David Reyes v. Christopher Smith

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID REYES, No. 13-17119

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:12-cv-00652-

KJM-CMK

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, Chief

Physician and Surgeon, Mule Creek

State Prison; SCOTT HEATLEY, Chief OPINION

Medical Officer, Mule Creek State

Prison,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 20, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed January 12, 2016

2 REYES V. SMITH

Before: Michael J. Melloy,* Sandra S. Ikuta, and Andrew

D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz

SUMMARY**

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of

claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a

California state inmate against two physicians alleging

deliberate indifference to medical needs, and remanded for

further proceedings.

The district court dismissed the claims after finding that

plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act because he had not

named the defendant physicians in his grievance, contrary

to a procedural rule requiring inmates to “list all staff

member(s) involved” in a grievance and “describe their

involvement in the issue.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15

§ 3084.2(a). The panel held that despite the prisoner’s

failure to comply with the procedural rule, the exhaustion

requirement was nevertheless satisfied because prison

*

The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

REYES V. SMITH 3

officials decided the potentially flawed grievance on the

merits. The panel held that when prison officials opt not to

enforce a procedural rule but instead decide an inmate’s

grievance on the merits, the purposes of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement have been

fully served: prison officials have had a fair opportunity to

correct any claimed deprivation and an administrative

record supporting the prison’s decision has been developed.

The panel further held that in this case the grievance

sufficed to put prison officials on notice of the alleged

deprivation and gave them ample opportunity to resolve it.

COUNSEL

Lesley Pak (argued), Frederick S. Chung, Stuart M.

Rosenberg, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Palo Alto,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Jonathan

L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S.

Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Jose A.

Zelidon-Zepeda (argued), Deputy Attorney General, San

Francisco, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

As a matter of first impression, we must decide whether

an inmate has exhausted administrative remedies under the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e, if his grievance is decided on the merits at all

available levels of administrative review despite failure to

comply with a procedural rule. Consistent with each of our

4 REYES V. SMITH

sister circuits to have addressed this issue, we hold that in

these circumstances the inmate’s claim is exhausted.

I.

In January 2011, California state inmate David Reyes

was examined by a prison physician, Dr. Wesley

Hashimoto, who recommended a regimen of pain

medication, including morphine, for Reyes’ degenerative

spine condition. The prison’s Pain Management

Committee—which included Dr. Christopher Smith, the

Chief Physician and Surgeon, and Dr. Scott Heatley, the

Chief Medical Officer—originally approved the

prescriptions. But in May 2011, Dr. Hashimoto told Reyes

that Drs. Smith and Heatley had ordered that his pain

medications would be gradually reduced and discontinued

entirely by June.

Reyes filed a prison grievance complaining of the

“drastic changes” to his medication regimen. The

grievance asserted Reyes suffered “unbelieveable pain,”

but that a nurse refused to prescribe anything but aspirin.

The grievance requested an examination by a physician,

stated that “‘[d]eliberate indifference to medical needs’

violates the [Eighth] Amendment,” and included citations

to Eighth Amendment cases.

In response to the grievance, Reyes was interviewed by

a physician’s assistant (PA) who issued a decision denying

the request for pain medication. The decision recited that

“the Pain Management Committee determined narcotics

were not medically necessary” and that the PA “did not

determine Morphine was medically indicated” because

Reyes was functioning well with his current treatment. The

decision provided, however, that the need for pain

medication “may be revisited” after consultation with a

rheumatologist.

REYES V. SMITH 5

Reyes appealed this decision to Lawrence Fong, the

Chief Executive Officer of Health Care Services. Fong

denied Reyes’ “request to be prescribed Morphine,” stating

that the “Pain Management Committee determined

narcotics were not medically necessary,” and concluding

that Reyes’ medical treatment had been “appropriate and

timely.” Reyes appealed again. The third-level appeal was

denied by L.D. Zamora, Chief of the Office of Third Level

Appeals for healthcare. The denial noted that Reyes had

requested pain medication, stated that the Pain

Management Committee had “recommended against

narcotics,” and concluded that intervention was

unwarranted because Reyes was “receiving treatment

deemed medically necessary.” The order concluded: “This

decision exhausts your available administrative remedies.”

