B. Sinkiewicz and T. Sinkiewicz v. Susquehanna County Board of Commissioners

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bernard Sinkiewicz and :

Toni Sinkiewicz, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 375 C.D. 2015

: Argued: December 10, 2015

Susquehanna County Board of :

Commissioners :

BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: December 30, 2015

Bernard and Toni Sinkiewicz (Homeowners) appeal an order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County (trial court) denying their request

for a writ of mandamus to be issued to the Susquehanna County Board of

Commissioners (County). Homeowners sought the writ to compel the County to

enforce the requirements of the Susquehanna County Subdivision and Land

Development Ordinance (SALDO)1 and the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning

Code (MPC)2 against High Cadence LLC (High Cadence). Homeowners

complained to the County that High Cadence had subdivided its property without

the County’s approval. However, the County disagreed with Homeowners’ legal

conclusion and, thus, declined to take action against High Cadence. The trial court

1

SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY SUBDIVISION AND LAND DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE, effective January

26, 2011, Ordinance # 2005-01, as amended.

2

Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§10101 - 11202.

held that by granting others permission to use its land, High Cadence did not effect

subdivisions that triggered the requirements of the SALDO or the MPC. Thus,

Homeowners were not entitled to a writ of mandamus.

Background

Homeowners own real property located in Gibson Township,

Susquehanna County, adjacent to the property owned by High Cadence. High

Cadence’s property consists of two lots. Lot No. 5 is approximately 29 acres and

includes a single family residence.3 Lot No. 10 is approximately 13 acres and

includes a commercial building that originally housed a sawmill.

Over the past several years, portions of Lot No. 5 and Lot No. 10 have

been used, with High Cadence’s permission, by a variety of business enterprises.

Currently, Scott and Longacre Trucking, LLC uses most of Lot No. 10 to operate a

trucking and truck repair business, known as “Route 92 Truck Repair.” In turn,

Scott and Longacre has rented out parts of Lot No. 10 it does not need. For

instance, for approximately one year, Scott and Longacre rented four acres of Lot

No. 10 to Cody Energy Services, Inc., which conducted pipeline fabricating

activities on the lot. At another time, Scott and Longacre rented some of the front

acreage of Lot No. 10 to Letourneau Corporation for equipment storage.

Currently, Scott and Longacre rents ten acres of Lot No. 10 to another pipeline

fabrication company known as “Michael’s Pipeline.” High Cadence has also

rented Lot No. 10 to persons other than Scott and Longacre. It rented three acres

of Lot No. 10 to Somerset Water Resources for its fracking water supply operation.

3

Donald Twining is the caretaker for High Cadence; he resides in the house with his family.

2

High Cadence often rents a portion of Lot No. 5 to natural gas

industry service companies for equipment storage. At one point, it rented

approximately three acres of Lot No. 5 for several months to a company called

“Rain for Rent” for the storage of water tankers. At present, one acre of Lot No. 5

is being used by Bruce Woodmansee & Sons, a pipeline land clearing company,

for equipment storage.

Though all of the leases between High Cadence and its lessees have

been oral, Scott and Longacre used a written agreement to sub-lease part of its

leased property to Cody Energy Services, Inc. The written agreement established a

rental period of one year, with an option to renew, for payment of $1,750 per

month. It states that “Cody Energy Services, Inc.” has the right to use “the 4 (four)

acre premises located at: 232 State Route 2036 Thompson PA 18465.”

Reproduced Record at 452a (R.R.____). Both of High Cadence’s lots, which total

42 acres, use this address. No boundaries or further description of the sub-leased

four acres are set forth in the lease.

Homeowners complained to the Susquehanna County Planning

Commission that High Cadence had not obtained the Commission’s approval to

subdivide Lot Nos. 5 and 10 in connection with the various above-listed tenancies.

By letter dated July 1, 2013, the Planning Commission informed Homeowners that

no action would be taken because it did not agree that any “subdivision” had

occurred. The letter set forth three reasons regarding why no enforcement action

could be taken against High Cadence:

1. It is the Planning Commission’s understanding that an

approved industrial development existed on the subject property

3

prior to the purchase of the neighboring property by

[Homeowners].

