Opinion

Gary Steven Kalus v. Department of Homeland Security

  • 2016 MSPB 9
Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Feb 12, 2016
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

2016 MSPB 9

Docket No. NY-1221-15-0110-W-1

Gary Steven Kalus,

Appellant,

v.

Department of Homeland Security,

Agency.

February 12, 2016

Gary Steven Kalus, Massapequa, New York, pro se.

Cynthia J. Pree, Esquire, and Keturah Carr, New York, New York, for

the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal as untimely filed. For the

reasons discussed below, we VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the

case to the field office for further adjudication in accordance with this Opinion

and Order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant is a National Import Specialist with the agency’s Bureau of

Customs and Border Protection. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2, 9. On

2

August 10, 2014, he filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint with the Office of

Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that his branch chief failed to nominate him for a

fiscal year 2011 performance award in reprisal for his prior protected activity.

Id. at 9-20. On December 8, 2014, OSC issued a close-out letter notifying the

appellant of his right to seek corrective action from the Board. Id. at 22. On

February 8, 2015, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with the Board. Id. at 2-8.

¶3 The agency argued that the appeal was untimely filed because the appellant

previously had filed an OSC complaint regarding the same issue on December 7,

2011, OSC had issued a prior close-out letter on August 29, 2012, and he

apparently failed to seek corrective action from the Board at that time. IAF,

Tab 9 at 5-6. Consequently, the administrative judge issued a show cause order

informing the appellant that his IRA appeal appeared to be untimely filed and

directing him to file evidence and argument to prove either that his appeal was

timely filed or that the filing deadline was subject to equitable tolling. IAF,

Tab 10.

¶4 In response, the appellant did not dispute that his August 10, 2014 OSC

complaint was based on the same matters raised in his prior OSC complaint, but

he argued that his most recent complaint was based on new evidence, he had

informed OSC of his prior complaint, and OSC decided to open a new case. IAF,

Tab 12 at 4-5. He further argued that he timely filed this IRA appeal within

65 days after receiving OSC’s December 8, 2014 letter terminating its

investigation. Id. Alternatively, he argued that equitable tolling was warranted

because his August 10, 2014 complaint was based on new evidence, specifically,

affidavits that he believed contained solid evidence in support of his

whistleblower complaint that he obtained in connection with his equal

employment opportunity complaint after OSC had issued its August 29, 2012

close-out letter. Id. at 5-8.

¶5 In an initial decision issued without holding the appellant’s requested

hearing, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal as untimely filed. IAF,

3

Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that the matters

raised in this appeal were the same as those previously raised before OSC in

December 2011, and thus, the appellant’s February 8, 2015 IRA appeal was

untimely filed with respect to OSC’s August 29, 2012 close-out letter. ID at 9.

The administrative judge further found that the circumstances did not warrant

equitable tolling. ID at 13.

¶6 The appellant has filed a petition for review in which he asserts that the

administrative judge improperly determined that his IRA appeal was untimely

filed and, alternatively, that the deadline was not subject to equitable tolling.

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 8. The agency has opposed the

appellant’s petition. PFR File, Tab 3.

ANALYSIS

¶7 Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(A), an appellant may file an IRA appeal with

the Board once OSC closes its investigation into his complaint and no more than

60 days have elapsed since notification of the closure was provided to him.

Under the Board’s regulations implementing that statutory time limit, an IRA

appeal must be filed no later than 65 days after the date that OSC issues its

close-out letter, or, if the letter is received more than 5 days after its issuance,

within 60 days of the date of receipt. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a)(1).

¶8 In finding that the appellant’s IRA appeal was untimely filed, the

administrative judge relied on Heimberger v. Department of

Commerce, 121 M.S.P.R. 10 (2014), to determine that the statutory deadline

began to run from the date of OSC’s August 29, 2012 close-out letter. ID at 9.

We find Heimberger distinguishable from the circumstances in this case. In

Heimberger, after the statutory period for filing an IRA appeal had passed, the

appellant filed a request to reopen with OSC, OSC denied her request, and the

appellant filed an IRA appeal with the Board arguing that her appeal was timely

filed because timeliness should be calculated from the date of OSC’s denial of

4

her request to reopen. Heimberger, 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶¶ 3-4. The Board

disagreed and found that the appellant’s IRA appeal was untimely filed. Id., ¶ 8.

The Board reasoned that, because the denial of a request to reopen generally

does not restart the statutory period to file an IRA appeal, the timeliness of the

appeal was properly assessed from the date of OSC’s close-out letter, not the date

of OSC’s denial of her request to reopen. Id.

¶9 Unlike Heimberger, which involved OSC’s denial of the appellant’s

request to reopen, OSC here accepted the appellant’s new complaint based on

new evidence and resumed its investigation under a new case number. The Board

has held, under similar circumstances, that OSC’s reopening of an appellant’s

complaint after it already had issued a close-out letter in the matter creates a new

statutory filing period, providing the appellant the right to file an IRA appeal

either within 65 days after OSC issued its new close-out letter or, in the absence

of a final OSC determination, at any time following 120 days from having sought

further corrective action. Morrison v. Department of the Army, 77 M.S.P.R. 655,

656-57, 661 (1998) (reviewing and applying the legislative history of the

Whistleblower Protection Act). Here, because the appellant filed his appeal

within 65 days of OSC’s new close-out letter, we find his appeal timely. * See id.

at 661.

¶10 As the Board noted in Morrison, the appellant’s request for reopening

alone would not have affected his deadline to file his IRA appeal with the Board;

rather, it was OSC’s decision to reopen that restarted the statutory filing period.

Id. at 659 n.4; cf. Hawker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 62,

¶ 7 (2015) (recognizing that a decision by OSC to reopen its investigation

deprives its initial close-out determination of the requisite finality needed for

purposes of seeking Board review). The Board will accept OSC’s decision to

*

Because we find that the appeal was timely filed, we need not address the appellant’s

arguments on review concerning equitable tolling. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-8.

5

reopen at face value, absent egregious circumstances evidencing an abuse of

process, which are not present here.

¶11 Finally, our decision to accept this appeal as timely filed is consistent with

the Board’s analysis in appeals of the final decisions of the Office of Personnel

Management (OPM) under similar circumstances. Like IRA appeals, which

require exhaustion before OSC, certain retirement matters can be appealed to the

Board within 30 days after the appellant receives a final decision from

OPM. 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d); 5 C.F.R. §§ 831.110, 1201.22(b)(1). The Board has

found that OPM’s issuance of a second final decision creates a new filing

deadline. See Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 395, ¶¶ 7,

9 (2010); see also House v. Office of Personnel Management, 44 M.S.P.R. 161,

165-66 (1990) (finding that OPM’s issuance of a letter supplementing its final

decision created a new filing deadline). Similarly, the Board also has recognized

that OPM’s issuance of a prior final decision does not preclude the Board from

taking jurisdiction over a matter pursuant to a subsequent final decision by OPM

regarding the same matter. See Smith v. Office of Personnel

Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 5 n.1 (2012); Powell v. Office of Personnel

Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 580, ¶ 9 n.2 (2010).

¶12 Accordingly, we find that the appellant’s IRA appeal was timely filed.

6

ORDER

¶13 For the reasons discussed above finding that the appeal was timely filed,

we remand this case to the field office for further adjudication.

FOR THE BOARD:

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.