Williams v. Board of Review

Docket No. 109469.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

REGINIA WILLIAMS, Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF REVIEW,

an Administrative Agency of the State of Illinois, et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed March 24, 2011.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

At issue is whether appellee, Reginia Williams, is eligible to

receive trade readjustment allowance (TRA) benefits under the federal

Trade Act of 1974 (Act) (19 U.S.C. §2101 et seq. (2006))1. The

Board of Review (Board) of the Illinois Department of Employment

Security (Department) denied Williams TRA benefits because she had

missed a statutory deadline for enrollment in an approved training

program. The circuit court of Cook County confirmed the Board’s

decision, and the appellate court reversed (395 Ill. App. 3d 337).

1

All citations to the Act are to that version in existence prior to the

amendments adopted in 2009 as Pubic Law 111–5.

We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court, albeit for

reasons different from those advanced by that court.

BACKGROUND

To better understand the facts of this case, and to give them some

context, we begin with an overview of the federal legislation.

The Act

As set forth in the congressional statement of purpose, the Act is

intended to foster economic growth and full employment in the United

States, reduce trade barriers, and generally open up new market

opportunities. 19 U.S.C. §2102. The Act is also intended “to provide

adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor against

unfair or injurious import competition, and to assist industries, firm[s],

workers, and communities to adjust to changes in international trade

flows.” 19 U.S.C. §2102(4). To this end, the Act provides various

forms of relief from injury caused by import competition. See 19

U.S.C. §§2251 through 2401g. Specific to an “adversely affected

worker”–a worker who has been “separated from employment” (19

U.S.C. §2319(2))–the Act provides “trade adjustment assistance”

(TAA) in the form of “counseling, testing, training, placement, and

other supportive services,” with the goal of achieving reemployment.

20 C.F.R. §§617.1(a), 617.2, 617.3(nn) (2006); 19 U.S.C. §§2295

through 2298. In addition, the Act provides for the payment of a

TRA, a cash allowance payable to qualifying workers to supplement

state unemployment insurance benefits. 19 U.S.C. §§2291 through

2293; 20 C.F.R. §§617.1(b), 617.3(nn), 617.11.

TAA and TRA benefits are only available to workers covered by

a “certification of eligibility.” 19 U.S.C. §§2271, 2291. To obtain a

certification, a group of workers, their union or other representative,

or their employer must file a petition with the Secretary of Labor

(Secretary) indicating that the threatened or actual job losses are the

result of import competition or a shift in production to a foreign

country. See 19 U.S.C. §§2271, 2272. If, after investigation, the

Secretary agrees, the Secretary issues a certification of eligibility for

benefits. 19 U.S.C. §2273. A worker covered by a certification must

still satisfy other statutory conditions before payment of TRA benefits

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can be made. 19 U.S.C. §2291; 20 C.F.R. §617.11. One such

condition, relevant to this appeal, focuses on job training. 19 U.S.C.

§2291(a)(5); 20 C.F.R. 617.11(a)(2)(vii)(A). If the worker has not

already completed a training program approved by the Secretary, or

has not obtained a waiver of training, the worker must be enrolled in

an approved program by the latest of:

“(I) the last day of the 16th week after the worker’s most

recent total separation from adversely affected employment

***,

(II) the last day of the 8th week after the week in which

the Secretary issues a certification covering the worker, [or]

(III) 45 days after the later of the dates specified in

subclause (I) or (II), if the Secretary determines there are

extenuating circumstances that justify an extension in the

enrollment period[.]” 19 U.S.C. §2291(a)(5)(A)(ii).

The deadline established in subsections (I) and (II) above is generally

referred to by the Department of Labor as the “8/16 week deadline.”

See, e.g., 69 Fed. Reg. 60,903 (Oct. 13, 2004).

TRA benefits, though funded by the federal government, are

administered locally by the Department, as agent of the United States,

pursuant to a cooperative agreement with the Secretary. 19 U.S.C.

§§2311(a), 2313. The Department is obligated to notify workers

about the availability of TAA and TRA benefits at two distinct times.

First, the Department must advise each worker, at the time the worker

first applies for state unemployment insurance, of the benefits under

the Act, including the procedures and deadlines for applying for such

benefits. 19 U.S.C. §2311(f); 20 C.F.R. §§617.4(e)(1), 617.10(d).

