Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services v. Warner

Docket No. 103289.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND

FAMILY SERVICES, Appellant, v. EVERETT WARNER,

Appellee.

Opinion filed January 25, 2008.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Garman and Burke concurred

in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Kilbride dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices

Fitzgerald and Karmeier.

OPINION

In February 1996 the Illinois Department of Public Aid, now

known as the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services

(the Department), filed a petition in the circuit court of Adams County

to establish Everett Warner (respondent) as the father of C.S. and

B.S. Respondent entered into an agreed judgment of parentage, and

the court ordered him to pay child support. In October 2002, in a

separate proceeding, respondent’s parental rights were terminated.

More than two years later–in March 2005–respondent petitioned the

circuit court to vacate the child support order. Relying on section 17

of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)), respondent

argued that the termination of his parental rights had also ended his

parental responsibilities, including the obligation to pay child support.

The circuit court denied the petition, and respondent appealed. The

appellate court reversed. 366 Ill. App. 3d 1178. For the reasons set

forth below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Debbie Stover is the mother of C.S., born December 12, 1993,

and B.S., born August 18, 1995. In February 1996, the Department

petitioned the circuit court, on Stover’s behalf, to establish respondent

as the father of the two children, and to order him to pay child

support. On March 28, 1996, the court entered a judgment of

parentage, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, finding that respondent

was the father of C.S. and B.S. The court ordered respondent to pay

child support in the amount of $46.13 per week. In September 1999

the Department petitioned the court for a modification of the child

support order. The petition, which alleged that the mother had

custody of the children, claimed that there had been a “significant

change in circumstances” since the initial child support order was

entered. According to the Department, there was a need for health

insurance or some other means of providing for the children’s health

care. The Department asked that respondent be ordered to carry

dependent health insurance and to pay any uninsured health-care

costs. On October 7, 1999, the court increased respondent’s support

obligation to $120 every two weeks. However, the court denied the

Department’s health insurance request “due to [the] prohibitive cost

to obtain such insurance for the dependents.” The court added:

“Respondent agrees to [the] increase in the support obligation.”

On October 24, 2002, in a separate proceeding in juvenile court,

respondent’s and Stover’s parental rights were terminated. The record

in the case at bar contains no copies of the termination orders.

On February 2, 2005, respondent filed a pro se motion to end his

child support obligation. In support of this motion, respondent noted

that both his and Stover’s parental rights had been terminated. At the

hearing that followed, the Department informed the court that

respondent’s support payments were being used by the state to help

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pay for the children’s foster care. The Department indicated it would

oppose any motion to end respondent’s support obligation. According

to the Department, a parent’s obligation to support a child does not

end with the termination of parental rights. That obligation would

cease, the Department asserted, only if the child were adopted. The

circuit court continued respondent’s motion in order to allow him time

to consult with an attorney.

Respondent retained an attorney, and filed a petition to vacate the

child support order. The petition was based on section 17 of the

Adoption Act, which provides that, after either a termination of

parental rights or a judgment of adoption, the natural parents of a

child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental

responsibility for the child. 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004).

On March 31, 2005, at a hearing on the petition, respondent and

the Department stipulated, in relevant part, that (1) respondent had

continued to pay child support of $120 every two weeks even after his

parental rights were terminated, (2) the children had been in the

custody and guardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and

Family Services (DCFS) since before the date of termination, and (3)

the state had received respondent’s child support payments since the

date of termination. The circuit court took judicial notice of the

juvenile court orders in cases 00–JA–41 and 00–JA–42 terminating

respondent’s and Stover’s parental rights, as well as the most recent

order in those cases showing that the goal for the children remained

adoption.

During the March 31 hearing, respondent argued that, under

section 17 of the Adoption Act, he was relieved of all parental

responsibility, including any obligation to pay child support. In

response, the Department argued that, under In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d

53 (1993), the termination of parental rights does not effect a

complete severance between a child and its natural parents. The parent

still has a residual, common law duty to support the child, and this

residual duty stands as an exception to section 17 of the Adoption

Act. According to the Department, respondent in the case at bar

retained a residual obligation to pay child support, even though his

parental rights had been terminated.

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On May 6, 2005, the circuit court entered an order denying

respondent’s petition to vacate the child support order. The court

stated:

“Pursuant to the clear language of In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d

53, 619 N.E.2d 702, 708 (1993), termination of the

respondent’s parental rights did not extinguish his obligation

to support his children, notwithstanding the language of 750

ILCS 50/17, which was in effect at the time of the holding in

In re M.M.”