Reyes then brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the

Eastern District of California against Drs. Smith and

Heatley and other prison officials, alleging that they had

violated the Eighth Amendment through deliberate

indifference to his medical needs. A magistrate judge

recommended dismissal of the claims against Drs. Smith

and Heatley for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

under the PLRA because Reyes had not named these

physicians in his grievance, contrary to a rule requiring

inmates to “list all staff member(s) involved” in a grievance

and “describe their involvement in the issue.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.2(a) (2015). The district court adopted

the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and

6 REYES V. SMITH

granted the physicians’ motion to dismiss. This timely

appeal followed.1

II.

The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this

title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) requires an inmate

not only to pursue every available step of the prison

grievance process but also to adhere to the “critical

procedural rules” of that process. Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements,

and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper

exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

The California prison grievance system has three levels

of review; an inmate exhausts administrative remedies by

obtaining a decision at each level. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.1(b) (2011); Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683

(9th Cir. 2010). It is uncontested that Reyes obtained a

decision at all three levels. The issue is whether he

nevertheless failed to exhaust administrative remedies

because his grievance did not name all staff members

involved in his case. See Cal Code. Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.2(a) (2015).

1

The district court also dismissed Reyes’ claims against the other

prison officials. Reyes does not challenge those dismissals on appeal.

REYES V. SMITH 7

“The PLRA attempts to eliminate unwarranted federal-

court interference with the administration of prisons, and

thus seeks to afford corrections officials time and

opportunity to address complaints internally before

allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford,

548 U.S. at 93 (alterations, footnote, and quotation marks

omitted). Requiring exhaustion provides prison officials a

“fair opportunity to correct their own errors” and creates an

administrative record for grievances that eventually become

the subject of federal court complaints. Id. at 94; see

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002). Requiring

inmates to comply with applicable procedural regulations

furthers these statutory purposes. See Woodford, 548 U.S.

at 94–96.

But when prison officials address the merits of a

prisoner’s grievance instead of enforcing a procedural bar,

the state’s interests in administrative exhaustion have been

served. Prison officials have had the opportunity to address

the grievance and correct their own errors and an

administrative record has been developed. For these

reasons, all seven of our sister circuits to have considered

the issue have concluded that the PLRA exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if prison officials decide a

potentially procedurally flawed grievance on the merits.

Whatley v. Warden, 802 F.3d 1205, 1214–15 (11th Cir.

2015); Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir.

2012) (per curiam); Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 125 (2d

Cir. 2011); Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721–22 (7th Cir.

2011); Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 326 (6th

Cir. 2010); Ross v. Cty. of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186

(10th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Jones,

549 U.S. at 219–224; Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281

(3d Cir. 2000).

8 REYES V. SMITH

Two of these cases are particularly instructive. In

Reed-Bey, the Sixth Circuit confronted a Michigan prison

rule which required the inmate to identify “all those

involved in the issue being grieved.” 603 F.3d at 324. The

inmate failed to do so, but prison officials “chose to address

Reed-Bey’s grievance on the merits.” Id. The Sixth

Circuit therefore rejected the defendant’s PLRA exhaustion

defense, stating that because the exhaustion requirement is

designed to serve the state’s interests, “[w]e see no benefit

to enforcing a procedural bar that the Department of

Corrections did not.” Id. at 326. Similarly, in Maddox, the

Seventh Circuit determined that an inmate exhausted

administrative remedies under the PLRA despite failing to

comply with a procedural rule nearly identical to the

California rule at issue here, because officials had decided

the inmate’s grievance on the merits at each level of

review. 655 F.3d at 722 (“Where prison officials address

an inmate’s grievance on the merits without rejecting it on

procedural grounds, the grievance has served its function of

alerting the state and inviting corrective action, and

defendants cannot rely on the failure to exhaust defense.”).