Second, upon receipt of a certification of eligibility from the

Secretary, the Department must provide notice by mail to each worker

covered by that certification. 20 C.F.R. §617.4(d)(1)(i). The written

notice must include an explanation of how, when and where workers

can apply for benefits. 20 C.F.R. §617.4(d)(1)(ii). To effect notice by

mail, the Department is required to obtain from the employer, or other

reliable source, the names and addresses of all adversely affected

workers covered by the certification. 20 C.F.R. §617.4(d)(1)(ii).

With this background, we turn to the present dispute.

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Williams’ Case

On April 21, 2006, Williams’ employment with Chicago Castings

Company was terminated due to the permanent closing of that facility.

Williams had been employed at the company for over nine years. The

termination notice the company gave to Williams stated that she may

use the notice to apply for unemployment benefits. The notice did not

refer to TAA or TRA benefits. Two days later, Williams applied for

unemployment insurance benefits in person at her local unemployment

office. Williams explained where she had worked and why she was

laid off. The Department did not advise Williams that she might be

eligible for TRA benefits or provide any information to her about TRA

benefits generally. On June 21, 2006, the Secretary certified that

Chicago Castings’ workers were eligible to apply for benefits under

the Act. Williams was not on the list of workers the Department

obtained from Chicago Castings, and the Department never notified

Williams that she could apply for TRA benefits.

Williams first learned from a coworker, on or about October 10,

2006, about the possibility of being paid while obtaining training. The

coworker, who had worked in a different department than Williams,

said that she had received a letter explaining the program. Based on

this conversation, Williams believed that her unemployment insurance

benefits were the same as her coworker’s TRA benefits. After

exhaustion of her unemployment insurance benefits in December

2006, and after learning that there would be no extension, Williams

contacted her local unemployment office and inquired about TRA

benefits. As instructed, Williams obtained an appointment at the

Department’s local office on December 12, 2006. Williams was

advised that she was not in the system for TRA benefits or on the list

to whom outreach letters had been sent. Williams immediately applied

for TRA benefits and sought a waiver of the training requirement.

That same day, the Department, through its local TAA administrator,

denied Williams benefits because she had missed the 8/16 week

deadline for enrollment in an approved training program.

Under the 8/16 week deadline, Williams was required to be

enrolled by the later of August 12, 2006 (the last day of the 16th week

after she was laid off), or August 17, 2006 (the last day of the 8th

week after the Secretary’s certification). If extenuating circumstances

existed, the enrollment deadline could have been extended 45 days to

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October 2, 2006.

Williams immediately sought reconsideration, explaining that she

had not been advised of TRA benefits. On December 27, 2006, the

Department again ruled she was ineligible. Williams appealed that

decision, which resulted in a telephone hearing conducted by a

Department referee in May 2007. Williams testified generally to the

facts set forth above and argued that, under these circumstances,

equitable tolling should apply. The referee found, as a matter of fact,

that Williams did not apply for benefits earlier than December 12,

2006, “because she was unaware of possible eligibility prior to that

time.” The referee determined that while the reason for Williams’

failure to be enrolled in an approved training program was a

“compelling” one, he was without authority to overlook the statutory

deadline.

Williams appealed the referee’s decision to the Board, again

arguing that the decision should be reversed because the Department

failed to comply with its statutory obligation to provide notice to her

about the procedures and deadlines for TRA benefits. Williams cited

a federal regulation which provides a “good cause” exception to the

application deadline where notice is not provided. See 20 C.F.R.

§617.10(b). Williams further argued that under the doctrine of

equitable tolling her TRA application should be deemed timely.

Alternatively, Williams argued that the 8/16 week deadline does not

apply to training waivers, and that the matter should be remanded to

the Department to determine whether she qualifies for a waiver under

the Act.

The Board rejected Williams’ arguments and affirmed the referee’s

decision. The Board determined that (i) equitable tolling and equitable

estoppel do not bar application of the 8/16 week deadline; (ii) the

federal regulation on which Williams relied has been superceded by

the later adoption of the 8/16 week deadline; and (iii) the 8/16 week

deadline applies to both enrollment in training and obtaining a waiver

of training.

Williams filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit

court of Cook County, which confirmed the Board’s decision.

