Shane Bailey v. Don Feltmann

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-3859

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Shane Bailey,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

Don Feltmann, in his individual capacity,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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Submitted: September 23, 2015

Filed: January 15, 2016

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Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Shane Bailey brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Deputy Don Feltmann of the Jefferson County, Missouri Sheriff’s Department,

alleging that Feltmann had denied him emergency medical care in violation of his

constitutional rights. The district court1 granted summary judgment for Feltmann,

ruling that Bailey had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove a constitutional

violation. Bailey appeals, and we affirm.

I.

On the afternoon of March 13, 2012, Bailey was at a friend’s house. After

arguing with his friend, Bailey left the house upset. Once outside, Bailey punched

the driver’s side mirror of his truck and punched and kicked out the truck’s

windshield, cutting his right hand in the process. Bailey drove away in his truck but

ran out of gas shortly thereafter. Bailey then called for emergency assistance.

Paramedics arrived at the scene at 3:05 p.m. Bailey, who was eighteen years

old, told the paramedics that he had been drinking alcohol earlier that day. Bailey

eventually allowed the paramedics to evaluate and treat his right hand. The

paramedics examined his hand, noting that the area around the lacerations was

bruised and swollen and that the bleeding was controlled. The paramedics dressed

the wound. The paramedics reported that Bailey then cursed at them and refused

further treatment, but Bailey averred by affidavit that he did not refuse treatment.

Deputy Feltmann arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. Feltmann observed the

damage Bailey had inflicted on the truck and also saw a large amount of blood on the

truck’s rear window. Because of the bandages on Bailey’s hand, Feltmann could not

determine the full extent of Bailey’s injuries, but he was aware that Bailey’s hand was

cut and had been bleeding. Feltmann also could see blood soaking through, and

leaking out of, the bandages on Bailey’s hand. Feltmann asked Bailey how he

sustained the injuries to his hand; Bailey explained that he had punched his truck

1

The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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mirror and windshield. Due to the strong odor of alcohol on Bailey’s breath,

Feltmann administered a field sobriety test. Feltmann determined that Bailey was

intoxicated and placed Bailey under arrest. He later issued summonses to Bailey for

the offenses of careless driving and possession of alcohol as a minor.

Feltmann could not recall what he discussed with the paramedics, but one of

the two paramedics who treated Bailey testified that the paramedics advised the

deputy at the scene that Bailey’s right hand needed sutures and that Bailey needed to

be taken to an emergency room for evaluation. The paramedic’s report reflected that

a deputy agreed to transport Bailey to a hospital before taking him to jail. According

to Feltmann, however, he believed that the paramedics’ treatment of Bailey’s hand

was sufficient, and he drove Bailey directly to the county jail. During the short time

that Bailey was in Feltmann’s custody, blood continued to seep through Bailey’s

bandages, but Bailey did not complain about his hand or request additional medical

treatment. When they arrived at the jail, Feltmann released Bailey into the custody

of jail personnel. Bailey never saw Feltmann again.

Early the next morning, Bailey’s family picked him up from the jail and took

him to an emergency room. A physician examined Bailey’s right hand, noted that

Bailey’s pain was mild, determined that his hand was not tingling or numb, and found

that he had no loss of sensation in his hand. An x-ray of Bailey’s hand showed no

fractures. The physician cleaned the wounds and removed a small glass fragment

from one of the cuts on Bailey’s hand but chose not to suture any of the cuts, because

the injuries had occurred nearly twenty-four hours earlier, and the skin was “too

rotted” to stitch. He also treated a laceration on Bailey’s forehead that was sustained

at the jail and sent Bailey home with ibuprofen. A few days later, Bailey returned to

the hospital, and a physician removed the stitches on his forehead but did not examine

the injured hand. Bailey never sought additional treatment for his hand.

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Bailey testified that he suffers from pain in his right hand between his index

and middle fingers, but that the pain occurs only rarely. He did not miss any time

from work due to his injuries. Bailey’s right hand also has several scars from the

lacerations. One scar is on the back of Bailey’s hand and is approximately one inch

long; the others are located on and between his index and middle fingers. Aside from

expenses associated with his first visit to the hospital, Bailey could not recall any

other costs incurred as a result of the injuries to his hand.

Bailey brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Feltmann, alleging that

Feltmann’s decision to transport him to the jail rather than a hospital denied him

emergency medical care in violation of the Constitution. The district court ruled that

Feltmann’s conduct had not violated Bailey’s constitutional rights and granted

summary judgment for the defense. We review de novo the district court’s order

granting summary judgment, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences

therefrom in the light most favorable to Bailey.

II.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity shields a government official from

liability unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or

statutory right of which a reasonable official would have known. Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To overcome Feltmann’s assertion of qualified

immunity, Bailey must show (1) that the facts taken in the light most favorable to his

case establish a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the constitutional right

was clearly established as of March 2012, such that a reasonable official in

Feltmann’s position would have known that his actions were unlawful. Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009); Howard v. Kan. City Police Dep’t, 570 F.3d

984, 987-88 (8th Cir. 2009).

