Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 14-3201

RATNA BAGWE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT

SERVICES, INC., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11-cv-02450 — Young B. Kim, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 26, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Ratna Bagwe, who was born in India

and is of Indian descent, brought this action in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

2 No. 14-3201

against Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedg-

1

wick”) and her former supervisors, Tammy LeClaire and An-

gela Papaioannou. Alleging claims under the Civil Rights Act

of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Illinois Human Rights Act

(“IHRA”), 775 ILCS 5/1, she stated that Sedgwick had paid

her a comparatively low salary because of her race and na-

tional origin. She also alleged that she was terminated for re-

taliatory and racially discriminatory reasons. The district

court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all

2

counts. Ms. Bagwe now seeks reversal of that judgment. For

the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Because the district court entered summary judgment for

the defendants, we must view the facts in the light most fa-

vorable to Ms. Bagwe, the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Gerhartz

v. Richert, 779 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 2015).

Sedgwick is a claims management services company

headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. Ms. Bagwe began

1The defendants note that Tammy LeClaire is now known by the name

Tammy Worthey. Both the filings and the record refer to Ms. LeClaire, so

we will use this name for ease of reading.

2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties consented to a federal mag-

istrate judge’s conducting all proceedings including final judgment. Ac-

cordingly, we refer to the magistrate judge as the district court throughout

this opinion.

No. 14-3201 3

working in Sedgwick’s Chicago office in March 2001. She was

promoted to Assistant Manager II in 2005, and received a cor-

responding pay raise. She was then asked to serve as Interim

Operations Manager in 2007. In late 2007, Ms. Bagwe was pro-

moted to Operations Manager III. Ms. LeClaire, a Managing

Director at Sedgwick, made the decision to promote

Ms. Bagwe. Delaine Simmons, Ms. Bagwe’s direct supervisor

at the time, counseled Ms. LeClaire against promoting

Ms. Bagwe. In Ms. Simmons’s view, Ms. Bagwe had demon-

strated poor leadership skills and had not provided sufficient

direction to her subordinates.

As Operations Manager III, Ms. Bagwe oversaw short

term disability claims for Sedgwick’s AT&T account. Ms. Pa-

paioannou, the Area Manager for the AT&T account, was her

3

direct supervisor. At the time of her promotion, Ms. Bagwe

3 At this stage, it will be helpful to summarize the organizational structure

of Sedgwick in the years Ms. Bagwe served as Operations Manager III.

Ratna Bagwe reported to Angela Papaioannou, Area Manager for the

AT&T account. Ms. Papaioannou reported to Tammy LeClaire, Managing

Director. Ms. LeClaire reported to Brad Johnson, the Executive Vice Pres-

ident.

Charles French, the AT&T Workers’ Compensation Account Execu-

tive, was on the same grade level as Ms. Bagwe. Mr. French reported di-

rectly to Ms. LeClaire.

Within Colleague Resources, Carla Street worked as a Colleague Re-

sources Manager in Sedgwick’s Chicago office. She reported to Stepha-

nie Simpson, Regional Colleague Resources Manager. Ms. Simpson re-

ported to Rachel Jackson, Senior Vice President of Colleague Resources.

Terri Browne, Executive Vice President and Chief People Officer, oversaw

Colleague Resources.

4 No. 14-3201

received a promotional pay raise of $10,000. She received an-

4

other pay raise of $3,000, sometime in 2008.

Ms. Bagwe did have some managerial problems as Oper-

ations Manager III. In early 2008, one of Ms. Bagwe’s subor-

dinates, Tonya Warner, requested that Ms. Papaioannou reas-

sign her to a different supervisor. Ms. Warner claimed that

Ms. Bagwe had failed to provide her with important infor-

mation and was overly confrontational. Ms. Papaioannou and

Ms. LeClaire considered the complaints and decided to reas-

sign Ms. Warner so that she reported to Ms. Papaioannou in-

stead of Ms. Bagwe.

Ms. Bagwe was also dissatisfied with her compensation.

During an April 2008 conference call with Ms. Papaioannou

and Carla Street, a Colleague Resources Manager, Ms. Bagwe

expressed general concerns about her pay increases over the

three previous years. Ms. Bagwe concedes that she did not

mention race, national origin, or discrimination in the course

of that conversation. Ms. Papaioannou allegedly warned

Ms. Bagwe “that we have to be careful because we don’t want

5

to be perceived as a whiner.” Ms. Papaioannou later dis-

cussed Ms. Bagwe’s complaints with Ms. Simmons in a series

of text messages:

Ms. Papaioannou: tried to tell [Ms. Bagwe] yesterday

4 Ms. LeClaire explained that an employee’s direct supervisor would rec-

ommend salary increases and that she then would review those recom-

mendations. R.163-2 at 27 (47:10–19). After Ms. LeClaire gave her ap-

proval, the recommendations went to Terri Browne, Executive Vice Presi-

dent and Chief People Officer; Jim Wiertelak, Chief Operating Officer,

later made a final review.

5 R.163-24 at 4.

No. 14-3201 5

to be careful on the whole max 3% thing

Ms. Papaioannou: apparently didn't not hear me

Ms. Simmons: yes i know, she told me you did. i

tried to talk her down as well. she really has an

overinflated sense of her importance

Ms. Papaioannou: I am meeting with her again on

Friday so I’m probably going to be direct with

her again but if she continues, I’m not going to

6

be able to stop [Ms. LeClaire]

Ms. Bagwe submitted a memorandum to Ms. Street a few

days later, expressing similar concerns about her compensa-

tion. The memorandum was then forwarded to Ms. LeClaire.

Like the earlier conference call, the memorandum did not

mention race, national origin, or discrimination. Instead,

Ms. Bagwe claimed that Ms. LeClaire had pressured Ms. Sim-

mons, her direct supervisor before the promotion, to deny her

a promotional increase in 2005. Ms. Bagwe also claimed that,

sometime shortly after she sent this memorandum, Ms. Le-

Claire raised her voice to Ms. Bagwe and told her that “[you]

7

think [you’re] good but [you’re] no good.”

Ms. LeClaire determined that Ms. Bagwe had received ap-

propriate raises since 2005. In her affidavit, Ms. LeClaire

stated that Ms. Simmons had recommended above-budget

pay increases for Ms. Bagwe in 2003 and 2004. As a result,

Ms. Bagwe’s salary already was above the median salary of

an Assistant Manager II. In addition, Ms. LeClaire determined

6 R.163-23 at 2.

7 R.163-1 at 6 (231:10–232:20).

6 No. 14-3201

that her subsequent pay raises were average for her peer

group. Based on these observations, Ms. LeClaire concluded

that Sedgwick need not take any further action regarding

Ms. Bagwe’s salary at that time.

