Tracy Williams v. Brandon Brooks

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 15-1763

TRACY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRANDON BROOKS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:13-CV-1592 — Jane E. Magnus-Stinson, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 5, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Defendant Officer Brandon Brooks

conducted a traffic stop of plaintiff Tracy Williams for failing

to activate his turn signal prior to changing lanes. Williams

did not cooperate with the instructions of Officer Brooks and

Defendant Officer Kehl, which led to a physical confronta-

tion. Defendant Sergeant Shannon Trump then arrived at the

scene. Officer Brooks arrested Williams for resisting law en-

forcement, and after a bench trial, a state court judge granted

2 No. 15-1763

Williams’s motion to dismiss the charge. Williams sued de-

fendants in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to

protect in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district

court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

We affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The facts presented here are taken from the videotape ev-

idence of the incident, the officers’ affidavits, and Williams’s

deposition testimony.

On October 5, 2011, at approximately 1:15 AM, Officer

Brooks of the Noblesville, Indiana Police Department ob-

served Williams’s vehicle pull into the left turn lane without

signaling his lane change. Williams later testified in a depo-

sition that his normal habit is to signal as he enters a turn

lane but that he had no present memory of activating his

turn signal on this specific night. Once Williams was in the

left turn lane, he activated his turn signal and made a left

turn. Officer Brooks turned on his police vehicle’s overhead

lights, which triggered his dashboard camera. Williams

pulled into a gas station parking lot, and Officer Brooks

pulled in behind him. Officer Kehl also arrived at the scene.

When Officer Brooks approached Williams’s vehicle, Wil-

liams’s window was only rolled down two inches. Officer

Brooks asked Williams to lower his window, and Williams

rolled it down approximately one more inch. Based on his

training and experience, Officer Brooks knew that this was

common behavior for intoxicated persons attempting to pre-

No. 15-1763 3

vent officers from smelling their breath or the inside of their

cars.

After telling Williams that he had been pulled over for

failing to signal before changing lanes, Officer Brooks asked

for his license and registration. He also asked Williams

whether he had been drinking, and Williams said he had

not. Officer Brooks said, “You’re acting like you kind of have

an attitude with me right now. Like I pulled you over for no

reason.” Williams responded that he normally puts his turn

signal on and that it had been a long day. Officer Brooks took

Williams’s license and registration, told Williams to “hang

tight,” and said he would be right back.

Officer Brooks returned to his police vehicle, ran Wil-

liams’s license plate and registration, and did not find any

problems. He decided to issue Williams a warning for his

failure to signal. Officer Brooks told Officer Kehl that he

could leave the scene.

As Officer Brooks exited his vehicle to give Williams the

warning ticket, Williams stepped out of his vehicle and

started walking toward the center of the gas station. Officer

Brooks had never encountered a person getting out of his

vehicle during a traffic stop. Additionally, he had learned in

training that being away from his vehicle without cover is

one of the most vulnerable positions for an officer during a

traffic stop. Williams is significantly larger than Officer

Brooks: Officer Brooks is 5’9 and 170 pounds, and Williams

is 6’3 and 195 pounds. Officer Brooks asked Williams to get

back in his car, but Williams ignored him. Officer Brooks re-

peated this command six more times. Williams did not com-

ply until Officer Brooks drew his taser.

4 No. 15-1763

Officer Brooks radioed Officer Kehl to return to the sce-

ne. He asked Williams why he would get out of his car dur-

ing a traffic stop, and Williams responded that he wanted to

get a paper towel to clean his side mirror. Officer Brooks

again asked Williams if he had been drinking, and Williams

again responded that he had not.

Because Williams had exited his vehicle and because of

his demeanor, Officer Brooks believed that Williams might

be intoxicated or otherwise mentally impaired. He decided

to perform a pat down search followed by a field sobriety

test. He asked Williams to step out of his car at least six

times before Williams complied. Williams finally exited his

vehicle and stood facing Officer Brooks.

For safety reasons, Officer Brooks wanted Williams

against the car so that he could not reach into his pockets

during the pat down. He pointed in the direction of Wil-

liams’s car and said, “Face that way for me.” Williams did

not comply. Instead, he took a step toward Officer Brooks

and asked for a breathalyzer. Officer Brooks again said,

“Face that way for me, turn around,” and grabbed Williams’s

right arm and pushed him toward his car. Williams pushed

against the car with his left hand and backed into Officer

Brooks. Williams said, “If you’re going to do this, you’re go-

ing to visit with my attorney, son.” Officer Brooks instructed

Williams to stop resisting. Williams said, “I’m not resisting,”

but again pushed against the car with his left hand back to-

ward Officer Brooks.

