Disciplinary Counsel v. Broyles

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Disciplinary Counsel v. Broyles, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-4442.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-4442

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BROYLES.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Broyles, Slip Opinion No.

2015-Ohio-4442.]

Attorneys―Misconduct―Representing new client in same matter as former client

when new client’s interests are adverse to former client’s―Public

reprimand.

(No. 2015-0598—Submitted May 6, 2015—Decided October 29, 2015.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2014-106.

_______________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Bruce Martin Broyles of Boardman, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0042562, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989. On

December 15, 2014, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Broyles with

professional misconduct. Broyles had represented The Bank of New York Mellon

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

(“NY Mellon”) at a default hearing in a foreclosure case and obtained a judgment

against Felix and Barbara Aponte. Approximately nine months later, Broyles was

retained by the Apontes to defend them in the foreclosure action filed by NY

Mellon. Broyles subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment and other

pleadings in the case, arguing that the default judgment he had previously obtained

against the Apontes should be vacated. NY Mellon did not give informed consent

to allow Broyles to represent the Apontes.

{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Professional Conduct1 considered the cause

on the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. See Gov.Bar R. V(16).

{¶ 3} In the consent-to-discipline agreement, Broyles stipulates to the facts

alleged in relator’s complaint and agrees that his conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.9

(prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter from

representing another person in the same matter in which that person’s interests are

materially adverse to the interests of the former client).

{¶ 4} The parties stipulate that the mitigating factors include the absence of

a prior disciplinary record, Broyles’s cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary

proceedings, his full and free disclosure of his actions, and his acknowledgement

that his actions were improper. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (4). The parties

agree that there are no aggravating factors. Based upon Broyles’s stipulated

misconduct and these factors, the parties stipulate that the appropriate sanction for

Broyles’s misconduct is a public reprimand.

{¶ 5} The panel and board found that the consent-to-discipline agreement

conforms to Gov.Bar R. V(16) and recommend that we adopt the agreement in its

entirety. In support of this recommendation, the parties referred to Geauga Cty.

Bar Assn. v. Psenicka, 62 Ohio St.3d 35, 577 N.E.2d 1074 (1991) (a public

reprimand was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who represented the

1

Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been

renamed the Board of Professional Conduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII.

2

January Term, 2015

husband in a divorce action after withdrawing from representing the wife in the

same proceeding). In addition, the panel considered Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v.

Leiken, 143 Ohio St.3d 21, 2014-Ohio-5220, 34 N.E.3d 73 (a public reprimand was

the appropriate sanction for an attorney who represented a passenger in a

negligence action against a driver who the attorney previously represented

regarding the same automobile accident).

{¶ 6} We agree that Broyles violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.9 and, as stated in the

parties’ agreement and as indicated by the cited precedent, that this conduct

warrants a public reprimand. Therefore, we adopt the parties’ consent-to-discipline

agreement.

{¶ 7} Accordingly, Bruce Martin Broyles is hereby publicly reprimanded.

Costs are taxed to Broyles.

Judgment accordingly.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,

FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.

_________________

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Audrey E. Varwig, Assistant

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Bruce Martin Broyles, pro se.

_________________

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