, could have accessed the telephone in the

apartment. Soon thereafter, McEntee spoke to plaintiff in the

presence of the apartment owners. Displaying a photograph of

Acuna, McEntee asked plaintiff whether she knew the man in the

photograph, and she claimed that she did not know him.

The police did not find plaintiff's denials convincing,

and so on the night of October 25, 2002, Detectives Hendricks and

Santiago went to plaintiff's apartment. Santiago asked plaintiff

whether she knew Acuna, and plaintiff denied that she knew him.

When Santiago told plaintiff that telephone records showed that

someone had called Acuna from her apartment, plaintiff claimed

that she had not called him. Given that this interview occurred

in the presence of the owners of the apartment, Santiago became

concerned that plaintiff was reluctant to give candid answers to

her questions in front of them. Accordingly, Santiago asked

plaintiff if she would come to the local police precinct, and

plaintiff agreed to accompany Santiago there.

At the precinct, Santiago and Hendricks asked plaintiff

again whether she knew Acuna and had telephoned him on the day of

the murder. About 15 minutes into this conversation, Santiago

showed Acuna's telephone records to plaintiff, at which point she

acknowledged that she knew Acuna. Plaintiff stated that she had

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previously lied about calling Acuna on the day of the crime

because she had used the telephone in her apartment to make the

calls, which the owners had forbidden her to do, and she did not

want to admit her unauthorized use of the telephone in their

presence. After receiving this explanation, Santiago permitted

plaintiff to leave.

In early November 2002, the police contacted plaintiff

and asked her whether she would submit to a polygraph

examination, and she replied that she would. At about 7:00 a.m.

on November 8, 2002, Detective Santiago and defendant Detective

Denitor Guerra picked up plaintiff at her home and transported

her to the precinct, where they arrived at about 7:30 a.m.

Plaintiff waited in a room with the detectives for almost two

hours, during which time the detectives did not question her.

Detectives Santiago, Guerra and Hendricks then took plaintiff to

the District Attorney's Office. There, at about 9:30 a.m.,

plaintiff signed a consent form and agreed to take the polygraph

test, and the detectives sat with her while they waited for a few

hours for the polygraph device to be available and ready for use.

At about 12:30 p.m., defendant Lieutenant Vilardi, the Deputy

Chief Investigator at the District Attorney's Office,

administered the polygraph examination, and Santiago and Vilardi

asked plaintiff questions relating to Acuna's murder, repeating

each question multiple times and in Spanish. The examination

lasted about 40 minutes.

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After the examination, the detectives took plaintiff

out for lunch. At about 4:30 or 5:00 p.m., they brought

plaintiff back to the precinct and placed her in an interview

room, and Santiago and Guerra periodically stayed in the room

with plaintiff. At about 11:30 p.m., Santiago read Miranda

warnings to plaintiff in Spanish, and on a form, plaintiff

indicated that she understood each Miranda right. Santiago

questioned plaintiff about Acuna's murder, and Detective Corey

periodically entered the room, though he did not participate in

the questioning of plaintiff. From approximately 1:00 a.m. to

1:45 a.m., plaintiff confessed to murdering Acuna in self-

defense. Plaintiff asked Santiago to write down her confession,

and Santiago complied, generating a three-page written version of

plaintiff's statement in Spanish. Plaintiff signed the

statement.

Next, the detectives requested permission to search

plaintiff's room, and plaintiff signed a consent form authorizing

the search. Later that morning, Detective Corey searched the

room. Corey recovered the clothes that, according to plaintiff's

statement, she had worn during the murder. Corey also found a

knife in the room. The police arrested Torres for Acuna's

murder.

C

The District Attorney's Office convened a grand jury in

this case, and in January 2003, the grand jury returned an

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indictment charging plaintiff with two counts of murder in the

second degree (see Penal Law §§ 125.25 [1]; 125.25 [2]) and one

count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree

(see Penal Law § 265.01 [2]). Subsequently, plaintiff filed an

omnibus motion for, among other things, dismissal of the

indictment and suppression of her statement to the police and of

the evidence recovered from her room.

In February 2003, while plaintiff's omnibus motion was

pending, OCME completed preliminary forensic testing on the blood

found in Acuna's apartment. The test results indicated that the

blood belonged to Acuna and two unknown males. At that time,

OCME had not compared plaintiff's DNA to the DNA present in the

blood in Acuna's apartment. The record does not reveal whether

the investigating detectives learned of the preliminary DNA test

results during the criminal proceedings against plaintiff.

At a Huntley/Mapp hearing following an in camera

inspection of the grand jury minutes, in summer 2003 prosecutors

presented the testimony of Detectives Santiago, Corey and

McEntee, as well as the testimony of Lieutenant Vilardi. Those

witnesses described their interactions with plaintiff on October

11, October 25, November 8 and November 9, 2002, in essentially

the manner set forth above. At the close of the hearing, Supreme

Court denied plaintiff's suppression motion.

Meanwhile, in January 2004, OCME completed its

comparison of plaintiff's DNA to the DNA in the blood samples

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taken from Acuna's apartment, and the results showed that

plaintiff's DNA was not present in the blood samples. The record

does not indicate whether the detectives learned about these test

results during the criminal proceedings against plaintiff.

After Supreme Court denied plaintiff's suppression

motion, plaintiff moved to reopen the suppression hearing and

call Detectives Guerra and Hendricks to testify at the reopened

hearing. Supreme Court granted plaintiff's application to reopen

the suppression hearing, and at the reopened hearing, Detectives

Guerra and Hendricks testified to their roles in the

investigation as recounted above. Crediting their testimony,

Supreme Court again denied plaintiff's suppression motion.

In January 2007, the District Attorney's Office moved

to dismiss the charges against plaintiff, and the court granted

the motion.

D

In September 2007, plaintiff commenced the first of the

instant civil rights actions by filing a complaint in Supreme

Court against the City of New York (the City) and several police

officers involved in the investigation of Acuna's murder,

including Lieutenant Vilardi and Detectives Santiago, Guerra,

Hendricks, Corey and McEntee. In the complaint, plaintiff

asserted a cause of action against the City and the individual

defendants for violation of 42 USC § 1983, a cause of action

against the City for negligent supervision and a cause of action

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against the individual defendants for wanton, wilful and reckless

conduct. Plaintiff maintained, inter alia, that the City had

negligently failed to supervise the officers who wrongfully

suspected her of killing Acuna and had negligently furthered her

wrongful arrest and prosecution. Only the City answered in the

first action. Plaintiff did not serve any of the other

defendants and unsuccessfully sought an extension of time in

which to do so.

