Opinion

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Phil J. Marotta, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Phil Felice Marotta

  • 182 So. 3d 829
  • 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 222
  • 2016 WL 64447
Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed
Jan 6, 2016
Status
Published
Author
Ciklin
On the bench
Ciklin, Gerber, Johnson, Laura
Cited by
5 cases
Authority
More cited than 71.7%

“[TJort verdicts .., do not always rise to a state law standard; sometimes they may only motivate an optional decision for a defendant to behave differently[.]”

How later courts described this case

  • “[TJort verdicts .., do not always rise to a state law standard; sometimes they may only motivate an optional decision for a defendant to behave differently[.]”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,

Appellant,

v.

PHIL J. MAROTTA, as Personal Representative of the Estate of PHIL

FELICE MAROTTA, deceased,

Appellee.

No. 4D13-1703

[January 6, 2016]

Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Jack Tuter, Judge; L.T. Case No. 07-

036723 CACE (19).

Gordon James III, Eric L. Lundt and Robert Weill of Sedgwick LLP,

Fort Lauderdale; and Gregory G. Katsas of Jones Day, Washington, D.C.,

for appellant.

Richard B. Rosenthal of The Law Offices of Richard B. Rosenthal,

P.A., Miami; Philip Freidin and Randy Rosenblum of Freidin, Dobrinsky,

Brown & Rosenblum, P.A., Delray Beach; and Alex Alvarez of The Alvarez

Law Firm, Miami, for appellee.

CIKLIN, C.J.

In this Engle progeny case,1 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (“the

defendant”) appeals a final judgment entered in favor of Phil J. Marotta,

as Personal Representative of the Estate of Phil Felice Marotta (“the

plaintiff”), arguing that federal law implicitly preempts state law tort

claims of strict liability and negligence based on the sale of cigarettes and

that the use of the Engle defect finding resulted in a violation of due

process. The plaintiff cross-appeals, contending that the trial court erred

in precluding the jury from considering punitive damages on the

products liability claim. We affirm on all issues pursuant to Philip Morris

1

See generally Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419, 422-25 (Fla.

2013) (providing a concise summary of Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d

1246 (Fla. 2006), and its progeny).

USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419, 424 (Fla. 2013), Engle v. Liggett

Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

v. Ciccone, 123 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), review granted, 147 So.

3d 526 (Fla. 2014). However, we write to address the defendant’s federal

preemption argument, and to certify a question thereon to the Florida

Supreme Court as one of great public importance.

The defendant very broadly argues that, because Congress has

expressly sanctioned the sale of cigarettes, and because the practical

effect of the Engle progeny litigation is to establish that all cigarettes are

inherently dangerous and defective, strict liability and negligence claims

are implicitly preempted by federal law allowing the sale of cigarettes.

This court explained federal preemption in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis,

973 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), as follows:

The doctrine of conflict preemption prevents state laws

which conflict with federal statutes from being applied.

Conflict preemption occurs where a federal statute implicitly

overrides state law either when the scope of a statute

indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a

field exclusively or when state law is in actual conflict with

federal law. Conflict preemption turns on the identification

of actual conflict and not an express statement of preemptive

intent. If Congress gives express sanction to an activity, the

states cannot declare that activity tortious.

Id. at 471 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

“[W]hether a state law claim is preempted is dependent on the exact

nature of that particular claim.” Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett

Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)). In Cipollone, the Supreme Court

explained, “The central inquiry in each case is . . . whether the legal duty

that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a

‘requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health . . . imposed

under State law with respect to . . . advertising or promotion’ . . . .”

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523-24 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). Cipollone

addresses causes of action of failure to warn, breach of express warranty,

fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal

material facts, and a plurality of the Court “found that state laws which

required a showing that warnings on cigarettes should have been more

clearly stated, were preempted, and the state law claims based on the

manufacturer’s practices of testing or research unrelated to advertising

2

were not preempted.” Davis, 973 So. 2d at 471. Accordingly, not all

tobacco claims are preempted, “only certain ones.” Id. at 472.

