Healy v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-1241

JOSEPH HEALY, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

METROPOLITAN PIER and EXPOSITION

AUTHORITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 C 8892 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2015 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2015

Before BAUER, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants, Joseph Healy,

Tom O’Driscoll, Alan Porter, James Howland, Karl Diede, Jim

Timothy, and John Ryan (collectively “Plaintiffs”), are electrical

workers. They claim that their respective employers, Freeman

Electrical, Inc. (“Freeman”) and Global Experience Specialists,

Inc. (“GES”) wrongfully terminated them, in violation of the

relevant collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) and

2 No. 15-1241

applicable federal labor law. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that

collusion between Freeman, GES, and defendant-appellee

Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority (“MPEA”) spurred

Plaintiffs’ terminations. Plaintiffs also claim that their union,

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union

No. 134 (the “Union”), failed to adequately represent them

in Plaintiffs’ CBA-mandated grievance process. Plaintiffs, on

behalf of themselves and a putative class of similarly-situated

electrical workers, brought a six-count lawsuit against Free-

man, GES, MPEA, and the Union (collectively “Defendants”),

seeking damages and declaratory judgments.

All Defendants moved to dismiss the counts particular to

them. The district court denied the motions to dismiss four of

the counts, but dismissed a declaratory judgment motion

against MPEA, Freeman, and GES, and the claim of state law

tortious interference with contracts against MPEA. In granting

MPEA’s motion to dismiss the tortious interference claim, the

district court held that Section 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“§ 301”) preempts

Plaintiffs’ state law tort claim. Plaintiffs have appealed only the

dismissal of the tortious interference claim against MPEA. For

the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court’s ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that defendants illegally circumvented the

hiring process detailed in the CBA. At the motion to dismiss

stage, we accept the allegations within Plaintiffs’ complaint as

true and draw all permissible inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor.

E.g., Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d

696, 700 (7th Cir. 2014).

No. 15-1241 3

A. The CBA Referral Process

The Union has a longstanding CBA with the Electrical

Contractors’ Association of Chicago. Freeman and GES are

members of the Electrical Contractors’ Association of Chicago;

MPEA is also a party to the CBA. Article IV of the CBA—

entitled “Referral Procedure”—describes a regimented process

for hiring Union electrical workers. Specifically, Article IV

states that the Union “shall be the sole and exclusive source of

referral of applicants for employment.” To do this, the Union

maintains a “pool” of workers from which a given employer

will be sent workers for a particular job. Within the overall

pool, the Union stratifies workers into four priority groups

based on their experience, certifications, and skills. The Union

then selects workers within each priority group based on when

the workers registered for employment. An employer may

only deviate from this “pool hiring” process in two situations:

to meet age quotas that the CBA mandates or when the

employer “states bona fide requirements for special skills and

abilities in his request for applicants.” If an employer lays off

workers, it must do so in reverse order of that established by

the priority group; that is, the employer must terminate

workers who are lower on the priority list first.

B. The McCormick Place Call List

Normally, the Union uses two separate “call lists” for

referring workers to potential employers, the “short call” and

the “long call.” The short call is for jobs demanding less than

ten days’ labor, while the long call is for jobs requiring at least

ten days’ labor. However, in referring workers to the

McCormick Place convention center, the Union uses a third call

4 No. 15-1241

list—the “McCormick Call.” All workers sent to McCormick

Place begin as short-term workers; that is, for less than ten

days’ work. MPEA, which operates McCormick Place, may

later convert any selected workers from short-term to long-

term work. MPEA has not defined the process for converting

workers or established standards for how workers qualify for

conversion. Instead, Plaintiffs claim that conversion occurs

“informally and without transparency.”

C. The 2010 Amendment to the Metropolitan Pier and

Exposition Authority Act

In 2009, McCormick Place began losing conventions and

exhibitions to competitor convention centers. To help

McCormick Place remain competitive, the Illinois legislature

amended the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority Act

in 2010 (the “Amendment”). Central to the legislative action

was the finding that, among other costs, the “mark-up” on

union labor work had “substantially increased exhibitor and

show organizer costs,” and had made McCormick Place a less

attractive venue than other convention centers. 70 ILCS

201/5.4(a)(13). To address this problem, the Amendment

forbade MPEA from serving “as the exclusive provider of

electrical services,” and demanded that MPEA “make every

effort to substantially reduce exhibitor’s costs.” 70 ILCS

210/5.4(f). The Amendment allowed MPEA two choices: to

retain an outside electrical contractor or offer its own electrical

services at cost.

