Disciplinary Counsel v. Lee

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Disciplinary Counsel v. Lee, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-85.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-85

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. LEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Lee, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-85.]

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct

and a Rule for the Government of the Bar—Indefinite suspension.

(No. 2014-1744—Submitted May 5, 2015—Decided January 14, 2016.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-036.

_______________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Raymond Thomas Lee III of Dublin, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0040765, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983.

Lee’s license to practice law has been suspended four times for his failure to register

as an attorney and once for his failure to comply with the continuing legal education

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(“CLE”) requirements of Gov.Bar R. X.1 Lee has failed to rectify the conditions

underlying his CLE and fourth attorney-registration suspensions. Thus, he has been

suspended from the practice of law in Ohio continuously since December 17, 2010.2

{¶ 2} On June 10, 2013, a probable-cause panel of the Board of

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline3 certified to the board a two-count

complaint filed by relator, disciplinary counsel, against Lee. The complaint alleged

that Lee, who primarily practices federal employment law on behalf of the Federal

Educators Association (“FEA”) and its members,4 had neglected the Kentucky

licensing matter of a union member. The complaint further alleged that Lee had

failed to reasonably communicate with that client; engaged in dishonesty, fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation; practiced law in a jurisdiction in violation of the

regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; and failed to cooperate in the

ensuing investigation.

{¶ 3} A panel of the board conducted a hearing and issued a report in which

it rejected Lee’s claim that federal labor law rendered him immune from state

1

See In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Lee, 107 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2005-Ohio-6408, 838

N.E.2d 671, and In re Reinstatement of Lee, 110 Ohio St.3d 1480, 2006-Ohio-4761, 854 N.E.2d 207

(suspended from December 2, 2005, to July 26, 2006, for his failure to register for the 2005-2007

biennium); In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Lee, 116 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2007-Ohio-6463,

877 N.E.2d 305, and In re Reinstatement of Lee, 118 Ohio St.3d 1523, 2008-Ohio-3532, 890 N.E.2d

331 (suspended from December 3, 2007, to April 29, 2008, for his failure to register for the 2007-

2009 biennium); In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Lee, 123 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2009-Ohio-

5786, 915 N.E.2d 1256, and In re Reinstatement of Lee, 126 Ohio St.3d 1603, 2010-Ohio-4979, 935

N.E.2d 48 (suspended from November 3 to December 2, 2009, for his failure to register for the

2009-2011 biennium); In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Lee, 130 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2011-

Ohio-5890, 957 N.E.2d 302 (effective November 15, 2011); In re Continuing Legal Education

Suspension of Lee, 127 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2010-Ohio-6302, 938 N.E.2d 368 (effective December 17,

2010).

2

Lee is also licensed to practice law in the state of California, but at the May 5, 2015 oral argument

of this case, he stated that he had not reported his Ohio suspensions to the California bar.

3

Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been

renamed the Board of Professional Conduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII.

4

The FEA is a union that represents educators working in the Department of Defense school system

who are charged with educating the children of military members. Federal Education Association,

Inside FEA, www.feaonline.org/inside/ (accessed Dec. 9, 2015); Department of Defense Education

Activity, About DoDEA, http://www.dodea.edu/aboutDoDEA/index.cfm (accessed Dec. 9, 2015).

2

January Term, 2016

attorney disciplinary proceedings in this case. The panel also found that based on

Lee’s conduct, an implied attorney-client relationship arose between Lee and the

union member and that relator had proven each of the alleged ethical violations by

clear and convincing evidence. Based on those violations, the panel recommended

that Lee be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio.

{¶ 4} The board adopted the panel report with minor modifications and

agreed that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction for Lee’s

misconduct. Lee objects to the board’s findings that (1) he is not immune from

discipline, (2) an attorney-client relationship arose between him and the union

member, and (3) he failed to cooperate in relator’s investigation. We overrule Lee’s

objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, and indefinitely

suspend Lee from the practice of law in Ohio.

Count I: The Buhl Matter

{¶ 5} At all times relevant herein, Lee was on a regular retainer with the

FEA and received a fixed monthly fee to handle disciplinary matters involving

members of the FEA’s collective-bargaining unit; more than 50 percent of those

matters involved teacher discipline. His primary contact at the FEA was his ex-

wife, Dorothy Lee (“Dorothy”), who served as general counsel for the FEA

Stateside Region.