We agree with these decisions. When prison officials

opt not to enforce a procedural rule but instead decide an

inmate’s grievance on the merits, the purposes of the PLRA

exhaustion requirement have been fully served: prison

officials have had a fair opportunity to correct any claimed

deprivation and an administrative record supporting the

prison’s decision has been developed. See Nussle, 534 U.S.

at 525. Dismissing the inmate’s claim for failure to exhaust

under these circumstances does not advance the statutory

goal of avoiding unnecessary interference in prison

administration. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. Rather, it

prevents the courts from considering a claim that has

already been fully vetted within the prison system.

REYES V. SMITH 9

Declining to enforce procedural rules when prison

officials fail to do so also serves the state’s interests in

“deciding when to waive or enforce its own rules.” Reed-

Bey, 603 F.3d at 325. It “takes into account the likelihood

that prison officials will benefit if given discretion to

decide, for reasons such as fairness or inmate morale or the

need to resolve a recurring issue, that ruling on the merits is

better for the institution and an inmate who has attempted

to exhaust available prison remedies.” Hammett, 681 F.3d

at 948.

Accordingly, we hold that a prisoner exhausts “such

administrative remedies as are available,” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a), under the PLRA despite failing to comply with

a procedural rule if prison officials ignore the procedural

problem and render a decision on the merits of the

grievance at each available step of the administrative

process.

III.

The defendant physicians also contend that Reyes’ suit

is barred under the PLRA exhaustion requirement because

his grievance failed to “alert[] the prison to the nature of

the wrong for which redress is sought” and provide

sufficient information “to allow prison officials to take

appropriate responsive measures.” Griffin v. Arpaio,

557 F.3d 1117, 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation

marks omitted). Drs. Smith and Heatley argue that the

grievance related on its face only to Dr. Hashimoto’s

determination that Reyes should not receive narcotic pain

medication, and thus did not exhaust his claim relating to

actions by the Pain Management Committee.

Their argument fails. Under the PLRA, a grievance

“suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for

which redress is sought.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813,

10 REYES V. SMITH

824 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120).

The grievance “need not include legal terminology or legal

theories,” because “[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is

to alert the prison to a problem and facilitate its resolution,

not to lay groundwork for litigation.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at

1120. The grievance process is only required to “alert

prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice

to a particular official that he may be sued.” Jones,

549 U.S. at 219 (citations omitted).

Reyes’ grievance plainly put prison officials on notice

of the nature of the wrong alleged in his federal suit—

denial of pain medication by the defendant doctors. Prison

officials also plainly knew that the Pain Management

Committee, of which Drs. Smith and Heatley and Smith

were members, had decided Reyes should not receive the

medication; that decision was cited repeatedly by the prison

administration in denying Reyes’ grievance. Prison

officials had full notice of the alleged deprivation and

ample opportunity to resolve it. The grievance thus

sufficed.

Contrary to the defendants’ arguments, this case is not

like Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1118–21, in which an inmate

submitted a grievance requesting a ladder to access his top

bunk, and later filed a lawsuit asserting that prison staff had

disregarded an order assigning him to a lower bunk, nor

Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824, in which an inmate submitted a

grievance about medical treatment for an eye condition but

his § 1983 suit also alleged failure to provide review of his

medical records and improper screening of administrative

appeals. Rather, prison officials in this case easily

identified the Pain Management Committee’s involvement

in the issue, and explained repeatedly that they were

denying Reyes’ grievance precisely because the Committee

had determined that narcotics were not medically

REYES V. SMITH 11

necessary. On this record, the state defendants cannot

argue that prison officials were unaware of the involvement

of physicians other than Dr. Hashimoto in the events

alleged. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir.

2004); Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722 (The inmate “complained

about an administrative decision—the cancellation of

[religious] services—and it belies reason to suggest that

prison administrators at [the prison] were unaware of who

was responsible for that decision.”).

IV.

We REVERSE the district court order dismissing

Reyes’ claims against Drs. Smith and Heatley and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.