LeCompte v. Zoning Board of Appeal for the Village of Barrington Hills

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

LeCompte v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 2011 IL App (1st) 100423

Appellate Court BENJAMIN B. LeCOMPTE, CATHLEEN B. LeCOMPTE, and NORTH

Caption STAR TRUST COMPANY, as Successor Trustee of Harris Bank

Barrington N.A., as Trustee Under Trust Number 11-5176, Plaintiffs-

Appellants, v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS FOR THE VILLAGE

OF BARRINGTON HILLS; JONATHAN J. KNIGHT, Chairman;

JUDITH FREEMAN, BYRON JOHNSON, NANCY MASTERSON,

GEORGE MULLEN, KAREN ROSENE, and MARK ROSSI, as

Members of the Zoning Board of Appeals, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. First District, Third Division

Docket No. 1-10-0423

Rule 23 Order filed June 30, 2011

Rehearing denied September 8, 2011

Rule 23 Order

withdrawn September 8, 2011

Filed September 21, 2011

Held The zoning board of the village where plaintiffs resided properly ordered

(Note: This syllabus plaintiffs to cease and desist using their property for the commercial

constitutes no part of boarding of horses, since the commercial boarding of horses was not a

the opinion of the court permitted agricultural use in the R-1 district in which plaintiffs resided.

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 09-CH-00934; the

Review Hon. Nancy J. Arnold, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Bauch & Michaels, LLC, of Chicago (Paul M. Bauch, Kenneth A.

Appeal Michaels, Jr., Carolina Y. Sales, and Luke J. Hinkle, of counsel), for

appellants.

Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C., of Chicago (Douglas E.

Wambach, George J. Lynch, and Susan M. Horner, of counsel), for

appellees.

Panel JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Quinn and Murphy concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiffs, Dr. Benjamin LeCompte, Cathleen LeCompte (LeComptes), and the North Star

Trust Company as successor trustee of Harris Bank Barrington N.A. and as trustee under

trust number 11-5176, filed a complaint for administrative review of a final decision by the

Zoning Board of Appeals (Zoning Board) for the Village of Barrington Hills (Village). The

Zoning Board upheld a Village order directing the LeComptes to stop using their property

for the commercial boarding of horses because it was not a permitted agricultural use in an

R-1 zoned district. The circuit court affirmed the Zoning Board’s decision. We find that the

commercial boarding of horses is not a permitted use of property in an R-1 zoned district

because it is not agriculture as that term is defined in section 5-2-1 of The Village of

Barrington Hills’ Zoning Ordinance (Zoning Code). Therefore, we affirm the order of the

circuit court.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 The LeComptes are the beneficial owners of approximately 130 acres of property located

at 350 Bateman Road, in the Village of Barrington Hills, Illinois. The property was organized

in December of 2003, as Oakwood Farm of Barrington Hills, L.L.C. (Oakwood Farm), for

the purpose of operating a horse farm. There are approximately 45 horses boarded at

Oakwood Farm and 35 are owned by third parties who signed an “Equine Training and

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Breeding Agreement.” The other 10 horses are owned by the LeComptes and 2 of those

horses are involved in breeding. The property consists of a single-family residence where the

LeComptes reside with a stable and a riding arena, which is approximately 30,000 square

feet, and there are 60 stalls for the horses and other buildings. In addition to boarding horses,

the LeComptes also grow, cut and bale their own hay; raise, train and sell horses; provide

pasturage; and provide veterinary services for the horses.

¶4 The Village has been predominantly a residential community, with approximately 72.3%

of its land dedicated to residential and agricultural property more than five acres in size,

24.6% of its land is forest preserves, 2.1% is residential property less than five acres in size,

0.7% is institutional, and 0.4% is business and industrial. Many of the residential properties

are involved in equestrian activities and these activities remain an important part of the

Village’s character.

¶5 Oakwood Farm is located in a residential district of the Village zoned R-1. The preamble

to section 5-5-2 of the Village’s Zoning Code provides (1) that agriculture is a permitted use

for land located in an R-1 zoned district; (2) that other than accessory uses–uses incidental

to and on the same or an adjacent zoning lot or lots under one ownership–only one of the

enumerated permitted uses may be established on a zoning property; and (3) that no building

or zoning lot shall be devoted to any use other than a use permitted in the zoning district.

Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-5-2 (Feb. 27, 2006).

