Opinion

People of Michigan v. Alenna Marie Rocafort

Court
Michigan Court of Appeals
Filed
Jan 7, 2016
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.9%

equating the “preponderance of the evidence” standard with “more likely than not”

How later courts described this case

  • equating the “preponderance of the evidence” standard with “more likely than not”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED

January 7, 2016

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 321804

Kent Circuit Court

ALENNA MARIE ROCAFORT, LC No. 13-000391-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and MURPHY and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by right her jury trial convictions of unlawful manufacture of

marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii) (less than five kilograms or fewer than 20 plants), unlawful

possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii), and knowingly keeping

or maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(d). Defendant was sentenced to 24 months’

probation. We affirm.

This case concerns the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et

seq., and defendant’s manufacturing of marijuana in a house located in Kentwood, Michigan.

There is no dispute that on September 19, 2012, defendant was a registered patient and caregiver

under the MMMA and that she had five registered patients and provided four of those patients

with marijuana. There is also no dispute that on that date defendant had 34 marijuana plants

growing in an unoccupied house located next to the house in which she lived. Defendant used

the unoccupied house solely to produce marijuana.

On September 15, 2012, defendant harvested marijuana from her plants and began the

process of drying it. She intended to produce hash oil from this harvested marijuana. On

September 19, 2012, she placed the harvested marijuana into canisters as part of the drying

process. When she returned home from work that afternoon, she saw police officers at the

unoccupied house. She approached the officers and told them she was a registered patient and

caregiver under the MMMA. She told them the house was hers and that she used it only for

producing marijuana. Police nevertheless seized approximately 5.8 pounds of marijuana that

defendant had put inside the canisters to dry. Before trial, defendant moved the trial court to

dismiss her charges pursuant to § 4 of the MMMA, MCL 333.26424(b). The trial court

dismissed her motion because it found that the marijuana seized from the house was above the

amount of usable marijuana permitted under § 4. Defendant also moved the trial court to permit

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her to assert a defense pursuant to § 8 of the MMMA, MCL 333.26428(a). The trial court

granted the motion. Defendant was convicted as previously stated.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in finding that the seized marijuana was

dried, and thus usable, in denying her motion to dismiss under § 4. Manufacturing marijuana or

possessing marijuana with intent to deliver it “where the amount is less than 5 kilograms or

fewer than 20 plants” is a felony. MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii). And, a person “[s]hall not

knowingly keep or maintain a . . . dwelling . . . that is used for keeping or selling controlled

substances . . . .” MCL 333.7405(d). But “the MMMA allows the medical use of marijuana by a

limited class of individuals.” People v Carruthers, 301 Mich App 590, 597; 837 NW2d 16

(2013). Section 4 of the MMMA “grants broad immunity from criminal prosecution and other

penalties to qualified patients and caregivers . . . .” Id. at 597-598. Section 4 at the time of the

charged offenses stated in relevant part as follows:

(b) A primary caregiver who has been issued and possesses a registry

identification card shall not be subject to arrest, prosecution, or penalty in any

manner, or denied any right or privilege, including but not limited to civil penalty

or disciplinary action by a business or occupational or professional licensing

board or bureau, for assisting a qualifying patient to whom he or she is connected

through the department’s registration process with the medical use of marihuana

in accordance with this act[1], provided that the primary caregiver possesses an

amount of marihuana that does not exceed:

(1) 2.5 ounces of usable marihuana for each qualifying patient to whom he or she

is connected through the department’s registration process; and

(2) for each registered qualifying patient who has specified that the primary

caregiver will be allowed under state law to cultivate marihuana for the qualifying

patient, 12 marihuana plants kept in an enclosed, locked facility; and

(3) any incidental amount of seeds, stalks, and unusable roots. [MCL 333.26424.]

Thus, for a caregiver to be immune from prosecution pursuant to § 4, the caregiver

cannot possess an amount of marijuana that exceeds “2.5 ounces of usable marihuana for each

qualifying patient to whom he or she is connected through the department’s registration process .