Recently, in Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 782 F.3d 1261

(11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit held that Engle progeny strict

liability and negligence claims are implicitly preempted by federal law.

Id. at 1280. Rather than defining a legal duty or duties imposed by

Florida case law with respect to strict liability and negligence claims

pursuant to the test propounded in Cipollone, the Eleventh Circuit

identifies “[t]hree aspects of that litigation [that] inform how we

characterize the duty it has come to impose on cigarette manufacturers”:

First, the Engle class definition does not distinguish among

types of smokers, types of cigarette manufacturers, or types

of cigarettes. It applies across the board. The class

definition thus creates a “brandless” cigarette, one produced

by all defendants and smoked by all plaintiffs at all times

throughout the class period.

Second, the Phase I findings, given claim-preclusive effect by

Douglas reading Engle III, concern conduct common to the

class. . . . To avoid a due process violation, the Phase I

findings must turn on the only common conduct presented

at trial—that the defendants produced, and the plaintiffs

smoked, cigarettes containing nicotine that are addictive and

cause disease.

Third, the Douglas causation instruction removes the need to

litigate brand-specific defects in Engle-progeny trials

altogether. Progeny plaintiffs must only prove how their

addiction to cigarettes containing nicotine caused their

injuries, not how the specific conduct of a specific defendant

caused their injuries.

Taken together, these three factors compel the conclusion

that Engle strict-liability and negligence claims have imposed

a duty on all cigarette manufacturers that they breached

every time they placed a cigarette on the market. That result

is inconsistent with the full purposes and objectives of

Congress, which has sought for over fifty years to safeguard

consumers’ right to choose whether to smoke or not to

smoke.

Id. at 1279-80. Graham concludes:

3

[A]s a result of the interplay between the Florida Supreme

Court’s interpretations of the Engle findings and the

strictures of due process, the necessary basis for Graham’s

Engle-progeny strict-liability and negligence claims is that all

cigarettes sold during the class period were defective as a

matter of law. This, in turn, imposed a common-law duty on

cigarette manufacturers that they necessarily breached every

time they placed a cigarette on the market. Such a duty

operates, in essence, as a ban on cigarettes. Accordingly, it

conflicts with Congress’s clear purpose and objective of

regulating—not banning—cigarettes, thereby leaving to adult

consumers the choice whether to smoke cigarettes or to

abstain. We therefore hold that Graham’s claims are

preempted by federal law.

Id. at 1282.

We disagree with Graham, and we respectfully note what we believe to

be flaws in its reasoning. First, Graham overstates the effect of the past

ten years of Florida tobacco case law by equating it to a ban on cigarette

sales. As one commentator notes, “tort verdicts (which are hardly

uniform), do not always arise to a state law ‘standard’; sometimes they

may only ‘motivate an optional decision’ for a defendant to behave

differently.” Douglas J. McNamara, What Were They Smoking? Why the

Graham Court was Wrong, LAW 360, May 14, 2015 (footnote omitted)

(quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005)). “The

proper [preemption] inquiry calls for an examination of the elements of

the common-law duty at issue, see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct.

2608 (plurality opinion); it does not call for speculation as to whether a

jury verdict will prompt the manufacturer to take any particular action (a

question, in any event, that will depend on a variety of cost/benefit

calculations best left to the manufacturer’s accountants).” Bates, 544

U.S. at 445.2

Additionally, Graham suggests that state and presumably local

governments cannot ban a product that Congress has chosen to regulate.

This blanket argument cannot withstand the test of experience and logic.

2 But see Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2013) (holding that

state design defect claims which turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are

preempted by federal law and noting that implied preemption is not “defeated

by the prospect that a manufacturer could pay the state penalty for violating a

state-law duty” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

4

For example, numerous so-called dry counties exist throughout the

United States today despite federal regulation of alcohol.

