People v. Garcia

Docket No. 109886.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

ABRAHAM GARCIA, Appellee.

Opinion filed January 21, 2011.

CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court,

with opinion.

Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis

concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

The issue in this appeal is whether a defendant’s wrongful delay

of criminal proceedings by violating bond and becoming a fugitive

from justice tolls the 10-year limitation on prior convictions used to

impose an extended-term sentence under section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) of the

Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–5–3.2(b)(1) (West

1998)). The appellate court answered that question negatively, relying

on the absence of statutory language specifically tolling the 10-year

limit based on a defendant’s wrongful delay. 396 Ill. App. 3d 792,

799. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the part of the appellate

court’s judgment construing the statute.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 1999, the State charged defendant, Abraham Garcia,

with attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery, alleging

that defendant beat the victim following a minor traffic incident on

August 31, 1999.

Pertinent to this appeal, the circuit court of Cook County released

defendant on bond, but later issued a bond forfeiture warrant when

defendant failed to appear. The warrant was quashed when defendant

appeared at a subsequent hearing. Defendant again failed to appear at

another hearing. Thus, in November 2000, the court issued a second

bond forfeiture warrant. For the next six years, defendant remained a

fugitive from justice. Defendant was not rearrested until November

2006.

In 2008, defendant was tried in a bench trial. The State presented

evidence that the victim, Roberto Rios, and his wife were driving on

a public road when they encountered defendant’s vehicle stopped on

the road, blocking Rios’ passage. After waiting briefly, Rios honked

his car horn at defendant’s vehicle. Defendant exited his vehicle and

approached Rios’ car. Defendant argued with Rios and unsuccessfully

tried to hit Rios through an open car window. Rios and his wife then

drove to a nearby restaurant.

Shortly afterwards, defendant and another man entered the

restaurant and attacked Rios. Defendant restrained Rios while the

other man repeatedly hit Rios with a metal pipe. Rios eventually fell

to the ground. While Rios was on the ground, defendant hit him in the

head with a glass pitcher, breaking the pitcher. Defendant then cut

Rios’ face with pieces of broken glass. During the attack, Rios

sustained a broken arm and serious permanent injuries to his face.

Ultimately, the trial court convicted defendant of three counts of

aggravated battery.

At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that defendant was

eligible for an extended-term sentence based on his 1993 conviction

for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced

defendant to three extended 90-month prison terms, to be served

concurrently.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing that

he was not eligible for an extended-term sentence under section

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5–5–3.2(b)(1) of the Code because that section authorized an

extended-term sentence based only on prior convictions within the

previous 10 years, but his 1993 conviction for possession of a stolen

motor vehicle occurred more than 10 years before his 2008 conviction

in this case. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider,

finding that the statutory 10-year limit was tolled during the six years

when defendant willfully violated his bail bond.

On appeal, the appellate court agreed with defendant’s challenge

to his extended-term sentence. The court recognized that section

5–5–3.2(b)(1) was intended to impose harsher sentences on offenders

who had demonstrated their resistance to correction through repeated

convictions but also noted, as a penal statute, it must be strictly

construed in favor of the defendant. Observing that the statute

contained no express tolling language, the court declined to toll the

10-year time limit when a defendant wrongfully delayed the criminal

proceedings. 396 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99.

Accordingly, the appellate court determined that defendant was

not eligible for an extended-term sentence when his 1993 conviction

occurred more than 10 years before his 2008 conviction.

Consequently, the court vacated as void the extended-term portion of

his sentence, consisting of 2½ years. The court also remanded the

cause to the trial court to vacate one of defendant’s aggravated

battery convictions under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. 396 Ill.

App. 3d at 795-97.

We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R.

315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The State challenges only the part of the

appellate court’s judgment on the extended-term sentence issue, and

we thus limit our consideration in this case to that issue.

II. ANALYSIS

The State argues the appellate court erred when it held that

defendant’s wrongful delay of criminal proceedings by becoming a

fugitive from justice did not toll the 10-year limit on prior convictions

used to impose an extended-term sentence under section

5–5–3.2(b)(1) of the Code. Acknowledging that the statute does not

specifically toll the 10-year time limit when a defendant wrongfully

delays proceedings, the State nonetheless contends that the appellate

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court’s construction of the statute was overly strict and directly

conflicts with both legislative intent and well-established public policy

prohibiting a criminal defendant from benefitting from his own

wrongdoing.

We review de novo the State’s claim because it presents a question

of statutory construction. People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 156

(2010). When construing a statute, our fundamental objective is to

ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, best indicated by

the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Tidwell, 236

Ill. 2d at 157. A reviewing court may also consider the underlying

purpose of the statute’s enactment, the evils sought to be remedied,

and the consequences of construing the statute in one manner versus

another. People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery, 235 Ill. 2d 73, 79 (2009).

It is always presumed that the legislature did not intend to cause

absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32,

44 (2009).