Ms. Bagwe first raised the issue of racial discrimination in

a May 2008 conversation with Stephanie Simpson, Regional

Colleague Resources Manager. The record does not indicate

whether Ms. Simpson actually reported this complaint to

Ms. LeClaire or to Ms. Papaioannou, as required by Sedg-

wick’s policies.

In June 2008, Ms. Bagwe took a business trip to Atlanta

with Ms. LeClaire and another Sedgwick employee,

Anne Coyle. One evening, at the bar of the hotel where they

were staying, Ms. LeClaire began discussing her pending di-

vorce with Ms. Bagwe and Ms. Coyle. During this conversa-

tion, Ms. LeClaire allegedly told Ms. Bagwe that she should

get rid of her “old Indian husband” and get a “white man be-

8

cause white men are more fun.” Ms. Coyle made similar re-

marks.

About six months later, in January 2009, Ms. Bagwe and

Ms. Coyle got into a heated exchange at work. Charles French,

the AT&T Workers’ Compensation Account Executive, over-

heard the conversation. He sent an email to Ms. Papaioannou

on January 22, 2009, expressing his concerns about

Ms. Bagwe’s leadership and some other staffing issues on

Ms. Bagwe’s team. He then met with Ms. Bagwe and

Ms. Street on February 10, 2009, to discuss the incident in-

volving Ms. Coyle. At the meeting, Ms. Bagwe relayed Ms.

8 R.145-15 at 48–49 (265:23–266:2).

No. 14-3201 7

LeClaire’s and Ms. Coyle’s comments about finding a “white

husband.” Ms. Bagwe also mentioned that Ms. Coyle previ-

ously had made a hand gesture to make fun of a co-worker’s

sexual orientation. Following this meeting, Ms. Bagwe re-

peated the information to Ms. Papaioannou.

Mr. French later sent a memorandum to Ms. Street and

Ms. Papaioannou, expressing his concerns about Ms. Bagwe’s

leadership. The memorandum mentioned the altercation be-

tween Ms. Bagwe and Ms. Coyle, a series of emails from

Ms. Bagwe in which she questioned a final decision that she

had previously approved during an earlier meeting, and a

failure by Ms. Bagwe’s team to share reports with others in

9

the company.

In March 2009, Sedgwick placed Ms. Bagwe on a Perfor-

mance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). The PIP cited several criti-

cisms of Ms. Bagwe’s behavior over the prior year, notably

that she had not brought any solutions to the February meet-

ing with Mr. French, that she had been unresponsive to

emails, and that she refused to listen to criticism. The PIP also

mentioned Ms. Bagwe’s complaints about Ms. Coyle’s com-

ments, noting “that if you overheard comments being made

by another colleague about someone else, it was your role and

responsibility to address the issue at that time and not a year

10

later.” Ms. LeClaire and Ms. Papaioannou presented the PIP

to Ms. Bagwe in a meeting on March 12, 2009. During this

meeting, Ms. LeClaire allegedly pointed her finger at

9 R.145-9 at 45–48.

10 R.145-18 at 30.

8 No. 14-3201

Ms. Bagwe and warned her that she “better be careful.” 11

In April 2009, Ms. Bagwe complained about the PIP to Ms.

Papaioannou, Ms. LeClaire, Ms. Street, and Ms. Simpson. She

also sent a complaint to Ms. Simpson in which she described

“discrimination, harassment, bullying, and hostile work envi-

12

ronment.” The latter complaint mentioned “disparities in

salaries for some of [the] other colleagues,” and Ms. Le-

13

Claire’s “retaliation” for Ms. Bagwe’s previous complaints.

Ms. Simpson forwarded this complaint to Ms. Browne and

Rachel Jackson, the Senior Vice President of Colleague Re-

sources.

Ms. Simpson then investigated the complaint and issued a

report on June 15, 2009. The report discussed Ms. Bagwe’s

complaints about her work environment and set forth her

coworkers’ perspective of the situation. According to the re-

port, Ms. Warner noted “a perception [that Ms. Bagwe] is re-

14

taliatory.” Mr. French felt “like [Ms. Bagwe] is the one at-

15

tacking him.” One coworker said that Ms. Bagwe “would

talk over her and it was her natural instinct to raise her

11 R.163-1 at 36 (777:3–20). In her appellate brief, Ms. Bagwe claims that

Ms. LeClaire also told her “that she better not tell anyone about a fabri-

cated write-up.” Appellant’s Br. 7–8. However, Ms. Bagwe stated in her

deposition that “the threatening was about you better be careful…and not

like you better not tell anyone.” R.163-1 at 36 (777:9–14) (emphasis added).

12 R.163-30 at 3.

13 Id.

14 R.145-11 at 32.

15 Id. at 33.

No. 14-3201 9

16

voice.” Another co-worker observed that “it was very diffi-

cult to get the benefit of the doubt from [Ms. Bagwe] or change

17

her perception to be favorable.” The report also concluded

that Ms. Bagwe was compensated fairly, considering her level

18

of experience.

On June 22, 2009, Ms. Bagwe sent Ms. Simpson another e-

mail about her concerns, stating that “[i]f discrimination is not

the reason, please help me understand why my repeated re-

quests to have the compensation addressed based solely on

19

the merits of the situation have not been considered[.]”

Ms. Simpson sent Ms. Bagwe a letter on July 28, 2009, stating

that “[w]e were unable to obtain tangible evidence or addi-

tional witness[es] to confirm that harassment and/or discrim-

ination occurred,” and that “we analyzed your pay and deter-

20

mined that your compensation is fair.”

At some point around early July, after a lunch outside the

office, Ms. Bagwe asked Ms. LeClaire how her sister-in-law

was doing. According to Ms. Bagwe, Ms. LeClaire responded,

21

“which one, the Indian?” Ms. LeClaire then said that she did

22

not like her sister-in-law.

16 Id. at 34.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 37.

19 Id. at 40.

20 Id. at 48.

21 R.145-15 at 56 (273:6–8).

22 Id.

10 No. 14-3201

In July of 2009, Ms. Warner canceled a meeting and ig-

nored Ms. Bagwe when confronted about the cancellation.

Ms. Bagwe then sent Ms. Warner a series of heated emails,

which left Ms. Warner in tears. Ms. Warner forwarded these

emails to Ms. LeClaire. Ms. LeClaire expressed concern about

the confrontational tone of the emails, and subsequently met

with Ms. Papaioannou to discuss the matter. Ms. Papaioan-

nou stated in her deposition that she felt that Ms. Bagwe “han-

23

dled the situation appropriately.” However, Ms. Papaioan-

nou said she also received complaints from other coworkers

24

about “email war debates” started by Ms. Bagwe.

