Opinion

Grant W. Morgan v. Raymours Furniture Company, Inc.

Court
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Filed
Jan 7, 2016
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.9%

The opinion

DATE NAME OF CASE (DOCKET NUMBER)

01/07/16 GRANT W. MORGAN VS. RAYMOURS FURNITURE COMPANY, INC.,

ET AL.

A-2830-14T2

Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to compel

arbitration of claims contained in plaintiff's complaint, which

included age discrimination and wrongful termination claims,

arguing that within its employee handbook could be found

plaintiff's agreement to both arbitrate and waive his right to

sue. Although those provisions were located within, the

employer had prefaced the handbook with a disclaimer against any

assumption that its provisions were "contractual in nature."

The court affirmed the denial of arbitration, concluding the

employer could not equitably have it both ways and that the

presence of the employer's disclaimer precluded a determination

that the employee had contracted away his right to sue.

12/30/15 SEOUNG OUK CHO, ET AL. VS. TRINITAS REGIONAL MEDICAL

CENTER, ET AL.

A-5923-13T2

On the day before jury selection in this medical

malpractice case, defendant filed a motion that was purportedly

a "motion in limine," but which sought the dismissal of the

complaint against him in its entirety, an admitted violation of

the rule governing summary judgment motions.

The fact that this misuse of the motion in limine occurs

sufficiently often to win our notice, despite our repeated

cautions against such practice, leads us to conclude it

necessary to state clearly what a motion in limine is not. It

is not a summary judgment motion that happens to be filed on the

eve of trial. When granting a motion will result in the

dismissal of a plaintiff's case or the suppression of a

defendant's defenses, the motion is subject to Rule 4:46, the

rule that governs summary judgment motions. We hold the trial

court's consideration of these motions and dismissal of the

complaint against defendant deprived plaintiffs of their right

to due process of law, reverse that dismissal and remand for

restoration of the complaint to the trial calendar.

12/30/15 J-M MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. VS. PHILLIPS & COHEN,

LLP, AND JOHN HENDRIX

A-5867-13T2

We affirm the Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal of J-M's complaint

based on application of the entire controversy doctrine. In

2006, defendant John Hendrix, plaintiff J-M's former employee,

filed a federal qui tam action in California under the False

Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3732, alleging J-M

defrauded various governmental entities in the sale of PVC pipe.

Hendrix gathered the information which formed the basis of the

FCA action while represented by his attorneys, defendant

Phillips & Cohen. The FCA protects legitimate whistleblowers

from counterclaims meant to harass or indemnify a liable

defendant by holding the counterclaims in abeyance until a

defendant's liability is decided. If a defendant is found

liable, the counterclaim is dismissed as the FCA prohibits a

defendant from obtaining indemnification or offset for its

wrongdoing. No counterclaim was filed by J-M.

While the qui tam action was pending final resolution, J-M

sued in New Jersey seeking damages against Hendrix and his

attorneys for Hendrix's investigatory activities, including the

removal or duplication of confidential documents, customer

information, and other claimed breaches of Hendrix's contractual

commitments to J-M. We conclude that the entire controversy

doctrine mandates dismissal of the New Jersey complaint because

it was based on the same transaction or transactional

circumstances as the California proceedings. We further

conclude that in light of the purpose of the entire controversy

doctrine and the policy aims of the FCA, the fact that the cases

were being pursued simultaneously did not prevent application of

the doctrine.

12/29/15 IN THE MATTER OF THE NEW JERSEY MARITIME PILOT &

DOCKING PILOT COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION REGARDING

EXAMINATION REQUIREMENT FOR LICENSURE OF NEW JERSEY

DOCKING PILOTS

A-5176-13T1

In this appeal, appellants challenged the validity of a

regulation adopted by the New Jersey Maritime Pilot & Docking

Pilot Commission, which required docking pilot apprentices to

pass an examination before licensure as a docking pilot. We

rejected appellants' contentions that the regulation was

inconsistent with the New Jersey Maritime Pilot and Docking Act,

which had no such requirement, was contrary to legislative

intent, transgressed the Commissions enabling legislation, and

lacked regulatory standards. We held that the regulation fell

within the substantive authority vested in the Commission under

the Act and was consistent with and achieved the express

legislative policies and overall objectives underlying the Act.

