Opinion

J v. Lounge, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board

  • 131 A.3d 517
  • 2015 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 589
  • 2015 WL 10000536
Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Dec 10, 2015
Status
Published
Author
Anne
On the bench
Leavit, Brobson, Covey
Cited by
4 cases
Authority
More cited than 55.5%

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

J.V. Lounge, Inc. :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Liquor :

Control Board, : No. 824 C.D. 2015

Appellant : Argued: November 17, 2015

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVIT, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: December 10, 2015

The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (Board) appeals from the

Allegheny County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) April 15, 2015 order granting

J.V. Lounge, Inc.’s (Licensee) appeal nunc pro tunc, and requiring the Board to

renew Licensee’s Restaurant Liquor License No. R-19642 (License). There are three

issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or

abused its discretion when it granted Licensee’s nunc pro tunc appeal; (2) whether

the trial court erred when it granted renewal of Licensee’s late-filed applications; and,

(3) whether the trial court erred when it ordered the License’s renewal without proof

of Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (Revenue) tax clearance. After review, we

vacate the trial court’s order and affirm the Board’s order.

Licensee holds the License for use at a premises located at 6024

Saltsburg Road, Verona, Pennsylvania. Because the License expired on May 31,

2009, it was placed in safekeeping pursuant to Section 474.1(d) of the Liquor Code,

47 P.S. § 4-474.1(d).1 On March 26, 2013, Licensee untimely filed the following

documents with the Board’s Bureau of Licensing (Licensing): A renewal application

for the licensing period effective June 1, 2009; a validation application for the

licensing period effective June 1, 2010; a renewal application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2011; and, a validation application for the licensing period effective

June 1, 2012. On that same date, Licensee filed an application to extend the

safekeeping period.

By October 2, 2013 letter (Objection Letter), Licensing notified Licensee

that it objected to the applications based on the following:

1. The applicant has failed to verify and [Revenue] has not

informed the Board that all State tax reports have been filed

and all [S]tate taxes have been paid, timely appealed or

approved for deferred payment as required by Section 477

of the Liquor Code[2] . . . for the licensing periods effective

June 1, 2009, June 1, 2010, June 1, 2011, and June 1, 2012.

2. The renewal application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2009 was filed on March 26, 2013,

whereas it should have been filed on or before April 2,

2009.

3. The validation application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2010 was filed on March 26, 2013,

whereas it should have been filed on or before April 2,

2010.

4. The renewal application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2011 was filed on March 26, 2013,

whereas it should have been filed on or before April 4,

2011.

5. The validation application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2012 was filed on March 26, 2013,

1

Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, as amended, added by Section 21 of the Act of December

9, 2002, P.L. 1653. Section 474.1(d) of the Liquor Code provides: “Any period of time in which

the licensee allows the license to lapse by not filing a timely license renewal or license validation

shall be considered time in which the license was held in safekeeping for purposes of this section.”

2

Added by Section 77 of the Act of June 29, 1987, P.L. 32, 47 P.S. § 4-477.

2

whereas it should have been filed on or before April 2,

2012.

6. You have failed to submit the renewal application for the

licensing period effective June 1, 2013, whereas it should

have been filed on or before April 2, 2013.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 27a-28a. The Objection Letter further stated:

The [Board] HAS NO AUTHORITY to remedy any dispute

over a failure to issue a tax clearance by either [Revenue],

or the Department of Labor and Industry, or both. This is a

matter strictly between you, the licensee, and the taxing

authority. Do not assume that payment of all taxes

constitutes clearance. Renewal of your license by the

[Board] requires notification from the taxing agency(s) to

the [Board].

Id. at 29a. In addition, the Objection Letter explained the limitations and

requirements pertaining to safekeeping, and informed Licensee that a hearing would

be held. Enclosed with the Objection Letter were copies of Section 464 of the Liquor

Code3 and Section 3.41 of the Board’s Regulations.4

By January 27, 2014 letter, Licensing notified Licensee that the hearing

would be held on February 20, 2014 to address the following:

1. The Board shall take evidence to determine whether it

may accept the renewal and validation applications nunc

pro tunc under the standard set forth in Cook v.

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, . . . 671

A.2d 1130 ([Pa.] 1996).

2. The Board shall take evidence to determine whether it

may accept the safekeeping applications nunc pro tunc

under the standard set forth in Cook v. Unemployment

Compensation Board of Review, . . . 671 A.2d 1130 ([Pa.]