Respondent appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 366 Ill.

App. 3d 1178. The appellate court held that, under section 17 of the

Adoption Act, a termination of parental rights ends all parental

responsibility, including the obligation to pay child support. In

reaching this decision, the court rejected the Department’s arguments

that (1) section 17 did not apply to the case at bar because neither

C.S. nor B.S. was in the process of being adopted, and, alternatively

(2) even if section 17 did apply, the termination of parental rights did

not eliminate a natural parent’s common law, residual duty to support

a child. With regard to the first argument, the appellate court

acknowledged that section 17, by its terms, applies to “ ‘the natural

parents of a child sought to be adopted.’ “ 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1180,

quoting 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004). The court also noted the

Department’s assertion that there was no evidence before the trial

court suggesting that anyone was seeking to adopt C.S. or B.S.

Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded: “a fair reading of the

statute includes situations where a child is available for adoption,

whether or not someone is actively seeking to adopt that child, and

where a child has been adopted.” 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1180. The

appellate court noted that respondent’s parental rights had been

terminated and that the goal for C.S. and B.S. was adoption.

According to the appellate court, C.S. and B.S. therefore were

available for adoption, and section 17 applied.

Turning to the Department’s alternative argument regarding the

residual duty of support, the court pointed to M.M., upon which the

circuit court relied in concluding that respondent’s obligation to

support his children survived the termination of his parental rights.

The appellate court asserted that M.M.’s mentioning of the residual

duty of support was part of a general discussion dealing with historical

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context. According to the appellate court, M.M. “did not attempt to

address the current viability of any residual duty of support.” 366 Ill.

App. 3d at 1182. The appellate court added that M.M. made no

specific mention of section 17 of the Adoption Act.

We allowed the Department’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.

2d R. 315. We also allowed the Cook County public guardian to file

an amicus curiae brief in support of the Department. 210 Ill. 2d R.

345.

ANALYSIS

Before this court, the Department advances the same two

arguments it raised below. First, the Department contends that section

17 is inapplicable to the case at bar because neither C.S. nor B.S. is “a

child sought to be adopted” (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)).

Alternatively, the Department argues that even if section 17 does

apply, it does not eliminate a natural parent’s common law, residual

duty of support, which survives a termination of parental rights.

To address the Department’s first argument, we are required to

construe section 17 of the Adoption Act. Our review is therefore de

novo. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002). The

primary objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent

of the legislature. Harshman v. DePhillips, 218 Ill. 2d 482, 493

(2006); Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 307. The most reliable indicator of

the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute, which is given its

plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Lieberman, 201 Ill.

2d at 308. “We read the statute as a whole, considering all relevant

parts.” Harshman, 218 Ill. 2d at 493.

Section 17 provides:

“After either the entry of an order terminating parental

rights or the entry of a judgment of adoption, the natural

parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all

parental responsibility for such child and shall be deprived of

all legal rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free

from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects

such natural parents.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/17

(West 2004).

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According to its plain language, section 17 applies to the natural

parents of a child “sought to be adopted.” The term “seek” is defined

as “to make an attempt: TRY.” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 2055 (2002). Under this definition, a child “sought to be

adopted” is one whom someone is attempting or trying to adopt.

Section 17 does not identify who may seek to adopt a child. This

section could reasonably, although erroneously, be construed in

isolation to mean that merely by making a child available for adoption

the state “seeks” to have the child adopted. This is not the case.

Section 2 of the Adoption Act provides that only individuals who

meet certain requirements may institute an adoption proceeding. 750

ILCS 50/2 (West 2004). When section 17 is read in conjunction with

section 2, it is clear that the state cannot seek the adoption of a child.

In the case at bar, there is no indication in the record that C.S. and

B.S.–who are 13 and 12 years old, respectively–are now, or ever

were, in the process of being adopted. 1 Accordingly, under the plain

meaning of the relevant statutory terms, neither of them is “a child

sought to be adopted” (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent argues that section 17

should not be interpreted as applying only where the child is “sought

to be adopted.” According to respondent, construing the statute in this

manner would lead to an absurd result: “the statute would not apply

to a child who is adopted and therefore no longer sought to be

adopted.” Respondent appears to argue that, because of this absurd

result, the “sought to be adopted” language should not apply after the

entry of a judgment of adoption. According to respondent, this

language also should not apply after the termination of parental rights.

Respondent’s argument, in essence, is that in construing section 17,

we should ignore the “sought to be adopted” language.