Thereafter, plaintiff commenced the second lawsuit by

filing a complaint against the New York City Police Department

(NYPD), Lieutenant Vilardi and Detectives Santiago, Guerra,

Hendricks and Corey. In that complaint, plaintiff asserted

causes of action for: defendants' denial of plaintiff's

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection in

violation of 42 USC § 1981; the individual defendants' unlawful

detention of her in violation of 42 USC § 1983; the NYPD's

pattern and practice of improper treatment of arrestees in

violation of 42 USC § 1983; the NYPD's failure to supervise the

individual defendants who improperly arrested plaintiff in

violation of 42 USC § 1983; defendants' unlawful malicious

prosecution of plaintiff under the common law; defendants'

unlawful false arrest and imprisonment of plaintiff under the

common law; and defendants' improper conduct warranting punitive

damages. Plaintiff successfully served the City and Detectives

Santiago, Guerra and Hendricks with the summons and complaint in

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the second action; consequently, the City's attorney appeared and

answered on behalf of the NYPD and those detectives in that

action.

E

Detectives McEntee, Santiago, Corey and Hendricks were

deposed in these actions.3

At their depositions, the detectives gave an account of

the disputed events that was mostly consistent with the

prosecution witnesses' testimony at the suppression hearing.

However, while the detectives' suppression hearing testimony

covered primarily their interactions with plaintiff, their

deposition testimony recounted their investigation at the crime

scene and the other developments in the investigation summarized

above. And, the detectives provided new details about their

discussions with plaintiff on November 8 and November 9, 2002.

According to their deposition testimony, just prior to

the polygraph examination on November 8, 2002, Detective McEntee

showed plaintiff a crime scene photograph of Acuna and asked her

to confirm that she knew Acuna. Upon seeing the picture,

plaintiff cried out, but she immediately returned to a state of

calm in a manner that struck McEntee as "[c]old blooded."

3

Immediately prior to the start of Corey's deposition,

counsel for the City acknowledged on the record that he

represented Corey and appeared on Corey's behalf "without any

jurisdictional defenses or anything like that or statute of

limitations."

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Following the polygraph examination, Lieutenant Vilardi informed

Santiago that the results were "[i]nconsistent, that it was like

she was lying." Vilardi told Detective Corey, however, that the

results were "inconclusive."

After the polygraph examination and a lunch break, at

about 11:30 p.m., the detectives interrogated plaintiff as

described at the suppression hearing. At some point during the

interrogation, the interviewing detectives told Detective Corey

that defendant was crying and claiming that she had accidentally

killed Acuna. At around that time, plaintiff orally confessed to

her interrogators that she had killed Acuna in self-defense, and

Santiago wrote versions of that statement in English and Spanish.

According to her paperwork, Santiago finished writing the

statement at about 4:45 a.m., not at 1:45 a.m. as she had

suggested in her hearing testimony.

The English-language version of the statement declared

that plaintiff had met Acuna two years before the murder.

According to the statement, they started a friendship that later

became a sexual relationship. One day during the week prior to

the date of the murder, plaintiff was having sex with Acuna, and

he demanded that she remove her crucifix necklace while they were

engaging in this intimate activity. She complied and left the

necklace in his bedroom. Later that week, plaintiff called Acuna

to ask him to return the necklace, and although they made various

plans for its return later that week, those plans fell through.

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Regarding the day of the murder, plaintiff's written

statement said:

"The following day, Tuesday, I called him

again it was around 12:30 or 1:00 in the

afternoon and he asked me if I liked the way

he made love to me. We talked a little bit,

and he told me it was okay to visit him

because his son was working and he was going

to be home alone. I bath[ed], dressed and

fixed myself up so I could go and visit him.

When I arrived at his house he asked me why

it took so long. Immediately I went to his

bedroom, and he removed my clothing and I

didn't resist. He made love to me. . . . I

was laying on his bed and he immediately

asked me to pass him a condom, and he

commence[d] to remove his shorts. . . . After

we had sex, he grabbed my clothes and threw

them at me, and he stated, 'Get dress[ed]',

and [he] told me I had to leave." (emphasis

added).

Following this explanation of the origin of the

confrontation between plaintiff and Acuna, the statement

continued:

"I didn't want to leave, but he insisted that

I leave, and he continued pulling me and I

resisted. He pulled me all the way from the

bedroom to the front door. I tried to resist

him, but he grabbed me by my hair and

clothing and pushed me out. I pushed the

door again and reentered. . . . I asked him

what's happening, and he said there were

people coming to paint and he didn't want

them to see me there. . . . I asked him are

they going to be males or females, why is

there so much rush for me to leave. He

smirked like he was making fun of me, and he

repeated again 'leave now'. He then began

pulling me harder and he slapped me and began

grabbing me by my clothing and pulled me to

the area by the dining area. He was grabbing

me very hard by the hair, and grabbed it and

slammed my head against the wall, and

continued slapping me on the face. I wasn't

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defending myself, but he kept hitting me and

I defended myself. . . . He dragged me to the

kitchen and at this point I was looking to

defend myself. I had to defend my life, he

was hitting very hard. I was losing my mind

and saw everything dark. . . At this moment I

couldn't see anything. I don't know where I

grabbed the knife from, I only knew that I

had to defend myself. I had the knife in my

hand, I thought he would get scared, but he

didn't. He continued to grab my hair,

pulling my head forward. I went forward

towards him, and I had the knife in my hand

and I stabbed him I don't know how many

times. Possibly more than two times. I at

this moment, I lose sense of time. I saw

blood coming from his chest. I was seeing

everything dark and my head was dizzy. I

didn't see if he fell to the floor. I ran

towards the front door and left. I got on

the elevator, and the elevator stopped on the

third floor. A white female got onto the

elevator, and I had my hair loose and I tried

to hide my face with my hair. I don't know

what I did with the knife, I can't remember

where I got rid of it. At no moment did I

want to do him any harm or hurt him, but he

hurt me so hard that I had to defend myself."

(emphases added).

After making this statement, plaintiff consented to a search of

her room. The detectives arrested plaintiff.