We also held that the docking pilot regulations as a whole

provided sufficient regulatory standards to inform the public

and docking pilot apprentices of the content of the examination.

12/28/15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MWANZA FITZPATRICK/

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KEEYAN BRISTER

A-2477-14T3/ A-2478-14T3

These consolidated appeals present a question of first

impression of what is the time within which the State can appeal

the denial of a drug offender restraining order sought in

connection with a sentence. At sentencing, the State requested

drug offender restraining orders in accordance with N.J.S.A.

2C:35-5.7(h). The sentencing court denied those applications

and the State appealed. We hold that the governing statute,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(k), requires such appeals to be filed within

ten days of the date of sentencing. Because the State failed to

file its notices of appeal in these matters within the ten-day

period, we dismiss both appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

12/22/15 HACKENSACK RIVERKEEPER, INC. AND NY/NJ BAYKEEPER VS.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

A-1752-12T3

Two non-profit organizations challenged DEP's promulgation

of its "public trust rights rule," N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48, and

"public access rule," N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9, first adopted in 2012,

re-codified in 2014, and re-adopted as re-codified in 2015. In

Borough of Avalon v. New Jersey Department of Environmental

Protection, 403 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 2008), certif.

denied, 199 N.J. 133 (2009), we concluded earlier versions of

the rules were "not statutorily authorized and therefore

invalid." Id. at 597. In this opinion, we conclude that the

current regulations are not authorized by case law developed

under the "public trust doctrine," or by CAFRA, and invalidate

the regulations.

12/21/15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVID HUDSON

A-2943-14T4

In this interlocutory matter, we review an order

disqualifying counsel and his firm from representing defendant,

a former Newark police officer. The State moves for

disqualification alleging an actual conflict of interest

resulted because one of the ten Newark police officers

identified by the State as possible witnesses was counsel's

former client. Additionally, the State alleges counsel had a

current conflict based on an appearance of impropriety as he was

an attorney for the Newark Fraternal Order of Police lodge, in

which the Newark police officers are members.

We reverse the order and remand for further proceedings,

concluding the record did not support the finding or existence

of an actual conflict of interest. Further, the trial judge

erred in grounding his determination of a potential conflict on

the appearance of impropriety. We hold the appearance of

impropriety standard may not be used as a basis to find a

conflict of interest under RPC 1.7 or 1.9. In re Supreme Court

Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Op. No. 697, 188 N.J. 549, 563

n.5, 568 (2006).

12/18/15 IN THE MATTER OF THE NEW JERSEY FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION

OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE RELIEF APPLICATIONS UNDER THE

OPEN PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

JEFF CARTER VS. JOHN DOE

A-2810-13T2

In this OPRA and common law right of access case, the New

Jersey State Firemen's Association secured a declaratory

judgment that it correctly denied access to records of a relief

award to an Association member. The records requestor appealed.

We conclude a records custodian may not bring a declaratory

judgment action against a record requestor to enforce its right

to withhold records, because OPRA does not provide the records

custodian an independent right of action. As to both OPRA and

the common law, declaratory relief was inappropriate in this

case because the declaratory judgment action was essentially an

effort to preempt an imminent claim by the records requestor;

and allowing a declaratory judgment action solely with respect

to the common law would unnecessarily fragment claims. As a

substantive matter, we conclude that under the circumstances

presented, both OPRA and the common law required disclosure of

documents containing the applicant's name and the award amount.

Judge Messano concurs in the judgment, but declines to join

in the section of the opinion that expresses the general

principle that if there is no private right of action under a

particular statute, a party may not secure a declaration of its

statutory rights under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

12/17/15 MARK LAGERKVIST VS. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND JAVIER DIAZ, LEGAL

SPECIALIST/RECORDS CUSTODIAN

A-0250-14T3

A journalist appeals a Law Division order denying him

access to records of the Governor and unspecified members of his

senior staff's third-party funded travel. He contends that the

Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13,

required the custodian of the records to have attempted to reach

an agreement with him before denying the request, and that in

any event, his inquiry, which covered a two-year period and did

not specify dates, events, or participants other than the

Governor himself, was not unclear or overbroad.

Having decided the inquiry exceeded OPRA's scope, we also

declined to expand the effect of N.J.S.A. 47:1A 5(g), which

requires the custodian to "attempt[] to reach a reasonable

solution with the requestor" when a records request would

"substantially disrupt agency operations." We found it does not

include this scenario, when research and information, not

records, are sought.

