James Styers v. Charles Ryan

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES LYNN STYERS, No. 12-16952

Petitioner-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:98-cv-02244-

JAT

CHARLES L. RYAN,

Respondent-Appellee. OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 24, 2013—San Francisco California

Filed December 30, 2015

Before: Jerome Farris, Alex Kozinski,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

2 STYERS V. RYAN

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of James

Lynn Styers’s motion for an unconditional writ of habeas

corpus after the Arizona Supreme Court, in response to the

district court’s conditional writ ordered by this court in Styers

v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008), conducted an

independent review of Styers’s death sentence, and affirmed

it in 2011.

In Styers, this court held that when the Arizona Supreme

Court initially affirmed the death sentence in 1993, it violated

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Smith v.

Texas, 453 U.S. 37 (2004), which prohibit consideration of

only mitigation evidence causally related to the crime.

Styers argued in his petition for the unconditional writ

that, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Arizona Supreme Court

was powerless to correct the constitutional error identified in

Styers, and that the death sentence could now be imposed

only by a jury’s determination of the aggravating factors.

The Arizona Supreme Court denied the Ring claim on the

ground that the sentence was final.

The panel observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has

never held that the issuance of a conditional writ of habeas

corpus necessarily renders non-final a conviction or sentence

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

STYERS V. RYAN 3

that was predicated on constitutional error, and that the

conditional writ in this case did not vacate Styers’s death

sentence. The panel concluded that the Arizona Supreme

Court’s determination that Styers’s sentence remained final

at the time of the second independent review was therefore

not contrary to federal law as determined by the U.S.

Supreme Court.

The panel rejected Styers’s contention that the Arizona

Supreme Court failed to correct the error found by this court

in Styers. The panel observed that the Arizona Supreme

Court considered the mitigating evidence and decided to give

it little weight, and that neither Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.

274 (2004), nor Eddings requires more.

COUNSEL

Julie S. Hall (argued), Oracle, Arizona; Amy Beth Krauss,

Tucson, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Zick (argued), Thomas C. Horne, Kent E. Cattani,

and Ginger Jarvis, Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix,

Arizona, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

We must determine whether a state court’s constitutional

error in failing to consider certain evidence offered in

mitigation of a death sentence can be corrected by the court

4 STYERS V. RYAN

that committed the error, rather than require the convicted

murderer to be sentenced anew, but before a jury.

James Lynn Styers, an Arizona prisoner, was convicted of

first degree murder and other charges and sentenced to death.

Styers’s first degree murder conviction and his sentence of

death were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court. State v.

Styers, 865 P.2d 765, 770 (Ariz. 1993) (“Styers I”). Styers

sought federal habeas corpus, and was denied. On appeal to

us, we found that the Arizona Supreme Court had erred in not

considering certain mitigation evidence, because it found

such evidence was not connected to Styers’s actions at the

time of the murder. Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1028

(9th Cir. 2008) (“Styers II”). We reversed and remanded to

the district court with instructions to issue a conditional writ

ordering Styers’s release from his death sentence unless the

State were to initiate proceedings either to correct the

constitutional error or to vacate the death sentence and

impose a lesser sentence consistent with the law. Id. at 1036.

The district court so ordered.

The Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent

review of Styers’s death sentence pursuant to its view of the

Arizona statute which provides for independent reviews of all

death sentences, A.R.S. § 13-755. State v. Styers, 254 P.3d

1132, 1133 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (“Styers III”). It again

affirmed the death sentence, after expressly considering and

weighing the mitigation evidence to which this court’s

opinion referred. Styers then moved the district court for an

unconditional writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Arizona

Supreme Court was powerless to correct the constitutional

error, because the law had changed since Styers I; the death

sentence could be imposed only by a jury’s determination of

the aggravating factors that rendered Styers eligible for the

STYERS V. RYAN 5

death penalty. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The

district court denied Styers’s petition for an unconditional

writ. Styers timely appealed.

We review de novo, and we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In 1989, Styers lived in an apartment with his daughter,

a roommate, Styers’s co-defendant Debra Milke,1 and Debra

Milke’s four-year-old son, Christopher. Styers provided

childcare for Christopher while Milke was at work. On

December 2, 1989, Styers borrowed Milke’s car to go to the

mall. Christopher wanted to see Santa Claus and joined

Styers. On the way to the mall, Styers picked up his friend

Roger Scott. Scott, Styers, and Christopher had pizza for

lunch and then drove to the desert. The men told Christopher

that they were going to look for snakes in the wash.2 They

then shot him three times in the head, leaving his body in the

wash. State v. Styers, 865 P.2d 765, 769 (Ariz. 1993)

(“Styers I”).