The police found a knife and some clothes in

plaintiff's room, but there was no blood on those items or

anywhere in her residence. At some point after plaintiff's

statement and arrest, because plaintiff had claimed in her oral

statement that she believed some sheet rock had been broken when

Acuna slammed her head into the kitchen wall of his apartment, a

detective went back to the apartment to check the kitchen wall

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for signs of damage. The detective found no dents in the wall

and reported as much to Detective Corey. The police also asked

some of Acuna's neighbors whether they had seen plaintiff in the

elevator on the night of the crime, and none of them had.

"Years later," the District Attorney's Office told

Corey that the DNA of one male other than Acuna had been found in

the blood samples recovered from the scene of the crime.

Otherwise, Corey never saw any lab reports or DNA test results.

At their depositions, Detectives McEntee and Corey were

questioned about whether NYPD supervisors encouraged swift

arrests in homicide cases. McEntee testified that the NYPD

considered the number of cases closed by arrest as one factor

among many in a detective's performance evaluation. Corey

testified that his superiors did not pressure him in any way to

resolve the investigation of Acuna's murder.

F

At her deposition, plaintiff described her own

background, explaining that she was an undocumented Mexican

immigrant who sold flowers on Roosevelt Avenue in Queens, that

she spoke some English but was far more fluent in Spanish and

that she had only an elementary school education. About a year

before Acuna's death, plaintiff met him while she was selling

flowers, and she started a friendship with him which, after a

couple of weeks, became a sexual relationship.

According to plaintiff, when the detectives interviewed

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her on October 11, 2002, she told Detective McEntee that she did

not know Acuna. Plaintiff hid her relationship with Acuna

because she was afraid to reveal that, in the course of that

relationship, she had called him from her apartment in violation

of her landlords' directive not to use the telephone there.

Additionally, plaintiff had difficulty recognizing Acuna in the

photograph displayed by McEntee because Acuna did not have a

beard in that photograph, as he did for the entire period in

which they had known each other.

On October 25, 2002, plaintiff initially concealed from

Detectives Santiago and Hendricks her familiarity with Acuna and

her phone calls to him, but she did so only because she spoke to

those detectives in the presence of the couple from whom she

rented a room and did not want to divulge her unauthorized use of

their telephone. Following that initial conversation, plaintiff

willingly accompanied the detectives to the precinct, and she

acknowledged her connection to Acuna. After her arrival at the

precinct, the detectives took plaintiff to an interview room, and

they placed Acuna's bloody clothes and photographs of the grisly

scene of his murder on a table in the room. The detectives asked

plaintiff whether she was afraid, and she answered that she was

scared because she had "never seen anything like that." The

detectives asserted that plaintiff was scared because she had

committed the murder, but she denied this. The detectives told

her that her "conscience wo[uld]n't leave [her] alone

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afterwards," and they left her alone in the interview room with

the clothes and crime scene photographs, causing her to cringe in

the corner of the room for the next hour. The detectives then

returned to the room and told plaintiff that she could leave, but

that she should not depart the country because they would contact

her again. Plaintiff left the precinct.

On November 8, 2002, plaintiff agreed to take a

polygraph examination, and Detectives Santiago, Guerra and

Hendricks drove her to the precinct. There, the detectives

interrogated her for three to five hours, again displaying the

bloody clothes and the photographs. Santiago told her that she

"had to" claim that she had killed Acuna in self-defense.

Santiago directed plaintiff to claim that Acuna had grabbed her

by the hair and thrown her against the wall. Santiago also

accused plaintiff of killing Acuna out of jealousy, saying that

"if [she] had done it to accept it" so that Santiago would help

her. Santiago reiterated that Santiago would tell plaintiff what

to say so that Santiago could help her, but plaintiff continued

to deny that she had killed Acuna. The detectives left plaintiff

alone in the room, and she started to cry.

Later that day, Santiago returned to the interview room

and started writing something on a piece of paper. Santiago told

plaintiff to write that she had committed the crime, but

plaintiff refused and insisted on her innocence. Santiago next

told plaintiff to "say that it was in self-defense." Santiago

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presented plaintiff with a written statement to this effect, but

plaintiff refused to sign it. Santiago asserted that signing the

statement was "for [plaintiff's] good" and that Santiago "would

let [her] go" if she signed it. Subsequently, raising her voice,

Santiago told plaintiff that it was her fault that Santiago

"didn't go sleep with her son," adding that Santiago would soon

make "a definite decision."

At that point, another detective entered the room.

This detective offered plaintiff food and soothingly informed her

that if she signed the statement, that would help her. The

detective pointed out that the statement would indicate that she

had acted "in self-defense and that is what many women did." The

detectives repeated that plaintiff could leave if she signed the

statement, and she finally signed it in the early hours of

November 9 because Detective Santiago "made [her] sign that

paper." At some point, Santiago sought to videotape her

interview with plaintiff, but plaintiff refused to be taped.

After plaintiff signed the confession drafted by

Detective Santiago, the detectives placed her in a holding cell.

Santiago offered plaintiff her business card and said that

plaintiff should call her if plaintiff wanted the advice of a

mother. Thereafter, the police took plaintiff to the jail at

Riker's Island, where she remained for the duration of the

criminal proceedings against her.

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G

After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment

dismissing the complaints in both actions. In support of the

motion, defendants asserted, inter alia, that the detectives'

deposition testimony and other evidence established that they had

lawfully arrested plaintiff based on her suspicious conduct,

including her voluntary confession that she had murdered Acuna.

Defendants also argued that they had demonstrated their

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the probable cause

and malice elements of plaintiff's false arrest and mprosecution

claims. And, defendants maintained that plaintiff had neither

pleaded nor proven that the City had a custom or practice of

committing constitutional violations that could render it liable

under 42 USC § 1983. Additionally, defendants argued that

plaintiff had abandoned her claims against the individual

defendants on whose behalf the City had not interposed an answer

because she had failed to seek entry of a default judgment

against them within one year.

Plaintiff opposed defendants' motion, asserting that

the detectives' testimony did not conclusively establish that

they had probable cause to arrest her and that her testimony

created a triable issue of fact as to whether they had improperly

relied on her false confession to justify the arrest. In

opposition to the City's claim that no City policy or practice

had caused any violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights,

plaintiff submitted an affidavit from an expert witness, Evrard

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Williams, a former NYPD homicide detective who last served in

1985. Williams opined that the detectives had coerced plaintiff

into confessing by promising that they would release her for

doing so, and he maintained that the detectives must have taken

such action "because of a strong policy that was pervasive

throughout the police department to quickly investigate and close

out investigations so that statistically it would appear that the

police department was quickly solving crimes, particularly

homicides." In support of plaintiff's claim that the City and

the NYPD had a policy of pressuring police officers to make

arrests without probable cause, she also cited Detective

McEntee's testimony that police officials evaluated each

detective's performance based in part on the number of cases the

detective has closed via arrest.