Officer Brooks radioed Officer Kehl to “step it up a little

bit.” He tried to get both of Williams’s hands behind his

back, but Williams kept pushing against Officer Brooks. Of-

ficer Brooks pushed against Williams as Williams leaned in-

No. 15-1763 5

to him. Williams hit the side of the car three times during the

struggle.

At this point, Officer Kehl arrived at the gas station. Wil-

liams pulled his hand free of Officer Brooks’s grip and spun

around to face Officer Brooks. As Williams pushed Officer

Brooks away and threw an elbow at him, Officer Brooks

backed up and drew his taser on Williams. Williams took a

step toward Officer Brooks, and Officer Brooks instructed

Williams to turn around. Williams ignored the command.

Officer Brooks repeated it several times and told Williams to

put his hands above his head. Williams did not turn to face

his vehicle but instead made a 360-degree turn so that he

was still facing Officer Brooks. He briefly put his hands

above his head and said, “What do you want from me?”

Officer Kehl approached Williams and ordered him to

turn around. After Williams ignored two more commands to

turn around, Officer Kehl grabbed Williams and turned him

so he was facing his car. He ordered Williams to put his

hands behind his back multiple times. Williams did not

comply, so Officer Kehl pulled his hands behind his back

and handcuffed him. Williams said, “Guys, this is going to

be really bad. You’re going to put me in handcuffs? For

what? This is going to be a really bad video for you guys.”

Officer Kehl responded that he saw Williams assault Officer

Brooks, and Williams denied having done so.

Officer Brooks proceeded to pat down Williams. Officer

Brooks asked Williams again if he had been drinking that

night. Williams said, “I’ve told you no several times. Why do

you keep asking me?” Officer Brooks replied, “Because nor-

mal people that haven’t been drinking don’t act like you’re

acting right now.” Williams said that it had been a long day

6 No. 15-1763

at work. Officer Brooks put Williams in the back seat of his

police vehicle. Williams complained that his handcuffs were

uncomfortable on his wrists, and Officer Kehl responded

that they were not supposed to be comfortable.

Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Shannon Trump, the shift su-

pervisor that evening, came to the scene and spoke with Wil-

liams. Williams said Officer Brooks was “very hostile and

aggressive,” claimed he did not know why Officer Brooks

had pulled him over, and alleged that he had complied with

everything Officer Brooks asked of him. When Sergeant

Trump asked Williams if Officer Brooks had told him not to

walk away from the car and if Williams had not listened to

him, Williams responded that Officer Brooks had given him

contradictory messages by first telling him to stay in the car

and then telling him to get out of the car. Williams again

complained about his handcuffs and asked Sergeant Trump

to remove them, but she declined. Sergeant Trump asked

Williams if he would be willing to take a field sobriety test,

and he agreed. Officer Brooks administered a field sobriety

test. Williams also consented to a breathalyzer, which regis-

tered a zero percent reading for blood-alcohol level.

Sergeant Trump reviewed the video of the incident and

found that Williams had resisted law enforcement and that

Officer Brooks had acted appropriately.

B. Procedural Background

Williams was arrested and charged with resisting law en-

forcement, a Class A misdemeanor under Indiana law. Ind.

Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(1) (repealed 2012). On March 20, 2012,

Williams signed a diversion agreement, wherein he “ad-

mit[ed] the truthfulness of the charges against [him]” and

No. 15-1763 7

acknowledged that “such admission may be used against

[him] if there is a resumption or prosecution of these charges

by reason of termination from the pretrial diversion pro-

gram.” A condition of the diversion agreement was that Wil-

liams complete anger management training. Williams did

not fulfill this condition, so the State revoked the agreement,

and the case went to a bench trial in Hamilton County Crim-

inal Court on April 25, 2013. The State presented the video of

the incident and the testimony of Officer Brooks. The state

court granted Williams’s motion to dismiss the resisting law

enforcement charge.