Williams appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding that the 8/16

week deadline should be extended pursuant to the “good cause”

exception in the governing federal regulation, and remanded the

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matter to the Department for a determination as to the amount of

benefits to which plaintiff is entitled. 395 Ill. App. 3d at 340-41 (citing

20 C.F.R. §617.10(b)). We allowed the Board’s petition for leave to

appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

ANALYSIS

I

Under the Act, the Board’s decision regarding entitlement to TRA

benefits is “subject to review in the same manner and to the same

extent” as decisions under our state Unemployment Insurance Act

(820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 2008)). 19 U.S.C. §§2311(d),

2319(10); 20 C.F.R. §617.51(a). That statute, in turn, provides that

a decision of the Board is reviewable in accordance with the

provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–101 et

seq. (West 2008)). 820 ILCS 405/1100 (West 2008). Review extends

to “all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before

the court.” 735 ILCS 5/3–110 (West 2008). Here, the initial questions

we address are purely legal: whether the 8/16 week deadline is subject

to equitable tolling or equitable estoppel and, if not, whether the

good-cause exception set forth in section 617.10(b) of title 20 of the

Code of Federal Regulations is still valid. On these questions, our

review proceeds de novo. See Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois

Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 369 (2002). We

turn first to the issue of equitable tolling.

II

In determining whether the 8/16 week deadline, a provision of a

federal statute, is subject to equitable tolling, we are bound by

decisions of the United States Supreme Court bearing on that issue.

Bowman v. American River Transportation Co., 217 Ill. 2d 75, 91

(2005). In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, and based on the

need for uniformity in the application of a federal statute, we will look

to decisions of the federal circuit and district courts as persuasive

authority. Bowman, 217 Ill. 2d at 91.

Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to

excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations

where “because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other

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circumstances beyond his control,” the plaintiff cannot reasonably be

expected to file suit on time. Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th

Cir. 1996). Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable

tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. Miller, 77 F.3d

at 191; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12

F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Equitable tolling just means that

without fault by either party the plaintiff does not have enough

information to sue within the period of limitations***.”); Lehman v.

United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Equitable

tolling focuses primarily on the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the

limitations period,” whereas “[e]quitable estoppel focuses on the

actions of the defendant” (emphases in original)).

A “nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally

subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’ ”

(Emphasis in original.) Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.

Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)).2 Based on the presumption,

application of the doctrine turns on the answer to the query: “Is there

good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable

tolling doctrine to apply?” (Emphasis in original.) United States v.

Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. 89).

Congress is presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this

presumption (Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002)),

which operates in suits against private parties, as well as in suits

against the federal government (Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96).

Equitable tolling is not applied exclusively to traditional limitation

periods for filing suit. The doctrine has also been applied to other

statutory and administrative deadlines. See, e.g., Young, 535 U.S. at

47 (holding that the Bankruptcy Code’s three-year lookback period,

which prescribes a period in which certain rights may be enforced, is

subject to equitable tolling); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455

U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding that the timely filing of a discrimination

2

The term “nonjurisdictional” means that the limitations provision is a

defense, like other threshold barriers to suit, which the defendant forfeits if

not raised, and which the court is not obligated to raise sua sponte. Day v.

McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006). The Board makes no argument that

the 8/16 week deadline is anything other than a nonjurisdictional time limit.

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charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a

requirement, like a statute of limitations, that is subject to waiver,

estoppel, and equitable tolling). Pertinent here, the doctrine has been

applied to toll various time limits contained in the Act.

In Former Employees of Sonoco Products Co. v. Chao, 372 F.3d

1291, 1296-98 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the federal court of appeals held that

equitable tolling applies to the Act’s 60-day deadline for contesting

the denial of a certification petition for benefit eligibility (19 U.S.C.

§2395(a)). Accord Anderson v. United States Secretary of

Agriculture, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade 1742, 1744 n.6, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1333,

1335 n.6 (2006); Former Employees of Quality Fabricating, Inc. v.

United States Secretary of Labor, 27 Ct. Int’l Trade 419, 422-24, 259

F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285-86 (2003); Former Employees of Siemens

Information Communication Networks, Inc. v. Herman, 24 Ct. Int’l

Trade 1201, 1205-08, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111-14 (2000).