In a short form order filed in the first action on

August 10, 2012, Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's claims

against all of the individual defendants as abandoned, and it

dismissed the complaint against the City on the merits.

Plaintiff appealed the August 10 order to the Appellate Division.

Evidently, judgment was never entered in the first action.

In a short form order filed in the second action on

August 9, 2012, Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's claims

against Lieutenant Vilardi and Detective Corey as abandoned, and

it dismissed her claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest,

violations of 42 USC § 1981 and violations of 42 USC § 1983 on

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the merits. On November 30, 2012, Supreme Court, relying on the

August 9 order, entered judgment dismissing the complaint against

defendants in the second action. Plaintiff appealed from both

the August 9 order and the November 30 judgment. The Appellate

Division consolidated plaintiff's appeals in both actions.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the August

10 order and the November 30 judgment dismissing the complaints

in both actions, and it dismissed the appeal from the August 9

order in the second action on the ground that the issues raised

in that appeal had been brought up for review and considered on

the appeal from the November 30 judgment (see Torres v Jones, 120

AD3d 572, 572-575 [2d Dept 2014]). On the merits, the Appellate

Division held that defendants had made a prima facie showing of

entitlement to summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims, and

it ruled that plaintiff had failed to rebut defendants' showing

with proof sufficient to demonstrate the existence of any triable

issue of fact (see id. at 574-575). We granted plaintiff leave

to appeal, and we now modify the Appellate Division's order.

II.

A

Under the common law, a plaintiff may bring suit for

false arrest and imprisonment against one who has unlawfully

robbed the plaintiff of his or her "freedom from restraint of

movement" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456

[1975], cert denied sub nom Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929

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[1975]; see Dobbs' Law of Torts § 41 [2d ed. 2011]). To prevail

on such a cause of action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that

the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the

plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, that the plaintiff

did not consent to the confinement and that the confinement was

not privileged (see Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389,

394-395 [2011]; Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85

[2001]; Parvi v City of Kingston, 41 NY2d 553, 556 [1977]). For

purposes of the privilege element of a false arrest and

imprisonment claim, an act of confinement is privileged if it

stems from a lawful arrest supported by probable cause (see

Gisondi v Town of Harrison, 72 NY2d 280, 283 [1988]; Broughton,

37 NY2d at 458; see also Fortunato v City of New York, 63 AD3d

880, 880 [2d Dept 2009]). "Probable cause consists of such facts

and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person in

like circumstances to believe plaintiff guilty" (Colon v City of

New York, 60 NY2d 78, 82 [1983]). "Probable cause does not

require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a

reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a

reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed"

by the suspected individual, and probable cause must be judged

under the totality of the circumstances (People v Bigelow, 66

NY2d 417, 423 [1985]).

The common law also recognizes a cause of action for

the separate tort of malicious prosecution, which protects the

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plaintiff's distinct "interest of freedom from unjustifiable

litigation" (Broughton, 37 NY2d at 457). "The elements of the

tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) the commencement or

continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against

the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of

the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal

proceeding and (4) actual malice" (id. at 457; see Smith-Hunter v

Harvey, 95 NY2d 191, 195 [2000]; Martinez, 97 NY2d at 84; Thaule

v Krekeler, 81 NY 428, 433 [1880]). Thus, while false arrest and

malicious prosecution are "kindred actions" insofar as they often

aim to provide recompense for illegal law enforcement activities,

each action "protects a different personal interest and is

composed of different elements" (Broughton, 37 NY2d at 456; see

Marks v Townsend, 97 NY 590, 597-598 [1885]). And, the unique

elements of malicious prosecution typically present a greater

obstacle to recovery than the elements of false arrest; as we

have said, "The law [ ] places a heavy burden on malicious

prosecution plaintiffs" (Smith-Hunter, 95 NY2d at 195; see Munoz

v City of New York, 18 NY2d 6, 9 [1966]).

We have "never elaborated on how a plaintiff in a

malicious prosecution case demonstrates that the defendant

commenced or continued the underlying criminal proceeding"

(Grucci v Grucci, 20 NY3d 893, 896 n [2012]). But, by suggesting

that a defendant other than a public prosecutor may be liable for

supplying false information to the prosecutor in substantial

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furtherance of a criminal action against the plaintiff, we have

implicitly recognized that such conduct may, depending on the

circumstances, constitute the commencement or continuation of the

prosecution (see Colon, 60 NY2d at 82 [noting that proof

establishing "that the police witnesses" have falsified evidence

may create liability for malicious prosecution]; see also

Hopkinson v Lehigh V. R. Co., 249 NY 296, 300-301 [1928] [noting

that the falsification of evidence and presentation of that

evidence to the prosecutor can constitute commencement of a

prosecution]). Relevant Appellate Division decisions are to the

same effect (see Ramos v City of New York, 285 AD2d 284, 298-299

[1st Dept 2001]; cf. Defilippo v County of Nassau, 183 AD2d 695,

696 [2d Dept 1992]). Similarly, in other jurisdictions, the rule

is that the defendant commences the prosecution of the plaintiff

if the defendant demands in bad faith that the public prosecutor

initiate the criminal action or supplies the prosecutor with

falsified evidence that the defendant knows or should know will

cause the prosecutor to prosecute the plaintiff (see Zenik v

O'Brien, 137 Conn 592, 596 [Conn 1951]; Szczesniak v CJC Auto

Parts, Inc., 21 NE3d 486, 491 [Ill App Ct 2014]; Macintosh v

Interface Group Massachusetts-Comm, 9 Mass L Rep 408 [Mass Sup Ct

1999]; Lester v Buchanen, 112 Nev 1426, 1429 [Nev 1996]; Bradley

v Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 2001 PA Super 172 at 8 [Pa Super Ct

2001]).

Just as in the false arrest context, the plaintiff in a

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malicious prosecution action must also establish at trial the

absence of probable cause to believe that he or she committed the

charged crimes, but this element operates differently in the

malicious prosecution context because "[o]nce a suspect has been

indicted, [ ] the law holds that the Grand Jury action creates a

presumption of probable cause" (Colon, 60 NY2d at 78; see Grucci,

20 NY3d at 898; Lee v City of Mt. Vernon, 49 NY2d 1041, 1043

[1980]). Generally, the plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption

of probable cause with evidence merely indicating that the

authorities acquired information that, depending on the

inferences one might choose to draw, might have fallen somewhat

shy of establishing probable cause (see Colon, 60 NY2d at 83).