12/15/15 MICHAEL BANDLER VS. ROCCO MELILLO

A-1315-14T2

In this opinion, we address a situation where plaintiff's

only argument on appeal is that the trial judge included dictum

in his written opinion dismissing plaintiff's complaint. He

asked that we redact the dictum from the judge's decision.

We concluded that a party may not parse through the opinion

of a trial judge and take an appeal from words, sentences, or

sections of the opinion that he or she finds objectionable when

the party is not asserting the order or judgment was made in

error. Because appeals are taken from actions of a trial court,

and not from the trial court's rationale, much less dicta, we

dismissed plaintiff's appeal for want of jurisdiction.

12/15/15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RODNEY J. MILES

A-2692-12T1

The defendant was arrested during an undercover drug

operation. Defendant was charged on a warrant with possession

of a CDS with intent to distribute on or near school property.

Defendant was also charged on a summons with a disorderly

persons offense of possession of marijuana.

After defendant was indicted, he appeared pro se in

municipal court via video conference after being incarcerated

for a family matter. The disorderly persons drug offense, which

was not joined with the indictable offense, was pending.

Without the presence or participation of the State, but in

accord with the existing "practice," the judge amended the

offense to loitering and then took a plea from defendant.

Predicated upon his plea, defendant sought to bar the

prosecution of the indictable charge.

The court held that the subsequent prosecution and

conviction on the indictable charge was barred under the "same

evidence" test which is still recognized under state

constitutional principles. The court reasoned that the

"fundamental fairness" doctrine did not apply, notwithstanding

the State's failure to join the disorderly offense with the

indictable charges and defendant's reasonable expectation that

his plea to the disorderly offense charge resolved all charges

which arose out of his arrest.

12/11/15 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL D. FISHER, II

A-0878-14T2

In this case of first impression, we interpret N.J.S.A.

3B:5-14.1(b)(1), which provides that a parent who is deemed to

have "abandoned" his or her child "by willfully forsaking" the

child is barred from sharing in the child's estate if the child

dies intestate. Among other things, we conclude that the party

seeking to apply the statute to bar recovery must demonstrate by

a preponderance of the evidence that the parent, through his or

her intentional conduct, manifested a settled purpose to

permanently forego all parental duties and relinquish all

parental claims to the child.

In our case, we determined that while the parent did not

take the steps needed to resume parenting time with his child

after a final restraining order prohibiting parenting time was

issued near the time of the parties' divorce, he did not intend

to permanently forego all parental duties and claims. Most

notably, the parent continued to pay child support, and was in

contact with the child over social media several months prior to

the child's death.

12/08/15 IN THE MATTER OF BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS, FIRE

DISTRICT NO. 1, MONROE TOWNSHIP AND MONROE TOWNSHIP

PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 3170

A-0765-14T2

Applying the dual motivation test in In re Township of

Bridgewater, 95 N.J. 235 (1984), PERC determined that anti-union

animus was a substantial or motivating factor for the Board's

termination of firefighters. It also rejected as pretextual the

Board's assertion that it fired the firefighters as a cost

saving measure.

We affirmed PERC's determinations and held that after it

reinstates an aggrieved employee, a public employer retains its

rights under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act,

N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 to -43, "to discharge a worker for a

legitimate business reason, unrelated to the employee's union

activities." Twp. of Bridgewater, supra, 95 N.J. at 237. The

reinstatement of the employee, therefore, does not forever

preclude the public employer from making legitimate and non-

retaliatory employment decisions.

12/03/15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WALTER A. TORMASI

A-3830-13T4

Defendant, convicted of his mother's 1996 murder, filed in

2011 a post-conviction relief petition based on an incomplete

affidavit purporting to contain his father's acknowledgement

that he, not defendant, was responsible for the murder; this

thirty-eight-page document was discovered by defendant's brother

shortly after the father's death in 2010. The PCR judge

conducted a testimonial hearing limited solely to the

admissibility of the document; defendant's siblings testified

they had seen the complete document, with a signed and notarized

thirty-ninth page years earlier. The PCR judge concluded —

without opining on the siblings' credibility — that the document

was inadmissible because it was neither handwritten, signed, nor

capable of being authenticated. The court reversed, holding

that, even though incomplete, the document was admissible

pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) and capable of being

authenticated pursuant to N.J.R.E. 901. The court remanded for

consideration of the witnesses' credibility and the other

factors relevant to claims of newly-discovered evidence.