At some point in late July or early August 2009, Sedgwick

decided to terminate Ms. Bagwe. Ms. LeClaire, Ms. Papaioan-

nou, Ms. Browne, and Brad Johnson, Executive Vice President

of Sedgwick, were involved in the decision. Sedgwick’s poli-

cies required that Ms. Browne or Ms. Jackson approve any ter-

25

mination. The decisionmakers all stated that Ms. Browne ap-

proved Ms. Bagwe’s termination. However, each gave differ-

ing accounts of how the company reached the decision to ter-

minate. Ms. Papaioannou said that the decision was reached

during a conference call between her, Ms. LeClaire,

26

Ms. Browne, and Mr. Johnson. Ms. LeClaire said that she

and Ms. Papaioannou reached the decision, and she then

23 R.145-8 at 18 (191:24–192:5).

24 Id. at 17 (185:21–186:11).

25 R.163-8 at 3 (50:18–21).

26 R.163-3 at 2 (9:13–25).

No. 14-3201 11

27

spoke directly to Ms. Browne. Ms. Browne said that she re-

ceived a recommendation to terminate from Mr. Johnson, and

28

never spoke to Ms. LeClaire. Mr. Johnson testified that he

spoke to Ms. LeClaire, and then communicated Ms. LeClaire’s

29

recommendation to Ms. Browne.

On August 13, 2009, Ms. Bagwe stopped by Ms. Papaioan-

nou’s office to say hello. Ms. Bagwe claims that, as she was

leaving, she heard Ms. Papaioannou call her an “Indian

30

bitch.” Ms. Papaioannou disputes that she ever made this

comment, but we must accept Ms. Bagwe’s testimony as true

on review of a grant of summary judgment.

Later that day, Ms. Bagwe learned from Ms. Street and

Ms. Jackson that she was terminated. Ms. Jackson explained

that there was a “continuing lack of trust” that had “become

31

a distraction to the business.” Ms. Jackson and Ms. Street

also made clear that the termination had “nothing to do with

32

performance.” Following her termination, Ms. Bagwe was

escorted directly out of the building.

Sedgwick had used a “Termination Checklist and Ques-

27 R.163-2 at 11 (203:13–204:13).

28 R.163-5 at 8 (49:23–52:1).

29 R.163-4 at 7 (67:1–68:25).

30 R.163-1 at 22–23 (581:8–582:9).

31 R.163-66 at 2.

32 R.163-1 at 32 (713:10–24).

12 No. 14-3201

tionnaire” on previous occasions. The form included a num-

ber of yes or no questions and ended with an instruction to

“[a]llow the colleague to say goodbye to co-workers and to

33

gather belongings; then escort quietly from the premises.”

The checklist was not filled out during Ms. Bagwe’s termina-

34

tion. Ms. Street described the checklist as a “routine thing.”

However, Ms. Jackson stated that “[a]ny time I go [to the ter-

mination meeting], for the most part, a termination checklist

is not involved, because those termination checklists come to

35

me to review.” At least two other employees were termi-

nated without the use of this checklist.

In February 2010, Sedgwick hired a replacement for the

Operations Manager III position. Ms. Bagwe’s replacement

was white and American. He did not have experience with

disability claims, but he did have management experience

that Ms. Bagwe lacked. He also started at a higher salary than

Ms. Bagwe. Ms. Papaioannou could not remember why Sedg-

wick started him at a higher salary, but Ms. LeClaire ex-

plained that it was based on “his level of experience and years

36

of management.” Ms. Bagwe’s replacement failed to learn

the aspects of claim management, and settled a workers’ com-

37

pensation claim without proper authority. After being coun-

33 R.163-19 at 4–6.

34 R.163-8 at 4 (70:15–16).

35 R.163-7 at 12 (85:7–9); see also R.163-5 at 7 (41:11–12) (Ms. Browne stating

that the checklist is not used in every situation).

36 R.170 at 2 (104:12–19).

37 R.145-5 at 58 (119:13–120:23).

No. 14-3201 13

seled by Ms. Papaioannou for about one year, he was termi-

nated on September 21, 2012.

A few months after her termination from Sedgwick,

Ms. Bagwe applied for a position with Matrix Absence Man-

agement. Ms. Bagwe was denied the position. Ms. Bagwe has

submitted the affidavit of a former employee at Matrix, who

states that:

Prior to the time I could schedule Ms. Bagwe’s

trip with the recruiter, I received an e-mail from

[the CEO of Matrix]. The e-mail indicated [that

the CEO] had just spoken with someone he

knew from working at Sedgwick and that,

based on that, I should not hire Ms. Bagwe. It

said [that the CEO] learned that Ms. Bagwe was

a good performer before she was promoted, but

that then she became a “problem.” The e-mail

did not provide any specifics about Ms. Bagwe’s

performance after her promotion, only that she

was a “problem.” The e-mail specifically said

38

“Do not hire her.”

The Matrix employee further related that, upon receiving this

email, she terminated the hiring process.

B. Earlier Proceedings

Ms. Bagwe filed timely charges of discrimination, hostile

work environment, harassment, and retaliation with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on

38 R.163-59 at 3–4.

14 No. 14-3201

December 12, 2009. She later filed this action in district court

against Sedgwick, Ms. LeClaire, and Ms. Papaioannou on

April 12, 2011. The complaint included discrimination, retali-

ation, and defamation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, the IHRA, and state common law.

On May 1, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for sum-

mary judgment on all counts. The defendants argued that

Ms. Bagwe’s claims of pay discrimination were barred by the

applicable statutes of limitations and that all of the claims fell

short on the merits. Ms. Bagwe did not respond to the defend-

ants’ argument that certain pay discrimination claims were

time-barred. Ms. Bagwe did contest, however, the defend-

ants’ merits arguments about the discrimination and retalia-

tion claims. She withdrew her defamation claim.

On September 5, 2014, the district court granted summary

judgment in favor of Sedgwick, Ms. LeClaire, and Ms. Papai-

oannou on all of Ms. Bagwe’s claims. It concluded that

Ms. Bagwe’s claims of pay discrimination were untimely, and

therefore it did not consider these claims on the merits. The

district court further concluded that Ms. Bagwe’s remaining

claims of discrimination and retaliation failed on the merits.

II

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014).

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after construing the

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we

conclude that no reasonable jury could rule in favor of the

No. 14-3201 15

nonmoving party. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir.

2014).

A. Discrimination Claim Based on Termination

Ms. Bagwe first contends that Sedgwick terminated her on

the basis of race and national origin. Title VII makes it unlaw-

ful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual

with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or priv-

ileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Sec-

tion 1981 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

on the basis of race or national origin when “mak[ing] and

enforc[ing] contracts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The IHRA makes it

unlawful “[f]or any employer…to act with respect to…privi-

leges or conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful

discrimination or citizenship status.” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A).