2. The Susquehanna County Planning Commission has not,

for as long as any member can remember, required a

subdivision or land development plan for a lease of a portion of

property.

3. There is no mechanism known to the Planning

Commission to discover if and when a lease of a portion of

property has taken place.

R.R. 435a.

In response, Homeowners instituted the instant mandamus action to

compel the County to require High Cadence to file a subdivision plan for Lot Nos.

5 and 10, which had been subdivided by reason of the above-described rental

agreements, or “leases.”4 A hearing was held on December 15, 2014. At the

hearing, Donald Twining, High Cadence’s caretaker for Lot Nos. 5 and 10, Robert

Templeton, the Director of Planning for Susquehanna County, and Adam

Longacre, the owner of Scott and Longacre, testified.

Twining testified that he formerly owned the property from 1998 to

2012. R.R. 203a. At the time of his purchase, the property consisted of one lot,

which he later subdivided into Lot No. 5 and Lot No. 10. R.R. 205a. In 2012, the

property was sold at a public auction to High Cadence, a company owned by

Twining’s brother. R.R. 203a. Twining explained that the various rental

agreements did not specify dimensions; rather, the agreements allowed the renters

4

The County filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, asserting that

Homeowners’ mandamus action was improper because it sought to compel the County’s exercise

of discretion. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections in an order dated February 6,

2014.

4

to “use what they need[ ].” R.R. 211a, 213a. The agreements were oral, not

written. R.R. 216a.

Templeton testified on behalf of the County. He explained that the

County declined the Homeowners’ request to bring enforcement actions against

High Cadence because the County concluded that the casual rental agreements had

not effected subdivisions. Templeton explained:

So the definition of lot is: “A designated parcel, tract, or area of

land regardless of size, established by a plat.” A plat is a

surveyor’s description by [metes] and bounds of a property. So,

I contend that leasing a portion, you know, 2 or 3 acres over

here with a wave of a hand or the portion behind the building is

not a lot, is not a plat, it’s not a platted lot.

R.R. 235a. Templeton then discussed leasing situations that could effect a

subdivision within the meaning of the SALDO and the MPC:

Over the years, we’ve had a number of cell towers developed

throughout the county. The cell tower companies lease –

generally 100 by 100 foot piece of land with courses and

distances. That was submitted to the Planning Commission,

along with the development. The Planning Commission

considers that a land development, but there’s also a

specifically designated leased parcel which is submitted to the

Planning Commission for approval, along with the development

of the tower.

R.R. 243a.

Templeton explained that Homeowners’ real objection was with the

commercial and industrial uses of the land owned by High Cadence. He stated as

follows:

I see this more as a zoning issue, is an issue that would be

addressed if there was a zoning ordinance. The use of the land,

5

various uses on a single piece of land, that has in my knowledge

of planning always been a zoning issue rather than subdivision,

dividing up land into specific lots, or land development

building a commercial or industrial development. Gibson

Township does not have zoning[.]

R.R. 238a (emphasis added). Templeton opined that Homeowners sought to

prevent land uses they found offensive by invoking the County’s SALDO when

what was needed was the enactment of land use regulation, i.e., zoning.

By order filed February 26, 2015, the trial court denied Homeowners’

complaint on the merits. In its accompanying one and a half page opinion, the trial

court explained:

We are not aware of any new buildings, streets, sewers or sewer

systems to have been constructed by any tenants or subtenants

of any of the areas of the subject lots. Our understanding of the

matter was that the existing building or buildings were used and

no new ones constructed. Further, many of the lessors were

only using barren lands/acreage upon which to conduct their

business. This being the case then there is not a right or

jurisdiction under either the MPC or SALDO.

Trial Court op. of 2/26/15, at 2 (citation omitted).5 Homeowners then appealed to

this Court.