11/25/15 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MONROE TOWNSHIP

HOUSING ELEMENT AND FAIR SHARE PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING

ORDINANCES

A-0688-15T1

In the wake of In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 221 N.J. 1

(2015), and In re Failure of the Council on Affordable Housing

To Adopt Trust Fund Commitment Regulations, 440 N.J. Super. 220

(App. Div. 2015), the trial court denied the motion of the

Department of Community Affairs to intervene in this action,

which was commenced by the Township of Monroe for a judgment

declaring its housing plan presumptively valid. The DCA sought

to file a counterclaim seeking an accounting and turnover of

Monroe's affordable housing trust funds based on an allegation

that Monroe failed "to spend or commit to spend" the funds with

the period prescribed by law. The court granted leave to appeal

and affirmed substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge

Douglas K. Wolfson's published written opinion.

11/25/15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. JEAN A. SENE

A-2256-13T1

The question of first impression presented on this appeal

is whether contact between defendant's vehicle and a victim is a

necessary element of leaving the scene of an accident in

violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. Defendant was driving a taxi

when a pedestrian stepped into his lane of traffic. The

pedestrian fell into the adjoining lane of traffic and was

killed when she was run over by another vehicle. Defendant did

not stop his taxi at the scene and left without speaking to

anyone. A jury convicted him of leaving the scene of a fatal

motor vehicle accident under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. On appeal,

defendant contends that a necessary element to the crime is

contact between his vehicle and the victim. We disagree and

hold that such contact is not an element of this crime. We also

hold that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 is not unconstitutionally vague.

We, therefore, affirm defendant's second-degree criminal

conviction.

Because the sentencing judge did not correctly identify the

aggravating and mitigating factors, we remand for resentencing.

We also vacate a $5000 restitution award and remand for a

hearing in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b), (c).

11/24/15 LISA B. FREEDMAN AND JEFFREY C. ENDA VS. MURRAY N.

SUFRIN AND ELLEN L. SUFRIN, ET AL.

A-4942-13T1

Plaintiffs commenced this quiet-title action in response to

defendants' assertion that a restrictive covenant, which they

imposed years earlier on a former owner of plaintiffs' property,

required that "as many trees . . . as possible" be retained on

plaintiffs' property. In applying the long-standing rule of

strict construction of restrictive covenants of this nature, the

court found numerous ambiguities in the language employed by the

covenant's drafter that suggested, among other things, that the

tree-removal restriction was likely intended to apply only

during the construction of a residence on plaintiffs' property

that occurred many years earlier. Because the strict-

construction rule barred enforcement of the covenant in light of

these ambiguities, the court affirmed the summary judgment

entered in favor of plaintiffs.

11/19/15 ESTATE OF SANDRA BRUST AND PHILIP BRUST, ETC. VS. ACF

INDUSTRIES, LLC, ET AL.

A-3431-13T4

Sandra Brust's father, John Noga, was employed by the Port

Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) from 1970 to 1977. His

job duties included adjustment and repair of locomotive brakes,

which allegedly released friable asbestos particles into the

air. He also worked on approximately one car a year for resale

after hours at home, removing and replacing automotive brake

shoes in the process. That also allegedly released asbestos

particles into the air. The family moved from New Jersey in

1977. Brust, who was born in 1963, came into contact with

Noga's asbestos-laden clothes when he came home from work and

when she helped her mother wash his laundry. She developed

mesothelioma in 2010. Plaintiffs sued the locomotive and

automotive defendants for personal injuries based on Brust's

secondary exposure to asbestos.

We conclude that Brust's state law claims against the

locomotive defendants regarding her secondary exposure to

asbestos in the years Noga was a PATCO employee were preempted

by federal law, specifically, the Locomotive Inspection Act

(LIA), 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 20701-20703. We further conclude that

Brust's secondary exposure to asbestos resulting from her

father's work on cars was not sufficiently frequent, regular,

and proximate to withstand the automotive defendants' motions

for summary judgment.