And, even if the plaintiff shows a sufficiently serious lack of

cause for the prosecution and rebuts the presumption at trial, he

or she still must prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the

defendant acted with malice, i.e., that the defendant "must have

commenced the prior criminal proceeding due to a wrong or

improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of

justice served" (Nardelli v Stamberg, 44 NY2d 500, 503 [1978]).

Although burdensome, these barriers to a malicious

prosecution plaintiff's recovery are not insurmountable, and in

some instances, the plaintiff can simultaneously rebut the

presumption of probable cause and satisfy the malice element by

demonstrating that the evidence of guilt relied upon by the

defendant was so scant that the prosecution was entirely baseless

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and maliciously instituted. In that sense, "[w]hile lack of

probable cause to institute a criminal proceeding and proof of

actual malice are independent and indispensable elements of a

malicious prosecution action, the absence of probable cause does

bear on the malice issue," and "probable cause to initiate a

criminal proceeding may be so totally lacking as to reasonably

permit an inference that the proceeding was maliciously

instituted" (Martin v Albany, 42 NY2d 13, 17 [1977]; see Thaule,

81 NY at 434). Moreover, in the alternative, the plaintiff may

show malice and overcome the presumption of probable cause with

proof that the defendant falsified evidence in bad faith and

that, without the falsified evidence, the authorities' suspicion

of the plaintiff would not have fully ripened into probable cause

(see Hopkinson, 249 NY at 300; cf. Gisondi, 72 NY2d at 284-285).

Thus, we have observed that, in the context of a malicious

prosecution suit against the police, the presumption may be

overcome "by evidence establishing that the police witnesses have

not made a complete and full statement of facts . . . to the

District Attorney, that they have misrepresented or falsified

evidence, that they have withheld evidence or otherwise acted in

bad faith" (Colon, 60 NY2d at 82-83).

The foregoing elements and considerations also impact a

plaintiff's parallel claims under 42 USC § 1983, which authorizes

the plaintiff to sue government agents for unlawful arrest and

malicious prosecution in violation of the laws and constitution

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of the United States (see 42 USC § 1983; Albright v Oliver, 510

US 266, 270-275 [1994] [opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.]; Lennon v

Miller, 66 F3d 416, 423-425 [2d Cir 1995]; cf. Rehberg v Paulk,

__US__, 132 S Ct 1497, 1507-1508 [2012]). Indeed, the elements

of those causes of action under the federal statute are

substantially the same as the elements of the comparable state

common-law claims, and they are evaluated in much the same way

(see Simpson v City of New York, 793 F3d 259, 265 [2d Cir 2015];

Weyant v Okst, 101 F3d 845, 852 [2d Cir 1996]; Manganiello v City

of New York, 612 F3d 149, 160-161 [2d Cir 2010]; see also Paulos

v City of New York, 122 AD3d 815, 817 [2d Dept 2014]). However,

as will be discussed in detail hereinafter, the government itself

cannot be liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution under

42 USC § 1983 unless an official government policy, custom or

widespread practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's

constitutional rights (Monell, 436 US at 694, 701; City of Canton

v Harris, 489 US 378, 385 [1989]).

Considering the aforementioned law in the context of a

summary judgment motion, the defendant moving for summary

judgment must establish a defense to the plaintiff's malicious

prosecution and false arrest claims as a matter of law by

submitting sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues

of fact (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v

Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 49 [2015];

Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 833

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[2014]; see also MacDonald v Town of Greenburgh, 112 AD3d 586,

586-587 [2d Dept 2013]). On such a motion, the facts must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and every

available inference must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor (see

Jacobsen, 22 NY3d at 833; William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers &

Auctioneers, Inc. v Rabizadeh, 22 NY3d 470, 475 [2013]). "Once

[the movant's prima facie] showing has been made, however, the

burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form

sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact

which require a trial of the action" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,

68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; see Vega v Restani Construction Corp.,

18 NY3d 499, 503 [2012]). Under this summary judgment standard,

even if the jury at a trial could, or likely would, decline to

draw inferences favorable to the plaintiff on issues of probable

cause and malice, the court on a summary judgment motion must

indulge all available inferences of the absence of probable cause

and the existence of malice.

B

The law outlined above reveals that the lower courts

here improperly granted summary judgment to defendants on

plaintiff's common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution

claims, and it forecloses judgment as a matter of law in favor of

the individual defendants on plaintiff's claims under 42 USC §

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1983.4 When viewed in combination with other evidence and in the

light most favorable to her, plaintiff's deposition testimony

raised triable questions of fact regarding whether the detectives

unlawfully arrested her for Acuna's murder without probable

cause, improperly commenced the prosecution against her and

participated in the prosecution out of malice.

With respect to plaintiff's false arrest claims, the

evidence of the information known to the detectives prior to her

arrest, excluding her alleged confession on November 9, 2002, did

not conclusively demonstrate that the detectives had probable

cause to arrest her as a matter of law. To be sure, based on the

detectives' discovery of plaintiff's necklace in Acuna's bedroom,

her phone calls to him, and her admission on October 25, 2002,

that she knew him, the detectives had ample reason to believe

that she and Acuna were acquaintances or friends. Additionally,

since Acuna's corpse was unclothed, the detectives may have had

some reason to believe that he had died shortly after having sex

with or undressing in the presence of such an acquaintance, as

opposed to a stranger. Plaintiff also initially lied to the

4

In this context, the individual defendants are Detectives

Corey, Guerra, Hendricks and Santiago, as the instant lawsuits

were dismissed against the remaining named individual defendants

on procedural grounds. Additionally, while the nisi prius court

removed Corey from the case based on plaintiff's failure to enter

a default judgment against him, the court's decision in that

respect was erroneous for reasons that will be discussed later in

this opinion. Thus, plaintiff's claims against the detectives

remain viable only against Corey, Guerra, Hendricks and Santiago.