Section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) of the Code allows for imposition of an

extended-term sentence based on a defendant’s prior conviction when:

“[A] defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been

previously convicted in Illinois or any other jurisdiction of the

same or similar class felony or greater class felony, when such

conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous

conviction, excluding time spent in custody, and such charges

are separately brought and tried and arise out of different

series of acts[.]” 730 ILCS 5/5–5–3.2(b)(1) (West 1998).

Initially, we note that the legislature’s intent underlying this

provision is settled. As a recidivist statute, the goal of section

5–5–3.2(b)(1) “is to impose harsher sentences on offenders whose

repeated convictions have shown their resistance to correction.

[Citation.]” People v. Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d 469, 476 (1982); see also

People v. Lemons, 191 Ill. 2d 155, 160 (2000) (citing Robinson for

the legislative intent underlying section 5–5–3.2(b)(1)). Consistent

with this purpose, the plain language of the statute authorizes an

extended-term sentence based on a defendant’s prior criminal

conviction within the preceding 10 years, excluding time spent in

custody. Although the language allows exclusion of time spent in

custody, it does not refer to time spent as a result of a defendant’s

wrongful delay.

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We find instructive our decision in People v. Harden, 113 Ill. 2d

14, 21 (1986). In Harden, we construed an earlier version of section

5–5–3.2(b)(1) to determine whether a prior federal conviction could

serve as the basis for imposition of an extended-term sentence. The

version of the statute in Harden did not specifically reference a federal

conviction. Instead, the statutory language allowed imposition of an

extended-term sentence “ ‘[w]hen a defendant is convicted of any

felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois of the same

or greater class felony, within 10 years, excluding time spent in

custody.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at 21 (quoting

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005–5–3.2(b)(1)). In other words,

the statute was silent on the issue of whether it applied to a prior

federal conviction.

While noting that the statutory language did not reference federal

convictions, we also observed that the statute did not confine its

application only to Illinois convictions. To resolve the issue, we

focused on the legislative objective underlying the extended-term

sentencing statute, namely, to punish repeat criminal offenders more

severely. Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at 21.

In light of the legislature’s intent, we determined that, despite the

absence of language applying the statute to prior federal convictions,

the legislature intended the statute to apply to those convictions. We

explained as follows:

“[The legislature’s] objective cannot be attained if the statute’s

application is to depend upon the sheer chance of an

offender’s having been convicted earlier in a Federal or in a

State court. To construe the statute as providing only for

consideration of convictions in State courts in Illinois would

serve to defeat the statute’s purpose of imposing harsher

sentences on repeating offenders, who as a matter of public

policy should be subject to greater punishment. Too, curiously

and unintentionally, it would treat more harshly offenders who

have prior convictions in State courts, while exempting

Federal offenders.” Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at 21-22.

Therefore, in Harden we held that the language and purpose of

section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) required a conclusion that an offender’s prior

convictions in both federal and state courts may serve as the basis for

an extended-term sentence, despite the absence of statutory language

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applying the provision to federal convictions. Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at

22.1

Here, as in Harden, we must discern legislative intent on an issue

not specifically referenced by section 5–5–3.2(b)(1). In Harden, the

statutory language clearly applied to prior Illinois convictions but did

not reference federal convictions. Here, the statutory language clearly

excludes time spent in custody from the 10-year limit, but does not

reference exclusion of time spent as a result of a defendant’s wrongful

delay. Ultimately, as in Harden, the legislative intent underlying

section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) must control. Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at 21; see

also, e.g., Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d at 157 (primary objective of statutory

construction is giving effect to legislative intent).

Mindful that the legislature intended section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) to

impose harsher sentences on repeat offenders who have demonstrated

resistance to correction, we conclude that its intent can be honored

only by construing the statute to exclude, or toll, time lapsed during

a defendant’s wrongful delay of criminal proceedings when that

defendant otherwise qualifies for an extended-term sentence. In our

view, the legislature could not have intended to allow a defendant

subject to an extended-term sentence to avoid increased punishment

by violating bond and remaining a fugitive from justice until the 10-

year statutory limitation expires. Another shortcoming in the

construction advanced by defendant, and adopted by the appellate

court, is that it illogically punishes more severely defendants who

properly participate in criminal proceedings than defendants who flee

the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution.

Moreover, construing section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) to allow tolling based

on a defendant’s wrongful delay of proceedings as a fugitive from

justice is consistent with this court’s recognition that “ ‘[s]tatutes

must be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will

permit so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose prejudice

1

After our decision in Harden, the General Assembly amended

5–5–3.2(b)(1) to allow for extended-term sentences, in relevant part, when

the defendant has been “previously convicted in Illinois or any other

jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.) See 730 ILCS 5/5–5–3.2(b)(1) (West

1998).