A plaintiff may prove discrimination under Title VII, Sec-

tion 1981, and the IHRA either directly or indirectly. 39 A plain-

tiff proceeds under the direct method of proof by showing

“either direct or circumstantial evidence of intentional racial

39 The analytical framework for all three statutes is “essentially identical,”

and therefore we need not analyze them separately. Brown v. Advocate S.

Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1104 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing Title VII

and § 1981); Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 545 N.E.2d 684, 687

(Ill. 1989) (discussing Title VII and the IHRA). We therefore accept Ms.

Bagwe’s contention that the claims should be assessed under the same

framework. Appellant’s Br. 23–24; see also Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum Int’l,

LLC, 766 F.3d 747, 754 (7th Cir. 2014) (resolving a Title VII and IHRA claim

at the same time because the plaintiff “conceded that the merits of his

state-law discrimination claim would rise or fall with the merits of the fed-

eral claim”).

16 No. 14-3201

discrimination.” Tank v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 800, 805

(7th Cir. 2014). Direct evidence includes actual admission of

discriminatory intent. Mullin v. Temco Mach., Inc., 732 F.3d

772, 776 (7th Cir. 2013). Circumstantial evidence includes:

(1) a mosaic of evidence which, taken together,

would permit a jury to infer discriminatory in-

tent; (2) comparative evidence showing that em-

ployees similarly situated to the plaintiff other

than in the protected characteristic received sys-

tematically better treatment; and (3) pretext ev-

idence, where the plaintiff is qualified for and

fails to receive the desired treatment, and the

employer’s stated reason for the difference is

unworthy of belief.

Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.

1996); see also Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 527

(7th Cir. 2008). We do not employ “some kind of esoteric ‘mo-

saic test’ or theory” under the direct method of proof. Morgan

v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2013). The circumstan-

tial evidence, taken together, “must point directly to a dis-

criminatory reason for the employer’s action.” Adams v. Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003). “[A]n over-

load of irrelevant or nonprobative facts,” will not “add up to

relevant evidence of discriminatory intent. … [Z]ero plus

zero is zero.” Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 763

(7th Cir. 2001). Similarly, a single piece of circumstantial evi-

dence, without more, will not support a case of illegal dis-

crimination. Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 644

(7th Cir. 2013).

Under the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff employs

the test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

No. 14-3201 17

U.S. 792 (1973). A plaintiff has the initial burden to show that:

(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting

her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she was subject to

an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated em-

ployees who were not members of the protected class were

treated more favorably. Andrews v. CBOCS W., Inc., 743 F.3d

230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie

case, the burden shifts to the defendants to “articulate a legit-

imate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action, at which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to

submit evidence that the employer’s explanation is pre-

textual.” Id.

Ms. Bagwe has not specified whether she is proceeding

under the direct or indirect method of proof, but instead crit-

icizes the entire framework as too rigid. We previously recog-

nized that “serious questions” have been raised about this

framework, but “[a]s long as the Supreme Court’s precedents

in this area are still good law, we’re not authorized to aban-

don the established framework.” Smith v. Chicago Transit

Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Simpson v.

Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 789–90 (7th Cir.

2015)). We emphasize that “all relevant direct and circumstan-

tial evidence is considered (in its ‘totality’) in both methods,”

but that “we do indeed consider the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’

methods separately when reviewing summary judgment.”

Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2014) (empha-

ses in original).

When “a plaintiff eschews burden-shifting and presents

direct and circumstantial evidence in opposition to an em-

ployer’s motion for summary judgment,” we typically use the

direct method as the “default rule.” Morgan, 724 F.3d at 997.

18 No. 14-3201

Here, the district court elected to review the evidence under

both methods of proof; therefore, for the sake of complete-

ness, we also will evaluate the evidence under both the direct

and indirect methods.

1. Direct Method

Ms. Bagwe submits that there is sufficient circumstantial

evidence to permit a jury to conclude reasonably that she was

terminated on the basis of race and national origin. In her

view, the record contains “pretext” evidence, comparative ev-

idence, and evidence of remarks that suggest a discriminatory

motive. We will consider each of these types of evidence in

turn, and then determine whether the record, taken as a

whole, “point[s] directly to a discriminatory reason for the

employer’s action.” Adams, 324 F.3d at 939.

a.

Ms. Bagwe first contends there is evidence which suggests

that Sedgwick’s alleged rationale for termination—that

Ms. Bagwe demonstrated poor leadership skills—is “unwor-

thy of belief.” Piraino, 84 F.3d at 274. To meet this burden,

Ms. Bagwe must “identify such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, or contradictions” in Sedgwick’s rationale

“that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of cre-

dence.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 852 (7th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792

(7th Cir. 2007)).

Ms. Bagwe has not met that burden here. By the time

Ms. Bagwe was terminated, Sedgwick had received multiple

No. 14-3201 19

complaints about her inability to work with others. Indeed,

the company earlier had placed Ms. Bagwe on a PIP because

of such concerns. Later, at Ms. Bagwe’s termination, Ms. Jack-

son explained that there was a “continuing lack of trust” and

40

noted particularly the “continuing excessive emails.”

Ms. LeClaire observed that “morale was low in the office” as

41

a result of Ms. Bagwe’s leadership. Ms. Papaioannou noted

the “[e]mail communication” and that “[p]ersonal relation-

42

ships with office colleagues are lacking.”

Ms. Bagwe nevertheless argues that Sedgwick has given

“shifting” explanations for her termination, which calls this

rationale into question. Where decisionmakers’ stated ration-

ales are “sufficiently inconsistent or otherwise suspect,” a

summary judgment cannot stand. Hitchcock v. Angel Corps,

Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). However, these “expla-

nations must actually be shifting and inconsistent to permit

an inference of mendacity.” Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327

F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2003); see also O’Connor v. DePaul Univ.,

123 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a letter which

described “insubordinate activities on your part which you

were previously advised to cease” did not conflict with a let-

ter which described “the continued harassment of an em-

ployee … after you were advised to cease”). Here, the deci-

sionmakers’ explanations that Ms. Bagwe identifies are en-

tirely consistent and supported by the record. Ms. Street and

40 R.163-66 at 2.

41 R.145-5 at 39 (204:4–5).

42 R.163-45 at 2.

20 No. 14-3201

Ms. Jackson told Ms. Bagwe that her termination had “noth-

ing to do with performance,” 43 which is in keeping with Sedg-

wick’s assertions that Ms. Bagwe was fired for interpersonal

reasons. Sedgwick stated in its EEOC statement that

Ms. Bagwe “was interfering with everyone’s ability to do

their job and service their clients satisfactorily,” 44 which is not

inconsistent with Sedgwick’s admission that Ms. Bagwe

never had an impact on the company’s bottom line. As Ms.

LeClaire explained in her deposition, the “metrics ha[d]

45

been…met” under Ms. Bagwe’s leadership, but the com-

pany decided to terminate her because “morale was low in

the office.” 46 Contrary to Ms. Bagwe’s suggestion, these se-

mantic differences are not evidence of pretext. Ms. Bagwe

may have met the company’s goals, but she had done so in a

manner that jeopardized the ability of those around her to do

their job. A company can certainly insist on a management

style that ensures a smooth operating atmosphere.