Additionally, the Court of International Trade,3 in Former

Employees of Fisher & Co. v. United States Department of Labor, 31

Ct. Int’l Trade 1272, 1278-79, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1329 (2007),

held that equitable tolling applies to the Act’s one-year deadline for

filing a petition for TAA certification (19 U.S.C. §2273(b)(1)). The

same court also held, in Lady Kelly, Inc. v. United States Secretary of

Agriculture, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade 186, 188-90, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1171,

1174-75 (2006), that equitable tolling applies to the Act’s 90-day

deadline for applying for benefits after a petition is certified (19

U.S.C. §2401e(a)(1)). Accord Truong v. United States Secretary of

Agriculture, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade 1512, 1513, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1349,

1351 (2006).

3

The Court of International Trade, established under article III of the

Constitution of the United States (28 U.S.C. §251 (2006)), has exclusive

jurisdiction of certain civil actions commenced against the United States, and

its agencies and officers, including any civil action commenced to review a

final determination of the Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Commerce, or

Secretary of Agriculture with respect to eligibility of workers, firms,

communities and agricultural commodity producers for TAA under the Act.

28 U.S.C. §1581; 19 U.S.C. §2395(a). Decisions of the Court of

International Trade may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit (28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(5); 19 U.S.C. §2395(c)).

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The Board argues that the deadlines in Sonoco, Fisher and Lady

Kelly are similar to traditional limitations periods to which equitable

tolling applies, but are dissimilar to the 8/16 week deadline which sets

forth a requirement for benefit eligibility. We agree that the deadline

in Sonoco, which established a time limit for contesting an adverse

benefits decision, does not closely resemble the 8/16 week deadline.

Thus, Sonoco lends little support for application of equitable tolling

here.

The deadlines at issue in Fisher and Lady Kelly, however, do

resemble the 8/16 week deadline. In each case, the statutory deadline

that was subject to tolling set forth a time limit by which a claimant

under the Act was required to complete some task as a condition of

benefit eligibility. In Fisher, the task was the timely filing of a petition

for TAA certification, and in Lady Kelly the task was the timely filing

of an application for benefits after a petition was certified. Here, the

task was timely enrollment in an approved training program. While

this similarity militates in favor of applying equitable tolling to the

8/16 week deadline, we must consider, as the Supreme Court

instructs, whether “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did

not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” (Emphasis in

original.) Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350.

In discerning congressional intent, where the agency charged with

administration of the federal statute has answered the question before

the reviewing court, the court need only decide whether that answer

is based on a “permissible construction” of the statute. Chevron

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 843 (1984). Here, however, the federal agency charged with

administering the Act–the Department of Labor–has not answered the

question of whether equitable tolling can apply to the 8/16 week

deadline. Since Congress adopted the deadline, the Department of

Labor has not promulgated any regulation which addresses the

applicability of equitable tolling generally, or the availability of tolling

where, as here, notice to the worker was lacking.4

4

Although the Department of Labor, in 1986, adopted, a “good cause”

exception to the TRA application deadline (20 C.F.R. §617.10(b); 51 Fed.

Reg. 45,840 (Dec. 22, 1986)), that regulation predates by several years the

adoption by Congress of the 8/16 week deadline. See Trade Act of 2002

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The Board directs our attention to the Department of Labor’s

“Training and Employment Guidance Letters” (TEGLs), certain of

which the Board is obligated to follow pursuant to the Department’s

agreement with the Secretary. While the TEGLs may merit some

deference (see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35

(2001)), the TEGLs do not address equitable tolling. To be sure, the

TEGLs generally speak in terms of adhering to the 8/16 week

deadline. See, e.g., Department of Labor TEGL No. 11–02, Change

1, 69 Fed. Reg. 60,903 (Oct. 13, 2004). But a statement from the

Department of Labor that the Act’s deadlines should be followed is

not tantamount to a statement that the deadlines must be followed in

all cases and can never be relaxed, no matter the equities.

In the absence of guidance from the agency on the applicability of

equitable tolling, courts will consider the language establishing the

statutory deadline, the underlying subject matter and purpose of the

statute, and the practical effect of applying the doctrine. See

Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350-51; Burnett v. New York Central R.R.

Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965); Siemens, 24 Ct. Int’l Trade at 1207-

08, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. To illustrate, in Brockamp, the Supreme

Court considered whether equitable tolling could apply to the time

limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in section 6511 of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. §6511 (2006)). The Court

initially focused on the forcefulness and complexity of the limitations

provision:

“Section 6511 sets forth its time limitations in unusually

emphatic form. Ordinarily limitations statutes use fairly simple

language, which one can often plausibly read as containing an

implied ‘equitable tolling’ exception. ***. But §6511 uses

language that is not simple. It sets forth its limitations in a

highly detailed technical manner, that, linguistically speaking,

cannot easily be read as containing implicit exceptions.