¶6 Section 5-2-1 of the Zoning Code defines “agriculture” as “[t]he use of land for

agricultural purposes, including farming, dairying, pasturage, apiculture, horticulture,

floriculture, viticulture and animal and poultry husbandry (including the breeding and raising

of horses as an occupation).” Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1 (added

Dec. 18, 1972). Section 5-2-1 also defines “animal husbandry” as “[t]he breeding and raising

of livestock, such as horses, cows and sheep.” Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance

§ 5-2-1 (added June 27, 2005).

¶7 On January 10, 2008, the Village’s attorney delivered a cease and desist letter to the

LeComptes which stated that the LeComptes’ property, Oakwood Farm, was being used as

a commercial horse boarding facility in violation of the Zoning Code and ordered the

LeComptes to immediately cease and desist using the property for the nonpermitted use.

¶8 The LeComptes filed an appeal with the Zoning Board. The Zoning Board conducted a

hearing on August 13 and 28, 2008, which was attended by the parties to this appeal, the

attorneys for the LeComptes and the Village, and members of the community. The issue

before the Zoning Board was whether the commercial boarding of horses is agriculture, a

permitted use of property in an R-1 zoned district under section 5-5-2(A) of the Zoning Code.

¶9 During the hearing, the LeComptes admitted that they were using their property for the

commercial boarding of horses. Dr. LeCompte argued that the commercial boarding of

horses is agriculture as defined by section 5-2-1 of the Zoning Code. He also argued that

since the commercial boarding of horses is a permitted agricultural use, according to section

5-3-4(A) of the Zoning Code, the Zoning Board was without authority to regulate the use of

his property.

¶ 10 The attorney for the Village, Doug Wambach, argued that the commercial boarding of

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horses is not a permitted use in an R-1 zoned district. He also argued that, according to the

definition of agriculture in section 5-2-1 of the Zoning Code, only the breeding and raising

of horses is a permitted use in an R-1 zoned district and horse boarding is not. He further

argued that the drafters of the Zoning Code intended that the permitted uses in an R-1 zoned

district would be compatible with each other and that Oakwood Farm’s commercial boarding

facility was not compatible with the other single-family residences in the R-1 zoned district.

¶ 11 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Zoning Board made the following findings: (1) that

the LeComptes are operating a commercial boarding facility in an R-1 zoned district; (2) that

the commercial boarding of horses is not a permitted agricultural use in an R-1 zoned

district; and (3) that because the commercial boarding of horses is not a permitted

agricultural use, section 5-3-4(A) does not apply. Finally, the Zoning Board denied the

LeComptes’ petition to overturn the Village’s order to cease and desist using Oakwood Farm

for the commercial boarding of horses.

¶ 12 The LeComptes filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court and

requested that the Zoning Board’s decision be reversed. The circuit court affirmed the Zoning

Board’s decision and the LeComptes appealed to the appellate court.

¶ 13 After the LeComptes filed their reply brief in the appellate court, the Zoning Board filed

a motion to strike the reply brief and argued that it contained arguments that were not

presented in the administrative proceedings in the circuit court or in its initial appellate brief.

The Zoning Board’s motion to strike was taken with the case.

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 I. Standard of Review

¶ 16 The LeComptes appeal from the circuit court’s order affirming the Zoning Board’s

decision. Appellate courts review the decision of the administrative agency, herein the

Zoning Board, not the circuit court. Kimball Dawson, LLC v. City of Chicago Department

of Zoning, 369 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786 (2006). The Zoning Board was asked to interpret the

Village’s Zoning Code to determine whether the commercial boarding of horses is

agriculture, a permitted use under the Zoning Code. The LeComptes have admitted that they

were engaged in the commercial boarding of horses on their property. However, the parties

disagree about whether or not the commercial boarding of horses is agriculture. We note that

a mixed question of law and fact is one in which the facts are admitted or established, the

rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard or

whether the rule of law as applied to the historical facts is or is not violated. AFM Messenger

Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 391 (2001). The

agency’s application of a rule of law to a mixed question of law and fact will not be reversed

unless it is clearly erroneous. Cook County Republican Party v. Illinois State Board of

Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 243-44 (2009). A decision is clearly erroneous if the reviewing

court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Cook

County Republican Party, 232 Ill. 2d at 244.