{¶ 6} In 2007, Patricia Lee-Buhl (“Buhl”), a teacher and member of the

FEA, was employed by the Fort Knox Community Schools5 (“the school district”)

in Fort Knox, Kentucky. During the summer of 2007, Buhl’s husband, who served

in the United States Army, was transferred from Fort Knox to the Marshall Islands,

and the school district granted Buhl a 90-day leave of absence. In October 2007,

Buhl resigned her teaching position at the school district.

5

The Fort Knox Community Schools district is operated by the United States Department of

Defense. Department of Defense Education Activity, Fort Knox Community Schools,

http://www.am.dodea.edu/knox/fkcsco/ (accessed Dec. 9, 2015).

3

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{¶ 7} Buhl contacted Lee and Dorothy in early November 2007 to inquire

about the possibility of filing a grievance in connection with an investigation by the

school district that had been pending against her at the time of her resignation. Lee

responded and advised Buhl that her resignation had weakened the position of the

FEA because she was no longer a member of the collective-bargaining unit and that

the school district could therefore challenge the union’s standing to bring an action

on her behalf. The record indicates that Buhl never filed a grievance about the

matter.

{¶ 8} On November 28, 2007, the Kentucky Education Professional

Standards Board (“the state licensing board”)—the state agency responsible for

issuing teaching certificates for all public-school teachers in Kentucky,

Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. 161.030(1)—sent Buhl a letter (at her new address in the

Marshall Islands) to inform her that she had been accused of teacher misconduct

and to request her response to the allegations.

{¶ 9} After receiving the state licensing board’s letter, Buhl prepared a draft

reply to the allegations and e-mailed that draft to Lee and several FEA staff

members for their review. Lee reviewed her draft, provided comments, and

recommended that she submit the revised draft as the reply. He also indicated that

he and Dorothy were preparing a “lawyer supplement” to be submitted after Buhl’s

reply. Buhl made Lee’s proposed changes and sent the letter back to him so that he

could submit it on her behalf. Lee faxed Buhl’s letter to the state licensing board,

but he did not submit any supplemental materials.

{¶ 10} In March 2008, the state licensing board notified Buhl and Lee that

it would hold a hearing on the disciplinary complaint against Buhl. The following

month, Buhl e-mailed Lee and other FEA staff members seeking advice, and Lee

replied that no action should be taken until the state licensing board assigned her

case to a judge and set a prehearing conference date. He further stated, “We will

naturally review the charges and take whatever action is appropriate based on the

4

January Term, 2016

charges brought, if any.” Although Buhl inquired about the status of the complaint

in October 2008 and June 2009, neither Dorothy nor Lee responded to her inquiries.

{¶ 11} In March 2010, attorney Courtney Baxter sent a letter to Buhl at her

former address stating that she would be prosecuting the complaint before the state

licensing board and advising Buhl that Lee had not responded to any of her

telephone calls. Although the state licensing board had previously sent

correspondence to Buhl in the Marshall Islands, Baxter’s letter was sent to Buhl’s

former Kentucky address. Apparently unaware of Baxter’s letter, Dorothy

responded to an April 2010 e-mail from Buhl, telling her that she should take no

action and that there was no reason to believe the complaint was still under review.

{¶ 12} Baxter filed the formal complaint against Buhl with the state

licensing board on February 11, 2011. After several attempts to serve the wrong

attorney and to serve Buhl at her former address, Baxter finally reached Lee, who

told her that he had not heard from Buhl recently and that he was not sure whether

he “still” represented her. Lee told Baxter that he would make an inquiry and be in

touch. After Baxter did not hear again from Lee, she moved for a default judgment

on March 7, 2011.

{¶ 13} Six days after Baxter moved for default, Buhl e-mailed Lee and

Dorothy to inform them that she had received a copy of the prehearing-conference

order, which had been forwarded to her, and to request that they contact the state

licensing board to clear up any misunderstanding and avoid defaulting. Just two

days later—on March 15, 2011—the hearing officer issued a recommended order

of default. That afternoon, Lee e-mailed Baxter, stating that Buhl had authorized

him to represent her but that he would need to move for admission to the Kentucky

bar pro hac vice. He forwarded that e-mail to Buhl and promised to file a notice of

appearance and request to be admitted pro hac vice later that day.

{¶ 14} Lee and Baxter exchanged e-mails the next day, agreeing to seek a

new prehearing-conference date and to begin settlement talks. Lee then sent a letter

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to the hearing officer requesting a date for a new prehearing conference and stating

his intent to move for admission pro hac vice. But Baxter soon informed him that

she had received a court order granting her motion for default judgment—and

permanently revoking Buhl’s Kentucky teaching certificate—and recommended

that he move to set the default judgment aside. Later that afternoon, Lee sent Buhl

a copy of the letter he had sent to the hearing officer promising to get “something

else” filed on the following Monday.