On October 4, 2013, Williams filed suit in federal district

court against Officer Brooks, Officer Kehl, and Sergeant

Trump. Williams asserted the following Fourth Amendment

claims pursuant to § 19831: unlawful stop and arrest claims

against Officer Brooks and Officer Kehl, an excessive force

claim against Officer Brooks, and failure to protect claims

against Officer Kehl and Sergeant Trump. Williams alleged

that he suffered from back pain and digestive problems from

being pushed against the car, but he stated in a deposition

that he was not taking aspirin or other medication and that

he did not seek medical treatment aside from one appoint-

ment for x-rays, which did not reveal any injuries.

After the close of discovery, the district court granted de-

fendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Of-

ficer Brooks reasonably concluded that Williams had en-

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: “Every person who … subjects … any citi-

zen of the United States … to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-

ing for redress … .”

8 No. 15-1763

gaged in a traffic violation justifying the traffic stop. Because

Officer Brooks could arrest Williams for the traffic violation,

the arrest for resisting law enforcement was constitutionally

permissible. The court also found that the arrest for resisting

law enforcement was independently supported by probable

cause. Additionally, the court found that Officer Brooks’s use

of force was reasonable given the circumstances and that no

reasonable jury could find otherwise. Since the court found

that neither Officer Brooks nor Officer Kehl violated Wil-

liams’s constitutional rights, it concluded that the failure to

protect claims failed as a matter of law. Also relevant to this

appeal, the district court concluded that it was not bound by

the state court judge’s findings and briefly referred to the di-

version agreement. Williams appeals.

II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment, construing all facts in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d

297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012). However, we will not draw infer-

ences that are “supported by only speculation or conjecture.”

Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2008)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Summary

judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that

“might affect the outcome of the suit … .” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A twist on the usual standard of review is at play here:

When the evidence includes a videotape of the relevant

events, the Court should not adopt the nonmoving party’s

version of the events when that version is blatantly contra-

No. 15-1763 9

dicted by the videotape. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379–80

(2007). Accordingly, we rely primarily on the video from the

dashboard camera of Officer Brooks’s vehicle. Williams ar-

gues that relying on the video is improper because the video

is ambiguous, creating a factual dispute that should go to a

jury. We disagree. The video clearly depicts the incident.

On appeal, Williams raises three main arguments. First,

he argues that there are material questions of fact as to the

unlawful stop and arrest claims, excessive force claim, and

failure to protect claims. Next, he argues that the district

court erred in not considering the state court’s findings. Fi-

nally, Williams argues that the district court improperly used

and relied on the pretrial diversion agreement.

A. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact

1. Unlawful Stop and Arrest

Williams argues that there is a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether he committed a traffic infraction such that

Officer Brooks had probable cause to stop and arrest him.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches

and seizures, but the existence of probable cause renders

traffic stops and resulting warrantless arrests permissible.

Jones v. City of Elkhart, 737 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 2013) (not-

ing that probable cause is an absolute defense to false arrest

claims in § 1983 actions). “When a police officer reasonably

believes that a driver has committed a minor traffic offense,

probable cause supports the stop.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Hernandez-

Rivas, 513 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that when

an officer observes a vehicle changing lanes without signal-

ing, the officer has probable cause for a traffic stop). Addi-

10 No. 15-1763

tionally, it is “not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to

arrest an individual for even a very minor traffic offense.”

Jackson v. Parker, 627 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2010); see also At-

water v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (holding

that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid “a warrantless

arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor

seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine”).

Officer Brooks testified that he initiated Williams’s traffic

stop because he observed Williams violate Indiana Code § 9-

21-8-25 by failing to signal before changing lanes.2 Williams

argues that his deposition testimony that his habit is to put

his turn signal on as he enters a turn lane is enough to prove

that he complied with the law. This argument is unconvinc-

ing. Williams did not testify that he signaled on the night in

question. Rather, he said that he did not have a present

memory of putting on his turn signal before changing lanes.

He stated, “I wasn’t consciously thinking of [putting on my

turn signal] that night” and also said, “I’m human. I’m falli-

ble. I mean, I could have maybe forgot to turn my signal on.”

Given the testimony of Officer Brooks and Williams, Wil-

liams’s statement about his normal habit is not enough for us

to infer that he signaled this particular lane change. See Jones,

737 F.3d at 1114 (noting that plaintiff’s assertion that he usu-

2 Indiana Code § 9-21-8-25 provides:

A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given

continuously during not less than the last two hundred

(200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or chang-

ing lanes. A vehicle traveling in a speed zone of at least

fifty (50) miles per hour shall give a signal continuously

for not less than the last three hundred (300) feet trav-

eled by the vehicle before turning or changing lanes.