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¶ 17 II. The Village’s Zoning Code

¶ 18 A. The Village Is a Home Rule Unit of Government

¶ 19 The threshold question we must decide is whether the Village had the power to

promulgate the Zoning Code. We note that the Illinois Constitution makes the Village a

home rule unit of government; therefore, it “may exercise any power and perform any

function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to

regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare.” Ill. Const. 1970,

art. VII, § 6(a). As a home rule unit, the Village has the power to enact the Zoning Code

(County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 511-12 (1979)), as long as

the legislative enactment comports with constitutional requirements. Thompson v. Cook

County Zoning Board of Appeals, 96 Ill. App. 3d 561, 569 (1981). The Village also has the

power to define the terms in its Zoning Code and the terms may be given a broader or

narrower meaning than they otherwise would have. County of Lake v. Zenko, 174 Ill. App.

3d 54, 59-60 (1988) (citing People v. Burmeister, 147 Ill. App. 3d 218, 222 (1986), appeal

denied, 113 Ill. 2d 577 (1987)). Accordingly, we hold that the Illinois Constitution

empowered the Village, a home rule unit, to enact its Zoning Code. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII,

§ 6(a).

¶ 20 B. The Rules of Statutory or Ordinance Construction

¶ 21 Next, we must determine whether the Zoning Board’s decision–that the commercial

boarding of horses is not agriculture, a permissible use, according to the Village’s Zoning

Code–was clearly erroneous. See Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1

(added Dec. 18, 1972); § 5-5-2(A) (Feb. 26, 2006).

¶ 22 The rules of statutory construction apply to municipal ordinances, like the Village’s

Zoning Code. Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 492 (2009).

When a court construes a zoning ordinance, “[e]ffect should be given to the intention of the

drafters by concentrating on the terminology, its goals and purposes, ‘the natural import of

the words used in common and accepted usage, the setting in which they are employed, and

the general structure of the ordinance.’ [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Cosmopolitan National Bank v. County of Cook, 103 Ill. 2d 302, 313 (1984). The best

indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.

Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 199 Ill. 2d 384, 388 (2002).

¶ 23 C. Agriculture Is a Permitted Use Under the Zoning Code

¶ 24 With the rules of statutory construction in mind, we now review the Zoning Board’s

decision. The LeComptes argued before the Zoning Board that commercial horse boarding

is a permitted agricultural use under section 5-5-2(A) of the Zoning Code. Village of

Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-5-2(A) (Feb. 26, 2006). They also argued that the

terms “breeding” and “raising,” in the definition for agriculture in section 5-2-1 of the

Zoning Code (Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1), encompass the

boarding of horses. The Village disagrees and argues that the boarding of horses is not a

permitted use under section 5-5-2(A) of the Zoning Code and that the boarding of horses is

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not agriculture based upon the definition of agriculture in section 5-2-1 of the Zoning Code.

¶ 25 Section 5-5-2(A) of the Zoning Code provides that agriculture is a permitted use in an

R-1 zoned district. Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-5-2(A) (Feb. 26, 2006).

Section 5-5-2(A) sets forth the permissible uses in an R-1 zoning district as (1) agriculture,

(2) single-family detached dwellings, (3) signs, and (4) accessory uses, incidental to and on

the same or an adjacent zoning lot or lots under one ownership, as the principal use. Village

of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-5-2(A) (Feb. 26, 2006). Therefore, we must

determine whether the Zoning Board erred when it found that the commercial boarding of

horses is not agriculture, a permitted use, as defined by section 5-2-1 of the Zoning Code.

¶ 26 D. The Commercial Boarding of Horses Is Not Agriculture

¶ 27 As previously indicated, section 5-2-1 defines agriculture as “[t]he use of land for

agricultural purposes, including *** animal *** husbandry (including the breeding and

raising of horses as an occupation).” Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1

(added Dec. 18, 1972). The preamble to the definitions in section 5-2-1 provides that “[i]n

the construction of this zoning title, the words and definitions contained in this chapter shall

be observed and applied, except when the context clearly indicates otherwise.” Village of

Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1. Finally, the rules of statutory construction

provide that when specific definitions of any terms are provided, those definitions, when

reasonable, will be sustained to the exclusion of hypothetical indulgences. RVS Industries,

Inc. v. Village of Shiloh, 353 Ill. App. 3d 672, 674 (2004).