5

The entirety of the trial court’s opinion is as follows:

Plaintiffs, Bernard Sinkiewicz and Toni Sinkiewicz, by and through their legal

counsel, filed a Complaint in Mandamus on October 4, 2013, against Defendant

Susquehanna County Board of Commissioners (Board).

Plaintiffs, owners of a 30.55 acre rural residential property in Gibson Township,

Susquehanna County, seek the court to compel the Board to enforce compliance

by an entity, High Cadence, an adjacent landowner, with the Susquehanna County

Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance and require High Cadence to

obtain necessary land development and/or subdivision approvals.

(Footnote continued on the next page . . .)

6

Appeal Issues

On appeal,6 Homeowners raise two issues. First, they argue that the

trial court erred in holding that High Cadence did not effect a subdivision that

required the County’s review and approval. Second, they argue that the trial court

correctly held that a mandamus action was appropriate where, as here, the

plaintiffs sought to compel the County to enforce the SALDO. The County rejoins

(continued . . .)

Additionally, Plaintiffs Sinkiewicz seek the court to direct the Board to take such

actions as are necessary to cease ongoing violations of the Susquehanna

Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance until all proper approvals

thereunder have been obtained by High Cadence.

The Board by its legal counsel on October 24, 2013 filed a Preliminary Objection

to Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Mandamus citing legal insufficiency of a pleading

(Demurrer).

The Court, after argument and briefing, filed an opinion and order on February 6,

2014, overruling the preliminary objections and ordering the Defendant Board to

file an answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint in Mandamus. In the opinion we

determined that (sic) the remedies and/or enforcement provisions of both the

SALDO and MPC (Municipal Planning Code) to be discretionary.

In the instant matter we must concern ourselves with the question of whether or

not under the circumstances presented as to the lands in question improvements

are sought to be made upon the lots in question. We are not aware of any new

buildings, streets, sewers or sewer systems to have been constructed by any

tenants or subtenants of any of the areas of the subject lots. Our understanding of

the matter was that the existing building or buildings were used and no new ones

constructed. Further, many of the lessors were only using barren lands/acreage

upon which to conduct their business. This being the case then there is not a right

or jurisdiction under either the MPC or SALDO. In Re Heritage Bldg. Group,

Inc., 977 A.2d 606 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

Trial Court op. of 2/26/15.

6

This Court’s review of a trial court’s denial of a writ of mandamus determines whether the trial

court committed an error of law or abused its discretion, and whether substantial evidence exists

to support its findings. Township of Forks v. Forks Township Municipal Sewer Authority, 759

A.2d 47, 51 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Our scope of review on factual findings is deferential.

Reading Area Water Authority v. Schuylkill River Greenway Association, 100 A.3d 572, 577 (Pa.

2014). Our standard of review of legal questions is de novo. Podolak v. Tobyhanna Township

Board of Supervisors, 37 A.3d 1283, 1287 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

7

that the casual “leases” authorized by High Cadence did not have a fixed duration

or convey a discrete portion of a property. Neither Lot No. 5 nor No. 10 has been

subdivided. The County also argues that the trial court erred in overruling its

preliminary objections because mandamus is not available where, as here,

Homeowners sought to compel the County to exercise discretion in a particular

way.

Mandamus Principles

The common law writ of mandamus lies to compel an official’s

performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty. McGill v. Pennsylvania

Department of Health, Office of Drug and Alcohol Programs, 758 A.2d 268, 270

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). “The burden of proof falls upon the party seeking this

extraordinary remedy to establish his legal right to such relief.” Werner v.