. . .” MCL 333.26424(b)(1). The MMMA defines usable marijuana as “the dried leaves and

flowers of the marihuana plant, and any mixture or preparation thereof, but does not include the

seeds, stalks, and roots of the plant.” MCL 333.26423(k).2 This Court has emphasized that

1

2012 PA 512, effective April 1, 2013, added to the statute at this point: “The privilege from

arrest under this subsection applies only if the primary caregiver presents both his or her registry

identification card and a valid driver license or government-issued identification card that bears a

photographic image of the primary caregiver.” The amendment also deleted “provided that” and

started the final sentence of subsection b with: “This subsection applies only if . . . .”

2

Before the 2012 amendment, this subsection was designated MCL 333.26423(j).

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usable marijuana “includes only ‘the dried leaves and flowers of the marihuana plant . . . .”

Carruthers, 301 Mich App at 601.

There is no dispute that defendant was a caregiver under the MMMA and that she was

registered to provide marijuana to five patients. The trial court stated that the sole issue with

regard to defendant’s § 4 motion was the fact that she had 5.6 pounds of harvested marijuana

which, if that marijuana were usable, exceeded the amount of usable marijuana defendant was

allowed to have pursuant to subsection (b)(1). Christopher Conrad, an expert in cannabis

cultivation, testified at the hearing on defendant’s § 4 motion that it usually takes 7 to 10 days to

dry marijuana after harvesting it. But he also testified that even dried marijuana consists of

approximately 10 percent moisture. Conrad testified that in his opinion, the marijuana seized

from defendant was not dried, but that it would have been “pretty dry” and that “[t]he bulk of its

moisture would be gone at that point [September 19]” because most of the drying happens at the

beginning of the process.

The trial court stated that the amount of marijuana seized from defendant exceeded the 15

ounces defendant was permitted to have under § 4. The trial court further stated that dried

marijuana pursuant to the MMMA could not possibly refer only to completely dried marijuana

because, as Conrad testified, even dried marijuana consists of approximately 10 percent

moisture. The trial court also noted that Conrad testified that marijuana loses most of its

moisture in the beginning of the drying process; therefore, after four days of drying, most of the

moisture is gone. The trial court concluded that, although the seized marijuana may not have

been dried to the ideal extent, it was “largely dried” and, therefore, denied defendant’s motion.

This Court is not “left with a definite and firm conviction” that the trial court made a

mistake in finding that defendant’s seized marijuana was dried. People v Rhodes, 495 Mich 938,

938; 843 NW2d 214 (2014). Although testimony indicated that the process for drying marijuana

took more than four days, there was also testimony that most of the drying took place in the

beginning of the drying process. There was no dispute that the marijuana had been drying for

four days when it was seized. In sum, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the seized

marijuana was dried, and thus usable under the MMMA. People v Bylsma, 493 Mich 17, 26; 825

NW2d 543 (2012). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

defendant’s motion because the result was within the range of principled outcomes. Id.; People v

Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 195; 817 NW2d 599 (2011).

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that she had the

burden of proving the elements of her § 8 defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Defendant argues that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant failed to establish the elements of her Section 8 defense. We disagree. The trial court

“must clearly present the case and applicable law to the jury[,]” and include “all elements of the

charged offenses and any material issues, defenses, and theories if supported by the evidence.”

People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 606; 709 NW2d 595 (2005).

Section 8 “provides an affirmative defense to charges involving marijuana for its medical

use . . . .” People v Kolanek, 491 Mich 382, 396; 817 NW2d 528 (2012). It provided at the time

of the offenses in relevant part as follows:

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(a) Except as provided in section 7 [listing certain activities not permitted under

the MMMA], a patient and a patient’s primary caregiver, if any, may assert the

medical purpose for using marihuana as a defense to any prosecution involving

marihuana, and this defense shall be presumed valid where the evidence shows

that:

(1) A physician has stated that, in the physician’s professional opinion, after

having completed a full assessment of the patient’s medical history and current

medical condition made in the course of a bona fide physician-patient

relationship, the patient is likely to receive therapeutic or palliative benefit from

the medical use of marihuana to treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or

debilitating medical condition or symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating

medical condition;

(2) The patient and the patient’s primary caregiver, if any, were collectively in

possession of a quantity of marihuana that was not more than was reasonably

necessary to ensure the uninterrupted availability of marihuana for the purpose of

treating or alleviating the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition or

symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition; and

(3) The patient and the patient’s primary caregiver, if any, were engaged in the

acquisition, possession, cultivation, manufacture, use, delivery, transfer, or

transportation of marihuana or paraphernalia relating to the use of marihuana to

treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition or

symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition. [MCL

333.26428.]