11/18/15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.L.H.'S

WEAPONS

A-0072-14T2

The State appeals from a final order of the Family Part

denying its motion to have C.L.H. forfeit five illegal assault

rifles, among other weapons, and his firearms purchaser

identification card seized pursuant to the Prevention of

Domestic Violence Act of 1991.

Following the entry of a temporary restraining order

against C.L.H.'s wife arising out of a domestic violence

complaint brought by her eighty-one-year-old father, the police

seized the weapons from the couple's home pursuant to N.J.S.A.

2C:25-28j. While the forfeiture action was pending, C.L.H.

advised the prosecutor he was transferring the confiscated

weapons to a licensed firearms dealer pursuant to the 2013 gun

amnesty law. The Family Part determined that because C.L.H. was

not a defendant in the domestic violence case, and the guns were

seized solely because of a restraining order against C.L.H.'s

wife, not allowing him to take advantage of the gun amnesty law

was "not equitable."

The panel reversed, concluding the court erred in

determining the gun amnesty law applied because the weapons were

in the possession of the prosecutor on the law's effective date.

Instead it held that because the five assault firearms were

seized pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act and

cannot be returned to C.L.H. under the Domestic Violence

Forfeiture Statute as they are contraband under N.J.S.A. 2C:64-

1a(1), C.L.H. is expressly disqualified from obtaining a handgun

purchase permit or firearms purchaser identification card under

the Gun Control Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(8), and thus from

regaining possession of his remaining firearms and his firearms

purchaser identification card held by the prosecutor.

11/18/15 CASEY PIATT VS. POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT

SYSTEM, NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, AND STATE OF

NEW JERSEY

A-5504-12T1

Under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3 and N.J.A.C. 17:4-2.5(a), a person

must be no more than thirty-five years old when becoming a

member of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS).

Plaintiffs are State corrections officers who claim that age

requirement cannot be applied to them. However, the long

history of PFRS makes clear that the Legislature intends to

restrict PFRS membership to persons meeting that age requirement

at the time they become a "policeman" or "fireman." N.J.S.A.

43:16A-3. Although N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3 applies by its terms to

political subdivisions, it also applies to State corrections

officers because the Legislature has included them in the

definition of "policeman." The age requirement serves the

Legislature's goals of using PFRS's heightened benefits to

encourage persons to become officers while young and fit, and to

retire at a relatively early age. Moreover, the PFRS Board by

regulation has properly applied this construction of the PFRS

Act for more than forty years. N.J.A.C. 17:4-2.5(a).

11/13/15 SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION LOCAL

UNION 22 VS. RAYMOND KAVANAGH VS. DAVID CASTNER, ET

AL.

A-3646-13T1

In this appeal of a summary judgment that affirmed a

union's imposition of fines against defendant, the court

affirmed the judge's upholding of the union's finding of

violations and also rejected defendant's contention that he was

wrongfully denied counsel at the union disciplinary proceedings.

The court, however, reversed the trial judge's determination

that the fines were reasonable because the judge did not

consider factors relevant and necessary to that determination.

The case is remanded for the trial judge to employ relevant

factors as set forth in this opinion in assessing the

reasonableness of the fine.

11/12/15 IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF L. 2012, C. 24,

N.J.S.A. 48:3-87(t), ETC.

A-4565-13T3

Construing the Solar Act, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87, we affirmed a

decision of the Board of Public Utilities that appellant's

application could not be considered under N.J.S.A. 48:3-87(t),

because it concerned a solar project to be sited on property

which had been valued, assessed and taxed as farmland. Such

applications are governed by N.J.S.A. 48:3-87(s). In addition,

subsection (t) did not apply to the application because the

property was not a contaminated industrial or commercial site

within the definition of a brownfield, as set forth in N.J.S.A.

48:3-51.

11/09/15 LISA IPPOLITO VS. TOBIA IPPOLITO

A-4840-13T1

In this matrimonial action, the family judge instituted a

contempt proceeding, pursuant to Rule 1:10-2, against defendant

upon the judge's receipt of a letter from plaintiff's counsel

claiming that defendant violated an order which prohibited

defendant from "threatening or intimidating any expert in this

matter." Because the judge presided over the very contempt

proceeding he initiated, failed to appoint counsel to prosecute

the matter, and shifted the burden of persuasion to defendant,

the court vacated the order under review and remanded the

contempt proceeding to the assignment judge to designate another

judge to preside over the contempt proceeding.