Zazyczny, 681 A.2d 1331, 1335 (Pa. 1996). Mandamus requires “[1] a clear legal

right in the plaintiff, [2] a corresponding duty in the defendant, and [3] a lack of

any other adequate and appropriate remedy at law.” Crozer Chester Medical

Center v. Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation,

Health Care Services Review Division, 22 A.3d 189, 193 (Pa. 2011) (citations

omitted). Mandamus is not available to establish legal rights but only to enforce

rights that have been established. Wilson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and

Parole, 942 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). As a high prerogative writ,

mandamus is rarely issued and never to interfere with a public official’s exercise of

discretion. Chadwick v. Dauphin County Office of the Coroner, 905 A.2d 600, 603

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

8

A writ of mandamus can be used to compel a public official to

exercise discretion where the official has a mandatory duty to perform a

discretionary act and has refused to exercise discretion. In establishing this use of

mandamus, our Supreme Court explained as follows:

But where by a mistaken view of the law or by an arbitrary

exercise of authority there has been in fact no actual exercise of

discretion, the writ will lie.

Tanenbaum v. D’Ascenzo, 51 A.2d 757, 758 (Pa. 1947) (citations omitted)

(emphasis added). When the official refuses to exercise discretion, a writ of

mandamus “will lie” to compel the official to do so. Id. Notably, where a public

official “is clothed with discretionary powers, and has exercised those powers,

mandamus will not lie to compel a revision of the decision resulting from such

exercise of discretion, though in fact, the decision may be wrong.” Anderson v.

Philadelphia, 36 A.2d 442, 444 (Pa. 1944) (emphasis added).

Applicable Law on Subdivision and Land Development

We begin with a review of the law on subdivision and land

development. This subject has been addressed in legislation enacted by the

General Assembly and by the County.

The MPC states that where a municipality has enacted a subdivision

and land development ordinance, its terms must be followed in order to effect a

lawful development or subdivision. Section 507 of the MPC states, in relevant

part, as follows:

Where a subdivision and land development ordinance has been

enacted by a municipality under the authority of this article no

subdivision or land development of any lot, tract or parcel of

land shall be made, no street, sanitary sewer, storm sewer,

9

water main or other improvements in connection therewith shall

be laid out, constructed, opened or dedicated for public use or

travel, or for the common use of occupants of buildings

abutting thereon, except in accordance with the provisions of

such ordinance.

53 P.S. §10507 (emphasis added).

The County has adopted such an ordinance, and several of its

provisions are relevant here. First, subdivision plans must be filed with the

Susquehanna County Planning Commission:

All plans for the subdivision and/or development of land within

the corporate limits of the municipalities governed by this

Ordinance shall be submitted to and reviewed by the

Susquehanna County Planning Commission and other

Municipal, State and/or County Officials as provided in this

Ordinance, and shall be approved or disapproved by the

Planning Commission in accordance with the procedures

specified in this Article.

SALDO, §301 (emphasis added); R.R. 304a. The SALDO further provides that

the “[a]pplications for subdivision and/or land development plans shall be

submitted in the manner and form prescribed by the Planning Commission” and

“shall contain and be supplemented with such information as may be required by

the Planning Commission and/or the Planning Department.” SALDO, §400; R.R.

319a. The SALDO defines “subdivision” as:

The division or redivision of a lot, tract, or parcel of land by any

means into two (2) or more lots, tracts, parcels or other

divisions of land including changes in existing lot lines for the

purpose, whether immediate or future, of lease, partition by the

court for distribution to heirs or devisees, transfer of ownership

or building or lot development[.]

10

SALDO, §204 (emphasis added); R.R. 302a.7 Finally, the SALDO provides that

In addition to other remedies, the County may institute and

maintain appropriate actions by law or in equity to restrain,

correct or abate violations to prevent unlawful construction, to

recover damages and to prevent illegal occupancy of a building,

structure or premises.

SALDO, §1104.1.A; R.R. 423a (emphasis added).

Landowners’ Request for a Writ of Mandamus

The County contends that because it does not have a mandatory duty

to enforce the SALDO, Homeowners lacked a clear legal right to relief. By

contrast, the County’s Planning Commission does have a mandatory duty to rule

upon an application for a subdivision and land development plan. Accordingly, if

the County refuses to exercise its discretion when presented with such an

application, a writ of mandamus may lie to force it to rule, albeit not to direct the

exercise of its discretion in a particular way. McGill, 758 A.2d at 270. However,

the County’s decision on whether or not to undertake an enforcement action

requires the exercise of a type of discretion that cannot be compelled by a writ of

mandamus.