In 2011, to comport with the Amendment’s demands,

MPEA contracted with Freeman and GES to provide electrical

services at McCormick Place. Freeman and GES then hired

No. 15-1241 5

workers for McCormick Place electrical work from the Union’s

McCormick Call list, pursuant to the CBA. Plaintiffs were

among those workers hired.

D. The Side Agreements and Termination of Plaintiffs

On June 29, 2011, the Union entered into “Interpretive

Side Letter” agreements with Freeman and GES. These

agreements—made without Plaintiffs’ knowledge—allowed

Freeman and GES to hire electrical workers outside of the

established CBA referral process. To continue working at

McCormick Place, Freeman and GES had to hire electrical labor

provided by MPEA itself, instead of from the established

McCormick Call list. After making the “Interpretive Side

Letter” agreements with the Union, Freeman and GES entered

into agreements with MPEA called the “McCormick Place

Utility Services Agreements” (“MPUSAs”) on June 30, 2011.

These MPUSAs established their own referral process, separate

from the referral process detailed in the CBA.

On August 15, 2011, Freeman and GES terminated Plaintiffs

and all other Union employees. Since that time, Freeman and

GES have used only in-house McCormick Place electricians

that MPEA provides for electrical work at the site. Plaintiffs

claim that their termination and Freeman’s and GES’ respective

use of in-house electricians contravenes both the CBA hiring

process and the demands of the Amendment. Plaintiffs further

claim to have “filed numerous grievances” with the Union

against their respective employers, but such grievances were

“to no avail.” Further, after filing their grievances, Plaintiffs

received copies of the “Interpretive Side Letter” agreements on

October 4, 2011. This was the first time that the Plaintiffs

6 No. 15-1241

became aware of the side agreements between the Union,

Freeman, and GES.

E. Procedural History

On November 30, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an internal charge

against their local Union officers with the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers’ regional Vice President.

Two weeks later, on December 14, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the

present lawsuit. The first complaint alleged four counts against

the Union, Freeman, and MPEA. Count I, against the Union,

alleged breach of duty of fair representation implicit in the

Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.

§§ 158(b) and 159(a). Count II, also against the Union, alleged

breach of duty of fair representation implicit in § 301. Count III,

against Freeman and MPEA, alleged violations of a collective

bargaining agreement under § 301. Count IV, against the

Union, alleged failure to permit inspection in violation of 29

U.S.C. §§ 414 and 431.

Plaintiffs later amended their complaint, adding GES as a

defendant and adding two requests for declaratory judgment.

Notably, Plaintiffs also converted their count against MPEA

from a § 301 violation of the CBA to a state law tortious

interference claim. The amended complaint alleges six causes

of actions. Counts I and II, against the Union, still allege breach

of duty of fair representation. Count III, against Freeman and

GES, alleges violation of a collective bargaining agreement

under § 301. Count IV, against MPEA, alleges a state common

law claim for intentional interference with contracts. Count V

is a request for declaratory judgment: that the district court

declare the MPUSAs between MPEA, Freeman, and GES illegal

No. 15-1241 7

and unenforceable. Count VI is also a request for declaratory

judgment, specifically that the district court declare the

“Interpretive Side Letter” agreements between the Union,

Freeman, and GES illegal and unenforceable.

All Defendants moved to dismiss the respective counts

against them. On April 14, 2015, the district court denied

dismissal of Counts I, II, III, and VI. However, the district court

dismissed Count V for lack of standing. It also dismissed

Count IV, the state law tortious interference claim against

MPEA, as preempted by § 301. It noted the long-standing

precedent that § 301 preempts any state law claim whose

resolution requires interpretation of the relevant collective

bargaining agreement. E.g., Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471

U.S. 202, 220 (1985); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486

U.S. 399, 413 (1988). It reasoned that analysis of Plaintiffs’ state

law tortious interference with contracts claim would require

interpretation of the CBA. Accordingly, the district court

concluded that § 301 preempts the tortious interference claim.

Plaintiffs then appealed only the dismissal of the tortious

interference claim against MPEA.

II. DISCUSSION

MPEA is a political subdivision that is immune from § 301

claims. Here, § 301 preempts the state law tortious interference

claim and converts it into a § 301 claim. As a result, MPEA’s

immunity to § 301 claims extinguishes Plaintiffs’ claim against

it.

