Opinion

Sandra K. Miller v. Office of Personnel Management

  • 2015 MSPB 63
Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Dec 16, 2015
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.8%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

2015 MSPB 63

Docket No. DE-0845-15-0148-I-1

Sandra K. Miller,

Appellant,

v.

Office of Personnel Management,

Agency.

December 16, 2015

Christine Wolfe, Topeka, Kansas, for the appellant.

Patrick Jennings, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below,

we DENY the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and

DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction for the reasons set forth in this

Opinion and Order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant’s mother received Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS)

annuity payments from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) until her

death on December 29, 2011. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 8. OPM asserts

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that, following her death, it erroneously continued to send annuity payments

totaling $2,433.40 to the appellant’s mother at the assisted living center where

she had resided. Id. According to the appellant, after her mother’s death, she

received a check in the amount of $2,212.97 from the assisted living center on

behalf of her mother’s estate. Id. at 7. She asserts that she returned the check

with a letter indicating that she believed the check consisted partly of funds from

OPM that were not the property of her mother’s estate, but rather were properly

due to the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Id. at 7, 14. The appellant later

received a new check from the assisted living center in the amount of $1,215.82.

Id. at 7; Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 6 at 9. The appellant cashed the

check and divided the proceeds among herself and the other two heirs of her

mother’s estate, with the appellant receiving $607.91. IAF, Tab 1 at 7, 12-13.

¶3 OPM subsequently informed the appellant that she was overpaid $1,215.82 1

in CSRS annuity benefits and that it intended to collect the overpayment. Id.

at 8. The appellant requested reconsideration, and on December 9, 2014, OPM

issued a reconsideration decision affirming its initial decision and denying the

appellant’s request for a waiver of the overpayment collection. Id. at 8-11.

OPM’s reconsideration decision advised the appellant that she could either pay

the full amount of $1,215.82 in one lump sum or complete the enclosed

repayment agreement and repay that amount, plus 1% interest, in 48 monthly

installments of $25.00 and one final installment of $15.82. Id. at 10.

¶4 The appellant filed the instant appeal of OPM’s December 9, 2014

reconsideration decision. IAF, Tab 1. In response, OPM asserted that it was

rescinding its reconsideration decision because it erroneously gave the appellant

notice of Board appeal rights. IAF, Tab 10 at 4. OPM also moved to dismiss the

appeal on the basis that, even absent its rescission, the Board lacks jurisdiction

1

OPM asserts that it recovered $1,217.40, the remainder of the overpaid funds, through

the U.S. Department of the Treasury. IAF, Tab 1 at 8.

3

because OPM had not issued a decision affecting the appellant’s rights under the

CSRS, but instead was attempting to collect an improper payment constituting a

debt collectable under 5 U.S.C. title 31. Id. at 4-5. The administrative judge

issued an initial decision finding that OPM’s rescission of its reconsideration

decision divested the Board of jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision.

¶5 The appellant filed a petition for review of the initial decision in which she

asserts that the administrative judge improperly dismissed the appeal because

OPM did not rescind its decision entirely, did not return her to the status quo

ante, and is continuing to collect the overpayment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. The

appellant further asserts that she did not receive adequate jurisdictional notice or

an opportunity to respond to the agency’s jurisdictional arguments. Id. at 7.

Lastly, the appellant argues that recovery would cause her financial hardship and

asserts that the Board has jurisdiction over a request that recovery of an annuity

overpayment be waived even absent jurisdiction over the propriety of the

overpayment itself. Id. at 9. OPM opposed the appellant’s petition. PFR File,

Tab 4 at 4.

¶6 Because the administrative judge dismissed the appeal on the basis of

OPM’s rescission of its reconsideration decision and the appellant did not have an

opportunity to develop the record on the relevant jurisdictional issue, the Board

issued a show cause order permitting the appellant an opportunity to submit

evidence and argument establishing that OPM’s decision to collect the alleged

debt from her constitutes “an administrative action or order affecting the rights or

interests of an individual or of the United States” under the CSRS. PFR File,

Tab 5. In response, the appellant argues that a factual dispute over the existence

and amount of the overpayments that OPM purports to collect under the authority

of the CSRS affects the rights and interests of the parties and OPM’s

reconsideration decision constitutes an “administrative action or order” under

5 U.S.C. § 8347(d)(1). PFR File, Tab 6 at 4-5.

4

ANALYSIS

¶7 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been

given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The appellant bears the

burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 2 that the Board has

jurisdiction over her appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). Generally, the

Board has jurisdiction over OPM’s determinations affecting an appellant’s rights

or interests under the CSRS only after OPM has issued a reconsideration

decision, and OPM’s complete rescission of its reconsideration decision divests

the Board of jurisdiction over the appeal. See, e.g., Morin v. Office of Personnel

Management, 107 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 8 (2007), aff’d, 287 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir.