Defendant argues that the prosecution had the burden to disprove the elements of her

Section 8 defense beyond a reasonable doubt because the statute states that the defense “shall be

presumed valid” if the elements are met. MCL 333.26428(a). Our Supreme Court held to the

contrary that this provision means that the burden of proof rests with the defendant. Kolanek,

491 Mich at 410. Specifically, our Supreme Court analyzed subsections (a) and (b) of MCL

333.26428 as follows:

Section 8(a) provides that a patient or person may assert this defense in “any

prosecution involving marihuana” and that the defense “shall be presumed valid”

if its elements can be established. Section 8(b) provides that a person “may assert

[this defense] in a motion to dismiss, and the charges shall be dismissed following

an evidentiary hearing where the person shows the elements listed in subsection

(a).” This scheme makes clear that the burden of proof rests with the defendant . . . .

[Kolanek, 491 Mich at 410-411 (last emphasis added).]

Furthermore, placing the burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by

preponderance of the evidence is in accord with due process because none of the elements of

defendant’s § 8 defense required her to disprove any of the elements of the charged offenses.

People v Pegenau, 447 Mich 278, 289; 523 NW2d 325 (1994).

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Here, the trial court instructed the jury that for defendant to satisfy her burden under § 8,

“the evidence must persuade you that it is more likely than not” that all three of the § 8 elements

were true. Thus, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant had to prove the elements of her

§ 8 defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 486; 684

NW2d 686 (2004) (equating the “preponderance of the evidence” standard with “more likely

than not”). The trial court correctly instructed the jury with regard to the defendant’s burden of

proof concerning her § 8 defense. Kolanek, 491 Mich at 410-412; Pegenau, 447 Mich at 289.

Finally, defendant argues that the prosecution committed misconduct when during its

closing argument, it told the jury that defendant possessed an unreasonable amount of marijuana

because she possessed an amount of marijuana that exceeded the amount permitted under § 4 of

the MMMA. We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether a defendant

was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546

(2007). “Issues of prosecutorial misconduct are decided case by case, and this Court must

examine the entire record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context.” Id. at 64. In general,

prosecutors are accorded wide latitude in their conduct and arguments. People v Bahoda, 448

Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). “Although a prosecutor may not argue facts not in

evidence or mischaracterize the evidence presented, the prosecutor may argue reasonable

inferences from the evidence.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 588; 629 NW2d 411

(2001). While a prosecutor’s uncorrected misstatement of the law may deprive a defendant of a

fair trial, the error may be cured if the jury is correctly instructed on the law. People v Grayer,

252 Mich App 349, 357; 651 NW2d 818 (2002). This is so because “[j]urors are presumed to

follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People v Abraham,

256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003).

In this case, the prosecutor first referred to the requirements of § 4 in its closing argument

by telling the jury that “[i]f two-and-a-half ounces per person is the standard, okay—that’s what

you’ve heard now from her patients even; although, Mr. Jones,3 as carefully as he reads things,

thought it was two—the defendant, she’s not even close.” In making this statement, the

prosecution was apparently referring to the testimony of another one of defendant’s patients that

he believed the law prohibited him from carrying more than 2.5 ounces of marijuana at one time,

and to Jones’s testimony that he believed that the law prohibited him from carrying more than

two ounces of marijuana at one time. Because the witnesses were referring to what they believed

the MMMA required with regard to the maximum amount of marijuana they could have, it is

evident that the prosecution’s statement referred to the requirement of § 4 that a patient is

immune from prosecution as long as, among other things, that patient does not possess more than

2.5 ounces of usable marijuana. MCL 333.26424(a).