A jury convicted Styers of first degree murder, conspiracy

to commit first degree murder, child abuse, and kidnapping.

Id. At sentencing, without a jury, the trial court found three

statutory aggravating factors that rendered Styers eligible for

the death penalty. Along with mitigating evidence as to

Styers’s family relationships, military service, and character,

1

Milke and Roger Scott were also convicted of first degree murder for

the murder of Christopher Milke. Milke’s conviction has been vacated for

reasons not relevant to this case.

2

A wash is a dry channel in the desert.

6 STYERS V. RYAN

Styers submitted evidence of mental health problems

including post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) caused by

Styers’s military service. The trial court found no mitigating

factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The trial

court imposed the death penalty. Id.

Styers appealed his convictions and sentence to the

Arizona Supreme Court. The Arizona Supreme Court

reversed Styers’s child abuse conviction for insufficiency of

evidence and affirmed Styers’s first degree murder,

conspiracy, and kidnapping convictions and the death penalty

sentence. Id. at 772, 778.

Styers filed a federal habeas petition in the district court,

challenging his conviction and sentence on various grounds.

The district court denied Styers’s petition, and Styers

appealed to this court. Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1028

(9th Cir. 2008) (“Styers II”). This court affirmed the district

court in part, and reversed and remanded in part because

when the Arizona Supreme Court conducted its 1993

independent review of Styers’s death sentence, that court

“appear[ed] to have imposed a test directly contrary to the

constitutional requirement that all relevant mitigating

evidence be considered by the sentencing body” when it

found that Styers’s PTSD did not qualify as mitigating

evidence because it had not affected his actions at the time of

the crime. Id. at 1035. Specifically, this court found that the

Arizona Supreme Court violated Eddings v. Oklahoma,

455 U.S. 104 (1982) and Smith v. Texas, 453 U.S. 37 (2004),

which prohibit consideration of only mitigation evidence

causally related to the crime. On remand, the district court

entered an order directing that

STYERS V. RYAN 7

Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus as to his

sentence of death is granted unless the State of

Arizona, within 120 days from entry of this

Judgment, initiates proceedings either to

correct the constitutional error in Petitioner’s

death sentence or to vacate the sentence and

impose a lesser sentence consistent with the

law.3

The State then moved the Arizona Supreme Court to “remedy

its initial independent review of Styers’ death sentence by

conducting a new independent review and considering Styers’

PTSD as a mitigating circumstance.” State v. Styers,

254 P.3d 1132, 1133 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (“Styers III”).

Styers objected to the procedure, arguing that by again

conducting an independent review under A.R.S. § 13-755, the

Arizona Supreme Court had reopened Styers’s case on direct

review and Styers’s sentence was no longer final.4 Id. at

3

In the same order, the district court denied a motion by the State to

remand the case to the Arizona Supreme Court for reweighing pursuant to

Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).

4

A.R.S. § 13-755 provides:

(A) The supreme court shall review all death sentences.

On review, the supreme court shall independently

review the trial court's findings of aggravation and

mitigation and the propriety of the death sentence.

(B) If the supreme court determines that an error was

made regarding a finding of aggravation or mitigation,

the supreme court shall independently determine if the

mitigation the supreme court finds is sufficiently

substantial to warrant leniency in light of the existing

aggravation. If the supreme court finds that the

mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to warrant

8 STYERS V. RYAN

1134. Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), if Styers’s

sentence was not final when the Arizona Supreme Court

conducted its second independent review, Styers would be

entitled to all constitutional rules which had been announced

at the time of Styers III. These rules would include the

requirement of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that

defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on

which their eligibility for the death penalty is conditioned.