2008). However, the Board has held that, if OPM rescinds its reconsideration

decision after the appellant files a Board appeal and it is apparent that OPM

does not intend to issue a new decision, the Board retains jurisdiction to

adjudicate the merits. See Triplett v. Office of Personnel Management,

100 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶¶ 5-7 (2005).

¶8 Here, OPM has not asserted that it intends to issue a new reconsideration

decision, and its claim in rescinding its reconsideration decision that this is a

collection matter outside of the Board’s jurisdiction suggests that it does not

intend to do so. IAF, Tab 10 at 4-5. Therefore, we find that OPM’s rescission of

its reconsideration decision did not divest the Board of jurisdiction over this

appeal. However, we find that the Board nonetheless lacks jurisdiction over this

appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d)(1) for the reasons set forth below.

¶9 The Board’s jurisdiction concerning retirement matters involving the CSRS

is defined at 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d)(1), which provides that “an administrative action

2

Preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable

person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a

contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).

5

or order affecting the rights or interests of an individual or of the United States

under this subchapter [(i.e., the CSRS)] may be appealed to the Merit Systems

Protection Board under procedures prescribed by the Board.” We find that the

appellant has not established that OPM’s decision to collect the debt from her

constitutes “an administrative action or order affecting the rights or interests of

an individual or of the United States” under the CSRS. The appellant has not

identified, and we are otherwise unaware of, any right or interest she has to the

funds under the CSRS. The appellant was not the annuitant or a designated

survivor annuitant with obvious rights or interests under the applicable

provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 8331(9)-(11). The appellant also did not receive the

funds either directly, as a representative of her mother’s estate, or as a third party

with rights under the applicable provisions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8341, 8345(e), (j).

Although the appellant argues generally that “a factual dispute over the existence

and amount of overpayment affects the rights and interests of the parties,” she

has not identified any right she has to the funds under the CSRS. PFR File, Tab 6

at 4. Because the appellant received the funds via a check payable to her

mother’s estate, her claim to the funds appears to derive from state probate or

intestacy laws. See Rossini v. Office of Personnel Management, 101 M.S.P.R.

289, ¶ 11 (2006).

¶10 Similarly, OPM has offered no argument or evidence to establish that its

authority to collect this debt from the appellant, or to consider the appellant’s

request for a waiver, is derived from the rights or interests of the United States

under the CSRS. Thus, although the appellant may have incurred a debt to the

Federal Government as a result of her receipt of funds from her mother’s estate,

there are provisions of law other than the retirement statutes that grant the head

of an executive agency the right to try to collect such a debt. See 31 U.S.C.

§ 3711(a) (stating the head of an executive agency “shall try to collect a claim of

the United States Government for money or property arising out of the activities

of . . . the agency”); Rossini, 101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶ 13. Accordingly, we find that

6

the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal of OPM’s decision

regarding the existence and amount of the alleged debt.

¶11 On review, the appellant argues that the Board has jurisdiction to review

OPM’s denial of her request for a waiver of recovery of the overpayment, even

absent Board jurisdiction over OPM’s decision regarding the existence and

amount of the alleged debt. PFR File, Tab 6 at 6-7. Under 5 U.S.C. § 8346(b),

recovery of payments erroneously made under the CSRS shall be waived “when,

in the judgment of [OPM], the individual is without fault and recovery would be

against equity and good conscience.” The Board has jurisdiction to review

OPM’s final decisions on requests that recovery of annuity overpayments be

waived. See Dubin v. Office of Personnel Management, 38 M.S.P.R. 437, 439

(1988); 5 C.F.R. § 831.1304(a)(8), (c)(2). The basis for the Board’s jurisdiction

to review OPM’s decisions on requests for a waiver of recovery of overpayments,

like the Board’s jurisdiction concerning retirement matters in general, derives

from an appellant’s rights or interests under Federal retirement law. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 8347(d)(1); Dubin, 38 M.S.P.R. at 438-39; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(2). Thus, we

find that, absent a showing of any right or interest the appellant has to the annuity

overpayments under the CSRS, the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider her

request for a waiver of the overpayment.