¶ 28 In support of their argument that commercial horse boarding is agriculture, the

LeComptes focus on the term “including” that is used in the definition of agriculture and they

argue that the use of the term “including” means that the list following the term is

illustrative, not exhaustive, and that the terms that follow are a partial list. We find the

LeComptes’ argument is consistent with cases construing the terms “includes” and

“including.” See People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 328 (2007); Paxson v. Board of Education

of School District No. 87, 276 Ill. App. 3d 912, 920 (1995). However, while the Zoning Code

defined agriculture as land used for “agricultural purposes,” and used the term “including”

to provide examples of other uses of land for agricultural purposes, unless the boarding of

horses is similar to other uses in the definition, the rules of statutory construction prevent us

from saying that the Village intended for the commercial boarding of horses to be a use

included in that list. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 328 (the preceding general term is to be construed

as a general description of the listed items and other similar items).

¶ 29 Specifically, the LeComptes argue that the terms “breeding” and “raising” in the

definition of agriculture encompass the boarding of horses. The definition of agriculture in

section 5-2-1 lists animal husbandry as a use for agricultural purposes. Village of Barrington

Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1 (added Dec. 18, 1972). The definition also includes the

“breeding and raising of horses as an occupation” as an example of animal husbandry.

Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1 (added Dec. 18, 1972). Because the

Zoning Code does not define the terms “breeding” and “raising,” we will look at a dictionary

to give the terms their ordinary and popularly understood meaning. O’Donnell v. City of

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Chicago, 363 Ill. App. 3d 98, 107-08 (2005) (citing People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 349

(2001)); In re Detention of Bailey, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1086 (2000) (A “court may look

to dictionary definitions to derive the plain and ordinary meaning without rendering the term

ambiguous.” (citing In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 198-99 (1997))).

¶ 30 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the term “breeding” as “the action

or process of bearing or generating,” as gestation or hatching, or as the propagation of plants

and animals. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 274 (1986). Webster’s also

defines the term “raising” as “the breeding and care of animals,” and it defines the term

“raise” as breeding or caring for animals to maturity. Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 1877 (1986). We note that Webster’s defines “boarding” as the act of supplying

meals and lodgings for pay. Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary 160 (1913). We find

that Webster’s definitions make it clear that a person who boards horses engages in different

acts from a person who breeds and raises horses.

¶ 31 We note that the Zoning Code also defines animal husbandry as “[t]he breeding and

raising of livestock, such as horses.” Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1

(added June 27, 2005). The definition does not include the commercial boarding of horses

as part of the definition of animal husbandry. Based upon the Zoning Code’s definition of

agriculture and Webster’s definitions of the terms “breeding,” “raising,” and “boarding,” we

find that the drafters of the Zoning Code did not intend for the commercial boarding of

horses to be included in the definition of agriculture as a use for agricultural purposes.

Cosmopolitan National Bank, 103 Ill. 2d at 313.

¶ 32 We are unwilling to interpret the definition for agriculture in the Zoning Code to include

the commercial boarding of horses as a use for agricultural purposes because the words in

context do not support such an interpretation. Cosmopolitan National Bank, 103 Ill. 2d at

313; Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1 (added Dec. 18, 1972). Therefore,

following Perry, we find that, while the terms in the definition of agriculture that describe

the uses for agricultural purposes are not exhaustive, if there are any other terms to be

included in the description of uses of the land for agricultural purposes they should be similar

to, not different from, as in this case, the listed terms. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 328; also see

Paxson, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 920; Kostecki v. Pavlis, 140 Ill. App. 3d 176, 181 (1986).

¶ 33 E. Using Stables for the Commercial Boarding of Horses

Does Not Comport With the Village’s Zoning Code

¶ 34 Next, the LeComptes argue that using their stables for the commercial boarding of horses

comports with the Village’s Zoning Code. We disagree. The Zoning Code defines a “stable”

as “[a] detached accessory building the primary use of which is the keeping of horses.”

Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1 (added Feb. 27, 2006). We note,

however, that the Zoning Code also defines an “accessory building” as “subordinate to and

serves a principal building or principal use.” Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance

§ 5-2-1 (added Apr. 1, 1963). Although the stable may be an accessory building, the

LeComptes are not using the stable as an accessory building that is subordinate to a principal

building or use. Therefore, because the LeComptes are using the stable for the commercial

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boarding of horses, which is a primary use and not a subordinate use, it is a use that does not

comport with the Village’s Zoning Code.

¶ 35 F. Viewed in its Entirety, the Zoning Code

Supports the Zoning Board’s Decision

¶ 36 The LeComptes also argued that the Village intended for residents to commercially board

horses. In order to determine the intent of the Village when it enacted the Zoning Code, we

must consider the Zoning Code in its entirety. Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228

Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2007) (citing Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 323).

¶ 37 Several sections of the Zoning Code support the conclusion that its drafters did not intend

for the commercial boarding of horses to be a permitted primary use in an R-1 zoned district.

For example, section 5-1-2 explains the “intent and purpose” of the Zoning Code and

provides that it is “[t]o promote and protect the public health, safety, *** convenience and

the general welfare of the people. *** [P]revent congestion *** overcrowding of ***

residential, *** areas *** from harmful encroachment by incompatible *** inappropriate

uses.” Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-1-2.

¶ 38 In addition, subsection 5-3-4(D), entitled “Home Occupation,” explains that the

residential tranquility of the neighborhood must remain paramount when a business is

conducted from the principal building. Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-3-

4(D) (added June 26, 2006). Subsection 5-3-4(D)(2) defines “home occupation” in pertinent

part as “any lawful business, *** occupation *** conducted from a principal building or an

accessory building in a residential district that *** [i]s incidental and secondary to the

principal use of such dwelling unit for residential occupancy purposes.” Village of

Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-3-4(D)(2) (added June 26, 2006). A home occupation

must be conducted in a manner that (1) “provide[s] peace, quiet and domestic tranquility

within all residential neighborhoods,” (2) “guarantee[s] *** freedom from [the] possible

effects of business or commercial uses,” and (3) cannot “generate significantly greater

vehicular or pedestrian traffic than is typical of residences in the surrounding neighborhood

of the home occupation.” Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-3-4(D)(3)(e).

¶ 39 The record reveals that commercial boarding at Oakwood Farm caused a significant

increase in the traffic and noise in the neighborhood and resulted in complaints by the

surrounding property owners. The record also reveals that Oakwood Farm’s primary purpose

is the commercial boarding of horses, which is a use that is not incidental and secondary to

residential occupancy. While the Zoning Code does permit the boarding and training of

horses as a home occupation, it must be done in a manner that maintains the peace, quiet and

domestic tranquility within all residential neighborhoods in an R-1 zoned district. See

Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-3-4(D)(3)(g) (added June 26, 2006). We

find that the commercial boarding of horses does not comport with the overall intent of the

Zoning Code. Therefore, the Zoning Board’s decision was not clearly erroneous.

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¶ 40 G. Section 5-3-4(A) Does Not Apply in This Case

¶ 41 Finally, the LeComptes also argue that section 5-3-4(A), which restricts the Village from

“impos[ing] regulations or requir[ing] permits with respect to land used or to be used for

agricultural purposes,” applies in this case. Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance

§ 5-3-4 (Apr. 1, 1963). We disagree. Section 5-3-4(A) is clear that “[i]n the event the land

ceases to be used solely for agricultural purposes, then, and only then, shall the provisions

of the zoning title apply.” Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-3-4 (Apr. 1,

1963). Here, because the LeComptes’ property was used primarily for the commercial

boarding of horses, which is not a use for agricultural purposes, section 5-3-4(A) of the

Zoning Code did not apply. Accordingly, the Zoning Board’s decision that section 5-3-4(A)

did not apply was not clearly erroneous.

¶ 42 H. The LeComptes’ Cases Do Not Support Their Position

¶ 43 The LeComptes rely on a number of cases to support their position. In Tuftee v. County

of Kane, 76 Ill. App. 3d 128 (1979), the court held that the care and training of horses for

show was an agricultural purpose. We find that the zoning ordinance in Tuftee is different

from the Zoning Code in this case. Unlike the zoning ordinance in this case, in Tuftee, there

was no definition for agriculture provided in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, because the

Tuftee court had to resort to extrinsic sources, other cases and the dictionary to obtain a

definition for terms in its zoning ordinance, it is distinguishable from this case. Tuftee, 76

Ill. App. 3d at 131-32. See County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188

Ill. 2d 546, 556 (1999).

¶ 44 In Borrelli v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 941 A.2d 966 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) the facts

are also distinguishable from the facts in our case. Although the zoning regulations in

Borrelli contained a definition for agriculture similar to the definition of agriculture in our

case, the descriptive phrase following “animal husbandry” “(including the breeding and

raising of horses as an occupation)” in the Village’s Zoning Code is not included in the

zoning ordinance in Borrelli. Borrelli, 941 A.2d at 972-73. In addition, unlike the ordinance

in our case, there is no definition for animal husbandry contained in the ordinance in Borrelli.

