Opinion

Thomas H. Whipple v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Feb 2, 2016
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 43.0%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

THOMAS H. WHIPPLE, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, NY-3443-15-0286-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: February 2, 2016

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Thomas H. Whipple, Canandaigua, New York, pro se.

Georgette Gonzales-Snyder, Esquire, Syracuse, New York, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his nonselection appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant

petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of

the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See

title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that

the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting

the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. For the

reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the initial decision except as to the

administrative judge’s alternative finding that the appellant had elected to pursue

a grievance remedy, which we VACATE.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant is a WG-8 Pipefitter at the Canandaigua Veterans Affairs

Medical Center in Canandaigua, New York. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1,

Tab 4 at 4. On June 17, 2015, the agency posted a job vacancy announcement for

a Utility Systems Operator (Water Treatment) position. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 4

at 4. The agency made an oral job offer to a WG-10 Pipefitter who initially

accepted, but later declined the offer. IAF, Tab 4 at 4. On July 13, 2015, the

appellant filed a grievance based on the agency’s job announcement for

“[i]mproper [c]lassification and [d]enial of [p]romotion [p]otential.” 2 IAF, Tab 1

at 4, Tab 4 at 6, 8.

¶3 The appellant subsequently filed an appeal with the Board and requested a

hearing. IAF, Tab 1. He indicated that he was appealing violations of merit

2

To the extent that the appellant is alleging that the position was improperly classified,

we find that the Board lacks jurisdiction over that claim. See Grigsby v. Department of

the Army, 45 M.S.P.R. 151, 154 (1990) (observing that the Board generally does not

have jurisdiction over appeals arising from position classification disputes).

3

system principles 1 and 2. Id. at 3. He also asserted that the agency’s selection

of an individual who, like the appellant, did not meet the qualifications of the

standards of the position was unfair and denied him promotion potential. Id. at 5.

However, he did not allege that he applied for the position. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 4

at 5, 8. In an acknowledgement order, the administrative judge informed the

appellant that the Board may not have jurisdiction over his appeal and apprised

him of the burdens of proving jurisdiction over a nonselection action. IAF, Tab 2

at 2. She also ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument on the

jurisdictional issue. Id. The appellant did not respond.

¶4 Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an

initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 6, Initial

Decision (ID) at 1, 5-6. Specifically, she found that the Board lacks jurisdiction

over the appellant’s nonselection and claims of violations of merit system

principles. ID at 3-6. She further found that the appellant cannot file a Board

appeal of his nonselection because he already elected to challenge the action

through the negotiated grievance process. ID at 5-6 n.*.

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)

File, Tab 1. The agency has not filed a response.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶6 The appellant has the burden of proving the Board’s jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence. 3 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). Generally, if an

appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation 4 of Board jurisdiction over an appeal,

he is entitled to a jurisdictional hearing. See Garcia v. Department of Homeland

Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). The Board’s

3

A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable

person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a

contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).

4

A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at

issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).

4

jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction

by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d

9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

¶7 As the administrative judge properly found, the appellant failed to make a

nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction over the appeal of his nonselection

and claims of violations of merit system principles. ID at 3-6. The appellant

does not challenge these well-reasoned findings on review, and we decline to

disturb them here. IAF, Tab 1 at 3, 5, Tab 4 at 4-5; see Becker v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 327, ¶¶ 5-6, 9, 12 (2007) (finding that the Board

lacks direct jurisdiction over an employee’s nonselection for a position); Davis v.

Department of Defense, 105 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 15 (2007) (finding that the merit

system principles are not an independent source of Board jurisdiction). Instead,

the appellant argues that the agency’s recruitment process violated the basic

requirements for employment practices under 5 C.F.R. § 300.103. 5 PFR File,

Tab 1 at 1-3.

¶8 The Board has jurisdiction over an employment practices appeal when the

following two conditions are met: (1) the appeal concerns an employment

practice that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is involved in

administering; and (2) the appellant alleges that the employment practice violated

one of the “basic requirements” for employment practices in 5 C.F.R. § 300.103.

Meeker v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 319 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003);

5

The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a

petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not

previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of the

Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980); see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). However, given

the appellant’s pro se status, we interpret his initial arguments liberally by assuming

that he made an employment practices claim below. See, e.g., Melnick v. Department of

Housing & Urban Development, 42 M.S.P.R. 93, 97-98 (1989) (observing that parties

without legal representation are not required to plead issues with precision), aff’d,

899 F.2d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Table); see also Morgan v. Department of the Navy,

28 M.S.P.R. 477, 478 (1985) (finding that the issue of Board jurisdiction may be raised

at any time during a proceeding).

5

Mapstone v. Department of the Interior, 110 M.S.P.R. 122, ¶ 7 (2008);

see 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a). Additionally, OPM must have “applied” an

employment practice to a candidate for the Board to have jurisdiction over an

employment practices appeal. Dow v. General Services Administration, 590 F.3d

1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a). Here, we find that the

appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that OPM applied an

employment practice to him because he does not contend that he applied for the

position. PFR File, Tab 1; IAF, Tab 1, Tab 4 at 5, 8. 6

¶9 Next, the appellant argues he was improperly precluded from engaging in

discovery because the agency failed to respond to his discovery request regarding

his employment practices claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-2. An appellant may

request discovery of relevant materials to help him meet his burden of

establishing the Board’s jurisdiction. Parker v. Department of Housing & Urban

Development, 106 M.S.P.R. 329, ¶ 9 (2007). The appellant, however, did not file

a motion to compel, and thus he is precluded from raising this issue for the first

time on review. See Szejner v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R.

275, ¶ 5 (2005), aff’d, 167 F. App’x 217 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

¶10 For these reasons, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the

appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous claim of Board jurisdiction and we affirm

the initial decision in this regard. 7

6

Ordinarily, an appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to

establish an appealable jurisdictional issue. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board,

758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, however, the appellant’s vague assertions

below regarding his employment practices claim did not trigger a duty on the part of the

administrative judge to provide him with his burden of proof over this claim. IAF,

Tab 1 at 5; cf. Parker v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 106 M.S.P.R.

329, ¶¶ 7-8 (2007) (remanding the appeal for the administrative judge to provide the

appellant with Burgess notice on his employment practices claim where he clearly

raised this claim below).

7

Although the administrative judge found that the appellant cannot file a Board appeal

because he elected to file a grievance, the record does not contain the specific terms of

the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that supposedly covers his nonselection for

6

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You have the right to

request review of this final decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit. You must submit your request to the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days

after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,

2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held

that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and

that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.

Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

title 5 of the U.S. Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,

2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the U.S. Code, at our

website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm. Additional information is

available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance

is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained

within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.

the position. ID at 5-6 n.*. Regardless, we vacate this alternative finding. Pursuant to

5 U.S.C. § 7121, the CBA procedure is the exclusive administrative procedure for

resolving grievances that fall within its purview. For certain matters, employees may

elect between filing a Board appeal or grievance under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d)-(e), (g). The

nonselection at issue here, however, is not a matter covered under subsections (d), (e),

or (g).

7

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website

at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono

representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal

Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services

provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation

in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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