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detectives by claiming that she had neither known nor called

Acuna, which naturally engendered some suspicion that she was

covering up her relationship with him because she felt it might

make her an object of suspicion. But, while the detectives might

have had reasonable cause to believe that plaintiff had an

amicable relationship with Acuna and that he might have died

under intimate conditions, those circumstances did not give them

a reasonable belief that she, as opposed to some other friend or

acquaintance of Acuna, was his sexual partner and had killed him

(see generally People v Anderson, 46 AD2d 150, 151-153 [4th Dept

1974] [police illegally arrested defendant simply because he was

a member of a group of the victim's friends and acquaintances]).5

The proof of Lieutenant Vilardi's assessment of

plaintiff's performance during the polygraph examination, as

formed at the time of plaintiff's interrogation and conveyed to

Detective Santiago, did not eliminate any possible factual

dispute regarding whether the test results raised the detectives'

5

Based on plaintiff's counsel's questioning of Detective

Santiago at her deposition, it appears that Santiago testified

before the grand jury that, on October 25, 2002, plaintiff had

admitted to her that plaintiff and Acuna had a sexual

relationship. However, at the deposition, Santiago's

recollection of that grand jury testimony was not refreshed.

Furthermore, defendants did not cite this portion of Santiago's

grand jury testimony, or even the excerpt of the deposition in

which she was asked about it, in support of their summary

judgment motion, nor did they argue that Santiago had been aware

of plaintiff's sexual relationship with Acuna prior to her

confession. As a result, defendants' current argument to that

effect is unpreserved (see generally Toure v Avis Rent a Car

Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 351 n3 [2002]).

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suspicion to the level of probable cause. As far as the record

shows, Vilardi merely told Detective Santiago that plaintiff had

lied about unspecified matters, and he told Detective Corey that

the polygraph test results were "inconclusive." Therefore, when

viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence of

the preliminary results of the polygraph examination at most

exhibited plaintiff's willingness to lie to the police in general

and not her concealment of her commission of the murder (cf.

Livers v Schenck, 700 F3d 340, 358 [8th Cir 2012] ["a reasonable

officer who knew of the polygraph examination's flaws would not

reasonably have believed he had probable cause to arrest" the

suspect]).6

Crediting plaintiff's testimony for purposes of summary

judgment, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the

confession increased the detectives' suspicion to the level of

probable cause, for by her account, they invented a false

confession and forced her to sign it. In that regard, plaintiff

testified that, on November 8 and into November 9, Detectives

Guerra and Santiago wore down her resistance to their demands

that she confess to the murder over an extended period of time.

In fact, if a jury were to credit all of plaintiff's testimony

6

In this respect, Lieutenant Vilardi's more specific

report about the polygraph results, which was drafted days after

plaintiff's arrest and cited by defendants in their summary

judgment motion, does not eliminate all triable issues of fact

regarding the conclusions reached by Vilardi and the detectives

at the time of the arrest, rather than thereafter.

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and part of the detectives' testimony, the jurors could find that

the detectives questioned her for around 21 hours and that,

during at least 11 of those hours, plaintiff did not feel free to

leave. Throughout that period, Santiago told plaintiff that she

"had to" confess to killing Acuna, positing alternative theories

of plaintiff's motive by suggesting that she had killed him in

self-defense or out of jealousy. From the early stages of the

interview, Santiago insinuated details of the crime that ended up

in the confession, including the written confession's allegation

that plaintiff had stabbed Acuna after he slammed her head into a

wall. As Santiago continued to insist that plaintiff admit her

guilt throughout the interview at the police precinct, Santiago

also declared that Santiago would tell plaintiff what she should

say so that Santiago could help her. Implicitly threatening to

make an imminent "definite decision" to arrest her, Santiago made

plaintiff fear that she would soon be imprisoned if she did not

confess.

In the later stages of the interrogation, Santiago

alone wrote out the confession, without plaintiff's input, and

then urged plaintiff to sign it, saying it was for her own good.

Eventually, Santiago and Guerra took turns requesting and

demanding that plaintiff sign the statement. Finally, after the

detectives repeatedly promised plaintiff that they would let her

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go if she signed the statement, she relented and signed it.7

Clearly, this account of the detectives' interview with

plaintiff, which must be credited on a summary judgment motion,

established that plaintiff's confession was false, for Detective

Santiago allegedly invented the entire contents of the confession

herself, drafted the confession and then used a combination of

deceptive assurances and implicit threats to pressure plaintiff

into signing the statement.8

Beyond the tactics described by plaintiff, the

detectives' own familiarity with the evidence in the case should

have given them pause about the reliability of the statement they

purportedly drafted for plaintiff to sign. The confession

7

Whether certain interrogation practices are legally

permissible is to be decided on a case-by-case basis. All we

decide here is that plaintiff's account of the impact of the

detectives' interrogation techniques on her decision to sign the

confession contributed to triable issues of fact in connection

with her false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

8

In relying on plaintiff's testimony that she signed the

confession only in response to the detectives' lengthy

interrogation of her and their commanding and cajoling her to

confess, we do not decide on summary judgment that the evidence

is legally insufficient to support a fact finder's conclusion

that the police had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based upon

the confession, nor do we opine that the confession was

involuntarily made as a matter of law. Indeed, as we explain

later in this opinion, plaintiff, like defendants, has not

established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. At

bottom, our decision here is grounded on the long-established

principle that "where it is demonstrated that there is a dispute

about . . . the inferences to be drawn by a reasonable person

from the facts which led to the [arrest or] prosecution, the

uniform rule has been to require there be a factual resolution at

a trial" (Munoz, 18 NY2d at 11).

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claimed that plaintiff had sex with Acuna using a condom, that

she had stabbed Acuna in the kitchen and that she had run out of

the apartment to the elevator. But the detectives never found a

condom or wrapper in the apartment, there was not much blood in

the kitchen and the blood trail from the apartment suggested that

the killer had fled down the stairs rather than into the

elevator. Accordingly, when viewed in the light most favorable

to plaintiff, the inconsistencies between the crime scene

evidence and the confession, as well as plaintiff's account of

the detectives' invention of the confession, revealed that the

detectives knew that the confession was false and that therefore

it could not have reasonably contributed to their suspicion of

plaintiff at all. Thus, the evidence gave rise to a triable

issue of fact as to whether the detectives falsified plaintiff's

confession and brazenly arrested her without even arguable

probable cause, and defendants were not entitled to summary

judgment on her false arrest claim (cf. Warney v State of New

York, 16 NY3d 428, 435-436 [2011] [where plaintiff alleged in a

suit under the Court of Claims Act that the police used threats

and coercive tactics to prompt him to falsely confess to a crime

and include a few true details in the confession, dismissal of

his claim that the police's misconduct in eliciting the false

confession and causing his wrongful conviction was improper]).9

9

Aside from an oblique reference to the issue in their

brief, defendants do not directly assert that the suppression

court's ruling on the voluntariness of plaintiff's confession

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Turning to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims,

the evidence that the detectives falsified plaintiff's confession

and provided the confession to the District Attorney's Office for

use in the prosecution of plaintiff created a triable issue of

fact on the commencement element of malicious prosecution.

