Commonwealth v. Morales

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SJC-11867

COMMONWEALTH vs. NELSON MORALES.

February 3, 2016.

Bail. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior

courts.

This case is before us on a reservation and report from a

single justice of the county court. It concerns a court's

authority to revoke a defendant’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276,

§ 58, where the defendant who was "on release" defaulted by

failing to appear in court and later was charged with committing

a new crime. A judge in the Boston Municipal Court concluded

that a defendant in these circumstances is no longer “on

release” and denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke his

bail. The same question is raised in two other cases,

Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 473 Mass. (2016), and Commonwealth

v. Jaiman, 473 Mass. (2016), which we also decide today.

Because we hold that the judge had the authority under § 58 to

revoke the defendant's bail, we reverse.

Background. On August 22, 2014, the defendant was

arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court on the charge of larceny

of property over $250, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30. The

court gave the defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to

G. L. c. 276, § 58, and released him on personal recognizance.

At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the defendant failed to

appear. The court found him in default and issued a default

warrant. That warrant was still outstanding when the defendant

was charged with committing a new crime in April, 2015.

At his arraignment on the new charge -- assault and battery

of a family or household member, G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a)-- the

Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke the defendant’s bail or

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recognizance in the larceny matter pursuant to G. L. c. 276,

§ 58. The Commonwealth also requested bail in the new assault

and battery matter. A judge of the Boston Municipal Court

denied the Commonwealth's motion on the ground that the

defendant was no longer subject to bail revocation under

G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par. The judge reasoned that because

he defaulted in the prior larceny matter he was no longer “on

release" and, consequently, did not commit the new crime during

the period of release. The judge did not take any action on the

outstanding default warrant. In the new assault and battery

matter, the judge set bail in the amount of $500 and imposed

conditions on the defendant’s release.

The Commonwealth subsequently filed a petition in the

county court pursuant G. L. c. 211, § 3, appealing from the

denial of its motion to revoke the defendant’s bail. The single

justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court.

Discussion. General laws c. 276, § 58, establishes

conditions for a defendant's initial release after arraignment,

pending adjudication of the charges against him. Pursuant to

that section, a defendant may be admitted to bail on personal

recognizance without surety unless the court, in its discretion,

believes that such a release will not reasonably assure his

appearance at subsequent court proceedings. The statute also

provides that a defendant’s bail can be revoked if he is charged

with a new offense during his "release." See Paquette v.

Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 125-131 (2003), cert. denied, 540

U.S. 1150 (2004) (discussing G. L. c. 276, § 58). When a

defendant is admitted to bail, he must be advised, as an

explicit condition of release, that if he is “charged with a

crime during the period of his release, his bail may be

revoked." G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par. As we have previously

recognized "[t]he import of this clear statutory language is

that the liberty interest of a person admitted to bail is

conditional; if the person violates the explicit condition of

his release, then his liberty can be curtailed." Paquette,

supra at 126.

Here, the judge reasoned that the defendant was no longer

"on release" within the meaning of G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth

par., after he defaulted when he failed to appear at a pretrial

hearing and a default warrant for his arrest had been issued.

In these circumstances, he was no longer "on release” or at

liberty when he was charged with the new crime. Although he was

not yet in custody, he was subject to arrest at any time

pursuant to the default warrant. The judge therefore concluded

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that, because the defendant was no longer “on release,” he was

not subject to bail revocation. We do not agree.

The defendant was released subject to certain conditions

that restrained his liberty in a way not shared by the public

generally. An explicit condition of his release was that

“should [he] be charged with a crime during the period of his

release, his bail may be revoked." G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth

par. He also was required to appear at pretrial hearings. See

G. L. c. 276, § 82A (criminalizing the failure to appear

“without sufficient excuse”). The court's issuance of a default

warrant for his failure to appear was another restraint on an

already conditional release. Thus, the issuance of the default

warrant did not put an end to the defendant being "on release"

for the purposes of § 58. We agree with the Commonwealth that

so long as the defendant was not in custody after defaulting in

the larceny matter, he was “on release.”

The purpose of § 58 is "to assure compliance with [the]

laws and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process by

exacting obedience with its lawful orders." Paquette, 440 Mass.

at 129. This purpose is not effectuated if a defendant who

fails to comply with the conditions of his release and later

commits a new crime is essentially immunized from the

consequences of failing to comply with those conditions.

As we have previously recognized, “a court has inherent

power to revoke a defendant’s bail for breach of any condition

of release.” Paquette, supra at 128. This authority must be

borne in mind when interpreting the statute. Interpreting § 58

to mean that, in the circumstances of the present case, the

defendant was no longer “on release” and that the judge

therefore, essentially, had no authority to revoke his bail,

ignores that inherent power. It potentially leads to the

untenable result of placing a defendant who failed to comply

with a condition of his release -- appearing for court

proceedings -- in a better position than one who has complied

with the condition, because the noncompliant defendant is no

longer subject to the consequences of his failure to comply

(i.e., revocation of bail).

For these reasons, we conclude that a defendant “on

release” pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, who defaults for

failing to appear and later is charged with committing a new

crime is subject to having his bail revoked.

Conclusion. We remand the case to the county court where

the single justice is directed to enter an order vacating the

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lower court's ruling and remanding the matter to that court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for

the Commonwealth.

Justin Kyle Brown, Committee for Public Counsel Services,

for the defendant.