8 No. 15-1241

A. Standard of Review

The district court did not specify whether its dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim was a Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or a

12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim. However, we

deem a dismissal of preempted state law claims a 12(b)(6)

dismissal for failure to state a claim, a dismissal on the merits.

See Turek v. Gen’l Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 2011)

(holding that a court should dismiss claim without any basis in

federal law on the merits and that certain preempted claims

have no basis in federal law). Thus, the district court’s dis-

missal was a 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim. We

review such a dismissal de novo. Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer,

796 F.3d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015).

B. MPEA’s Immunity From § 301 Claims

Pivotally, the district court noted that because MPEA is a

political subdivision, it is immune from federal claims arising

under § 301. Section 301(a) grants federal courts jurisdiction

over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization representing employees in an indus-

try affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). That is, the

provision grants federal courts jurisdiction over controversies

surrounding labor organizations and, by extension, the

violation of collective bargaining agreements. Textile Workers

Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450–51

(1957). However, the LMRA definition of “employer” expressly

excludes “any State or political subdivision thereof.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 152(2). So, even though a state or political subdivision may

sign and be a party to a collective bargaining agreement, it

No. 15-1241 9

remains immune from federal lawsuits arising under the

collective bargaining agreement and relevant federal law.

Here, MPEA is a political subdivision. 70 ILCS 210/3

(“There is hereby created a political subdivision, unit of local

government with only those powers authorized by law, body

politic and municipal corporation by the name and style of

Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority in the metropoli-

tan area.”) (emphasis added). As a political subdivision, MPEA

is not an “employer” under LMRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Because

the MPEA is not an employer, it cannot be sued under § 301.

See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

C. Section 301 Preemption of State Law Tortious Inter-

ference Claim

Section 301 preempts not only claims “founded directly” on

the collective bargaining agreement, but also state law claims

that indirectly implicate a collective bargaining agreement.

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). Specifically,

§ 301 preempts state tort laws that “do not exist independently

of private agreements” and that “purport[] to define the

meaning of the contract relationship.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213.

Thus, § 301 preempts a state law tort claim if resolution of the

claim “requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining

agreement.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413. A state law claim “requires

the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement” when

an element of the claim “requires a court to interpret any term

10 No. 15-1241

of a collective-bargaining agreement.” See Lingle, 486 U.S. at

407.

Under Illinois law,1 interpretation of the relevant contract

is necessary to resolve the tortious interference claim. To state

a claim under Illinois law for tortious interference with

contracts, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract

between the plaintiff and another; (2) the defen-

dant’s awareness of this contractual relation; (3) the

defendant’s intentional and unjustified inducement

of a breach of the contract; (4) a subsequent breach

by the other, caused by the defendant’s wrongful

conduct; and (5) damages.

HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill. 2d

145, 154–55, 545 N.E.2d 672, 676 (1989) (quotations and

citations omitted). Thus, to adjudicate a tortious interference

1

The tortious interference claim arises under Illinois law. The district court

has 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction over the tortious

interference claim because the state law claim shares a common nucleus of

operative facts with the federal claims. E.g., Bailey v. City of Chicago, 779 F.3d

689, 696 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, all six counts in the lawsuit are causes of

action designed to address the alleged collusion between Defendants, which

ultimately led to Plaintiffs’ termination. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that

Defendants entered into various side agreements with each other and then

terminated Plaintiffs, thereby circumventing the CBA. Because Illinois is the

forum state, and because no party has raised a choice of law issue, Illinois

law governs. See McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 684 (7th

Cir. 2014) (holding when neither party raises a choice of law issue, federal

courts hearing state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction “may

simply apply the forum state’s substantive law”).

No. 15-1241 11

claim, a court must determine if a breach of the relevant

contract has actually occurred. See Voelker v. Porsche Cars North

America, Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2003). Under Illinois

law, this determination is one of fact, in which the factfinder

must interpret the relevant contract terms and analyze the

actions of the party accused of breaching vis-à-vis these

contract terms. See Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill.

2d 52, 72, 886 N.E.2d 85, 96 (2006). Therefore, to adjudicate a

tortious interference claim under Illinois law, a court must

interpret the relevant contract. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407.