1996).

3. The applicant has failed to verify and [Revenue] has not

informed the Board that all State tax reports have been filed

3

47 P.S. § 4-464 (governing Board license hearings and appeals).

4

40 Pa. Code § 3.41 (relating to application hearings).

3

and all State taxes have been paid, timely appealed or

approved for deferred payment as required by Section 477

of the Liquor Code . . . for the licensing periods effective

June 1, 2009, June 1, 2010, June 1, 2011 and June 1, 2012.

4. The renewal application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2009 was filed on March 26, 2013,

whereas it should have been filed on or before April 2,

2009.

5. The validation application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2010 was filed on March 26, 2013,

whereas it should have been filed on or before April 2,

2010.

6. The renewal application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2011 was filed on March 26, 2013,

whereas it should have been filed on or before April 4,

2011.

7. The validation application for the licensing period

effective June 1, 2012 was filed on March 26, 2013,

whereas it should have been filed on or before April 2,

2012.

8. The applicant has failed to submit the renewal

application for the licensing period effective June 1, 2013,

as required by Section 3.2 of Title 40, Pennsylvania Code.

R.R. at 25a (italics added).

On February 20, 2014, a Board hearing examiner held a hearing on

Licensing’s objections. By April 15, 2014 order, the Board refused Licensee’s

untimely-filed renewal and validation applications.5 On August 21, 2014, more than

3 months after expiration of the appeal period,6 Licensee filed an appeal nunc pro

tunc with the trial court. The trial court held a hearing at which it accepted the

5

Section 470(a) of the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 4-470(a), provides for a grace period, which

permits the Board, in its discretion, to accept a late-filed application filed within two years after the

expiration date of the license with the payment of the required fees and a late fee.

6

Section 464 of the Liquor Code permits a licensee to file an appeal with the court of

common pleas within 20 days from a Board decision refusing to renew a license. Thus, Licensee’s

appeal period ended on May 5, 2014.

4

Board’s record from below. No new evidence was presented, but the parties were

permitted to submit post-hearing briefs. On April 15, 2015, the trial court issued its

memorandum order reversing the Board’s decision, stating:

After an analysis of the record and testimony, I find that

[Licensee’s] untimely appeal was not due to negligent

circumstances. Furthermore, I find that they [sic] became

aware of the issue with their [sic] [] License when they [sic]

attempted to sell it in 2013. Since then, they [sic] have filed

all of the renewal and validation applications and late fees

with the Board. I find that [Licensee’s] renewal

applications were filed within a reasonable period of time

after they [sic] discovered the error. Finally, I find that the

Board did not provide an argument why it would suffer

prejudice if nunc pro tunc relief is granted in this case. In

addition[,] [Licensee] is not trying to re-open, and equity

and fairness dictate that he [sic] be permitted to recapture

some of his [sic] investment.

R.R. at 165a. The Board appealed to this Court.7

The Board first argues that the trial court erred when it granted

Licensee’s nunc pro tunc appeal under circumstances in which Licensee filed its

appeal more than 3 months after the appeal period expired, and provided no

explanation for its untimely filing. We agree.

This Court recently addressed very similar factual circumstances in

Arena Beverage Corp. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 97 A.3d 444 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2014). In Arena, as in the instant matter, the Board refused the licensee’s

late-filed renewal and validation applications and, after the licensee filed an untimely

appeal from the Board’s decision, the trial court reversed the Board. In reversing the

trial court’s decision, this Court explained:

7

“Where the trial court permits an untimely appeal to be filed nunc pro tunc, our review is

limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”

Puckett v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 804 A.2d 140, 143 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2002).

5

‘Where the legislature has fixed a time period within which

an appeal may be filed, that period is mandatory and may

not be extended as a matter of grace or indulgence.’

Olson v. Borough of Homestead, . . . 443 A.2d 875, 878

([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1982) (emphasis added); see also

Hillanbrand v. [Pa.] Bd. of Prob. & Parole, . . . 508 A.2d

375 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1986); Coshey v. Beal, . . . 366 A.2d

1295, 1297 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1976) (‘[T]he timeliness of an

appeal goes to the jurisdiction of the body appealed to and

its competency to act’).

‘[A]n appeal nunc pro tunc is a recognized exception to the

general rule prohibiting the extension of an appeal deadline.