11/06/15 ROSALIE BACON VS. NEW JERSEY STATE DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION

A-2452-14T1

Plaintiffs, a group of fifteen school districts, and

parents and children from those districts, appeal from the Law

Division's order dismissing their complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs brought

the complaint as a summary action "to enforce agency orders"

under Rule 4:67-6(a)(2). Plaintiffs sought to compel defendant

New Jersey State Department of Education to provide the funding

provided by the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), along

with facilities improvements and other measures.

In this opinion, we hold that plaintiffs could not bring

their complaint as a summary action under Rule 4:67-6(a)(2)

because the district-specific needs assessments which plaintiffs

sought to enforce did not require the Department to fully fund

the districts under the SFRA or otherwise provide for specific

relief and, therefore, there were no orders capable of being

enforced under the rule.

11/05/15 MICHAEL CONLEY, JR. AND KATIE M. MAURER VS. MONA

GUERRERO, BRIAN KRAMINITZ, AND MICHELE TANZI

A-3796-13T2

We affirm the trial court's determination that a

residential seller effectively terminated her sale agreement

with plaintiffs during the agreement's three-day attorney review

period, mandated by New Jersey State Bar Association v. New

Jersey Association of Realtor Boards, 93 N.J. 470 (1983), mod.,

94 N.J. 449 (1983). The agreement requires notice of

disapproval by certified mail, telegram or personal delivery to

the realtors; no delivery method is prescribed for notice to

parties. The seller's attorney sent the disapproval letter by

facsimile and email to the buyer's attorney and by email to the

realtor, a dual agent. It was undisputed that the realtor, the

buyer's attorney, and the buyers received actual notice of the

disapproval. The realtor did not complain about the method of

delivery. We conclude that, even assuming the buyers could

enforce the realtor's right to notice by the prescribed delivery

methods, substantial compliance sufficed, since the buyer did

not dispute actual notice and enforcement of the method-of-

delivery requirement would result in a disproportionate

forfeiture of the seller's right to disapprove the contract.

11/02/15 O.Y.P.C. VS. J.C.P.

A-0334-14T1

We remanded this case to the trial court, based on the

Supreme Court's recent decision in H.S.P. v. J.K., __ N.J. __

(2015), and we provided guidance for the trial court to follow

on remand. The trial court had dismissed the application for

lack of jurisdiction, because it concerned an immigrant who was

over the age of eighteen. Following H.S.P., we held that in

addressing an application filed as a predicate step in seeking

special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status for a person under age

twenty-one, Family Part judges must make the required SIJ

findings regardless of whether other relief can be granted. We

also noted that the Family Court has some sources of

jurisdiction over persons between the ages of eighteen and

twenty-one, and the trial court's reliance on the definition of

"juvenile" set forth in the Code of Juvenile Justice was

misplaced.

10/30/15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RICKY ZUBER

A-4169-11T2

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth

Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole for a

juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. Graham v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d

825, 845 (2010). We hold that Graham applies retroactively.

Assuming Graham can be extended to aggregate term-of-years

sentences imposed consecutively for separate criminal episodes,

defendant's aggregate sentence of fifty-five years before parole

eligibility is not the "functional equivalent" of life without

parole. His sentence gives him a meaningful and realistic

opportunity for parole well within the predicted lifespan for a

person of defendant's age.

This predicted lifespan should be determined using the

CDC's National Vital Statistics Reports, "United States Life

Tables," as used in Appendix I of our Court Rules. When a

Graham claim is raised at a sentencing or PCR hearing, the court

should use the most recent table available for a person of the

defendant's age at the time of the hearing, without injecting

disparities regarding race, sex, and ethnicity.

10/29/15 BOUND BROOK BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. CIRIPOMPA

A-2198-14T1

This appeal involves a teacher-tenure arbitration conducted

pursuant to the Tenure Employees Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A.

18A:6-10 to -18.1. The Bound Brook Board of Education charged a

high school teacher with two counts of unbecoming conduct and

sought his dismissal. The arbitrator found that the Board

proved the first charge, but not the second charge, and modified

the penalty from dismissal to a 120-day suspension without pay.

The Board then filed an action in the Chancery Division

challenging the arbitrator's award. The Chancery Division judge

vacated the award as procured by undue means pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a) and remanded for a new arbitration hearing

before a different arbitrator.