Specifically, to determine if MPEA tortiously interfered

with the CBA, a factfinder would have to determine whether

Freeman and GES did in fact breach the terms of the CBA by

terminating Plaintiffs. See HPI Health Care, 131 Ill. 2d at 154–55,

545 N.E.2d at 676. The district court would have to review the

referral process outlined in Article IV of the CBA, and analyze

whether Freeman and GES contravened this referral process by

signing their respective side agreements with both the Union

and MPEA and by then terminating Plaintiffs.

Because Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim requires

interpretation of the CBA, § 301 preempts the claim and

converts it into a § 301 claim. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 309–14 (2010) (denying employer’s

tortious interference claim against third-party union); Kimbro

v. Pepsico, Inc., 215 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that

§ 301 “is not a tort statute” and holding that determining

plaintiff’s tortious interference claim would require interpreta-

tion of relevant collective bargaining agreement, thus preempt-

ing the claim). MPEA’s immunity guillotines Plaintiffs’ claim

against it. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2) and 185(a) (excluding

12 No. 15-1241

“political subdivision” from the “employer” definition under

§ 301); 70 ILCS 210/3 (establishing MPEA as a “political

subdivision”).

D. Plaintiffs’ Arguments

Plaintiffs argue that the preemptive principle undergirding

§ 301 jurisprudence does not apply in this case. Their argument

has three facets. First, they argue that our decisions in Brazinski

v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1993), and

Kimbro v. Pepsico, Inc., 215 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2000), carve a

jurisdictional pathway around the general preemption of state

law claims under § 301. Plaintiffs argue that they have properly

followed this path, and that the district court can therefore hear

their claim. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the district court, in

resolving Plaintiffs’ claim against the Union, Freeman, and

GES, was already interpreting the CBA, and that this interpre-

tation effectively negates any § 301 preemption. Finally,

Plaintiffs argue that preventing them from pursuing

the tortious interference claim will leave them without a

remedy against a wrongdoing third party, MPEA. However,

no exception to the Lueck-Lingle bright-line rule, detailed

above, applies in this case, and Plaintiffs cannot state a claim

against MPEA under state or federal contract or tort law.

1. Brazinski and Kimbro Are Not Applicable

Plaintiffs argue that this case presents an exception to

§ 301’s general preemption of state law claims requiring

interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Specifi-

cally, Plaintiffs cite this court’s suggestions around preemption

discussed in Brazinski and Kimbro.

No. 15-1241 13

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Brazinski and Kimbro is misplaced. In

Brazinski and Kimbro, this court held that because resolution of

the respective tort claims required interpretation of the

collective bargaining agreements at issue, § 301 preempted the

plaintiffs’ respective state law tort claims. See Brazinski, 6 F.3d

at 1179 (holding that § 301 preempted plaintiffs-employees’

invasion of privacy tort claim, because defendant-employers

had “a nonfrivolous argument that the surveillance of which

the plaintiffs complain is authorized, albeit implicitly, by the

management-rights clause of the agreement, so that the

plaintiffs’ claim that the surveillance invaded their privacy

cannot be resolved without an interpretation of the agree-

ment”); Kimbro, 215 F.3d at 727 (holding that § 301 preempted

plaintiff-employee’s tortious interference claim because

resolution of claim would require determining whether

plaintiff eating food inventory was a proper basis for termina-

tion under collective bargaining agreement).

Despite the preemption of the state law tort claims, we held

that the plaintiffs in Brazinski and Kimbro could still have

brought a § 301 claim in the district court if they had followed

a particular procedure. First, the plaintiff-employee must

grieve the dispute using the grievance process outlined in the

relevant collective bargaining agreement. Brazinski, 6 F.3d at

1179. Second, if the grievance process “does not produce a

satisfactory result” for the employee, he can then submit the

dispute to arbitration. Id. In both proceedings, the union would

be the employee’s representative. Id. Finally, if unsatisfied with

the arbitrator’s decision, the employee could then bring the

claim in federal court. Id.; see also Kimbro, 215 F.3d at 727

(referencing the Brazinski suggestion by noting that this court

14 No. 15-1241

“ha[s] suggested that a possible way to preserve [§ 301] causes

of action” would be to refer such issues to arbitration).