Ms. Bagwe also highlights the conflicting accounts from

Sedgwick’s decisionmakers over how and when the termina-

tion decision was reached. However, we have held that where

“there is no conflict in the evidence regarding the reasons for”

an adverse employment action, “differing recollections” of

the events surrounding that action “do not raise a reasonable

inference of discrimination.” Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC,

534 F.3d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Schuster, 327 F.3d at

43 R.163-1 at 32 (713:10–24).

44 R.163-11 at 3.

45 R.145-5 at 33 (177:14–24).

46 Id. at 39 (204:3–6).

No. 14-3201 21

579. Here, the decisionmakers at Sedgwick have provided a

consistent rationale for Ms. Bagwe’s termination: she demon-

strated ineffective leadership skills. Their differing recollec-

tions over exactly who spoke with whom do not call that ra-

tionale into question.

Next, Ms. Bagwe points to a list of complaints a coworker

provided to Ms. Papaioannou a few days after the decision to

terminate was made. Ms. Papaioannou received this list in

early August, a few days before Ms. Bagwe was actually ter-

minated. She then emailed the list to Ms. Jackson. Ms. Bagwe

contends that the list suggests that Ms. Papaioannou was try-

ing to “dig up” reasons for her termination. When “evidence

indicates an attempt to justify a discharge after the fact,” it can

suggest a discriminatory motive. Futrell v. J.I. Case, 38 F.3d

342, 349 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding potential discrimination

where a decisionmaker created a list of deficiencies after a ter-

mination and then made “it seem as if he kept the notes con-

temporaneously”). However, there is no evidence in the rec-

ord showing that Ms. Papaioannou solicited this list. More

importantly, Ms. Papaioannou never has intimated that she

relied on the list when recommending Ms. Bagwe’s termina-

tion. This list, therefore, does not raise any inference of dis-

crimination.

Ms. Bagwe also suggests that Sedgwick deviated from its

internal procedures when it terminated her. An employer’s

departure from its own policies may be circumstantial evi-

dence of discrimination. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420

F.3d 712, 727 (7th Cir. 2005). However, there must be evidence

of a specific policy that is regularly enforced and followed in

similar situations. Tank, 758 F.3d at 806 (holding that there

was not circumstantial evidence where plaintiff did not offer

22 No. 14-3201

any corporate policy); Long v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Illinois, 585

F.3d 344, 353 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding there was not circum-

stantial evidence where the “policy permits the employer to

exercise discretion”). In this case, Ms. Bagwe fails to present

any regularly enforced company policy that Sedgwick failed

to follow. Ms. Bagwe contends that Ms. Browne was obligated

to speak with all of Ms. Bagwe’s supervisors and review all

documentation and that Ms. Papaioannou was obligated to

attend her termination meeting. However, she does not point

to any evidence of a company policy that imposed these obli-

gations. Ms. Bagwe also contends that Sedgwick failed to

complete the “Termination Checklist and Questionnaire” on

the day of her termination and failed to follow the checklist’s

recommendation to allow an employee to return to her office

after being fired. However, the record indicates that when

Ms. Jackson, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources,

attends a termination meeting, the checklist is not employed.

Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 695 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that

a deviation from company procedure was not suspicious be-

cause the company had explained that the procedure was not

followed when a senior officer was involved).

Ms. Bagwe also argues that the decisionmakers knew that

she got along with others and that this shows that their ra-

tionale was pretextual. First, she points to Ms. Street’s testi-

mony that she had attended meetings run by Ms. Bagwe and

never had witnessed any communication issues. 47 However,

Ms. Street was not a decisionmaker, and nothing in the record

47 R.163-8 at 18–19 (107:17–108:12).

No. 14-3201 23

suggests that she conveyed that opinion to a decisionmaker. 48

Second, Ms. Bagwe claims that Ms. LeClaire was aware that

she had handled appropriately her dispute with Ms. Warner.

However, she does not provide any evidentiary support for

that proposition. 49 Third, she points to Ms. Papaioannou’s

comments that, in June, Ms. Bagwe’s relationships seemed to

be improving and that she was satisfied with the way

Ms. Bagwe handled the dispute with Ms. Warner. However,

Ms. Papaioannou explained that her decision to terminate

was based on the accusations of “email war debates” she

50

learned about in July. Finally, Ms. Bagwe contends that

Ms. Simpson and Ms. LeClaire had “objective” evidence that

she was a team player based on colleague survey results. 51

The survey results, however, only assessed management

teams, not individual employees. 52 Sedgwick concluded, after

receiving several emails and having numerous meetings with

48 Further, Ms. Street testified that she attended these meetings “[s]ome-

times. Not—not all the time.” Id. at 18 (107:24).

49Ms. Bagwe relies on Ms. LeClaire’s deposition for this proposition. Ap-

pellant’s Br. 41 (quoting R.166 at 33). However, the material she cites has

nothing to do with Ms. Warner. See R.166 at 33 (quoting R.163-2 at 3

(26:24–27:6)).

50 R.145-8 at 17 (185:21–186:11).

51 The Chicago AT&T management team, for which Ms. Bagwe was par-

tially responsible, scored better than Sedgwick’s Atlanta Disability Bell

South team in categories such as “[m]y immediate supervisor listens to

me,” and “[i]n my department, communications are open and honest.” See

R.163-13 at 35–44. However, the Chicago team performed worse than the

average Sedgwick management team in these same categories. Id.

52 R.163-5 at 13 (84:17–21).

24 No. 14-3201

Ms. Bagwe, that her interpersonal issues were a problem for

the company. The record does not suggest that Sedgwick’s ra-

tionale was insincere or pretextual, and we do not sit as a “su-

perpersonnel department[]” that judges the wisdom of Sedg-

wick’s decisions. Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 902

(7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lastly, Ms. Bagwe contends that Sedgwick called a poten-

tial employer, Matrix Absence Management, and told them

53

that she was “a problem.” Ms. Bagwe believes that this ex-

change proves that Sedgwick had an improper motive. How-

ever, she relies on the affidavit of a former Matrix employee,

who heard the comment secondhand. “Where a plaintiff at-

tempts to introduce the testimony of an individual who did

not personally witness the alleged … statement but was later

told by another that the statement was made, such testimony

is rejected as hearsay” on summary judgment. Schindler v.

Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Malin v. Hos-

54

pira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 554–55 (7th Cir. 2014). Moreover, even

53 R.163-59 at 3–4.

54 Ms. Bagwe argues that the statement falls within the “present sense im-

pression” exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). To fall within

this exception: “(1) the statement must describe an event or condition

without calculated narration; (2) the speaker must have personally per-

ceived the event or condition described; and (3) the statement must have

been made while the speaker was perceiving the event or condition, or

immediately thereafter.” United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir.