We reversed the vacatur of the arbitration award and

reinstated the award. We also rejected the teacher's argument

that the court lacked authority to order a rehearing before a

different arbitrator beyond forty-five days of the first

arbitration hearing date.

10/26/15 STEPHEN BARR VS. BISHOP ROSEN & CO., INC.

A-2502-14T2

Plaintiff was employed for seventeen years with defendant,

a securities broker-dealer. In defining their relationship by

written agreements in 1997 and 2009, plaintiff consented to

arbitrate any dispute, but he did not expressly waive his right

to sue in a judicial forum. In 2000, defendant advised

plaintiff by memorandum of a federal regulation that required

broker-dealers to advise employees that, when agreeing to

arbitrate, the employee surrenders the right to sue. The court

held, in affirming the trial judge's denial of a motion to

compel arbitration of plaintiff's complaint regarding

compensation, that the 2000 memorandum could not inform or pour

content into the arbitration agreements executed in 1997 and

2009, because the disclosure was not simultaneously made.

10/23/15 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF A CHILD BY J.E.V. AND

D.G.V.

A-3238-13T3

The order terminating parental rights is reversed because

the indigent mother, who placed her special-needs two-year-old

daughter in foster care with a State-licensed private adoption

agency, had a constitutional and statutory right to court-

appointed counsel, beginning when the agency first determined to

proceed with an adoption over the mother's objection. The

agency decided on its own that the mother was an unfit parent

and had abandoned her child. In the future, in similar

circumstances, a private adoption agency must notify the court

when advising an indigent parent of its intention to proceed

with an adoption. The court must devise a procedure for

assigning pro bono counsel to represent an indigent parent in

this situation, prior to the filing of the adoption complaint.

10/22/15 JOHN M. GATELY AND PATTY SUE GATELY VS. HAMILTON

MEMORIAL HOME, INC., D/B/A BRENNA-CELLINI FUNERAL

HOME, AND MARIA E. BRENNA

A-4458-13T2

This appeal arises out of a no-cause jury verdict rejecting

a father's claims that a funeral home wrongfully released the

remains of his adult son for cremation without the father's

authorization. The father contends that he told an individual

employed by the home (known in the trade as an "intern") that he

did not want his son to be cremated. He claims that the intern

and funeral home ignored his protestations and instead

improperly acceded to the contrary direction of the decedent's

mother.

The main and novel legal issue presented to us is whether

the qualified immunity from civil liability granted to funeral

directors under N.J.S.A. 45:7-95 and N.J.S.A. 45:27-22(d)

extends to interns who are employed by funeral homes pursuant to

regulations issued by the State Board of Mortuary Science. The

immunity precludes liability unless the defendant had

"reasonable notice" of untrue representations or a lack of

authorization by the decedent's surviving next of kin.

We conclude that the statutory immunity does extend to such

interns. The trial judge consequently did not err in charging

the elements of the immunity to the jury.

10/21/15 CAROL JACOBY VS. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE

BOROUGH OF ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, ET AL./ MARCIA DAVIS, ET

AL. VS. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF

ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, ET AL.

A-0007-13T1/A-0259-13T1/A-0404-13T1(CONSOLIDATED)

In this prerogative writs case involving the proposed

construction of a building in close proximity to the historic

Palisades Cliffs, we reversed an order upholding a height

variance and remanded to the Zoning Board to conduct further

proceedings consistent with the enhanced standards of N.J.S.A.

40:55D-70(d)(6), as articulated in Grasso v Borough of Spring

Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004). We held that

in determining whether the height of the building is "consistent

with the surrounding neighborhood," the Board was obligated to

consider the impact that the structure would have on all

reasonable visual vantage points. We otherwise affirmed the

order upholding a bulk variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-

70(c)(2).

10/20/15 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY, INSTITUTIONAL

ABUSE INVESTIGATION UNIT VS. D.B./ DEPARTMENT OF

CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, INSTITUTIONAL

ABUSE INVESTIGATION UNIT VS. A.G.

A-5434-12T3/A-0276-13T3 (CONSOLIDATED)

(NEWLY PUBLISHED OPINION FOR OCTOBER 20, 2015)

Applying established case law to N.J.A.C. 10:129-7.3,

effective April 1, 2013, the Institutional Abuse Investigation

Unit of the Department of Children and Families appropriately

entered findings of "not established" after investigating

allegations against two defendants — a teacher's aide for a

special needs child and an elementary school art teacher. The

reports, however, must be rewritten to clarify that no

determination as to the validity of the witness's statements was

made.