. . . [It] is intended as a remedy to vindicate the right to

an appeal where that right has been lost due to certain

extraordinary circumstances.’ Union Elec. Corp. v. Bd.

of Prop. Assessment, . . . 746 A.2d 581, 584 ([Pa.] 2000)

(quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). ‘‘[A]n appeal

nunc pro tunc may be granted . . . in order to prevent

injustice’ in unique cases, ‘upon a showing that unusual

circumstances prevented a party from timely filing.’’ In

re Borough of Riegelsville from Bucks Cnty. Bd. of

Assessment & Revision of Taxes, 979 A.2d 399, 402-03

(Pa.[]Cmwlth.[]2009) (emphasis added) (quoting

Hanoverian, Inc. v. Lehigh Cnty. Bd. of Assessment, 701

A.2d 288, 289 (Pa.[]Cmwlth.[] 1997)). This Court has

explained:

[N]unc pro tunc relief may only be granted in

limited circumstances. ‘When a statute fixes

the time within which an appeal may be

taken, a court may not extend that time

period or allow an appeal nunc pro tunc

absent a showing that extraordinary

circumstances involving fraud or its

equivalent, duress, or coercion caused the

delay in filing an appeal.’

Id. at 402 (bolded emphasis added).

In determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist, a

court must consider whether there was fraud or a

breakdown in the court’s operations or whether the party

seeking relief has proven that:

6

(1) the appellant’s notice of appeal was filed

late as a result of non-negligent circumstances,

either as they relate to the appellant or the

appellant’s counsel; (2) the appellant filed the

notice of appeal shortly after the expiration

date; and (3) the appellee was not prejudiced

by the delay.

Criss v. Wise, . . . 781 A.2d 1156, 1159 ([Pa.] 2001); see

also Baum v. Dep’t of Transp., 949 A.2d 345

(Pa.[]Cmwlth.[]2008).

Thus, in the instant matter, the trial court was required to

first address whether ‘extraordinary circumstances

involving fraud or its equivalent, duress, or coercion caused

the delay in filing an appeal.’ Borough of Riegelsville, 979

A.2d at 402 (quoting Hanoverian, Inc., 701 A.2d at 289).

Only if the trial court concluded that such extraordinary

circumstances existed, did it have jurisdiction to decide the

substantive issues of whether the Board properly refused

Licensee’s renewal application.

Arena, 97 A.3d at 448-49. The burden is on the filing party to demonstrate that it

meets the requirements for nunc pro tunc relief. Lopresti v. Unemployment Comp.

Bd. of Review, 55 A.3d 561 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

Importantly, here, as in Arena, there were two separate nunc pro tunc

issues before the trial court The first pertained to whether the circumstances

surrounding Licensee’s untimely appeal from the Board’s decision to the trial court

warranted nunc pro tunc relief. Only if the trial court concluded that circumstances

“involving fraud or its equivalent, duress, or coercion caused the delay in filing an

appeal[,]” did the trial court have jurisdiction to consider the second nunc pro tunc

issue – whether the Board should have accepted the untimely renewal and

validation applications. Id. at 449. Because Licensee offered the trial court no

evidence to justify the late-filing of its appeal, it failed to meet its burden. Moreover,

the trial court did not analyze whether “extraordinary circumstances involving fraud

or its equivalent, duress, or coercion caused the [3 month] delay in filing an

7

appeal[,]” but rather found, based on absolutely no record evidence, that the

“untimely appeal was not due to negligent circumstances.” Id., R.R. at 165a

(emphasis added). Given the absence of any record evidence to support the trial

court’s conclusion, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and erred as

a matter of law. As a result, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide the

substantive issue of whether the Board properly refused Licensee’s late-filed

applications.

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is vacated, and the

Board’s April 15, 2014 order is affirmed.8

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

8

Even if Licensee had offered evidence sufficient to justify nunc pro tunc relief, the trial

court was prohibited from directing the Board to renew the License without evidence that Licensee

had statutorily-mandated tax clearances. See 47 P.S. § 4-477.

8

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

J.V. Lounge, Inc. :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Liquor :

Control Board, : No. 824 C.D. 2015

Appellant :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 10th day of December, 2015, the Allegheny County

Common Pleas Court’s April 15, 2015 order is vacated, and the Pennsylvania Liquor

Control Board’s April 15, 2014 order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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