Furthermore, Graham relies in part on the 1965 Federal Cigarette

Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”), codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1331–1341, to conclude that Congress intended to preempt states

from banning the sale of cigarettes. See Graham, 782 F.3d at 1277. In

the “Congressional declaration of policy and purpose” of the FCLAA,

Congress expressed its policy to ensure that “commerce and the national

economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with

[the objective of adequately informing the public of the risks of smoking]

and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette

labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship

between smoking and health.” 15 U.S.C. § 1331. It then imposed

regulations for the labeling and advertising of cigarettes, and banned

states from imposing any separate regulations on the same activities. We

believe this only demonstrates an intent to prevent states from imposing

differing laws on the labeling and advertising of cigarettes, which

undoubtedly would have been cumbersome for cigarette companies to

comply with, and would have in turn stymied interstate commerce of

cigarettes. It does not, however, indicate an intent to preempt states

from banning the sale of cigarettes, a state right traditionally reserved

within a state’s police powers, or from permitting state tort claims

relating to the production and sale of cigarettes. See, e.g., Richardson v.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 2008)

(holding that the FCLAA did not implicitly preempt plaintiff’s strict

liability claim and explaining that “Congress clearly intended to ‘protect

the national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform,

and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations,’ Cipollone,

505 U.S. at 514, 112 S.Ct. 2608, but did not clearly intend to extend

broad immunity from common law liability to cigarette manufacturers.”).

Graham similarly relies in part on language from the 2009 Family

Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 387,

which grants the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) authority to

regulate cigarettes, but specifically prohibits the FDA from banning

cigarettes. See Graham, 782 F.3d at 1278-79. However, it contains no

such prohibition to prevent the states from banning cigarettes, if they so

choose.

In fact, although the TCA expressly preempts states from regulating

certain aspects of cigarette commerce such as labeling and

5

manufacturing,3 it specifically acknowledges states’ rights to regulate

other aspects of tobacco, including a state’s right to prohibit the sale of

tobacco:

Preservation of State and local authority.

(a) In general

(1) Preservation

Except as provided in paragraph (2)(A), nothing in this

subchapter . . . shall be construed to limit the authority of .

. . a State or political subdivision of a State . . . to enact,

adopt, promulgate, and enforce any law, rule, regulation,

or other measure with respect to tobacco products that is in

addition to, or more stringent than, requirements

established under this subchapter, including a law, rule,

regulation, or other measure relating to or prohibiting

the sale, distribution, possession, exposure to, access to,

advertising and promotion of, or use of tobacco products

by individuals of any age . . . .

....

(b) Rule of construction regarding product liability

No provision of this subchapter relating to a tobacco

product shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect

any action or the liability of any person under the product

liability law of any State.

21 U.S.C. § 387p (2009) (emphasis added). These provisions of the TCA

are curiously omitted from Graham.

In sum, because Engle progeny cases do not support a conclusion

that strict product liability claims amount to a ban on the sale of

cigarettes, and because federal tobacco laws expressly preserve a state’s

3 “No State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect

with respect to a tobacco product any requirement which is different from, or in

addition to, any requirement under the provisions of this chapter relating to

tobacco product standards, premarket review, adulteration, misbranding,

labeling, registration, good manufacturing standards, or modified risk tobacco

products.” 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(A).

6

ability to regulate tobacco in ways other than manufacturing and

labeling while declining to “modify or otherwise affect any action or the

liability of any person under the product liability law of any State,” we

find no conflict between the applicable state and federal laws.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting the defendant’s

argument that negligence and strict liability claims are preempted by

federal law.

Recognizing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to the contrary, however,

we certify this latest Engle progeny defense as a question of great public

importance:

WHETHER FEDERAL LAW IMPLICITLY PREEMPTS STATE

LAW TORT CLAIMS OF STRICT LIABILITY AND

NEGLIGENCE BY ENGLE PROGENY PLAINTIFFS BASED ON

THE SALE OF CIGARETTES.

Affirmed; question certified.

GERBER, J., and JOHNSON, LAURA, Associate Judge, concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

7

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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