Section 17 deals with the effect on parental rights and

responsibilities of two distinct judicial actions: an order terminating

parental rights and a judgment of adoption. In the latter of these

two–the entry of a judgment of adoption–the result is that the child is

adopted. In such situations, where section 17 applies “after the entry

1

In his brief to this court, respondent does not argue that C.S. and B.S.

were sought to be adopted.

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of a judgment of adoption” and the child is adopted, it would be

illogical to limit the statute’s application to instances where the child

is “sought to be adopted.” By definition, a child who is adopted

cannot simultaneously be “sought to be adopted.” The two terms

cancel each other out. However, the same cannot be said of an order

terminating parental rights, which does not necessarily result in the

adoption of the child. Where the child is not adopted, there is no

contradiction in terms–as there is in the judgment-of-adoption

situation–that would prevent the application of the “sought to be

adopted” language. Moreover, where the child is not adopted, there

is a sound policy reason for limiting the termination of parental

responsibilities to situations where the child is “sought to be adopted.”

Section 17 contemplates that, once a prospective adoptive parent

steps forward, the transition to an adoptive parent’s taking financial

responsibility for the child can begin to take place. However, where

no prospective adoptive parent has come forward, the termination of

the natural parent’s support obligation would leave the child with only

the state to look to for sustenance. By limiting the application of

section 17 to situations where the child is “sought to be adopted,” the

General Assembly clearly intended to avoid such a result.

We conclude that, after the entry of an order terminating parental

rights, where the child is not adopted, section 17 applies, as its plain

language indicates, only where the child is “sought to be adopted.”

Conversely, after the entry of a judgment of adoption, where the child

is adopted, the “sought to be adopted” language cannot logically

apply. In so holding, we adhere to the principle that a statute must be

given a sensible construction, “ ‘even though such construction

qualifies the universality of its language.’ ” Adams v. Northern Illinois

Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 64 (2004), quoting In re Illinois Bell

Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 246 (1994). We

emphasize the limited scope of our interpretation. We are qualifying

the reach of the “sought to be adopted” language, not eliminating it

from the statute altogether. To hold that this language is of no effect,

as respondent urges, would render the language superfluous or

meaningless. Such a construction is to be avoided, if possible. People

ex rel. Ryan v. Agpro, Inc., 214 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (2005).

While respondent in the case at bar argues that the phrase “sought

to be adopted” in section 17 should simply be ignored, the appellate

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court below followed a different path to reach essentially the same

conclusion. According to the appellate court, “a fair reading of

[section 17] includes situations where a child is available for

adoption, whether or not someone is actively seeking to adopt that

child.” (Emphasis added.) 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1180. In the appellate

court’s view, C.S. and B.S. were available for adoption, and section

17 therefore applied, regardless of whether C.S. and B.S. were sought

to be adopted. We find this analysis unpersuasive.

We initially note that the phrase “available for adoption” does not

appear in section 17. Rather, the appellate court, without any citation

to authority, construed the phrase “sought to be adopted” to include

children “available for adoption.” The appellate court’s analysis

ignores the fact that the phrase “available for adoption” has a precise

meaning in the Adoption Act. See 750 ILCS 50/1(F) (West 2004)

(defining a person “available for adoption”). Had the General

Assembly intended to include children “available for adoption” within

the ambit of section 17, it could have specifically done so. It did not.

We cannot depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into

it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the

legislature. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 437 (2004).

Finally, we note respondent’s reference, in his appellee brief, to

section 2–29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS

405/2–29(2) (West 2004)). This provision was not raised by

respondent in either the circuit court or the appellate court as the basis

for his claim that the child support order should be vacated.

Respondent has therefore forfeited any argument based on section

2–29(2). See Vine Street Clinic v. HealthLink, Inc., 222 Ill. 2d 276,

301 (2006). In addition, before this court, respondent provides no

argument with regard to section 2–29(2), nor does he explain how this

provision relates to his claim. His reference to section 2–29(2) in his

brief consists solely of the quotation of the statute. Without more, we

are unable to review any contentions that might have been made with

regard to this issue. 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7). We faced a similar

situation in Zaabel v. Konetski, 209 Ill. 2d 127 (2004), where the

petitioner raised a point in his reply brief but offered no argument. In

a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Garman, we held that the

point therefore was waived. We noted that a forfeited issue may

sometimes be addressed in the interest of justice, but stated: “[I]n this

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case the interest of justice does not require that we search for

arguments that [the petitioner] himself has made no attempt

whatsoever to provide.” Zaabel, 209 Ill. 2d at 137.