{¶ 15} Notwithstanding Lee’s multiple representations and promises to

Buhl, Baxter, and the hearing officer that he would take action on Buhl’s behalf, he

never filed a notice of appearance, never moved for admission pro hac vice, and

never moved to set aside the default judgment. He also never responded to Buhl’s

subsequent inquiries about the status of her case or to her requests for assistance.

{¶ 16} On November 2, 2011, Buhl received a notice that Pennsylvania

sought to revoke her teaching certification in that state based on the Kentucky order.

Again, Lee failed to respond to Buhl’s inquiries, and although he told her new

attorney that he “hope[d] to devote tomorrow [i.e., December 17, 2011] to this

matter,” he never provided Buhl’s file to the new attorney. Despite Lee’s inaction,

Buhl’s new counsel negotiated a settlement that vacated the revocation of her

Kentucky teaching certificate and, instead, imposed a two-year suspension

retroactive to May 16, 2011.

{¶ 17} At his disciplinary hearing, Lee testified that he was not a Kentucky

attorney, did not know how to get admitted pro hac vice or how to vacate a default

judgment, had no experience with teacher-licensing issues, and had more work than

he could handle at the time of the default judgment. He also admitted that he never

shared any of these facts with Buhl.

{¶ 18} The board found that Lee abandoned Buhl and her legal matter,

failed to act with reasonable diligence or promptness, failed to keep her informed,

ignored reasonable requests for information, and failed to turn over her file when

6

January Term, 2016

she retained new counsel. The board also found that Lee’s inaction was

compounded by his failure to tell Buhl that he could not represent her while

simultaneously allowing her to believe that he was handling her matter.

Consequently, the board found that Lee violated the following Kentucky Rules of

Professional Conduct:6 S.C.R. 3.130-1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable

diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client

reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to

comply as soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the

client), 1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer to take steps to surrender papers and property to

which the client is entitled upon termination of representation), 5.5(a) (prohibiting

a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the

legal profession in that jurisdiction), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging

in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Federal Labor Law Does Not Render Lee Immune from Discipline in Ohio

{¶ 19} The first of two defenses that Lee raised below is that federal labor

law grants him immunity from all federal- and state-law claims arising from his

representation of the FEA.

{¶ 20} The board found that Lee’s claim of immunity was predicated on a

body of federal law that renders an attorney who represents a union immune from

tort-liability claims arising from that representation. See Atkinson v. Sinclair

Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248-249, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962) (holding

that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29

U.S.C. 185(a), provides that when a private-sector union is liable for damages for

6

Because Lee’s conduct involved a matter pending before the Kentucky Education Professional

Standards Board, the choice-of-law provision of Ohio Prof.Cond.R. 8.5 makes it clear that Kentucky

law governs the relationship between Lee and Buhl. See Prof.Cond.R. 8.5(b)(1) (providing that for

conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which

the tribunal sits apply unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise). The Kentucky rules at

issue here are virtually identical to the corresponding Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.

7

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violation of a collective-bargaining contract, its officers, members, and agents

cannot be held personally liable for those damages); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d

1244, 1259 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that outside counsel retained by a private-sector

union is not subject to individual liability for acts performed on behalf of the union

in the collective-bargaining process).

{¶ 21} The board found, however, that “[d]isciplinary actions fall within

that inherent exclusive power of the Supreme Court of Ohio to admit, disbar, or

otherwise discipline attorneys admitted to practice law in the State of Ohio.” See

Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958),

paragraph three of the syllabus. See also Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section

2(B)(1)(g) (granting this court original jurisdiction over “[a]dmission to the practice

of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to the

practice of law”). And because the purpose of this disciplinary action against Lee

is to protect the public and to ensure that members of the Ohio bar are “competent

to practice a profession imbued with the public trust,” Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v.

Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 178, 707 N.E.2d 853 (1999)—rather than to

bring a tort claim to further Buhl’s private interests—the board concluded that the

federal statutes and cases cited by Lee do not confer immunity or offer a defense in

an attorney-discipline matter before this court.

{¶ 22} Lee objects to this finding, arguing that this disciplinary action “is a

state law proceeding seeking to adjudicate the quality of representation provided

by a Federal sector union” that involves an alleged violation of federal labor law.