10/16/15 STANLEY E. WILLIAMS VS. BOROUGH OF CLAYTON

A-3191-14T2

We affirm the trial court's issuance of a declaratory order

confirming that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-129 and -130 restrict the

appointment of Police Chiefs in smaller cities (i.e., those not

of the "first class" or "second class" in population and which

are not civil service jurisdictions) to police officers who have

served in those police departments for at least three years.

The issuance of declaratory relief in this case was

appropriate because there was an actual controversy presented by

the Borough's plan to include external candidates who lack such

statutory eligibility in the testing and selection process for

Police Chief.

We also note that the trial court's order does not require

the Borough to appoint plaintiff, the sole statutorily-qualified

officer who had applied for the position, as Chief. The Borough

may choose to re-advertise the position or pursue other options

not contrary to these statutes.

10/14/15 DEBORAH SPANGENBERG VS. DAVID KOLAKOWSKI

A-2655-14T1

Among the issues reviewed in this post-judgment matrimonial

matter is defendant's argument that plaintiff's cohabitation

requires termination of his alimony obligation, as required by

newly enacted subsection (n), amending N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. We

rejected defendant's suggestion applying N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n),

concluding the provisions are inapplicable to post-judgment

orders finalized before the statute's effective date.

10/14/15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. VANCLEVE ASHLEY

A-0403-12T2

When there has been a plea agreement and a defendant seeks

to withdraw his guilty plea to multiple counts after providing

an inadequate factual basis to support the plea, the remedy is

to vacate the plea in its entirety, reinstate the dismissed

charges and restore both the State and the defendant to their

positions prior to the guilty plea. State v. Campfield, 213

N.J. 218, 232 (2013) (citing State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 420

(1989)). In this case, we consider whether the same remedy

applies when the guilty plea, lacking an adequate factual basis

for two of three charges, is entered without a plea offer from

the prosecutor, but after the defendant has been advised by the

trial court regarding the maximum sentence the judge was

"inclined" to impose. Because it was intended that the maximum

ten-year sentence the judge was inclined to impose would

globally address all charges and defendant provided an

inadequate factual basis for the most serious offenses, it was

error to deny his motion to vacate his plea and sentence him to

the ten year term.

09/17/15 A.A. VS. CHRISTOPHER J. GRAMICCIONI, ESQ., CAREY J.

HUFF, ESQ., AND OFFICE OF THE COUNTY PROSECUTOR OF

MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY

A-0946-13T3

This appeal involves an anonymous requestor of records

pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1

to -13, and alternatively under the common law right of access,

who seeks to remain anonymous when litigating in the Superior

Court. We conclude there is no statutory authorization, rule

authorization or compelling reason permitting A.A. to prosecute

this matter anonymously. We also conclude that the trial judge

properly dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with Rule

4:67.

09/17/15 JACQUELINE SCHIAVO, ET AL. VS. MARINA DISTRICT

DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, D/B/A BORGATA CASINO HOTEL &

SPA

A-5983-12T4

Plaintiffs, twenty-one women who are present or former

employees of defendant Marina District Development Company, LLC,

operating as the Borgata Casino Hotel & Spa, appeal from the

summary judgment dismissal of their complaint alleging

violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD),

N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, as informed by Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-

17. Plaintiffs allege defendant's adoption and application of

personal appearance standards (the PAS) subjected them to

illegal gender stereotyping, sexual harassment, disparate

treatment, disparate impact, and as to some plaintiffs, resulted

in adverse employment actions.

We examine the types of decimation claims and generally

hold the PAS requirements were permitted by N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(p),

a provision allowing an employer to establish reasonable

employee appearance standards and the LAD does not encompass

allegations of discrimination based on weight, appearance, or

sex appeal.

The evidence does not support plaintiffs' claims of gender

stereotyping, disparate treatment, and disparate impact.

However, the record does present a material dispute of facts

regarding defendant's application of the PAS weight standard to

harass certain plaintiffs whose lack of compliance resulted from

documented medical conditions and post-pregnancy, thus targeting

them because of their gender. As to those claims, summary

judgment is reversed and the matter remanded.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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