The Arizona Supreme Court granted the State’s motion,

holding that (1) the Arizona Supreme Court was not required

to remand the case to the trial court for a new resentencing,

and that (2) even if Styers’s sentence was not final, Ring

requires jury findings only of aggravating factors, and the

aggravating factors in Styers’s case were not at issue in

determining the weight of the mitigating evidence. Styers III,

254 P.3d at 1133–34.

The Arizona Supreme Court did not review its prior

Eddings error for harmlessness. Instead, the court reviewed

anew whether the mitigation evidence was sufficiently

substantial to warrant leniency when weighed against the

aggravating factors found by the trial court. Id. at 1135. On

its review of the PTSD evidence, the court opined that

leniency, the supreme court shall affirm the death

sentence. If the supreme court finds that the mitigation

is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency, the

supreme court shall impose a life sentence pursuant to

§ 13-751, subsection A. (C) The independent review

required by subsection A does not preclude the supreme

court from remanding a case for further action if the

trial court erroneously excluded evidence or if the

appellate record does not adequately reflect the

evidence presented.

STYERS V. RYAN 9

because Styers had produced no evidence establishing a

causal connection between his PTSD and the crime, the

PTSD evidence was of little weight. Id. at 1136. The

Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Styers’s sentence of death.

Id.

Styers then moved the federal district court to enter

judgment granting an unconditional writ of habeas corpus on

the basis that the state had not complied with the conditional

writ of habeas corpus because (1) the constitutional error

could not be corrected without resentencing by a jury; (2) the

Arizona Supreme Court employed an unconstitutional process

in its attempt to cure the constitutional error; and (3) the

Arizona Supreme Court failed to correct the constitutional

error because it did not properly consider Styers’s mitigation

evidence. The district court denied the motion for habeas

relief because

[t]he conditional writ of habeas corpus entered

in [Styers’s] case gave the State the

opportunity to cure the constitutional defect

found by the Ninth Circuit. At the request of

the State, the Arizona Supreme Court

undertook a new independent review of

[Styers’s] capital sentence, reweighing the

proven aggravating and mitigating

circumstances. This remedied the

constitutional infirmity found in Styers II and

satisfied the condition precedent contained in

the conditional writ.

Styers moved the district court for a certificate of

appealability, and the district court granted a certificate of

appealability on the issue whether, in correcting Styers’s

10 STYERS V. RYAN

sentence, the State was required to provide him a jury

resentencing. Styers timely appealed.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo the district court’s

denial of the writ of habeas corpus. Harvest v. Castro,

531 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2008). This court may reverse

the district court only if the state court ruling “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1).

III. Analysis

A. Certified Issue: Ring Sentencing

When a constitutional rule is announced, its requirements

apply to defendants whose convictions or sentences are

pending on direct review or not otherwise final. Griffith v.

Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987). The rule announced in

Ring, under which “[c]apital defendants are entitled . . . to a

jury determination of any fact on which the legislature

conditions an increase in their maximum punishment,” Ring,

536 U.S. at 589 is a procedural rule that applies to capital

defendants on direct review, see Schriro v. Summerlin,

542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004).

Styers made a Ring claim before the Arizona Supreme

Court, arguing that the conditional writ of habeas corpus

required that Styers be re-sentenced and that a jury must find

STYERS V. RYAN 11

the aggravating factors rendering him eligible for the death

penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court denied the Ring claim

on the ground that Styers’s sentence was final. To prevail,

Styers must show that the Arizona Supreme Court’s

determination that his conviction was final (and therefore that

he was not entitled to a Ring sentencing) “was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The Arizona Supreme Court in Styers III rejected Styers’s

contention that the Arizona Supreme Court “must remand this

case to the trial court for a new resentencing proceeding

because this case is now on ‘direct review.’” Styers III,

254 P.3d at 1133. The court observed

“a judgment of conviction has been rendered,

the availability of appeal exhausted, and the

time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a

petition for certiorari finally denied.”

Because Styers had exhausted available

appeals, his petition for certiorari had been

denied, and the mandate had issued almost

eight years before Ring was decided, his case

was final, and he therefore is not entitled to

have his case reconsidered in light of Ring.

Styers III, 254 P.3d at 1133–34 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at

328).5 The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the

5

The Arizona Supreme Court further held that “nothing in § 13-755

limits our review to direct appeals. Instead, for murders committed before

August 2002, the statute imposes an obligation on this court to ‘review all

death sentences.’” Styers III, 254 P.3d at 1134 n.1. Our now colleague,

12 STYERS V. RYAN

issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus necessarily

renders non-final a conviction or sentence that was predicated

on constitutional error, and the conditional writ of habeas

corpus in this case did not vacate Styers’s death sentence.

Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court’s determination that

Styers’s sentence remained final at the time of the second

independent review was not contrary to federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.6,7

then-Vice Chief Justice Hurwitz dissented and noted that “[t]he statute

mandating independent review of death sentences, A.R.S. § 13–755(A),

applies to direct review, not to post-conviction proceedings . . .

independent review is the paradigm of direct review—we determine, de

novo, whether the trial court, on the facts before it, properly sentenced the

defendant to death.” Styers III, 254 P.3d at 1147 (Hurwitz, V.C.J.,

dissenting). Styers urges this court to adopt Justice Hurwitz’s analysis.

However, the question whether an independent review under A.R.S. § 13-

755 is limited to direct review is a question of statutory interpretation of

an Arizona statute. Here that question was determined by Arizona’s

highest court, and it held that “nothing in § 13-755 limits our review to

direct appeals.” Styers III, 254 P.3d at 1134 n.1. We are constrained to

defer to the highest state court on a matter of state law and may not

construe A.R.S. § 13-755 differently than did the Arizona Supreme Court.

Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997).

6

The U.S. Supreme Court has been silent on whether the finality of a

conviction or sentence, for Teague purposes, is a question of federal law,

and has never held that a conditional writ of habeas corpus, regardless of

its terms, necessarily renders a conviction non-final. Alternatively, if the

question of finality is purely a matter of state law, then the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision that Styers’s sentence remained final and he

was not entitled to a Ring re-sentencing is not reviewable because it rests

on an adequate and independent state ground. Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 736–37 (1991).

7

The Arizona Supreme Court held in the alternative that “regardless of

what one calls the type of review we now undertake, Ring requires jury

findings only of aggravating factors that make a defendant eligible for the

STYERS V. RYAN 13

B. Uncertified Issue: The Arizona Supreme Court

Corrected the Eddings Error

Styers also contends that the Arizona Supreme Court

failed to correct the Eddings error found by this court in

Styers II because it treated Styers’s mitigation evidence as de

minimis.

The U.S. Supreme Court has “never held that a specific

method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a

capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required.”

Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175 (2006). Rather, the

Constitution prohibits considering exclusively only that

mitigation evidence that bears a relationship to the crime.

Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284–86 (2004).

Here, when the Arizona Supreme Court conducted its

second independent review, it did not preclude consideration

death penalty.” Styers III, 254 P.3d at 1134. This reading of Ring is

directly contrary to our decision in Murdaugh v. Ryan, 724 F.3d 1104 (9th

Cir. 2013), and inconsistent with the Arizona Supreme Court’s own

opinion on remand in Ring, which held that “[b]ecause a trier of fact must

determine whether mitigating circumstances call for leniency, we will

affirm a capital sentence only if we conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that no rational trier of fact would determine that the mitigating

circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. If we

cannot reach that conclusion, we must find reversible error and remand the

case for resentencing.” State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 946 (Ariz. 2003).

However, the Arizona Supreme Court’s alternative holding does not affect

its determination that its independent review per A.R.S. § 13-755 is not a

direct review. Because of the Arizona Supreme Court’s finding that

Styers’s sentence remained final after issuance of the conditional writ,

Ring does not apply, and so the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that

Ring requires consideration only of aggravating factors does not affect the

outcome in this case.

14 STYERS V. RYAN

of Styers’s PTSD, as it appeared to do in Styers I. There, the

Arizona Supreme Court held that PTSD could constitute

mitigating evidence in another case, but that it did not warrant

leniency because Styers’s PTSD was not causally related to

Christopher Milke’s murder. Styers II, 547 F.3d at 1035

(citing Styers I, 865 P. 3d at 777–78). In Styers III, the

Arizona Supreme Court found that Styers failed to present

evidence that his PTSD affected him at the time of the crime

and that his actions belied any claim that the disorder did

affect him. 254 P.3d at 1135–36. Based on this finding, the

Arizona Supreme Court considered the mitigating evidence

and decided to give it little weight.8 Neither Tennard,

542 U.S. at 285, nor Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113–15, requires

more.

Conclusion

Styers has not shown that the Arizona Supreme Court

made a decision contrary to, or involving an unreasonable

application of, federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States when it deemed his sentence final,

refused to remand his case for a jury resentencing, and

instead conducted an independent review under its death

penalty statute. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

8

To the extent that Styers argues that the determination that his PTSD

did not affect him at the time of the crime was an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), we decline to expand the

certificate of appleability.