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Bailey first argues that we should analyze his § 1983 claim against Feltmann

for denial of medical care under the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth

Amendment. The Fourth Amendment governs an arrestee’s claim alleging excessive

use of force, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), but this court has not

resolved whether an arrestee’s claim alleging denial of medical care is analyzed under

the Due Process Clause or the Fourth Amendment. One recent decision, Carpenter

v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 650 (8th Cir. 2012), applied due process analysis to the claim

of an arrestee, but the plaintiff there did not invoke the Fourth Amendment, and the

issue was not joined. Earlier cases seem to imply—also without discussion of the

Fourth Amendment—that the Due Process Clause may govern, e.g., Spencer v.

Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 905 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1999), and there is

a conflict in authority elsewhere about how to evaluate this type of claim. Compare

Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying Fourth

Amendment), with Barrie v. Grand Cty., 119 F.3d 862, 865-69 (10th Cir. 1997)

(applying Due Process Clause). For present purposes, it is enough to acknowledge

that a right under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable delay in medical care

for an arrestee was not clearly established in March 2012. Neither the Supreme Court

nor this circuit had announced such a right, and there is no uniform body of authority

that might allow us to conclude that the right was clearly established. Nor was it

clearly established that a standard of objective reasonableness applies under the Due

Process Clause. Cf. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015).

Feltmann is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Bailey’s claim that Feltmann

acted unreasonably, and the district court properly dismissed that portion of the

complaint. We think it prudent to avoid addressing the proper constitutional standard

unnecessarily. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011).

Bailey argues in the alternative that Feltmann’s decision to proceed to the jail

rather than to a hospital exhibited deliberate indifference to his need for medical

attention in violation of his clearly established constitutional rights under the Due

Process Clause. Regardless of whether an “unreasonable” decision to forego

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treatment would violate the Constitution, this court deemed it clearly established by

2008 that a pretrial detainee (or an arrestee, see Spencer, 183 F.3d at 905 n.3) has a

right to be free from deliberately indifferent denials of emergency medical care. See

Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2013). Bailey’s claim fails, however,

because he has not produced sufficient evidence to support a finding that Feltmann

violated that right.

Our cases in this area borrow from the Eighth Amendment deliberate-

indifference standard applicable to claims of prison inmates. See Carpenter, 686 F.3d

at 650. To establish a due process violation based on deliberate indifference, Bailey

must demonstrate that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and that

Feltmann had actual knowledge of that need but deliberately disregarded it. Id. A

medical need is objectively serious if it is supported by medical evidence, such as a

physician’s diagnosis, or is “so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize

the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 982 (8th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Jones v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 512 F.3d 478, 481 (8th Cir. 2008))

(internal quotation mark omitted); Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 808-09 (8th Cir.

2006). In this case, Bailey received medical treatment on the morning that he was

released from jail, and his claim is premised on harm allegedly arising from the delay

caused by Feltmann’s failure to arrange a hospital visit the day before.

Bailey did not present a physician’s diagnosis or other medical evidence that

establishes detrimental effects of the alleged delay in treatment. Bailey missed no

time from work as a result of his injuries, and aside from the initial examination, he

sought no treatment for his hand and incurred no additional medical costs. The only

lingering effects allegedly stemming from the injuries are several scars on and

between Bailey’s index and middle fingers and an aching pain between those fingers

that occurs only rarely. There is no evidence from a physician or other expert that

these seemingly modest effects would have been avoided if Feltmann had brought

Bailey to a hospital at the time of his arrest. The medical evidence is thus insufficient

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to establish an objectively serious medical need for expeditious treatment on the day

of Bailey’s arrest.

Bailey contends, however, that his serious need for prompt medical treatment

should have been obvious to a layperson like Feltmann. Bailey cites the paramedic’s

statement to Feltmann that Bailey needed sutures and needed to visit an emergency

room for evaluation, along with the paramedic’s report that a sheriff’s deputy said he

would transport Bailey to an emergency room for evaluation and care before the

arrestee was processed. Bailey also cites the blood soaking through his bandages, and

his pained facial expressions. We are not convinced that this evidence creates a

submissible case.

The statement of a paramedic that an arrestee needs sutures and further

evaluation does not necessarily establish an objectively serious medical need for

immediate treatment that would be obvious to a layperson. When Feltmann assumed

custody of Bailey, the paramedics had treated and bandaged his hand, and the

bleeding was controlled. Feltmann never observed the injury, and the appearance of

blood on the bandages did not show profuse bleeding of the sort that might have

demonstrated to a law enforcement officer an obvious need for emergency medical

attention. Bailey never said anything to Feltmann about his condition or a desire for

immediate treatment. Whatever facial expressions Feltmann might have observed

would not obviously have demonstrated a serious medical need for urgent care in

light of the circumstances.

In sum, Bailey has not presented medical evidence that he experienced a

serious medical need for urgent care at the time of his arrest, and there is no evidence

that a delay in treatment caused detrimental effects. The circumstances apparent to

Feltmann at the time of arrest were not so dramatic that a layperson easily would have

recognized an obvious need for immediate care by a physician. Feltmann is thus

entitled to qualified immunity.

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The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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