Charles Brown v. Carolyn Colvin

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2106

CHARLES A. BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Graham C. Mullen,

Senior District Judge. (1:13-cv-00096-GCM)

Submitted: January 26, 2016 Decided: February 9, 2016

Before GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charlotte W. Hall, CHARLES T. HALL LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellant. Jill W. Rose, Acting United States

Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; John J. Engel, Special

Assistant United States Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Charles A. Brown appeals the district court’s order

upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Brown’s applications for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.

On appeal, Brown primarily argues that the district violated

Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2013), when affirming

the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) finding that Brown’s heart

condition does not meet or equal the criteria of Listing 4.04C.

Specifically, Brown contends that the ALJ failed to explain

sufficiently his finding that Brown’s impairment does not meet

or equal the Listing criteria and that the district court erred

by mining facts from the medical record to support the ALJ’s

decision. We agree that the ALJ’s explanation was inadequate

and that the district court erred in its analysis. Accordingly,

we vacate the district court’s judgment and direct the court to

remand the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

“We will affirm the Social Security Administration’s

disability determination when an ALJ has applied correct legal

standards and the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by

substantial evidence.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th

Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial

evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. It consists of more than a

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mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a

preponderance.” Pearson v. Colvin, ___ F.3d ___, No. 14-2255,

2015 WL 9204335, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). We do not “reweigh

conflicting evidence[] [or] make credibility determinations” in

evaluating whether a decision is supported by substantial

evidence; rather, “[w]here conflicting evidence allows

reasonable minds to differ,” we defer to the Commissioner’s

decision. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate a

disability claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)

(2015). Pursuant to this process, the Commissioner asks, in

sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged

period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an

impairment that met or equaled the severity of a listed

impairment; (4) could return to his past relevant work; and

(5) if not, could perform any other work in the national

economy. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at Steps

One through Four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at

Step Five. Pearson, 2015 WL 9204335, at *3. If a decision

regarding disability can be made at any step of the process,

however, the inquiry ceases. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),

416.920(a)(4).

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Brown argues that the ALJ’s Step Three analysis was grossly

inadequate under our holding in Radford. In explaining his

decision at Step Three — that Brown’s heart condition does not

meet or equal the level of severity of Listing 4.04C — the ALJ

stated only that:

The medical evidence of record does not establish the

presence of objective findings that would meet or

equal any impairment listed in the Listing of

Impairments as found in Appendix 1, Subpart P of

Regulations No. 4. This is consistent [with] the

State Agency opinion considering Listing[] 4.04

(Ischemic Heart Disease).

We found a substantially similar explanation deficient in

Radford because it was “devoid of reasoning” and rendered

impossible the task of determining whether the ALJ’s finding was

supported by substantial evidence. 734 F.3d at 295.

The Commissioner contends that, despite the similarity in

the cursory explanations provided by the ALJ here and the ALJ in

Radford, we should not remand for further proceedings because,

unlike the medical record in Radford, the medical record here

clearly establishes that Brown’s heart condition does not meet

or equal the criteria of Listing 4.04C. We conclude that

Brown’s medical record is not so one-sided that one could

clearly decide, without analysis, that Listing 4.04C is not

implicated. Further, we do not accept Brown’s and the

Commissioner’s invitations to review the medical record de novo

to discover facts to support or refute the ALJ’s finding at Step

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Three, and it was error for the district court to do so.

Instead, we remand to avoid engaging in fact-finding “in the

first instance” and to allow the ALJ to further develop the

record so that we can conduct a meaningful judicial review in

the event the case returns to us. Radford, 734 F.3d at 296.

Brown also argues on appeal that the district court erred

in concluding that the ALJ properly accorded less than

controlling weight to the opinion of one of Brown’s treating

cardiologists. However, in view of our decision to vacate the

decision and remand on Step Three of the sequential analysis, we

decline to address this issue.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and

remand with instructions to remand the case to the agency for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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