To begin, the SALDO states that “the County may institute and

maintain appropriate actions … to restrain, correct or abate violations” of the

SALDO. SALDO, §1104.1.A (emphasis added); R.R. 423a. It does not require

the County to seek out and initiate legal actions against wayward property owners.

7

The SALDO’s definition of “subdivision” mirrors the definition of “subdivision” found in

Section 107 of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10107.

11

Homeowners seek to compel the County to exercise its prosecutorial discretion,

which is a matter beyond judicial review regardless of the form of action.

The exercise of an agency’s prosecutorial discretion is not subject to

judicial review, any more than the discretion of a criminal prosecutor not to

prosecute a particular case can be reviewed by courts. In an early en banc

decision, this Court upheld the decision of the Medical Education and Licensure

Board and the State Board of Nurse Examiners not to pursue a private party

complaint filed against the licenses of several medical providers. We held that

when an agency considers whether or not to take an enforcement action, it

exercises prosecutorial discretion that is beyond judicial review. We explained:

In exercising such discretion, neither Board action is properly

subject to judicial review, for such action is not adjudicatory in

nature. See generally, 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise

§4.07 (1958).... [E]xecutive officers of government who are

impressed with discretionary powers of prosecution often

choose not to exercise those powers upon policy considerations

wholly apart from the possibility that sufficient cause might

exist to support a prosecutorial action. Incident, however, to

the constitutional separation of powers between the executive

and judicial branches of government, courts cannot interfere

with the executive’s free exercise of such discretionary

determinations.

In re: Frawley, 364 A.2d 748, 749 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976) (emphasis added).

The United States Supreme Court has explained the nature of the

policy considerations referenced in Frawley. The Supreme Court held in Heckler

v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985), that “agency decisions to refuse

enforcement” are unsuitable for judicial review. The reasons are several.

12

First, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a

complicated balancing of a number of factors which are

peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only

assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency

resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether

the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular

enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall

policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources

to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act

against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with

enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts to

deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of

its priorities.

***

Finally, we recognize that an agency’s refusal to institute

proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the

decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict -

a decision which has long been regarded as the special province

of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is

charged by the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be

faithfully executed.” U.S. Const., Art. II, §3.

Id. at 831-32 (emphasis added).

The SALDO does not impose a mandate upon the County to enforce

the SALDO. As treatise authority observes, it is typical for legislation to provide

in the strongest terms that a prosecutor must enforce a statute. Even so, the

legislature presumes that there is a concomitant power not to enforce. 2 KENNETH

C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §9:1, at 216-218 (2d. ed. 1979). A

fortiori, where, as here, the SALDO does not present the agency’s power to

enforce a law as a mandate,8 a writ of mandamus does not lie.

8

Likewise, we have held that homeowners may not use a writ of mandamus as a means of

compelling a county to enforce zoning provisions. Hanson v. Lower Frederick Township Board

(Footnote continued on the next page . . .)

13

The County’s exercise of discretion not to enforce the SALDO is

beyond judicial review. It is not for courts to decide whether the County should

pursue putative violations of its SALDO or matters it may consider more

compelling such as, for example, the discharge of raw sewage into a stream that

flows through a County park. The County must be able to set its priorities free

from judicial interference. In any case, Homeowners did not have a clear right to

relief because the County’s reasons for not instituting an enforcement action

against High Cadence were legally sound, as set forth below.

Subdivision for a Lease

Homeowners argue that because the County’s SALDO regulates

“divisions of land … [done] for the purpose … of lease,” High Cadence has

subdivided its property. SALDO, §204 (Specific Terms); R.R. 302a.

Homeowners argue that before leasing various portions of the property, High

Cadence was required to apply for and obtain approval of a subdivision plan.