The prosecution next argued before the jury as follows:

We’re not talking, again, about a few grams, an ounce or two, okay? Ladies and

gentlemen, this is about 370 grams of marijuana on this side of the table

(indicating). Two-and-a-half ounces per person times five, okay? Defendant,

3

The prosecutor was referencing one of defendant’s registered patients.

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[and four of her patients]. Twelve-and-a-half times five[4] is about 354 grams. So

this is actually giving her even a little bit more benefit of the doubt by about 16,

17 grams. That’s what the statute says.

In this instance, the prosecution stated that “the statute says” that defendant could possess

2.5 ounces of marijuana for each of her four patients plus herself, thus referring to immunity for

caregivers under § 4 who possess not more than 2.5 ounces of usable marijuana for each of their

patients and themselves. MCL 333.26424(b)(1). Additionally, the prosecution indicated to the

jury a display of marijuana comparing the total amount seized from defendant with the amount

permitted under § 4. Therefore it is clear that the prosecution argued before the jury that

defendant possessed an unreasonable amount of marijuana under § 8 because she exceeded the

amount of marijuana specified for immunity under § 4. This was a misrepresentation of the law

as interpreted by our Supreme Court. Kolanek, 491 Mich at 401-403.

“Sections 4 and 8 provide separate and distinct protections and require different

showings,” so defendant did not need to satisfy the requirements of § 4 to establish a defense

under § 8. Kolanek, 491 Mich at 401. Consequently, “[a]ny defendant, regardless of registration

status, who possesses more than 2.5 ounces of usable marijuana or 12 plants not kept in an

enclosed, locked facility may satisfy the affirmative defenses under § 8.” Id. at 403.

In other words, possessing no more than 2.5 ounces of marijuana per patient is a

requirement for immunity for a caregiver under § 4. MCL 333.26424(b)(1). But the affirmative

defense under § 8 only required defendant to show—along with the other requirements of

§ 8(a)—that she and her patients “were collectively in possession of a quantity of marihuana that

was not more than was reasonably necessary to ensure the uninterrupted availability of

marihuana for the purpose of treating or alleviating the patient’s serious or debilitating medical

condition or symptoms . . . .” MCL 333.26428(a)(2); Kolanek, 491 Mich at 403, 408. Because

defendant was not required to satisfy the elements of § 4 as part of her § 8 defense, the

prosecution misrepresented the law. Kolanek, 491 Mich at 401-403.

Nonetheless, after defendant objected to the prosecution’s misstatement of the law, the

trial court correctly instructed the jury that “[t]his case is premised on Section 8 which talks

about what’s reasonably necessary for maintaining an adequate supply, and that’s what the

dispute’s about.” Defendant argues that the trial court erred by misleading the jury into believing

that § 4 was relevant by stating that “what [the prosecution] is saying is the smaller amount he

has on the far side of the table there would be absolutely exempt from prosecution under one

section of the Act, which doesn’t happen to be the section that’s the basis of the defense at this

trial.” But the trial court clearly did not state or imply that § 4 was relevant to a determination of

the issues. Quite the contrary, the trial court instructed the jury that § 4 immunity was not “the

section that’s the basis of the defense at this trial[,]” and clarified that when the prosecution was

referring to the “smaller amount” of marijuana, it was referring to § 4 immunity rather than to a

4

Clearly, the prosecution intended to multiply 12.5 by the number of grams in an ounce, not by

five. There are approximately 28.3 grams in an ounce, and 12.5 multiplied by 28.3 equals

353.75.

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reasonable amount under § 8. The trial court’s instruction was correct because it emphasized the

fact that the requirements of § 4 were legally distinct from the requirements of § 8, and that § 8

was at issue rather than § 4. Kolanek, 491 Mich at 401-403. Therefore, the trial court did not err

in so instructing the jury. Id. Indeed, the trial court’s instructions to the jury cured the

prosecution’s error. Abraham, 256 Mich App at 279.

We affirm.

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ William B. Murphy

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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