Moreover, §6511 reiterates its limitations several times in

several different ways.” Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350-51.

(Pub. L. 107–210, 116 Stat. 933, 939). Accordingly, we do not view this

regulation as necessarily indicative of the Department of Labor’s position on

whether equitable tolling can apply to the 8/16 week deadline.

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The Court also observed that section 6511 contained explicit

exceptions to its basic time limits, which did not include equitable

tolling. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 351. The Court further observed that

tolling the time limits in section 651l would toll not only the

procedural limitation, but would also affect the Internal Revenue

Code’s substantive limitations on the amount of recovery. Brockamp,

519 U.S. at 352. Finally, the Court considered the underlying subject

matter–nationwide tax collection–and expressed strong concern that

permitting tolling could create significant administrative problems by

forcing the Internal Revenue Service to respond to, and perhaps

litigate, large numbers of late claims, based on requests for equitable

tolling without sufficient equitable justification. Brockamp, 519 U.S.

at 352. The Court noted that the Internal Revenue Service processes

more than 200 million tax returns and more than 90 million refunds

each year, and concluded that “[t]he nature and potential magnitude

of the administrative problem suggest that Congress decided to pay

the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases *** in order to

maintain a more workable tax enforcement system.” Brockamp, 519

U.S. at 352-53. For these reasons, the Court held that equitable tolling

would not apply to the deadline in section 6511. Brockamp, 519 U.S.

at 354.

The Board argues that, similar to the Internal Revenue Code

deadline in Brockamp, the 8/16 week deadline is “emphatic,

mandatory, and technical” and thus not subject to equitable tolling.

We disagree. The 8/16 week deadline is not written in a repetitive or

unusually emphatic manner. The deadline appears once, as part of

section 2291(a) of the Act, and the language is relatively

straightforward. Section 2291(a) states that “[p]ayment of a trade

readjustment allowance shall be made to an adversely affected worker

*** if the following conditions are met.” 19 U.S.C. §2291(a). One

such condition is that the worker “is enrolled in a training program

*** no later than the latest of–”

“(I) the last day of the 16th week after the worker’s most

recent total separation from adversely affected employment

***, [or]

(II) the last day of the 8th week after the week in which

the Secretary issues a certification covering the worker[.]” 19

U.S.C. §2291(a)(5).

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The deadline for enrollment is established simply by counting days

from two relevant dates: the date the worker is laid off, and the date

the Secretary’s certification is issued. While not as simplistic as some

statutory time limits, the 8/16 week deadline does not approach the

complexity of the deadline at issue in Brockamp and is not so highly

technical as to preclude an implicit tolling provision.

In addition, and also in contrast to Brockamp, tolling the 8/16

week deadline would not affect the substance of a worker’s TRA

benefits; it would simply remove a procedural obstacle in obtaining

those benefits. Nor would tolling create the potential for

administrative problems like those envisioned in Brockamp. Unlike the

Internal Revenue Code, which applies broadly to millions of

Americans, the Act applies only to certain qualifying workers who

have been certified as eligible for TAA and TRA benefits by the

Secretary. Though the Board claims that tolling would hamstring TRA

administration, it provides no specifics as to why that is necessarily the

case.

The only similarity between the deadline in Brockamp, which was

not subject to tolling, and the 8/16 week deadline at issue here is that

both enactments contain an exception to the statutory time limit.

Under the Act, where “extenuating circumstances” exist, the 8/16

week deadline may be extended 45 days. 19 U.S.C.

§2291(a)(5)(A)(ii)(III). The Board, seizing on this language, argues

that Congress could not have intended for equitable tolling to apply.

Case law indicates that the inclusion of an express tolling

provision that operates in limited situations does not necessarily

preclude equitable tolling in other situations. For example, in Holland,

the Supreme Court held that a provision in the federal habeas corpus

statute which tolled the federal limitation period during the time the

defendant has a petition for postconviction relief pending in state

court does not bar equitable tolling in other situations. The Court

explained:

“[T]he fact that Congress expressly referred to tolling during

state collateral review proceedings is easily explained without

rebutting the presumption in favor of equitable tolling. A

petitioner cannot bring a federal habeas claim without first

exhausting state remedies–a process that frequently takes

longer than one year. [Citation.] Hence, Congress had to

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explain how the limitations statute accounts for the time

during which such state proceedings are pending. This special

need for an express provision undermines any temptation to

invoke the interpretive maxim inclusio unius est exclusio

alterius (to include one item (i.e., suspension during state-

court collateral review) is to exclude other similar items (i.e.,

equitable tolling)).” (Emphasis in original.) Holland, 560 U.S.

at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2562.