2001). Ms. Bagwe provides no proof that Sedgwick’s comment was imme-

diately conveyed. Instead, she relies on the Matrix employee’s assertion

that her supervisor told her that the comment had “just” been made. That

assertion also is based on hearsay, as it is using the supervisor’s statement

to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, the statement cannot

No. 14-3201 25

were we to consider the statement that was allegedly made in

this phone call, Ms. Bagwe has not explained why the call

would lead a jury to believe that Sedgwick had an ulterior

motive. The statement does not mention race, retaliation, or

anything improper. A Sedgwick employee could have made

this statement for any variety of equally plausible reasons, in-

cluding a legitimate concern about Ms. Bagwe’s inability to

55

get along with co-workers. No jury could infer discrimina-

tory intent from this call, or any of the other supposed “pre-

text” evidence.

b.

Ms. Bagwe also contends that she has “comparative evi-

dence showing that employees similarly situated to [her]

other than in the protected characteristic received systemati-

fit the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule. Schindler

v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 2007).

55 It is not clear that a Sedgwick employee even made the call. First, it is

unclear from the affidavit whether the Matrix supervisor made the call to

the “Sedgwick employee” or whether the “Sedgwick employee” called the

Matrix supervisor. See R.163-59. The affidavit does not specify, and it is

difficult to see how someone from Sedgwick would have known to call

Matrix about Ms. Bagwe sua sponte. Second, the Matrix supervisor alleg-

edly said that he had “spoken with someone he knew from working at

Sedgwick.” Id. at 3. It is unclear whether that meant a current Sedgwick

employee, a former Sedgwick employee, or someone who worked closely

with Sedgwick employees. Third, this discussion assumes that the Matrix

supervisor’s statement is true, but that statement is hearsay. Ms. Bagwe

has not presented an affidavit or deposition from the supervisor, or

demonstrated that she is otherwise prepared to submit non-hearsay evi-

dence.

26 No. 14-3201

cally better treatment.” Piraino, 84 F.3d at 274. Although com-

parative evidence is traditionally assessed under the indirect

method of proof, it can be relevant under the direct method

as well. Tank, 758 F.3d at 808; Coleman, 667 F.3d at 861 n.9; Ha-

san, 552 F.3d at 529–30 n.4. To be similarly situated, an em-

ployee must be “directly comparable to [a plaintiff] in all ma-

terial respects.” Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d

676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). Typically, we consider whether the

employees “(i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject

to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same su-

pervisor, and (iv) had comparable experience, education, and

other qualifications—provided the employer considered

these latter factors in making the personnel decision.” Ajayi v.

Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir. 2003).

Ms. Bagwe first compares herself to her replacement, who

was a white American that also had leadership problems dur-

ing his employment at Sedgwick. Ms. Bagwe’s replacement

also was terminated, which suggests he was not treated more

favorably. However, Ms. Bagwe contends that he was fired

for costing Sedgwick money. She believes that Sedgwick

would have otherwise retained him, despite his leadership is-

sues. Her belief is based entirely on speculation and does not

constitute evidence of discrimination. Winsley v. Cook Cty., 563

F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an employee was

not a valid comparator when she quit before any adverse ac-

tion could be taken, and it was therefore “far from clear that

[she] was treated more favorably”).

Ms. Bagwe also contends that she was paid less than her

colleagues who were white and American, which suggests

that Sedgwick acted with a discriminatory motive. Her argu-

ment is primarily based on a chart comparing her salary to

No. 14-3201 27

other Operations Managers III. However, Ms. Bagwe has pro-

vided no further information about these employees. She has

not explained whether these employees were subject to the

same standards, subordinate to the same supervisors, or had

comparable experience and qualifications. Ms. Bagwe cannot

simply rely on the fact that these employees held the same

title. Tank, 758 F.3d at 810; Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653

F.3d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2011). On the subject of pay, Ms. Bagwe

only identifies one employee with any specificity: her replace-

ment. However, he had additional operations management

experience when he was hired, and received a higher salary

56

based on that experience. Therefore, he is not similarly situ-

ated to her on the issue of compensation. Wyninger v. New

Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 979 (7th Cir. 2004).

c.

Finally, Ms. Bagwe contends that there is “evidence of dis-

criminatory intent” that would lead a reasonable jury to find

in her favor. Specifically, she points to Ms. LeClaire’s remark

about her sister-in-law, Ms. LeClaire’s suggestion to get rid of

Ms. Bagwe’s “old Indian husband,” and Ms. Papaioannou’s

comment referring to Ms. Bagwe as an “Indian bitch.”

Remarks can raise an inference of discrimination when

they are “(1) made by the decision-maker, 57 (2) around the

time of the decision, and (3) in reference to the adverse em-

ployment action.” Egonmwan v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602

56 R.170 at 2 (104:12–19).

57 The parties agree that Ms. Papaioannou and Ms. LeClaire were deci-

sionmakers.

28 No. 14-3201

F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2010). When considering whether a re-

mark is discriminatory, we also consider the context in which

the remark was made. Oest v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs., 240 F.3d

605, 611 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that comments made out-

side of work, in social settings, are less likely to constitute ev-

idence of workplace discrimination); see also Geier v. Med-

tronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a com-

ment did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination

when it “was made in a casual conversation during a long car

trip, a setting unrelated to discussions of…work deficien-

cies”).

Here, both of Ms. LeClaire’s comments were unrelated to

work and made in settings outside of the workplace. Her al-

leged comment about her sister-in-law was made after a lunch

outside of the office. Ms. LeClaire identified the ethnicity of

her sister-in-law, but the comment is far too ambiguous to

raise an inference of racial or ethnic discrimination. Her “old

Indian husband” remark was made in a casual conversation

in the bar of a hotel, during a business trip to Atlanta. Oest,

240 F.3d at 611. Further, the comment was made over a year

before Ms. Bagwe was terminated. Tank, 758 F.3d at 806

(“[I]solated comments made over a year before the adverse

action are not evidence of discrimination under the direct

method.”). Neither of these alleged comments would allow a

juror to reasonably infer discrimination.

Ms. Papaioannou’s alleged comment about Ms. Bagwe,

however, is a closer call. Ms. Papaioannou did not reference

the termination, but she did make a disparaging comment

which referenced Ms. Bagwe’s ethnicity, and she made it on

the day of Ms. Bagwe’s termination. A single “bit” or “piece”

No. 14-3201 29

of evidence, however, is not enough to support a claim of dis-

crimination under the direct method of proof. Hobgood, 731

F.3d at 644. We addressed a similar situation in Dass v. Chicago

Board of Education, 675 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 2012). In Dass, a

teacher who brought a claim of racial discrimination alleged

that a principal told her that she should look for a job “on the

North Side where most of the Indian kids go.” Id. at 1063. We

held that, “even if the remark had been closer in time” to the

adverse action, it could not support a claim of discrimination

because “[t]he undisputed facts show[ed] that [the plaintiff]

was non-renewed because she could not control her class.” Id.

at 1072. Here, the undisputed facts show that Sedgwick ter-

minated Ms. Bagwe because of interpersonal concerns.