However, in both Brazinski and Kimbro, neither plaintiff

went through this grievance-arbitration-district court process,

and thus waived any such argument. Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1179

(noting that plaintiffs’ failure to file grievance by deadline

outlined in collective bargaining agreement precluded their

claim in federal court); Kimbro, 215 F.3d at 727 (holding that

“the plaintiff has not picked up on this suggestion in our

Brazinski decision” by not filing grievance, and thus waived

argument). Because the plaintiffs in Brazinski and Kimbro failed

to follow the suggested procedure, the respective district

courts properly dismissed their claims. Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1179;

Kimbro, 215 F.3d at 727.

By contrast, Plaintiffs in this case argue that they have

properly followed the Brazinski-Kimbro path to the district

court. Plaintiffs filed “numerous” grievances, yet the Union

never submitted the grievances to arbitration. Under the CBA,

Plaintiffs could not pursue arbitration on their own; only the

Union could do so on their behalf. But Plaintiffs argue that they

overcame the inability to arbitrate by filing a “hybrid” § 301

suit against their respective employers and the Union. See Vaca

v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967) (allowing employee union

members to file simultaneous lawsuits against their employer

for breach of a collective bargaining agreement and their union

for breach of duty of fair representation); United Parcel Serv.,

Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66 (1981) (explicitly referring to this

type of suit as a “hybrid” suit). Plaintiffs therefore argue that

by filing the grievances and the subsequent hybrid suit, they

have comported with the procedural requirements of Brazinski

No. 15-1241 15

and Kimbro, and can sue MPEA for state law tortious interfer-

ence in federal court.

Plaintiffs misinterpret the implications of Brazinski and

Kimbro and ignore MPEA’s immunity from § 301 suits. Plain-

tiffs misrepresent the claims allowed by Brazinski and Kimbro

as state law tort claims. In those cases, while the plaintiffs

originally brought state law tort claims, those claims required

interpretation of the relevant collective bargaining agreement.

Therefore, the tort claims were preempted and transformed

into § 301 contract claims. Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1179; Kimbro, 215

F.3d at 727. See also Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407; Lueck, 471 U.S. at

213; Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394. Repeatedly and expressly, this

court in Brazinski and Kimbro held that § 301 does not create

tort rights. See Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1180 (holding that the

interpretive law stemming from § 301 “is a common law of

contracts, not a source of independent rights, let alone tort

rights”); Kimbro, 215 F.3d at 726–27 (disagreeing with federal

courts that have held that § 301 creates a tort right and noting

that “section 301 creates a right only for breach of a collective

bargaining agreement; it is not a tort statute”) (emphasis

added). As a result, the plaintiffs in Brazinski and Kimbro could

not have brought a state law tort claim; they could only have

brought a § 301 claim for breach of collective bargaining

agreement. However, because they did not follow the

grievance-arbitration-district court procedure, the plaintiffs

waived their opportunity to bring these claims.

Here, even assuming that Plaintiffs properly followed this

Brazinski-Kimbro procedure, they would only be able to bring

a § 301 claim against the proper parties. But MPEA is not a

proper party; it is immune from § 301 claims. Thus, even

16 No. 15-1241

though MPEA is a party to the CBA and, even if we assume

that Plaintiffs followed appropriate procedural steps to bring

their suit against MPEA into district court, § 301 preemption

and MPEA’s immunity still extinguish the claim.

2. Interpreting the CBA Does Not Create Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs also argue that by interpreting the CBA to

determine the merits of Plaintiffs’ case against Freeman, GES,

and the Union, the district court has opened the door to

interpreting the CBA to determine the merits of Plaintiffs’ case

against MPEA. But this argument does not give rise to a

cognizable cause of action that a federal district court could

resolve. Since § 301 preemption and MPEA’s immunity have

extinguished Plaintiffs’ state law claim, the district court

cannot resurrect it.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. E.g., Ne.

Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc.,

707 F.3d 883, 890 (7th Cir. 2013). We cannot create jurisdiction

where we have none. See Evergreen Square of Cudahy v. Wisc.

Hous. and Econ. Dev. Auth., 776 F.3d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 2015)

(noting that “federal courts possess only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute” and that considerations of judicial

economy do not alone create jurisdiction) (citations omitted).

Regarding immunity specifically, where a state or political

subdivision has been granted immunity, “absent waiver or

valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private

person’s suit against a State.” Virginia Off. for Protection and

Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1637 (2011).

Here, Plaintiffs are private citizens who have brought a

claim against an immune political subdivision. MPEA has not

No. 15-1241 17

waived its immunity to § 301 suits, nor has any other authority

abrogated this immunity. See Stewart, 131 S. Ct. at 1638.