SALDO, §301 (General); R.R. 304a.9 Homeowners rely on White v. Township of

Upper St. Clair, 799 A.2d 188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) to support this position.10

(continued . . .)

of Supervisors, 667 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). As we explained in Hanson, Section

617 of the MPC provides homeowners with a private right of action to redress zoning violations

of neighbors. 53 P.S. §10617 (“In case any … land is … used in violation of any ordinance

enacted under this act … any aggrieved owner … of real property … may institute any

appropriate action … to prevent, restrain, correct or abate such building, structure, landscaping

or land, or to prevent, in or about such premises, any act, conduct, business or use constituting a

violation.”). As the trial court observed, no mirror provision in the MPC exists for subdivision

violations. Trial Court op. of 2/6/14, at 12.

9

It states:

All plans for the subdivision and/or development of land within the corporate

limits of the municipalities governed by this Ordinance shall be submitted to and

reviewed by the Susquehanna County Planning Commission and other Municipal,

(Footnote continued on the next page . . .)

14

In White, a township entered into an agreement with a

telecommunications company to lease .428 acres of a dedicated park for the

development of a communications tower and a 20-foot wide, one quarter mile long

access road to the tower. The lease was for an initial 25 year term, with a renewal

option for three consecutive terms. Residents of the township brought suit against

the township, inter alia, for failing to require the telecommunications company to

comply with the township’s SALDO before subdividing the land for the lease. The

trial court disagreed that the lease effected a subdivision and development and

dismissed the residents’ action. On appeal, this Court reversed.

We explained that the township’s lease “conveys the use of a discrete

parcel of land from the [t]ownship to [the telecommunications company]” by

lease. White, 799 A.2d at 202 (emphasis added). The township’s SALDO defined

a “subdivision” as any action that divides a lot “for the … immediate … purpose of

lease.” Id. Because the lease identified a discrete parcel and because the SALDO

defined “subdivision” as it did, we concluded that the lease in question subdivided

the land within the meaning of the township’s SALDO.

The County distinguishes White. The lease in White conveyed a

discrete portion of the park to the telecommunications company in a written and

definitive contract for an initial period of 25 years. By contrast, the “leases” in the

(continued . . .)

State and/or County Officials as provided in this Ordinance, and shall be

approved or disapproved by the Planning Commission in accordance with the

procedures specified in this Article.

SALDO, §301.

10

In White, the issue of whether an action in mandamus was the proper vehicle for challenging

the County’s lease of a park to a telecommunications company was not raised. Notably, the

complaint in White involved numerous counts, not just mandamus.

15

matter sub judice are vague as to location and term. Because the leases are not

written, it cannot be discerned what portions of the land are to be used exclusively

by High Cadence, exclusively by the lessees or used jointly. Further, the lease in

White conveyed a parcel of .428 acres of property, i.e., a “discrete parcel of land,”

for a period of 25 to 75 years, for development of a communications tower. White,

799 A.2d at 202.

The leases at issue in this case grant others permission to “use what

they needed.” See R.R. 211a. The property in question is jointly used by High

Cadence, the lessees, and the sub-lessees. The agreements between High Cadence

and its lessees, and sub-lessees, do not convey discrete portions of land. Further,

as noted by the trial court, none of the lessees, or sub-lessees, constructed

“buildings, streets, sewers or sewer systems.” Trial Court op. of 2/26/15, at 2. In

sum, the leases effected neither a subdivision nor a development, in contrast to

White.

In short, because White concerned the conveyance of a discrete parcel

of land and a land development that accompanied the lease, it is distinguishable.

We affirm the trial court’s construction of the SALDO.

Conclusion

The trial court erred in allowing Homeowners to proceed in a

mandamus action to compel the County to initiate actions to enforce the SALDO.

In any case, High Cadence did not need to file a subdivision plan to allow others to

use its land in arrangements that do not convey a discrete portion of property.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.

______________________________

MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge

16

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bernard Sinkiewicz and :

Toni Sinkiewicz, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 375 C.D. 2015

:

Susquehanna County Board of :

Commissioners :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of December, 2015, the order of the Court

of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County filed February 25, 2015, in the above-

captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.

______________________________

MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge