Opinion

White v. Village of Homewood

Court
Appellate Court of Illinois
Filed
Nov 26, 1996
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.4%

The opinion

1-95-0961

ANGELA E. WHITE, ) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.

)

v. )

)

VILLAGE OF HOMEWOOD, a Municipal )

Corporation, and VILLAGE OF HOMEWOOD )

FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSION, ) Honorable

) Patrick E. McGann,

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is the second appeal involving these parties. White v.

Village of Homewood, 256 Ill. App. 3d 354, 628 N.E.2d 616 (1993),

appeal denied, 155 Ill. 2d 577, 633 N.E.2d 16 (1994) (White I). In

White I, this court reversed the circuit court's order granting

defendants' motion to dismiss, and remanded the case with

instructions. The present appeal emanates from that remandment.

Plaintiff Angela White sued defendants, Village of Homewood

and Village of Homewood Fire and Police Commission (Homewood), for

injuries sustained in a fall from horizontal bars she was climbing

in pursuance of a firefighter's physical examination. The circuit

court granted Homewood's motion for summary judgment. White

appeals, arguing that a special duty exception to the Local

Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort

Immunity Act), if satisfied, would allow her to recover damages

from defendants, raising a genuine issue of material fact and

precluding summary judgment.

In 1990, White responded to an advertisement in a local

newspaper, which sought applicants for the position of firefighter

with the Homewood Fire Department. She completed an employment

application. She knew she would have to take a physical agility

test that applicants must pass in order to be considered for the

firefighter position. Just before taking the test, White signed an

agreement releasing Homewood from liability for any injuries that

might occur during the test.

On June 16, 1990, White and seventy-four other applicants

arrived at the Homewood Fire Department to take the physical

agility test. The test required applicants to display strength,

stamina, and the ability to perform under conditions resembling an

actual fire. There were several stations prepared for the exam at

which applicants were required to perform specific exercises. At

the first few stations, applicants performed sit-ups, squat thrusts

and chin-ups, and had to lift and carry a 200-pound dummy without

allowing any portion of the dummy to touch the ground. A fifth

exercise involved lifting and carrying a pail filled with rocks.

At station number six the exercise involved climbing up a

vertical ladder, which intersected with a fifteen-foot-long

horizontal ladder, and then climbing across the horizontal ladder,

which was suspended approximately eight feet from the ground.

During the exercise, White's hands slipped off the bars of one of

the ladders, and she fell several feet to a mat placed on the floor

under the ladders. White sustained injuries to her wrist and

elbow.

On December 10, 1990, White filed suit against Homewood,

alleging that Homewood's fire department conducted the physical

agility test in a negligent manner. On March 7, 1991, Homewood

moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2-615 (now at 735

ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994))), for failing to plead facts

demonstrating the existence of a duty owed White, as well as a

breach of that duty.

White subsequently filed an amended complaint containing four

counts and joining a second defendant, the Village of Homewood Fire

and Police Commission (Commission), which administered the

physical agility test. Homewood's second section 2-615 motion to

dismiss all counts was granted with respect to three of the four

counts, allowing White to pursue a claim only for ordinary

negligence.

Homewood next filed a third motion to dismiss pursuant to

section 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS

5/2-619 (West 1992), alleging that the release signed by White

before she took the physical agility test barred her claim. White

argued that Homewood furnished no consideration for the agreement,

rendering the release unenforceable. The circuit court granted the

motion, however, and dismissed White's claim with prejudice. On

appeal, this court reversed the circuit court's decision, holding

the release unenforceable for lack of consideration. This court

also found that the agreement violated public policy, in that

plaintiff was forced to sign it in order to take the physical

agility test, and the release placed White "at the mercy of her

potential employer's negligence." White I, 256 Ill. App. 3d at

359. The circuit court was instructed to reinstate the ordinary

negligence count.

On remand, Homewood filed an answer and several affirmative

defenses. First, Homewood claimed that White's own negligence

proximately caused her injuries, entitling Homewood to a reduction

in any damages that might be awarded White, or no recovery at all.

Additionally, Homewood referred to four sections of the Tort

Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 1994) (Act), each of

which assertedly granted it immunity against White's claim.

Homewood first looked to section 3-102(a) (745 ILCS 10/3-

102(a) (West 1994)) as a defense. Section 3-102(a) immunizes any

public entity against liability for injuries occurring on its

property, unless the public entity had actual or constructive

notice of the existence of an unreasonably unsafe condition on the

premises. Homewood argued that it had no actual or constructive

notice of any unreasonably dangerous condition at the fire station,

and that under this statute it could not be liable for White's

injury.

Homewood next offered section 3-108(a) as support for its

immunity argument. 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West 1994). Section 3-

108(a) immunizes local public entities and public employees against

liability for injuries resulting from a "failure to supervise an

activity on or the use of any public property." Interpreting this

provision, Homewood contended that its administration of the

physical agility test constituted a supervisory function. As a

result, it could not be liable to White for any failure to properly

supervise her activities while taking the test.

Homewood also relied on section 2-201, taken together with

section 2-109, as additional support for its immunity defense. 745

ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994). Section 2-201 grants public employees

immunity against liability for injuries resulting from an

employee's exercise of discretion, even when the discretion is

abused. Section 2-109 immunizes a public entity against liability

for any activities for which its employees would not be liable.

745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1994). Homewood asserted that the

administration of the physical agility test was discretionary and

therefore immunized, precluding any liability to White for her

injuries.

Lastly, Homewood offered as support for its immunity argument

section 2-202 (745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 1994)), which immunizes

public employees against liability for acts or omissions that occur

while executing and enforcing the law, unless the employee's

conduct is willful and wanton. Homewood claimed that this

provision applied to the present case because state law requires

the Commission to test the physical skills of all applicants to the

fire department. See 65 ILCS 5/10-1-7 (West 1995). Furthermore,

Homewood noted that it passed a regulation requiring a physical

agility test in order to enforce the state statute. Homewood

reasoned that it was executing and enforcing the state law and its

own regulation in administering the test, and that section 2-202,

considered with section 2-109, immunized Homewood against liability

for White's injuries.

After raising these affirmative defenses, Homewood moved for

summary judgment. Because the Act precludes White from recovering

any damages, Homewood argued, it was entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Alternatively, Homewood insisted that even if the

Act did not apply, summary judgment should be granted because the

danger of falling from the horizontal ladder was apparent, and

White viewed the apparatus before climbing and therefore could

appreciate the danger. Illinois law imposes no duty to warn White

of any apparent danger.

White responded, arguing that all the cases cited by Homewood

in support of the motion were distinguishable and, in the

alternative, White posited that the language in those decisions

actually supported her position. White invoked the "special duty"

exception to the Act, recognized in Illinois case law.

White also contended that public policy supported her

position. Even if the risk of danger from taking the physical

agility test was apparent, she was obligated to take the test in

order to become a firefighter, and needed the job because she was

out of work; because Homewood exerted full control over and

responsibility for the test, it should not be allowed to expose

applicants to "unnecessary dangers." Homewood knew when it created

the test that not all the applicants would be able to pass it or

even complete it; and Homewood had a duty to exercise reasonable

care and ensure that the test was safe for all applicants.

Following a hearing on Homewood's motion for summary judgment,

the circuit court found that the conduct at issue could be

considered either discretionary or supervisory, concluded that the

Act applied, and granted Homewood's motion. At the hearing,

neither the parties nor the court addressed application of the

special duty exception to this case.

I

A reviewing court exercises de novo review when determining

whether the circuit court properly granted a motion for summary

judgment. Zoeller v. Augustine, 271 Ill. App. 3d 370, 374, 648

N.E. 2d 939 (1995). All evidence will be construed favorably to

the nonmoving party, and strictly against the moving party. Gatlin

v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 293, 560 N.E.2d 586 (1990); Soderlund

Brothers, Inc., v. Carrier Corp., 278 Ill. App. 3d 606, 614, 663

N.E.2d 1 (1996). Reversal is warranted if, on review of the case,

a material issue of fact or an inaccurate interpretation of the law

exists. Zoeller, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 374.

II

The parties first dispute whether a genuine issue of material

fact exists regarding two elements of White's negligence claim.

Homewood contends that White failed to establish that Homewood owed

White a duty, or that Homewood's alleged negligence proximately

caused White's injury. White insists that the record "clearly

reveals" the existence of issues of material fact.

We need not decide this issue, however, because the Act

clearly precludes White from pursuing her claim, entitling Homewood

to judgment on the merits.

III

White presents a different approach in her argument on appeal

as to the application of the Act. When arguing before the circuit

court, White denied the application of the Act to her case. In her

response to Homewood's motion for summary judgment, White briefly

raised the issue of whether the special duty exception also

applied. On appeal, however, White apparently concedes the

relevance of the Act to this case; she does not even mention the

statute in her brief. Instead, White bases her argument solely on

the special duty exception.

In contrast, Homewood claims, as it did in its summary

judgment motion, that sections 2-201, 3-108(a), and 2-202 of the

Act each offer Homewood immunity against White's claim. White did

not file a reply brief addressing this argument.

As Homewood succinctly notes in its brief, White waived the

question of the Act's application on this appeal by failing to

raise it in her brief. According to Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7)

(134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)), any issues not raised by appellant in

her brief "are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief,

in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing." Even if White had

properly raised this issue, however, both the language of the Act

and cases interpreting it establish that the Act controls this

case, and offers Homewood immunity absent an exception.

Section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act provides:

"Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a

public employee serving in a position

involving the determination of policy or the

exercise of discretion is not liable for an

injury resulting from his act or omission in

determining policy when acting in the exercise

of such discretion even though abused." 745

ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994).

This provision immunizes public officials from liability for

injuries caused by any acts that fall within their official

discretion. Anderson v. Village of Forest Park, 238 Ill. App. 3d

83, 92, 606 N.E.2d 205 (1992); Gavery v. County of Lake, 160 Ill.

App. 3d 761, 764, 513 N.E.2d 1127 (1987). This grant of immunity

to public officials is based upon the idea that public officials

should be allowed to exercise their judgment without fear that a

good faith mistake might subject them to a lawsuit. MidAmerica

Trust Co. v. Moffatt, 158 Ill. App. 3d 372, 376, 511 N.E.2d 964

(1987). In addition, under section 2-109 of the Act, the public

entity employing that official also will be held not liable for the

official's discretionary conduct. 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1994).

Therefore, if administration of the physical agility exam by the

Commission's employees is found to be discretionary, then under

sections 2-201 and 2-109 defendants cannot be liable to White for

her injuries.

Discretionary acts include conduct unique to a particular

public office, and are not merely ministerial in nature. Gavery,

160 Ill. App. 3d at 764; MidAmerica, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 376.

Discretionary acts require the exercise of judgment and skill, and

can be characterized as governmental. MidAmerica, 158 Ill. App. 3d

at 376. In contrast, ministerial acts involve conduct performed

according to a given state of facts and an established method.

Ministerial conduct occurs in compliance with a legal mandate, and

without any reference to an official's discretion regarding the

appropriateness of the conduct. Anderson, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 94;

Greeson v. Mackinaw Township, 207 Ill. App. 3d 193, 200-01 (1990);

Gavery, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 764.

In the present case, the administrators of the physical

agility examination are entitled to immunity under section 2-201.

Their immunity also renders Homewood immune from liability under

section 2-109. The administrators of the examination acted

pursuant to legal authority. State law requires Homewood to make

rules establishing qualifications for the appointment of

firefighters. 65 ILCS 5/10-1-7 (West 1994). In carrying out that

authority, Homewood passed rules requiring all applicants for the

firefighter position to pass a physical agility examination in

addition to meeting other requirements. The administrators of

Homewood's firefighter's examination exercised discretion in

deciding the components of the exam, as well as the necessary level

of physical strength and stamina that would be required of each

applicant in order to pass the test. The administrators also used

personal judgment in deciding the number and complexity of physical

skills that applicants must master. This exercise of independent

judgment qualifies as discretionary, and section 2-201 provides

immunity for these discretionary actions.

In light of our disposition set forth above we need not

consider the applicability of sections 2-202 and 3-108(a) to these

facts.

White argues nevertheless that Homewood's conduct in

administering the physical agility test renders it liable under the

special duty exception to the Act. Homewood counters this argument

by claiming that White did not establish all the requisite elements

of the exception. Alternatively, Homewood contends that the

special duty exception cannot be applied to this case because the

Act does not incorporate the exception within its terms.

The special duty doctrine is a common law exception to the

concept of governmental immunity. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale

Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 507, 565 N.E.2d 654 (1990), overruled in

part, McCuen v. Peoria Park District, 163 Ill. 2d 125, 643 N.E.2d

778 (1994). A common law principle applied in conjunction with the

Act states that municipalities cannot be held liable in tort to

members of the general public for negligently exercising municipal

authority for a governmental purpose. Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d at

507-08. The special duty rule, however, provides that where a

special relationship arises between the municipality and a specific

person, the municipality will owe a special duty toward that person

and can be liable for the negligent failure to carry out that duty.

139 Ill. 2d at 508.

A special duty has been found to exist where a plaintiff meets

four requirements: (1) the municipality must be uniquely aware of

the particular danger or risk to which plaintiff is exposed; (2)

plaintiff must allege specific acts or omissions on the part of the

municipality; (3) the specific acts or omissions must be

affirmative or willful in nature; and (4) the injury must occur

while plaintiff is under the direct and immediate control of

employees or agents of the municipality. Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d at

508; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago, 131 Ill. App. 3d 505, 507, 475

N.E.2d 960 (1985); Bell v. Village of Midlothian, 90 Ill. App. 3d

967, 970, 414 N.E.2d 104 (1980).

White urges that because Homewood designed the physical

agility test, arranged the equipment used to take the test, and

placed a mat underneath the horizontal ladder, it proved its unique

awareness of the dangerousness of the test. In addition, White

offers several examples of specific acts or omissions on the part

of the Commission: it required the five female applicants to take

the same physical fitness test as the seventy male applicants; it

required plaintiff to perform several upper body strength tests

consecutively without allowing her adequate time to rest between

each test; it placed the horizontal ladder nine feet above the

ground; it failed to warn White that the bars were dangerous and

unsafe; and it allowed White to use the horizontal bars when it

knew or should have known the bars were dangerous and unsafe.

White claims these actions constituted affirmative or willful

conduct. Lastly, White maintains that her injury occurred while

she was under the direct and immediate control of employees or

agents of the Commission.

The cases cited by White as support for her argument contain

facts significantly dissimilar from the present case. In Gardner

v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147

(1966), for instance, plaintiff called the police after four men

attacked and beat him. The police officers apprehended the men on

a local highway and brought plaintiff there to identify them. The

men then attacked plaintiff again in the presence of the police

officers. 71 Ill. App. 2d at 375. The Gardner court explained

that by bringing plaintiff to the place where they apprehended the

men and placing plaintiff in a "position of peril," the police owed

plaintiff a special duty. The court held that the police breached

this duty by failing to restrain the men from attacking plaintiff.

71 Ill. App. 2d at 378-80.

A municipality was found liable when police officers imposed

unreasonably dangerous risks upon a private citizen in Brooks v.

Lundeen, 49 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 364 N.E.2d 423 (1977). There,

police officers set up a road block in order to catch a car

traveling at speeds of 85 to 100 miles an hour. The officers

ordered plaintiff's decedent, who drove up to the roadblock, to

park his car on the shoulder, but did not tell him why he needed to

do so. A few minutes later, the speeding car collided with

decedent's car on the shoulder, killing him. 49 Ill. App. 3d at 4-

5. The Brooks court held that plaintiff presented sufficient

evidence for a jury to find the existence of a special duty owed

plaintiff's decedent and a violation of that duty. Specifically,

the court pointed to the fact that the officers failed to warn

decedent of the dangerous situation and failed to allow him to

choose to park in a safer place. 49 Ill. App. 3d at 7. More

recently, this court similarly concluded that firefighters who

"instructed, directed, and encouraged" plaintiff, who had no

experience or training in fighting fires, to aid them in opening an

elevator door in a burning building, owed a special duty to

plaintiff. Anthony v. City of Chicago, 168 Ill. App. 3d 733, 738,

523 N.E.2d 22, appeal denied, 123 Ill. 2d 555, 535 N.E.2d 398

(1988). The court held that the City of Chicago, which employed

the firefighters, would be liable to plaintiff for any injuries

resulting from a breach of that duty.

The most significant distinction between the facts of Gardner,

Brooks, and Anthony and the facts in the present case is the

voluntary nature of plaintiff's actions. In the former, a police

officer or other governmental official in a position of authority

ordered plaintiff to take specific actions. In the present case,

however, White voluntarily agreed to take the physical agility

test. Furthermore, in Gardner, Brooks, and Anthony, plaintiffs

established the first element of the special duty exception by

showing that defendants possessed information about the situation

that they did not share, and that the injured parties could not

have obtained. In Gardner, the police officers did not tell

plaintiff that the men who attacked him had not yet been handcuffed

or otherwise restrained and still posed a threat to plaintiff.

Similarly, in Brooks, the police officers did not tell plaintiff's

decedent that a dangerous, speeding car was approaching the

intersection. Moreover, in Anthony, the firefighters did not

explain to plaintiff the skills that might be necessary to perform

the job of firefighting. In contrast, in the case sub judice,

White clearly could see the height of the ladder and the thickness

of the mat beneath the ladder. She faced no hidden danger such as

a speeding car, an aggressive man, or a dangerous fire. Because of

the voluntary nature of her actions and the lack of any hidden

potential for injury, White cannot prove that Homewood placed her

in an unreasonably dangerous situation or "position of peril."

The fact that the Commission developed and set up the physical

agility test may have made the Commission more knowledgeable about

the equipment being used, but does not establish that Homewood was

uniquely aware of any particular danger to White. "Superior

knowledge, in and of itself, does not create a duty." Burdinie,

139 Ill. 2d at 522. In Burdinie, plaintiff registered to

participate in adult swimming classes at defendant's recreational

sports complex. At the instructor's direction, plaintiff jumped

into the shallow end of the pool, suffering injuries. 139 Ill. 2d

at 505. Plaintiff argued that the instructor, with his superior

knowledge and experience, should have known to instruct a beginning

swimmer that jumping into a shallow end of the pool was dangerous.

The Burdinie court disagreed, declaring that such a rule would

allow the special duty exception to swallow the general rule of

nonliability. The court noted that if this rule became law, any

municipality that employed someone with superior knowledge or

experience would be held liable for injuries arising from any

instructions related to the employee's expertise. 139 Ill. 2d at

522.

In addition, the Burdinie court found that plaintiff failed to

satisfy the fourth requirement of the special duty exception, that

plaintiff suffered injuries while under the direct control of

defendant. 139 Ill. 2d at 525. The court held that although the

swimming instructor occupied a position of responsibility, he did

not exercise direct and immediate control over plaintiff. The

court distinguished cases such as Anthony, Gardner, and Brooks,

noting that those decisions involved police or fire protection. In

such cases, the municipal employees by their nature are cloaked

with state authority, making any refusal to obey an order or

suggestion very difficult for the average citizen. The court noted

that a recreational swimming instructor did not enjoy the same

authority, and plaintiff easily could have refused to jump in the

pool. 139 Ill. 2d at 525. The Burdinie court distinguished those

cases by pointing out the voluntary nature of plaintiff's actions,

in contrast to the involuntary nature of plaintiffs' actions in

Anthony, Gardner, and Brooks.

The present case parallels Burdinie. White voluntarily took

the physical agility test and could have refused to take any

portion of the test if she wished. As in Burdinie, she failed to

offer evidence that the horizontal ladder was particularly

dangerous, other than to point out that it rose eight to nine feet

above the floor and that there was a 3-inch mat underneath. As in

Burdinie, the height of the ladder and the thickness of the mat do

not exhibit the level of danger found in the Anthony, Gardner, and

Brooks decisions. In addition, under Burdinie, Homewood cannot be

held liable simply because its employees set up the test and

instructed White on how to take it.

White does not allege that she involuntarily applied for the

firefighter position and does not show that she could not obtain

another, less dangerous job. She eagerly and voluntarily applied

for the firefighter position, knowing that it might be a dangerous

job. White also knew from reading the notice advertising the

position that she would be required to take a test to prove she was

physically capable of handling the dangers inherent in the

position. White has failed to show that she was compelled in any

way to take the physical agility test and therefore may not invoke

the special duty exception. The Act prevents her from pursuing her

claim. The circuit court properly granted Homewood's motion for

summary judgment as a matter of law because White may not recover

any damages from Homewood resulting from her injuries.

For the reasons aforesaid we must affirm.

Affirmed.

SCARIANO and DiVITO, JJ., concur.

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