Borrelli, 941 A.2d at 972-73. Therefore, Borrelli is also distinguishable from this case.

¶ 45 The LeComptes also cite other Illinois cases, People ex rel. Pletcher v. City of Joliet, 321

Ill. 385, 388 (1926), and County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 302 Ill.

App. 3d 342, 346 (1998), in support of their position. However, as the Zoning Board

correctly states in its brief, these cases are also distinguishable. In both City of Joliet and

County of Knox, the term “agriculture” was undefined and the courts resorted to extrinsic

sources for a broad definition of those terms. City of Joliet, 321 Ill. at 388 (“ ‘[a]griculture’

is another indefinite word which renders the statute more or less uncertain”; as such the court

resorted to the broad dictionary definition of “agriculture”); County of Knox, 302 Ill. App.

3d at 346 (the court applied the dictionary definition of “agriculture” used by the supreme

court in City of Joliet).

¶ 46 Finally, the LeComptes’ reliance on Steege v. Board of Appeals, 527 N.E.2d 1176, 1178

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(Mass. App. Ct. 1988), is misplaced because the term “agriculture” was not defined and

decisions from other jurisdictions are not binding on this court. Travel 100 Group, Inc. v.

Mediterranean Shipping Co. (USA), 383 Ill. App. 3d 149, 157 (2008). Accordingly, because

the facts in the aforementioned cases are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case,

we see no reason to follow these cases.

¶ 47 We find that the commercial boarding of horses is not agriculture as defined by the

Zoning Code. Accordingly, we hold that the Zoning Board’s decision, that the commercial

boarding of horses is not agriculture and is not a permitted use in an R-1 zoned district, was

not clearly erroneous. Village of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1 (added Dec. 18,

1972); § 5-5-2(A) (June 27, 2006); Cosmopolitan National Bank, 103 Ill. 2d at 313.

¶ 48 III. Zoning Board’s Factual Findings

¶ 49 Next, the LeComptes argue that the Zoning Board’s decision contains erroneous factual

findings because it did not accurately summarize comments from certain audience members

who were not called to testify. The Zoning Board’s factual findings are deemed prima facie

true and correct, and its decision will not be disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence. Scadron v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 264 Ill. App. 3d 946,

949 (1994). A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only where the

reviewing court determines, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency,

that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency. Scadron, 264 Ill. App. 3d at

949. If there is any competent evidence supporting the agency’s determination, it should be

affirmed. Scadron, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 949 (citing Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of

Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992)). We found nothing in the record to

suggest that the Zoning Board’s findings were unsupported by the evidence in the record.

Therefore, because there was competent evidence supporting the Zoning Board’s decision,

we find that its factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 50 IV. Zoning Board’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief

¶ 51 The Zoning Board argues that the LeComptes’ argument regarding the Illinois Open

Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2008)) in their reply brief should be stricken

because it was not made in the administrative proceedings, in the circuit court or in its initial

appellate brief. The LeComptes argue in their reply brief that the Zoning Board violated the

Act when it (1) failed to vote in open meeting to have a closed session and identify the

exception that allowed the closed session (5 ILCS 120/2(c)(4) (West 2008)), and (2) failed

to indicate the results of the vote in the minutes (5 ILCS 120/2a (West 2008)). We find that

this argument was not raised before the Zoning Board or in the complaint for administrative

review; therefore, it is forfeited. Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Edmonson, 397

Ill. App. 3d 146, 154 (2009); People ex rel. Hopf v. Barger, 30 Ill. App. 3d 525, 539-40

(1975) (citing Shaw v. Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246, 248 (1969)). Therefore, we see no need to

address that issue.

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¶ 52 CONCLUSION

¶ 53 We find (1) that the use of the land at Oakwood Farm for the commercial boarding of

horses is not agriculture as defined in section 5-2-1 of the Zoning Code (Village of

Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-2-1 (added Dec. 18, 1972)), and (2) that since the

commercial boarding of horses is not agriculture under section 5-5-2(A) of the Zoning Code,

it is not a permitted use in an R-1 zoned district in the Village of Barrington Hills. Village

of Barrington Hills Zoning Ordinance § 5-5-2(A) (June 27, 2006). After reviewing the

record, we do not have a definite and firm conviction that the Zoning Board made a mistake.

Accordingly, we hold that the Zoning Board’s decision was not clearly erroneous, and the

judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 54 Affirmed.

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