No. 15-1763 11

ally does not speed was not enough to rebut the officer’s

statement that he saw plaintiff swerving and that his radar

gun indicated that plaintiff was speeding, when plaintiff

could not positively state that he was not speeding on the

day in question and did not offer any evidence on which a

reasonable jury could rely); Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 734

(noting that inferences based on speculation or conjecture

are beyond the scope of our obligation to draw reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmovant). Thus, Officer Brooks’s

testimony that he saw Williams change lanes without signal-

ing establishes probable cause for the traffic stop, and Of-

ficer Brooks could lawfully arrest Williams for this traffic in-

fraction. No reasonable jury could find that this was an un-

lawful stop and arrest.

Williams’s next argument is that Officer Brooks did not

have probable cause to arrest him for forcibly resisting law

enforcement. This argument fails because once Officer

Brooks had probable cause to conduct the traffic stop, Of-

ficer Brooks could arrest Williams without violating the

Fourth Amendment, even if Williams was not resisting law

enforcement. See Jackson, 627 F.3d at 638–39 (“[A]n arrest is

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as there is

probable cause to believe that some criminal offense has been

or is being committed, even if it is not the crime with which

the officers initially charge the suspect.” (alteration and em-

phasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 401 (7th Cir.

2007) (holding that since the officer had probable cause to

arrest plaintiff for a parking offense in violation of an Illinois

12 No. 15-1763

statute, the officer could arrest plaintiff for driving under the

influence without violating his Fourth Amendment rights).3

Finally, Williams briefly argues that Officer Kehl partici-

pated in and facilitated the unlawful arrest when he shoved

and handcuffed Williams. He alleges that Officer Kehl knew

or should have known that Officer Brooks did not have a

sufficient basis to stop or arrest Williams. Since we have al-

ready concluded that a reasonable jury must find that Of-

ficer Brooks had probable cause to stop and arrest Williams,

this argument fails. Officer Brooks and Officer Kehl are enti-

tled to judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful stop and

arrest claim.

3 We briefly note that a reasonable jury must also find that Officer

Brooks had probable cause to arrest Williams for resisting law enforce-

ment in violation of Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1. Under this statute, “[a]

person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or

interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer

while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s du-

ties … commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor … .”

Williams argues that he did not forcibly resist but rather “leaned away

and twisted in pain.” However, the video blatantly contradicts these al-

legations. The video shows that Williams was uncooperative and ig-

nored many commands from Officer Brooks. Williams forcefully pushed

against Officer Brooks, using his arms to push away from the car and

backing his body into Officer Brooks, preventing Officer Brooks from

conducting a pat down search and conducting a field sobriety test. These

actions are enough to establish probable cause for arrest. See Lopez v.

State, 926 N.E.2d 1090, 1093–94 (Ind. App. 2010) (holding that defendant

forcibly resisted arrest when he refused to stand to be cuffed, pulled

away from officer’s attempts to pull him up from the couch, and physi-

cally prevented officers from pulling his arms from under him as he lay

on the ground).

No. 15-1763 13

2. Excessive Force

Williams argues that Officer Brooks used excessive force

and injured Williams by pushing him against the car during

his arrest.4 “An officer who has the right to arrest an indi-

vidual also has the right to use some degree of physical force

or threat of force to effectuate the arrest … .” Stainback v.

Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

That right is circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment’s rea-

sonableness standard. See id. Factors relevant to the reasona-

bleness inquiry include “the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety

of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citation omitted). We “re-

main cognizant of the fact that police officers are often

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances

that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”

Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013) (cita-

tion and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the first Graham factor, the initial infraction—

failing to signal before changing lanes—was not a significant

violation. However, resisting law enforcement is a more se-

rious offense. Under the second factor, Williams posed an

4 On appeal, Williams also attempts to raise an excessive force claim

against Officer Kehl. However, the district court correctly held that this

claim was waived since Williams did not assert it until his response to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Hancock v. Potter, 531

F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (declining to reach the substance of a claim

that plaintiff did not allege in her complaint and raised for the first time

in her opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment).

14 No. 15-1763

immediate threat to Officer Brooks when he got out of his

vehicle during the traffic stop and refused six commands to

get back in the car, especially since Officer Brooks was in a

vulnerable position away from his police vehicle and with-

out cover. Additionally, Williams was acting strangely and

resisted Officer Brooks’s attempts to conduct a pat down

search, creating safety concerns. Under the third factor, Of-

ficer Brooks had probable cause to believe that Williams was

actively resisting arrest. Thus, a reasonable jury must find

that Officer Brooks used a reasonable amount of force.