Ms. Papaioannou’s comment did not reference the termina-

tion and was made after the decision already had been made.

See Egonmwan, 602 F.3d at 850 (holding that a comment did

not raise an inference of discrimination because it did not

“specifically refer” to the termination and the timing did not

raise suspicion). Moreover, Ms. Papaioannou was one of four

decisionmakers. She did not make the ultimate decision to ter-

minate Ms. Bagwe, and the record shows that the other deci-

sionmakers based their decision on Ms. LeClaire’s independ-

ent assessment of the situation. Davis v. Time Warner Cable of

Se. Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 675 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a

claim that one employer acted in a retaliatory manner had far

less merit when three other managers signed off on the deci-

sion for independent reasons). Ms. Bagwe cannot survive un-

der the direct method of proof on her discrimination claims.

2. Indirect Method

Under the indirect method, we reach the same result. To

30 No. 14-3201

meet her initial burden, Ms. Bagwe must show that “similarly

situated employees” who were not members of the protected

class were treated more favorably. Andrews, 743 F.3d at 234.

As discussed above, Ms. Bagwe has failed to identify any sim-

ilarly situated employees. Ms. Bagwe cannot survive sum-

mary judgment under the indirect method of proof because

she cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Tank,

758 F.3d at 810.

B. Ms. Bagwe’s Pay Discrimination Claims

Ms. Bagwe also raises claims under § 1981, Title VII, and

the IHRA that Sedgwick paid her a low salary relative to her

peers on the basis of her race and national origin.

Before we assess the merits of this claim, we must address

two procedural obstacles. First, Sedgwick contends that all of

Ms. Bagwe’s claims regarding compensation are time-barred

and that we need not reach the merits on any claims of pay

discrimination. That is not the case. Under § 1981, a complaint

must be filed within four years of the alleged unlawful em-

ployment practice. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Ms. Bagwe filed her

complaint on April 12, 2011; therefore, in order to be timely,

58

her § 1981 claims must have arisen on or after April 12, 2007.

58 Ms. Bagwe’s other claims of pay discrimination have much shorter lim-

itations periods. Under Title VII, a charge of employment discrimination

must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful em-

ployment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Roney v. Illinois Dep’t

of Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2007). Under the IHRA, a claim must

be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employ-

ment practice. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1), (A-1)(1). Ms. Bagwe filed her

EEOC charge on December 9, 2009. Therefore, in order to be timely, the

No. 14-3201 31

At the very least, Ms. Bagwe’s claim that she received a com-

59

paratively small merit increase in 2008 is not time-barred.

Therefore, at least one of Ms. Bagwe’s pay discrimination

claims must be considered on the merits.

Second, Ms. Bagwe contends that Sedgwick only chal-

lenged the timeliness, but not the substance, of her pay claims.

Therefore, she believes that summary judgment on her pay

discrimination claims is inappropriate. See Sublett v. John

Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2006) (“As a gen-

eral matter, if the moving party does not raise an issue in sup-

port of its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving

party is not required to present evidence on that point, and

the district court should not rely on that ground in its deci-

sion.”). Ms. Bagwe specifically contends that Sedgwick only

addressed Ms. Bagwe’s claims about her raises and did not

address claims about her salary. Ms. Bagwe is mistaken. Sedg-

wick clearly addressed Ms. Bagwe’s “complain[t]s about her

cause for her Title VII claims must have arisen on or after March 19, 2009,

and the cause for her IHRA claims must have arisen on or after July 7,

2009. Ms. Bagwe may also be able to state a claim based on the paychecks

she received after these dates. See infra note 59.

59 Ms. Bagwe may also have claims based on each paycheck she received.

Under the paycheck accrual rule, a new limitations period is triggered

each time that a plaintiff is paid less than his or her colleagues. Groesch v.

City of Springfield, Ill., 635 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2011). The rule ap-

plies to Title VII claims, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)(3) (Lilly Ledbetter Fair

Pay Act), and to § 1983 claims. Groesch, 635 F.3d at 1026. We have not de-

termined whether this rule also applies to § 1981 claims. However, be-

cause we conclude that Ms. Bagwe cannot succeed on the merits of any of

her pay discrimination claims, we need not reach this issue today.

32 No. 14-3201

60

2008 pay raise and her compensation.” We must consider

whether summary judgment is appropriate on the merits.

Turning to the merits, we observe that our conclusions on

Ms. Bagwe’s discrimination claims based on termination nec-

essarily prove fatal to any claim she has made based on une-

qual pay. As previously discussed, Ms. Bagwe has not pre-

sented any similarly situated employee who received a higher

salary. Therefore, she cannot prevail under the indirect

method of proof. She also has failed to present circumstantial

evidence that would suggest that her employers had a dis-

criminatory motive, and therefore she cannot prevail under

the direct method of proof.

C. Ms. Bagwe’s Retaliation Claims

Ms. Bagwe finally contends that the defendants engaged

in a campaign of “escalating retaliation” against her for com-

plaining about workplace discrimination, which ultimately

resulted in her termination. Title VII makes it unlawful “for

an employer to discriminate against any of his employees …

because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful

employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

3(a). Retaliation also is a cognizable claim under § 1981 and

the IHRA. Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 398 (7th

Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981);

775 ILCS 5/6-101.

60R.143 at 17 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[O]nce all relevant factors

were taken into account, such as experience, time in service, and the 3%

budget for merit increases, [Ms. Bagwe’s] 2008 salary was equitable.” (em-

phasis in original)).

No. 14-3201 33

Retaliation, like discrimination, can be established under

the direct or indirect method of proof. Coleman, 667 F.3d at

859. Ms. Bagwe cannot establish a retaliation claim under the

indirect method because she fails to present any similarly sit-

uated employees who were treated more favorably. See Hutt

v. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 757 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2014). There-

fore, she must proceed under the direct method of proof and

show: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) Sedgwick

took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there

was a causal connection between the two. Tank, 758 F.3d at

807.

Ms. Bagwe satisfies the first element. The parties agree

that Ms. Bagwe made several protected complaints in early

2009, including her accusations in February 2009 of Ms. Le-

Claire’s discriminatory comments, a memorandum in April

2009 about her PIP and salary, and an email in July 2009 to

Colleague Resources about her salary. However, the parties

disagree about whether Ms. Bagwe engaged in earlier pro-

tected activity, specifically on May 21, 2008, when she told

Ms. Simpson that she was experiencing racial discrimination.