Further, the district court’s interpretation of the CBA is no

abrogation of this immunity, particularly when the precedent

on federal court jurisdiction over § 301 suits is patently clear.

See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450–51. Federal

district courts may interpret labor contracts. Lueck, 471 U.S. at

220; Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411. Indeed, this is the very mandate of

§ 301 and its related case law. Local 175, Teamsters, Chauffeurs,

Warehousemen, and Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95,

103–04 (1962). But no court or statute has allowed federal

courts to hear § 301 suits against immune entities. Accordingly,

the district court cannot hear Plaintiffs’ claim.

3. The “Remedial Gap”

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that § 301’s general preemption

rules and MPEA’s immunity from § 301 claims leave them

without a remedy against a third-party like MPEA. We can

only acknowledge that this “remedial gap” exists, and hold

that we cannot create a remedy where precedent forbids us

from doing so. See Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1179–80 (identifying the

“remedial gap” that § 301 preemption creates).

Supreme Court precedent and § 301 jurisprudence sever all

remedial avenues available to Plaintiffs. First, Plaintiffs cannot

pursue a federal § 301 claim against MPEA because MPEA is

immune from § 301 suits. Second, Plaintiffs cannot pursue a

state law breach of collective bargaining agreement claim

against MPEA, because federal law preempts such state law

causes of action. See Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103–04.

18 No. 15-1241

Finally, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Granite Rock prevents

Plaintiffs from pursuing any federal tort claim against MPEA.

561 U.S. at 309–14. Though the facts of Granite Rock are not

precisely the same as this case, both present the same legal

problem: a third-party to a labor dispute insulated from

remedy by § 301 preemption. In Granite Rock, a concrete and

building company employed members of the local chapter of

the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”) union. Id.

at 292. The employer and the local union began negotiations

about a new collective bargaining agreement. Id. When

negotiations stalled, the employee-union members initiated a

strike. Id. Because the current collective bargaining agreement

had a “no-strike” clause, the employer sued to enjoin the strike.

Id. at 294. The employer also sued the local chapter of the

union under § 301 for breach of the collective bargaining

agreement and sued the parent, IBT, for state law tortious

interference. Id. at 294–95. The district court allowed the § 301

dispute to go to the jury, but granted IBT’s motion to dismiss

the tortious interference claim as preempted by § 301. Id. at

295.

The employer’s argument on appeal mirrors Plaintiffs’

argument in this case. IBT, like MPEA in this case, was an

untouchable third party that the employer argued undermined

a labor dispute, yet escaped punishment. The employer

specifically claimed that IBT “not only instigated th[e] strike;

it supported and directed it.” Id. at 293. But the employer could

do nothing to remedy IBT’s alleged actions. Id. at 310 (noting

the employer’s argument that “potential avenues for deterring

and redressing [IBT’s] conduct are either unavailable or

insufficient”). Yet, because the employer could not show that

No. 15-1241 19

IBT either signed the relevant collective bargaining agreement

or was in a principal-agent relationship with the local chapter

which had signed the collective bargaining agreement, IBT was

not a signatory to the agreement. Id. at 310 (noting that the

employer conceded that “international unions structure their

relationships with local unions in a way that makes agency or

alter ego difficult to establish”). Thus, the employer could not

sue IBT under § 301 for breach of the agreement. Id. Unable to

pursue a § 301 claim, the employer then requested that the

Supreme Court provide a remedy by “recogniz[ing] a new

federal cause of action under § 301(a).” Id. at 292.

The Supreme Court unanimously denied this request and

upheld the dismissal of the state law tortious interference

claim. Id. at 313–14; see also id. at 314 (Sotomayor, J., concurring

and dissenting) (joining majority’s holding to affirm dismissal

of the tortious interference claim while dissenting on other

grounds). Noting the “host of policy” choices at work in § 301

jurisprudence, the Supreme Court reiterated that § 301 enabled

federal courts to create a federal common law of contract

interpretation, not of torts. Id. at 311 (quoting Brazinski, 6 F.3d

at 1180 (federal common law created under § 301 is “not a

source of independent rights, let alone tort rights”)). Thus, to

protect the “carefully calibrated” balance struck by § 301 and

its related statutes, the Supreme Court refused to create a

federal common law tort cause of action under § 301. Id. at 311.

Accordingly, no such federal tort cause of action is available to

Plaintiffs in this case.

20 No. 15-1241

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the

district court.