See also Young 535 U.S. at 53 (inclusion of express tolling provision

in the same section as the Bankruptcy Code’s three-year lookback

provision supplements, rather than displaces, principles of equitable

tolling).

The Board argues that, unlike Holland, no “special need”

underlies the 45-day tolling period contained in the Act. Assuming,

arguendo, that the Board is correct, this aspect of the federal

legislation is not, standing alone, determinative of whether the

presumption in favor of equitable tolling applies. As Brockamp

demonstrates, an express tolling provision is one circumstance, among

many, which a court must consider. Moreover, any uncertainty about

congressional intent based on the 45-day tolling provision dissolves

when we consider, as we must, the purpose of the Act:

“Trade Adjustment Assistance (‘TAA’) programs

historically have been–and today continue to be–touted as the

quid pro quo for U.S. national policies of free trade.

[Citation.]

As UAW v. Marshall explains, ‘much as the doctrine of

eminent domain requires compensation when private property

is taken for public use,’ the trade adjustment assistance laws

similarly reflect the country’s recognition ‘that fairness

demand[s] some mechanism whereby the national public,

which realizes an overall gain through trade readjustments, can

compensate the particular ... workers who suffer a [job] loss.’

UAW v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

In short, absent TAA programs that are adequately funded

and conscientiously administered, ‘the costs of a federal policy

[of free trade] that confer[s] benefits on the nation as a whole

would be imposed on a minority of American workers’ who

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lose their jobs due to increased imports and shifts of

production abroad.” Former Employees of BMC Software,

Inc. v. United States Secretary of Labor, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade

1315, 1316-17, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1307-09 (2006).

See also 19 U.S.C. §2102 (setting forth congressional statement of

purpose).

The Act must be broadly construed to effect this remedial

purpose. BMC Software, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade at 1320, 454 F. Supp. 2d

at 1311; Siemens, 24 Ct. Int’l Trade at 1208, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1113;

see also 20 C.F.R. §617.52(a) (requiring liberal construction of the

Act to carry out its purpose). Application of the doctrine of equitable

tolling to the 8/16 week deadline furthers this purpose.

We recognize, as the Board notes, that the Act has been amended

numerous times since its adoption in 1974, and that a greater focus

has been placed on enrollment in an approved training program to

expedite reemployment. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of

1981, Pub. L. 97–35, 95 Stat. 357 (adopting a provision authorizing

the Secretary of Labor to require workers to accept training in certain

circumstances); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,

Pub. L. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1244 (adopting a training

requirement as a condition of benefits); Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L.

107–210, 116 Stat. 933, 939 (adopting the 8/16 week deadline for

enrollment in training). That focus, however, has not altered the

remedial purpose of the Act as a whole, or the remedial purpose of the

specific provisions defining the TRA program.

Based on the language of the Act, as well as its subject and

purpose, and considering the practical implications of applying

equitable tolling, we hold that the presumption in favor of equitable

tolling applies to the 8/16 week deadline.

III

We next consider whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies

under the facts of this case. While we applied the do novo standard of

review to the issue of whether the 8/16 week deadline can be tolled,

we apply the clearly erroneous standard for mixed questions of law

and fact to the issue of whether the deadline should be tolled. See

Carpetland U.S.A., 201 Ill. 2d at 369; Truong, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade at

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1518, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. Under this standard, we will reverse

the Board’s decision only if, after review of the entire record, we are

“ ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.’ ” AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of

Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001) (quoting United

States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

Where equitable tolling is available, federal courts typically extend

it only “sparingly.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. The court’s reluctance to

apply tolling is based on “deference to Congress’ decision to establish

a deadline in the first place.” Lady Kelly, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade at 190,

427 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Nonetheless, ignorance of a statutory

deadline based on lack of notice or inadequate notice may provide a

proper basis for equitable tolling. Baldwin County Welcome Center v.

Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (citing Gates v. Georgia-Pacific

Corp., 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974)); Leorna v. United States

Department of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997); Anderson,

30 Ct. Int’l Trade at 1744 n.6, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1335 n.6; Truong,

30 Ct. Int’l Trade at 1516, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.

Here, the Act expressly requires notice to a worker who applies

for unemployment insurance of the benefits available under the Act,

including the procedures and deadlines (19 U.S.C. §2311(f)), as well

as written notice through the mail (19 U.S.C. §2275(b)(1)). The

Department of Labor’s administrative regulations mirror these

requirements. See 20 C.F.R. §§617.4(a), (d), (e), 617.10(d). As to the

8/16 week deadline, the Department of Labor’s training materials

underscore the necessity of notice:

“In many cases, the 8/16 week deadline for a worker will be

reached while the worker is still receiving unemployment

insurance (UI). Some workers are not aware that this deadline

may apply before they exhaust their UI. The SWA [State

Workforce Agency] is responsible for informing workers of

these requirements.” Department of Labor, TEGL No. 11–02,

Change 1, 69 Fed. Reg. 60,903 (Oct. 13, 2004).

This is the very situation that occurred here. The 8/16 week deadline

expired while Williams was still receiving unemployment insurance

benefits.

The statutory notice provisions, the federal regulations, and the

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Department of Labor’s related materials reflect the judgment of

Congress, as well as the Department of Labor, as to what may

reasonably be expected of adversely affected workers, i.e., in the

absence of notice, workers cannot be expected to learn about their

eligibility for benefits under the Act. The protection afforded workers

through the notice requirements would be rendered a nullity if we

were to hold that failure to provide notice was an insufficient basis on

which to toll the 8/16 week deadline. See Truong, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade

at 1516-17, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.

No dispute exists that the Department failed to provide Williams

with the required notice. Though the Board indicated in its order that

the Department did not act negligently, application of the doctrine of

equitable tolling does not require that the Department be at fault. See

Miller, 77 F.3d at 191; Tregenza, 12 F.3d at 721. Equitable tolling,

however, does require due diligence on the part of the claimant. Irwin,

498 U.S. at 96. Due diligence is a “fact-specific inquiry, guided by

reference to the hypothetical reasonable person,” or, in this case, a

reasonably prudent claimant similarly situated. Siemens, 24 Ct. Int’l

Trade at 1208, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.

As reflected in its order, the Board argues that Williams did not

exercise due diligence when she failed to inquire about TRA benefits

following her October 10, 2006, conversation with a coworker. The

Board notes that Williams waited almost two months, until her

unemployment insurance benefits were exhausted, before making

inquiry. The Board essentially argues that, to the extent equitable

tolling is applicable, the 8/16 week deadline would only be tolled for

some reasonable period after the October 2006 conversation, and that

December 2006 was simply too late.

Underlying the Board’s argument is its unexpressed conclusion

that Williams’ conversation with her coworker was an adequate

substitute for statutory notice, or that Williams at least had enough

information at that time to cause her to make further inquiry. The

record, however, does not support such a conclusion. Williams’

conversation with her coworker was not an adequate substitute for the

statutorily required notice because the conversation took place after

both the 8/16 deadline and the 45-day extension period had expired,

and months after she should have received notice from the

Department. See 19 U.S.C. §2311(f)(1) (requiring notice to “each

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worker who applies for unemployment insurance”).

As to the substance of the conversation, the record does not

support any inference that Williams had enough information to cause

her to make further inquiry. Williams testified that she had never heard

of the program, and that she did not do anything at that time because

she thought her coworker’s benefits were essentially “the same thing”

as her unemployment insurance benefits, which Williams was still

receiving. We note that the Department’s hearing referee, whose

decision the Board affirmed, made a factual finding that Williams did

not file for benefits sooner than December 2006 “because she was

unaware of possible eligibility prior to that time.” Williams had no

reason to know of the 8/16 deadline, much less that it had passed. Her

inquiry in December 2006 satisfies the due diligence requirement for

application of equitable tolling.

Based on our review of the entire record, we are left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed; the

Board erred in failing to toll the 8/16 week deadline and denying

Williams TRA benefits.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the appellate court judgment in favor

of Williams is affirmed. In light of our disposition, we need not

address whether the 8/16 week deadline is subject to equitable

estoppel, or whether the federal regulation which formed the basis of

the appellate court’s decision is still valid.

Affirmed.

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