Sedgwick contends that Ms. Simpson did not understand this

complaint to concern race. However, Ms. Bagwe testified that

she explicitly mentioned racial discrimination. We must ac-

cept Ms. Bagwe’s testimony as true on review of summary

judgment. Sedgwick also contends that Ms. Simpson did not

report Ms. Bagwe’s complaint to any decisionmaker, and

therefore no decisionmaker could have possibly retaliated

based on a complaint he or she never heard. However, one

can reasonably infer that such an accusation would be re-

ported by Colleague Resources to supervisors within Sedg-

34 No. 14-3201

wick. For the purposes of summary judgment, we must con-

strue the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Bagwe and

conclude that this conversation also was a protected activity.

We now consider whether these protected statements are

causally connected to any adverse employment action.

Ms. Bagwe presents a series of events that she believes were

adverse actions and argues that Sedgwick engaged in re-

peated retaliatory responses to her complaints. We have held

that a “sequence of protected activity and punitive action

could lend some support to a reasonable juror’s inference of

retaliation.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 862 (emphasis added). How-

ever, temporal proximity, without additional evidence, is

“rarely sufficient” to establish a causal connection. Castro v.

DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting

O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir.

2011)); see also Coleman, 667 F.3d at 861 (noting that a sequence

of protected activity and punitive action, without more,

“might not be enough” to defeat summary judgment). Here,

viewing the events in chronological order, we must consider

whether a reasonable juror could find that an adverse em-

ployment action occurred and that the action was causally

connected to Ms. Bagwe’s protected complaints.

Ms. Bagwe first submits that the defendants demonstrated

a motive to retaliate before any protected activity took place.

In April 2008, Ms. Bagwe complained about her pay, without

mentioning race or discrimination. In response, Ms. Papaio-

annou told her to be careful, and noted to a co-worker that she

61

was “not going to be able to stop” Ms. LeClaire. Ms. LeClaire

allegedly yelled at Ms. Bagwe about a week later. Ms. Bagwe

61 R.163-23 at 2.

No. 14-3201 35

concedes that these complaints were not protected activity.

See Kodl v. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 45, Villa Park, 490 F.3d 558, 563

(7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a complaint must indicate a pro-

tected class to constitute protected expression). Nevertheless,

she believes that Ms. Papaioannou’s and Ms. LeClaire’s re-

sponses suggest that these decisionmakers had an intent to

retaliate in the future. However, the reasonable characteriza-

tion of these comments is that they simply responded to an

employee’s general complaints about her pay. In their re-

sponses, neither Ms. Papaioannou nor Ms. LeClaire men-

tioned discrimination, race, or retaliation. Their “generic, for-

ward looking remarks,” without more, would not allow a rea-

sonable jury to infer that Sedgwick acted in a retaliatory man-

ner. Castro, 786 F.3d at 569.

Next, Ms. Bagwe contends that Sedgwick took its first re-

taliatory action in March 2009, when she was placed on a PIP.

To rise to the level of an adverse action, a change “must be

one that a reasonable employee would find to be materially

adverse such that the employee would be dissuaded from en-

gaging in the protected activity.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496

F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Roney v. Illinois Dep’t of

Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 461 (7th Cir. 2006)). A PIP, without

more, does not rise to this level. Davis, 651 F.3d at 677; see also

Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 761 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir.

2014); Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 2009).

Ms. Bagwe alleges that this PIP had materially adverse conse-

quences. Specifically, she claims that the PIP prevented her

from receiving a performance evaluation, and that the evalu-

ation would have resulted in a pay raise. However, nothing

in the record ties the PIP to her evaluation, much less her com-

pensation. Therefore, this PIP is not an adverse employment

action.

36 No. 14-3201

A PIP could still constitute relevant evidence of retaliation.

Oest, 240 F.3d at 613. However, nothing in the record suggests

that this PIP was pretextual or retaliatory. Ms. Bagwe re-

ceived the PIP after a confrontation with Ms. Coyle and two

detailed complaints sent by Mr. French. The PIP provides a

detailed list of concerns regarding Ms. Bagwe’s performance,

including her refusal to reply to emails or listen to criticism.

The PIP does mention Ms. Bagwe’s complaints about her

coworkers’ prejudiced comments, but states that “it was [her]

role and responsibility to address the issue at that time and

62

not a year later.” The PIP is, on its face, encouraging

Ms. Bagwe to report allegations of discrimination. It is neither

an adverse employment action nor evidence of retaliation.

Ms. Bagwe also alleges that Sedgwick investigated her im-

mediately after she complained of pay discrimination in April

2009 instead of taking her accusations seriously. She believes

this investigation was improper and, therefore, constitutes ev-

idence of Sedgwick’s retaliatory motive. However, we have

held that a company’s investigation of a plaintiff immediately

after she makes a complaint is “not suspicious,” because the

company might well need “to determine whether there was a

larger problem.” Tank, 758 F.3d at 805, 807. Indeed, Ms. Simp-

son explained that Sedgwick’s investigation of Ms. Bagwe

was “related to the overall investigation of what was occur-

63

ring in the office with relationships.” The subsequent report

addressed both Ms. Bagwe’s complaints and her relationships

62 R.145-18 at 30.

63 R.145-11 at 14 (71:22–23).

No. 14-3201 37

with coworkers. Sedgwick’s investigation does not constitute

evidence of retaliation.

Finally, Ms. Bagwe claims that she was terminated for re-

64

taliatory reasons. A termination is undoubtedly an adverse

employment action. Oest, 240 F.3d at 613. However,

Ms. Bagwe has not linked her termination to her complaints

of discrimination, or established that the reasons given by

Sedgwick are pretextual. Rather, Sedgwick’s rationale for ter-

minating Ms. Bagwe has been consistent and finds support in

the record. The PIP laid out in detail the company’s concerns

with Ms. Bagwe’s leadership skills. The investigation showed

that Sedgwick took Ms. Bagwe’s complaints of discrimination

seriously and that its willingness to investigate her claims

cannot be characterized as a punitive action. The termination

came after numerous complaints from coworkers and

Ms. Bagwe’s placement on a PIP. See Langenbach, 761 F.3d at

800 (affirming summary judgment where the timing and pre-

text arguments relied on “unbridled speculation,” and the

record presented a clear history of performance issues).

Ms. Bagwe therefore has not met her burden with regard to

her claims of retaliation.

64 Ms. Bagwe also argues that Sedgwick engaged in post-termination re-

taliation by giving a negative recommendation to Matrix. However, as dis-

cussed above, that argument is based entirely on inadmissible hearsay.

Further, even were we to consider that call, there is nothing in the record

suggesting that the call was made for retaliatory reasons.

38 No. 14-3201

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

AFFIRMED