¶12 Our decision is consistent with the Board’s prior analysis in Rossini,

101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶¶ 10-14, in which the Board questioned whether it had

jurisdiction to consider an appellant’s request for a waiver under similar

circumstances. In Rossini, the appellant requested a waiver of collection of an

overpayment she received as a result of annuity payments OPM erroneously made

to her deceased mother’s bank account following her mother’s death.

101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶¶ 2-3. In remanding the appeal for further development of

the jurisdictional issue, the Board stated that it was not clear that the waiver

provision in 5 U.S.C. § 8346(b) applied to the appellant, whose claim to the

overpaid funds did not appear to have derived from any right or interest she had

7

under Federal retirement statutes, but rather from state probate or intestacy laws.

Rossini, 101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶¶ 12-13. The Board also noted that, although it had

previously considered a widow’s request for a waiver of annuity overpayments

made to her deceased husband’s bank account in Martinez v. Office of Personnel

Management, 26 M.S.P.R. 315, 316 (1985), it did so without identifying any right

or interest under the CSRS that the widow may have had regarding the

overpayments. Rossini, 101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶ 12. Thus, Martinez is not

dispositive as to the jurisdictional issue presented here, and we decline to follow

its analysis.

¶13 We further find that OPM’s particular collection effort in this case does not

affect the appellant’s rights or interests under the CSRS or otherwise provide a

basis for jurisdiction. The appellant is not receiving an annuity from OPM, and

OPM is not seeking to collect the appellant’s debt through an administrative

offset to some other recurring payments to the appellant. Cf. Alexander v. Office

of Personnel Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 122, ¶¶ 7-12 (2010) (holding that the

Board had the authority to adjust an OPM-set repayment schedule to collect an

annuity overpayment through an administrative offset to the appellant’s recurring

payment of benefits from the Office of Workers’ Compensation). The appellant

asserts that her only source of income is Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

benefits, PFR File, Tab 6 at 6, but there is no indication in the record that OPM is

seeking to offset the appellant’s SSI benefits to recover the overpayment. Thus,

we find that OPM’s collection effort is not a matter affecting the appellant’s

rights or interests under the CSRS and, as such, is outside of the

Board’s jurisdiction.

¶14 As the appellant argues, the Board has considered waiver requests in

certain cases where the underlying overpayment errors were not reviewable by

the Board; but, unlike the appellant, the individuals bringing such waiver requests

were annuitants who had clear rights and interests to annuity payments under the

CSRS sufficient to bring the waiver request within the Board’s jurisdiction. PFR

8

File, Tab 1 at 9, Tab 6 at 6-7; see, e.g., McIntosh v. Office of Personnel

Management, 104 M.S.P.R. 544, ¶¶ 2, 6-7 (2007) (finding that the Board had

jurisdiction to review an annuitant’s request for a waiver of overpayment

resulting from errors in deducting life insurance benefits despite the fact that the

Board lacked jurisdiction to review OPM’s determination that it failed to

withhold from the annuity the correct amount of life insurance premiums); Miller

v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 104, ¶¶ 12-13 (2005) (same),

aff’d, 449 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Mitchell v. Office of Personnel

Management, 97 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶¶ 3, 12 (2004) (same); Lee v. Office of Personnel

Management, 32 M.S.P.R. 149, 152-54 (1987) (finding that the Board lacked

jurisdiction to determine whether the annuitant was liable for health benefits

costs that OPM had failed to deduct from his annuity payments, but reviewing the

annuitant’s entitlement to a waiver of recovery of the resulting alleged

overpayment). Accordingly, we find that the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider

this appeal.

ORDER

¶15 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) (5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113(c)).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to the

court at the following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

9

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days

after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,

2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held

that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and

that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.

Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

title 5 of the U.S. Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,

2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the U.S. Code, at our

website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm. Additional information is

available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance

is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained

within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any

attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD:

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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