Because it is undisputed that the detectives who participated in

the creation of the confession also had it sent to the District

Attorney's Office, those detectives knew or should have known

that their submission of the plaintiff's unequivocal admission to

killing Acuna would cause prosecutors to bring a criminal

proceeding against plaintiff, and consequently, the detectives'

role in commencing the prosecution, coupled with plaintiff's

testimony about the falsity of the confession, yielded a triable

issue of fact on the commencement element of her malicious

prosecution claim.

Additionally, the proof recounted above, from which the

falsification of evidence and the absence of probable cause could

be inferred, produced a triable issue of fact regarding whether

probable cause supported plaintiff's prosecution. Because

evidence that a police officer lacked probable cause to believe

that the plaintiff committed a crime and provided a falsified

confession to prosecutors can rebut the presumption of probable

should entirely estop plaintiff from asserting that her

confession was involuntary and false. And, defendants did not

preserve such a claim below. Under these circumstances, we

decline to address any collateral estoppel issues in this case.

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cause arising from an indictment (see Colon, 60 NY2d at 82-83),

the evidence here that the detectives did not have probable cause

to believe that plaintiff had killed Acuna, made a fake

confession, attributed the confession to plaintiff and gave it to

prosecutors could, if credited, overcome the presumption of

probable cause arising from plaintiff's indictment. And, since

evidence of bad faith conduct in an infirm prosecution can also

support an inference of malice (see Hopkinson, 249 NY at 300),

this evidence further generated a triable issue of fact as to

whether the detectives maliciously commenced the criminal

proceedings against plaintiff. Thus, for the foregoing reasons,

we hold that the courts below erred in granting summary judgment

to all defendants on plaintiff's state law claims and to the

individual defendants on her claims under 42 USC § 1983.

C

While plaintiff maintains triable claims against the

individual defendants under federal law, the same is not true of

her federal civil rights claims against the City and the NYPD.

As previously noted, plaintiff can proceed to trial against the

governmental defendants on her claims under 42 USC § 1983 only if

the record discloses a triable issue of fact as to whether an

official policy or custom of the City government itself caused

the detectives to violate her constitutional rights. Under

Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs. (436 US 658) and

its progeny, "[o]fficial municipal policy includes the decisions

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of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking

officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to

practically have the force of law" (Connick v Thompson, 563 US

51, 61 [2011]; see Simpson v New York City Transit Authority, 112

AD2d 89, 91 [1st Dept 1985], affd 66 NY2d 1010 [1985]). Stated

differently, the existence of such a policy may be shown by proof

that the municipality had a custom or practice that was both

widespread and reflected a deliberate indifference to its

citizens' constitutional rights (see id. at 60-62; Bd. of the

County Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v Brown, 520 US 397, 403-407

[1997]; Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 819-823 [1985]; Jones

v Town of East Haven, 691 F3d 72, 80 [2d Cir 2012]).

Furthermore, to render the City liable under section 1983, the

City's custom or practice had to be the "moving force" behind

plaintiff's constitutional injury (Brown, 520 US at 404; see

Surprenant v Rivas, 424 F3d 5, 19 n6 [1st Cir 2005]).

Here, the evidence does not support an inference that

the City and the NYPD had a widespread custom of arresting people

in violation of their constitutional rights, nor is there any

proof that such a policy caused the allegedly wrongful arrest and

prosecution of plaintiff. On this subject, plaintiff points to

only two pieces of evidence that purportedly expose the existence

of a municipal policy or practice of making unfounded arrests:

(1) the testimony of her expert witness, Evrard Williams, who

last served on the police force in the 1980s, that he believed

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that police officials regularly pressured detectives to quickly

close homicide cases by making arrests, even without probable

cause; and (2) Detective McEntee's testimony that, as part of the

NYPD performance evaluation process, the department considered a

detective's record of closing cases with arrests. But those

pieces of evidence fail to create a triable issue of fact on the

official policy element of plaintiff's federal claims against the

City.

Notably, plaintiff's expert offered no factual support,

beyond his recitation of plaintiff's account of her arrest, for

his belief that the NYPD had a policy of pressuring police

officers to quickly arrest homicide suspects, nor could his

familiarity with NYPD policy during the 1980s have supplied an

adequate basis for his unsubstantiated opinion about any policy

in effect at the time of plaintiff's arrest decades later. In

addition, although Detective McEntee testified that NYPD

supervisors generally took a detective's case closure rate into

account in analyzing his or her performance, the NYPD's practice

of incentivizing arrests via a multi-factor evaluation does not

in itself amount to a practice of promoting arrests without

probable cause. Moreover, even if plaintiff had established the

existence of a municipal practice of promoting arrests without

probable cause in homicide cases, neither Williams nor McEntee

alleged facts establishing that any particular policy in effect

at the time of plaintiff's arrest was the cause of the

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detectives' decision to arrest her. Therefore, on this record,

there is no triable issue of fact as to whether an official City

policy caused the police to unlawfully arrest plaintiff, and the

lower courts properly granted summary judgment to the City and

the NYPD on plaintiff's claims under 42 USC § 1983.

D

On a final note, while we agree with plaintiff that the

courts below improperly granted summary judgment to the

individual defendants on her claims, we reject her argument that

the detectives' suppression hearing testimony that her confession

was voluntary, as opposed to their transmission of the sham

confession to the prosecutors in the first instance, may on its

own result in liability for the commencement or continuation of

the prosecution for purposes of her malicious prosecution claims.

As a matter of historically-rooted public policy, a witness

cannot be liable for malicious prosecution based on his or her

false testimony at a trial or pretrial proceeding, such as a

grand jury proceeding (see Rehberg, 132 S Ct at 1510; Briscoe v

Lahue, 460 US 325, 329-336 [1983]; see also Dobbs' Law of Torts §

587 [2d ed. 2011]), and courts have extended this rule to

eliminate liability arising from a police officer's false

testimony at a suppression hearing (see Curtis v Bembenek, 48 F3d

281, 284 [7th Cir 1995]; Daloia v Rose, 849 F2d 74, 76 [2d Cir

1988]; Holt v Castaneda, 832 F2d 123, 124-125 [9th Cir 1987]).

Drawing on the same underlying body of common law, we have

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recognized the need to shield grand jury witnesses from liability

for defamation based on their testimony, and we have generally

observed that public officials would be unduly deterred from the

full and frank discharge of their duties were their false

statements, made in the course of their official functions or in

judicial proceedings, to become the source of civil liability

(see Toker v Pollak, 44 NY2d 211, 219-220 [1978]; see also Pecue

v West, 233 NY 316, 319-320 [1922]). On the other hand, there

may well be cases in which a witness's improper act of testifying

in itself is such an appalling betrayal of justice, and such an

abuse of the immunity that ordinarily attaches to testimony, that

the immunity must yield.

However, here, while the testimony may not serve as a

separate act of commencement or continuation, it is relevant

evidence that the officers had a malicious state of mind in

creating and transmitting the falsified confession. The test is

"whether the plaintiff can make out the elements of his [or her]

§ 1983 claim without resorting to the . . . testimony. If the

claim exists independently of the . . . testimony, it is not

'based on' that testimony . . . [c]onversely, if the claim

requires the . . . testimony, the defendant enjoys absolute

immunity" (Coggins v Buonora, 776 F3d 108, 113 [2d Cir 2015],

cert denied, 135 S Ct 2335 [2015]). Given the strong public

policy against liability based on testimony in judicial

proceedings, the detectives here should not, at least on this

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record, be subjected to potential liability for their testimony

at the suppression hearing alone. But because plaintiff relies

on evidence independent of the suppression hearing testimony, the

detectives may not invoke absolute immunity.10

In addition, our decision to vitiate the grant of

summary judgment to defendants does not imply that plaintiff is

entitled to summary judgment or should necessarily win at trial

on her claims. The evidence simply discloses triable issues of

fact that must be resolved by the jury rather than by the court

as a matter of law (see Munoz, 18 NY2d at 11; see also Hyman v

New York C. R. Co., 240 NY 137, 143 [1925]). At trial, the jury

remains free to infer the presence or absence of the elements of

false arrest and malicious prosecution from this evidence as it

10

In Colon v New York (60 NY2d 78), we suggested that a

police officer might be liable for hiding material exculpatory

evidence from, or providing false evidence to, "either . . . the

Grand Jury or . . . the District Attorney" (id. at 82-83

[emphasis added]). But, in making this observation, we did not

rule that a police officer's testimony per se, as distinct from

his or her provision of fabricated evidence to the prosecuting

authority in a manner designed to commence the prosecution in the

first instance, is generally an appropriate basis in itself for

liability for malicious prosecution. Rather, our comment was

consistent with the rule of immunity applicable to a "complaining

witness" under the common law. Indeed, as the Supreme Court of

the United States recently explained, the common law has long

regarded a person who instigates a prosecution as the

"complaining witness" and hence permits a suit against that

person based on his or her non-testimonial conduct in commencing

the prosecution, but common-law principles nonetheless cloak a

witness in the grand jury, including a law enforcement agent who

acts as a "complaining witness," with immunity in connection with

his or her testimony (see Rehberg, 132 S Ct at 1502-1510).

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sees fit, and it can reach different conclusions regarding

distinct elements based on the same body of evidence.

Further, our decision does not signal that every

allegation of the falsification of material evidence is a

talisman shielding a plaintiff from summary judgment. It remains

the law that a plaintiff's vague and conclusory assertions that

the police fabricated evidence are insufficient to enable false

arrest and malicious prosecution claims to survive a summary

judgment motion (see Phillips v City of Syracuse, 84 AD2d 957,

957 [4th Dept 1981], affd 57 NY2d 996 [1982]). But, where, as

here, the plaintiff provides detailed sworn testimony about the

police's creation and dissemination of critical fabricated

evidence and the remaining proof does not eliminate all questions

as to probable cause, the defendant officers cannot win summary

judgment.

Lastly, as defendants do not dispute, Supreme Court

erroneously dismissed plaintiff's claims against Detective Corey

on the ground that she failed to timely request a default

judgment against Corey based on his failure to answer in these

actions. At the start of Corey's deposition, counsel for the

City stated that he represented Corey in the actions and waived

all jurisdictional defenses on the detective's behalf. As a

practical matter, then, Corey appeared in this action and, in any

event, unequivocally waived any right to dismissal that he might

have had, including his right to dismissal upon plaintiff's

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failure to timely seek a default judgment under CPLR 3215 (c).

In light of counsel's declarations, plaintiff's evident desire to

continue the actions against all defendants and the City's

inability to identify any reason to strictly enforce the statute

against plaintiff, Supreme Court improperly dismissed plaintiff's

claims against Corey, which should be reinstated (see generally

HSBC USA v Lugo, 127 AD3d 502, 503 [1st Dept 2015]; Myers v

Slutsky, 139 AD2d 709, 710 [2d Dept 1988]; cf. Perricone v City

of New York, 62 NY2d 661, 663 [1984]).

III.

The evidence in this case raises triable issues of fact

regarding plaintiff's common-law false arrest and malicious

prosecution causes of action against only Detectives Corey,

Santiago, Guerra and Hendricks, as well as the governmental

defendants, thereby enabling her to proceed to trial on those

claims. Likewise, the record reveals the existence of triable

issues of fact on plaintiff's federal civil rights claims against

the aforementioned detectives. Thus, defendants' motion for

summary judgment on those claims should have been denied.

However, since the record is devoid of proof that an official

City policy resulted in the allegedly wrongful arrest and

prosecution of plaintiff, the courts below properly granted

summary judgment to the governmental defendants on plaintiff's

claims under 42 USC § 1983. Finally, beyond the dismissal of

plaintiff's 42 USC § 1983 claims against the City on Monell

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- 44 - No. 21

grounds, it is undisputed that the lower courts properly

dismissed plaintiff's other claims in the first action, and hence

the Appellate Division's affirmance of Supreme Court's August 10,

2012 order should not be disturbed. Accordingly, the order of

the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, in

accordance with this opinion, and as so modified, affirmed.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Order modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion

herein and, as so modified, affirmed. Opinion by Judge

Abdus-Salaam. Judges Pigott, Rivera, Stein and Fahey concur.

Chief Judge DiFiore and Judge Garcia took no part.

Decided February 23, 2016

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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