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to public interests.’ ” In re Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 309 (2002)

(quoting Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District, 123 Ill. 2d 303,

313 (1988)). Here, as the State argues, construing the statute to toll

the 10-year limit when a defendant violates bond and becomes a

fugitive comports with well-established Illinois public policy

prohibiting a defendant from benefitting from his own wrongdoing and

allowing forfeiture of a defendant’s otherwise valid claims based on

his fugitive status. See People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 479

(1996) (concluding that defendant’s fugitive status warranted striking

all issues raised in defendant’s cross-appeal); Sahlinger v. People, 102

Ill. 241, 247 (1882) (determining that a defendant “can not be

permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, and thus defeat the

ends of justice”); McGowan v. People, 104 Ill. 100, 101-02 (1882)

(approving dismissal of a fugitive defendant’s appeal); People v.

Wicklund, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1045 (2006) (defendant not allowed to

appeal defense counsel’s failure to comply with instructions on

remand because defendant’s willful absence made it impossible for

counsel to comply); People v. Box, 260 Ill. App. 3d 803, 805-06

(1994) (defendant’s fugitive status prevented him from benefitting

from statute allowing him to serve simultaneous misdemeanor and

felony sentences); People v. Emery, 190 Ill. App. 3d 171 (1989)

(defendant’s fugitive status precluded him from obtaining a per diem

credit typically applied to a court-imposed fine).

We are not persuaded by defendant’s contention that the

legislature did not intend to toll the 10-year limit for a defendant’s

wrongful delay when section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) does not expressly allow

for tolling. It is likely, if not probable, that the legislature did not

specifically address the matter when it enacted the statute because it

did not contemplate the exclusion of an extended-term sentence when

a defendant wrongfully delayed criminal proceedings by violating bond

and fleeing the jurisdiction.

We addressed a similar situation in In re Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123,

137 (2005). In Powell, we construed a statutory filing provision under

the Sexually Violent Persons Act to determine whether a commitment

petition could be timely if filed within 90 days before an inmate’s

anticipated entry into mandatory supervised release (MSR), rather

than 90 days before the inmate’s actual entry into MSR. The

respondent in Powell refused to accept MSR, delaying his actual

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entry, and triggering the 90-day limit. The statute at issue, however,

was silent on the issue of whether “entry” meant actual entry into

MSR or anticipated entry in MSR. Instead, it merely referenced an

inmate’s “ ‘entry into mandatory supervised release.’ ” Powell, 217 Ill.

2d at 134-35 (quoting 725 ILCS 207/15(b–5)(1) (West 2000)).

Rejecting the petitioner’s contention that the statutory term

“entry” must be construed narrowly to mean actual entry into MSR,

we focused on the legislature’s intent to keep the public safe from

predatory sexual offenders, noting that a strict construction would run

counter to that intent. Furthermore, we explained that the statute did

not differentiate between actual entry and anticipated entry because

the legislature did not contemplate an inmate refusing MSR to trigger

the 90-day limit. Powell, 217 Ill. 2d at 137-38.

Here, as in Powell, it would be reasonable to assume the

legislature did not address the situation because it did not envision a

defendant avoiding an extended-term sentence by wrongfully delaying

criminal proceedings. This does not necessarily mean, however, that

the legislature’s silence must be construed to permit a defendant to

escape an extended-term sentence he otherwise qualifies for by

violating bail and becoming a fugitive until the 10-year limit has

passed.

Instead, as in Powell, we must focus on the legislative intent

underlying the statute. As we have already noted, it is indisputable that

the legislature intended section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) to impose harsher

sentences on defendants who receive another criminal conviction

within 10 years of a prior conviction. Considering this clear intent, it

would be absurd to construe the statute in a manner that allows a

defendant to avoid an extended-term sentence when he violates bond

and becomes a fugitive from justice. See Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 44

(reviewing court may presume that the legislature did not intend to

cause absurd results).

We also disagree with defendant’s contention that the rule of

lenity, requiring penal statutes to be construed strictly in favor of the

accused, warrants a construction of the statute to allow a defendant

to avoid an extended-term sentence by wrongfully delaying the

proceedings. The rule of lenity does not require this court to construe

a statute rigidly and circumvent the legislature’s intent. Powell, 217

Ill. 2d at 142. Indeed, the primacy of legislative intent is paramount,

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and all other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it.

Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 312. The strict construction advanced by

defendant would contravene the legislature’s intention to impose

harsher penalties on repeat offenders. We cannot countenance

defendant’s construction.

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the legislature’s clear intent to impose harsher

penalties on repeat offenders under section 5–5–3.2(b)(1), the statute

must be construed to toll the applicable 10-year limit for prior

convictions when the defendant wrongfully delays criminal

proceedings by violating bond and becoming a fugitive, but otherwise

qualifies for an extended-term sentence. Thus, any time that lapses as

a result of the defendant’s fugitive status should be excluded from the

calculation of the 10-year limit. Accordingly, we reverse the part of

the appellate court’s judgment construing the statute and vacating

defendant’s extended-term sentences.

Appellate court judgment reversed in part.

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