Williams argues that we must infer that Officer Brooks

intended to hurt Williams. However, an officer’s intent is ir-

relevant. In analyzing the use of force, we assess the reason-

ableness “without regard to [the officer’s] underlying intent

or motivation.” Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 743 (7th

Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, the record does not support this inference.

Even when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we will

not draw inferences that are “supported by only speculation

or conjecture.” Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 732 (citation and in-

ternal quotation marks omitted).

3. Failure to Protect

Williams alleges that Officer Kehl and Sergeant Trump

failed to intervene and protect Williams from Officer Brooks.

Since no reasonable jury could find that Officer Brooks vio-

lated Williams’s constitutional rights, this argument must

fail.

B. The State Court’s Findings

Williams argues that the district court erred as a matter

of law by not giving that state court’s findings any control-

No. 15-1763 15

ling or preclusive weight. At the end of the state court trial,

Williams moved to dismiss the charge against him for resist-

ing law enforcement, arguing that the state did not prove its

case beyond a reasonable doubt. The state court judge grant-

ed the motion and said: “[I]t’s pretty clear that the officer is

not attempting to pat down … . What the officer is doing is

attempting to get both of the Defendant’s hands behind his

back, apparently for the purpose of handcuffing him.” The

state court judge also stated that the officers “had no basis

that I heard in my record for handcuffing.”

Williams argues that the state court’s dismissal of the

charge should have been binding on the district court. In

other words, he argues that the district court should have

found—based on the state court’s dismissal—that Williams

did not resist law enforcement and therefore, the arrest for

resisting law enforcement was unlawful.

Williams’s argument misstates the law. “Evidence of ac-

quittal in a criminal action is generally irrelevant and inad-

missible in a civil case involving the same incident since it

constitutes a negative sort of conclusion lodged in a finding

of failure of the prosecution to sustain the burden of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395

F.3d 747, 755 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Therefore, the district court correctly decid-

ed that it was not bound by the state court’s findings. Addi-

tionally, even if the district court adopted the state court’s

finding that Williams did not resist law enforcement, it

would be irrelevant to his unlawful arrest claim. As ex-

plained above, a reasonable jury must find that since Officer

Brooks had probable cause for the traffic stop, he could ar-

16 No. 15-1763

rest Williams—for the traffic infraction or for resisting law

enforcement—without violating the Fourth Amendment.

Next, Williams argues that the contrast between the state

court’s and the district court’s findings demonstrates that

there is a genuine issue of material fact that should go to a

jury. The state court found that Officer Brooks had acted in-

appropriately by trying to handcuff Williams, whereas the

district court found that Officer Brooks’s actions were lawful.

However, this argument fails because the factual dispute

about whether Officer Brooks was trying to conduct a pat

down or trying to handcuff Williams does not create a genu-

ine issue of material fact. A material fact is one that “might

affect the outcome of the suit … .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The outcome of Williams’s suit

against the officers is not affected by whether or not Officer

Brooks was trying to handcuff Williams. Even if Officer

Brooks was attempting to handcuff Williams, that action

would have been lawful, and no reasonable jury could find

otherwise. Since Officer Brooks had probable cause to stop

and arrest Williams, he could handcuff Williams without vi-

olating the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the district court

properly decided not to consider the state court’s findings.

C. The Diversion Agreement

Williams’s final argument is that the district court im-

properly used and relied on the pretrial diversion agreement

in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Rule 408 states

that evidence of “accepting … valuable consideration in

compromising … the claim” is inadmissible “either to prove

or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to

impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradic-

tion[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 408. This argument is unconvincing be-

No. 15-1763 17

cause the district court did not rely on the diversion agree-

ment in granting summary judgment.

The district court only briefly referred to the diversion

agreement. The court noted that defendants pointed to the

agreement to support their claim that Williams was resisting

law enforcement. The court also noted Williams’s argument

that the agreement is not admissible. Without ruling on the

admissibility of the diversion agreement and without men-

tioning it further, the district court granted summary judg-

ment in favor of defendants. Thus, the district court did not

rely on the diversion agreement to prove the validity of a

claim—namely, defendants’ claim that Officer Brooks had

probable cause to believe that Williams was resisting law en-

forcement—or to impeach Williams with a prior inconsistent

statement.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

decision.