He also contends that because Buhl was a member of a collective-bargaining unit

working for a federal employer (as opposed to a private employer), Title VII of the

Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq., affords him even

greater protection than is conferred by the LMRA, Atkinson, and its progeny on

persons acting on behalf of private-sector unions. He asserts that his actions were

not taken on behalf of Buhl but on behalf of the federal-sector union, and he

8

January Term, 2016

therefore posits that the CSRA preempts all state-law causes of action arising out

of that representation and renders him immune from this disciplinary proceeding.

{¶ 23} However, the conduct at issue here occurred neither in the context

of an adverse personnel action taken against a federal employee nor during the

review of such an action. Rather, the conduct occurred in a separate state action

regarding a former federal-sector union member’s Kentucky teaching license.

Thus, this disciplinary proceeding is not intended to vindicate the individual

employment rights of a federal-sector employee or the collective-bargaining rights

of a federal-sector union. Rather, it is intended to further the state’s independent

and compelling interest in regulating the conduct of persons who are licensed to

practice law within its borders. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,

792-793, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975) (recognizing that “the States have

a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that

as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests,

they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and

regulating the practice of professions”).

{¶ 24} Lee has not identified any provision in the CSRA or its legislative

history manifesting a congressional intent to preempt a state’s inherent interest in

protecting the public from attorneys who are unethical, unscrupulous, or no longer

competent to practice law. See Retail Clerks Internatl. Assn., Local 1625 v.

Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963) (noting that

congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” in determining whether a federal

regulatory scheme will preempt or displace state regulation in the same field). Nor

has he shown how state regulation of attorney conduct under the circumstances of

this case will undermine the CSRA’s comprehensive system of labor regulation.

See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d

385 (1995) (recognizing that a federal statute may implicitly preempt state law

when the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy

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the field exclusively or when the state law is in actual conflict with federal law).

Therefore, we reject Lee’s defense that federal labor law preempts our professional

conduct rules and renders him immune from these disciplinary proceedings.

An Attorney-Client Relationship Arose Between Lee and Buhl

{¶ 25} In his second objection, Lee urges us to reject the board’s finding

that an attorney-client relationship arose between him and Buhl because he did not

give his “clear consent” to represent her individually in the context of her state

licensing matter.

{¶ 26} The board rejected Lee’s claim that the clear consent of both parties

was required to create an attorney-client relationship. Instead, the board found that

under Kentucky law,7 an implied attorney-client relationship arose because Buhl

had a reasonable expectation or belief, based upon Lee’s conduct, that he had

undertaken her representation. See Pete v. Anderson, 413 S.W.3d 291, 296

(Ky.2013) (“[A]n attorney-client relationship may be created as a result of a party’s

‘reasonable belief or expectation,’ based on the attorney’s conduct, that the attorney

has endeavored to undertake representation”), quoting Lovell v. Winchester, 941

S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky.1997), overruled on other grounds by Marcum v. Scorsone,

457 S.W.3d 710 (Ky.2015).

{¶ 27} It is evident from Buhl’s testimony that she believed that Lee was

representing her in her state licensing matter, and Lee’s interactions with her and

with others made this belief reasonable. Indeed, the record shows that Lee (1) gave

Buhl advice regarding the state licensing board’s investigation on numerous

occasions, (2) suggested that he had drafted and would submit a “lawyer

supplement” to her written rebuttal of the initial inquiry, and (3) made various

7

The choice-of-law provision of Ohio Prof.Cond.R. 8.5 makes it clear that Kentucky law governs

the relationship between Lee and Buhl. See Prof.Cond.R. 8.5(b)(1) (providing that for conduct in

connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal

sits apply unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise). The licensing matter at issue here was

pending before the Kentucky Education Professional Standards Board.

10

January Term, 2016

affirmative representations to Buhl, the hearing officer, and opposing counsel to the

effect that he represented Buhl, would enter an appearance in the action, would

move to be admitted pro hac vice, and would “get something else in [the following]

Monday.”

{¶ 28} Despite having made these representations, Lee failed to do anything

on Buhl’s behalf. Instead, he stood by while the state of Kentucky revoked her

teaching certificate, he failed to advise her that a default judgment had been entered

against her, and he failed to take any action to have that judgment set aside. He

also ignored multiple inquiries from Buhl regarding the status of her case and failed

to comply with requests for her file once she obtained new counsel.

{¶ 29} Even if Lee intended his representation of Buhl to be limited to

certain matters, the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct place the burden of

defining the scope of the representation squarely on the attorney. S.C.R. 3-130-

1.2(c) provides, “A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation

is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”

Similarly, Comment 4 to S.C.R. 3.130-1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client) cautions that when

the lawyer has handled matters for a client on an ongoing basis, the client may

assume that the lawyer’s representation will continue. Comment 4 specifies that

“[d]oubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified

by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose

the lawyer is looking after the client’s affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so.”

But Lee admitted that he made no effort to expressly limit the scope of his

representation or to make it clear to Buhl that he represented only the union.

{¶ 30} Because Buhl believed that Lee was representing her in her state

licensing matter and Lee’s conduct made that belief reasonable, we conclude that

an attorney-client relationship arose, at least by implication. We therefore overrule

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Lee’s objections and adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in

this regard.

{¶ 31} Having overruled both of Lee’s objections with respect to the Buhl

matter, we conclude that the board’s findings of fact and of misconduct with regard

to Count I are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and we adopt them as

our own.

Count II: Failure to Cooperate

{¶ 32} The board found that Lee failed to respond to relator’s first two

letters of inquiry and failed to appear for two scheduled depositions, even though

relator served him with subpoenas for both depositions by taping them to the front

door of his home. After relator e-mailed Lee to advise him of the numerous

attempts that had been made to reach him and to inform him that a formal

disciplinary complaint was being prepared for filing, Lee e-mailed relator claiming

that he had submitted a response to the first letter of inquiry and denying that he

had ever represented Buhl.

{¶ 33} Although relator asked Lee to send a copy of the response that he

claimed to have submitted, he failed to do so. Lee also denied having received

relator’s second letter of inquiry and the two subpoenas for deposition, and he

claimed that he had responded to all of the communications that he had received.

In May 2013, relator provided Lee with a copy of the draft complaint. Lee

responded to the draft complaint and all of the letters of inquiry—approximately

one year after relator’s first inquiry and six months after he first communicated with

relator—but failed to address one issue raised by relator.

{¶ 34} On these facts, the board found that Lee violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G)

(requiring a lawyer to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation) and Prof.Cond.R.

8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for

information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation).

12

January Term, 2016

{¶ 35} Lee objects and contends that there is insufficient evidence to

support these findings. Our review of the record, however, shows that there is

ample evidence to support the board’s finding that Lee failed to cooperate in

relator’s investigation. We therefore overrule Lee’s objections and adopt the

board’s findings with regard to Count II as our own.

Sanction

{¶ 36} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the

sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio

St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final determination,

we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD

Proc.Reg. 10(B).8

{¶ 37} In this case, the board found that the following aggravating factors

are present: (1) a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) a pattern of misconduct, (3)

multiple offenses, (4) a lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process, (5) a refusal

to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and (6) the vulnerability of and

resulting harm to Buhl, who testified that the matter took a toll on her health, her

family, and her children, caused her to fear for her husband’s military career, and

caused her to fear returning to the classroom. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b),

(c), (d), (e), (g), and (h). The only applicable mitigating factors that the board found

are the absence of prior discipline and two letters attesting to Lee’s character and

reputation apart from this misconduct. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (e).

{¶ 38} Relator argued that the appropriate sanction for Lee’s misconduct is

an indefinite suspension. Noting that we frequently impose indefinite suspensions

on attorneys who neglect client matters and fail to cooperate in the ensuing

disciplinary investigations, the board agreed that the sanction is appropriate in this

8

Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD

Proc.Reg. 10(B) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV.

13

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case. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Mathewson, 113 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-

Ohio-2076, 865 N.E.2d 891 (indefinitely suspending an attorney who neglected a

client matter, engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when

he failed to ensure documents were prepared and filed in three criminal appeals,

and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation); Disciplinary

Counsel v. Meade, 127 Ohio St.3d 393, 2010-Ohio-6209, 939 N.E.2d 1250

(indefinitely suspending an attorney who neglected a client’s appeal of a

deportation ruling and failed to cooperate in multiple disciplinary investigations);

Disciplinary Counsel v. Bogdanski, 135 Ohio St.3d 235, 2013-Ohio-398, 985

N.E.2d 1251 (indefinitely suspending an attorney who abandoned client matters,

engaged in acts of dishonesty, failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her

conduct, and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation).

{¶ 39} In light of Lee’s conduct, the significant aggravating factors present,

and the sanctions we have imposed for comparable misconduct, we find that an

indefinite suspension is warranted.

{¶ 40} Accordingly, Raymond Thomas Lee III is indefinitely suspended

from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs are taxed to Lee.

Judgment accordingly.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,

FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.

_________________

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, Assistant

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Raymond Thomas Lee III, pro se.

_________________

14