Moreover, as previously noted, the record in this case contains no

copies of the juvenile court orders terminating respondent’s and

Stover’s parental rights. It was the responsibility of respondent, as the

appellant below, to present a sufficiently complete record to support

a claim of error. Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001).

The absence of the orders makes it difficult for us to discuss with any

certainty the impact, if any, that section 2–29(2) has on this case.

Under section 2–29(2), the termination of parental responsibility

occurs in the context of the naming of a guardian. Section 2–29(2)

provides that, in terminating parental rights, the juvenile court may

authorize the guardian of the person of the minor to consent to

adoption. An order so empowering the guardian to consent to

adoption relieves the parents of all parental responsibility. 705 ILCS

405/2–29(2) (West 2004). In the case at bar, because the orders

terminating parental rights are not in the record, we do not know if

the juvenile court authorized the guardian to consent to adoption and

thereby, under section 2–29(2), relieved the parents of all parental

responsibility. Under these circumstances, we cannot determine if

section 2–29(2) is relevant to the instant case. Thus, given

respondent’s failure to properly raise the applicability of section

2–29(2) below, his failure to properly brief the statute before this

court, and his failure to provide a sufficient record, we decline to

engage in discussion which, of necessity, would be mere speculation.2

We express no opinion as to whether section 2–29(2) could be

considered in a case where the record contained support for the claim.

2

For example, such discussion would require us to speculate as to the

nature of the arguments regarding section 2–29(2) that respondent could

have made, but did not. We would, in effect, be acting as an advocate. A

reviewing court should not assume such a role. See People v. Jung, 192 Ill.

2d 1, 22 (2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting); Vernon Hills III Ltd.

Partnership v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 303,

311 (1997).

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We leave for another day the resolution of that question, when we are

confronted with an appropriate case.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the dissent argues that section

2–29(2) should have been included in our analysis, regardless of any

forfeiture of the issue or deficiency in the record. According to the

dissent, this provision of the Juvenile Court Act “is clearly relevant to

construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act.” Slip op. at 15

(Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Karmeier, JJ.). We

agree that the interpretation of section 17–specifically, the “sought to

be adopted” language–is at the heart of this appeal. However, we find

unpersuasive the dissent’s argument that section 2–29(2) is essential

to our analysis.

Under section 2–29(2), as noted, the juvenile court, upon the

satisfaction of certain conditions, “may terminate parental rights and

empower the guardian of the person of the minor, in the order

appointing him or her as such guardian, *** to consent to the

adoption.” 705 ILCS 405/2–29(2) (West 2004). Section 2–29(2)

provides further that “[a]n order so empowering the guardian to

consent to adoption deprives the parents of the minor of all legal

rights as respects the minor and relieves them of all parental

responsibility for him or her ***.” 705 ILCS 405/2–29(2) (West

2004). In section 2–29(2), it is the order authorizing the guardian to

consent to adoption that triggers the termination of parental

responsibility. This contrasts with section 17 of the Adoption Act,

which provides that, after the entry of an order terminating parental

rights, “the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be

relieved of all parental responsibility for such child.” (Emphasis

added.) 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004). Here, the question of the

termination of parental responsibility turns on whether the child is

“sought to be adopted.”

In the case at bar, even if we were to consider section 2–29(2), as

the dissent urges, the statute would provide no help in construing

section 17. Section 2–29(2) simply has nothing to say about the

interpretation of the term “sought to be adopted” in section 17.3 For

3

Indeed, the term “sought to be adopted” does not appear in section

2–29(2).

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this reason, we reject the dissent’s contention that section 2–29(2)

should have been included in our analysis.

In sum, neither C.S. nor B.S. is “a child sought to be adopted”

under section 17 of the Adoption Act. Contrary to the conclusion of

the appellate court below, section 17 does not apply to the situation

in the case at bar.

Because of our decision with regard to this issue, we need not

address the Department’s alternative argument that a natural parent’s

common law, residual duty of support survives the termination of his

parental rights. We recognize the importance of this residual-duty

issue. In addition, we acknowledge that there is disagreement within

our appellate court on this question. Compare Bodine v. Bodine, 127

Ill. App. 3d 492, 496 (1984) (“an adoption will not relinquish a natural

parent’s obligation to support the child if the adoptive parent is unable

to do so”), with 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1182 (a termination of parental

rights ends all parental responsibility, including the obligation to pay

child support). Nevertheless, as we have already held, section 17 of

the Adoption Act does not apply to C.S. and B.S. This decision

disposes of the appeal in the case at bar.

The dissent takes a different view, arguing that section 17 applies

in this case and that, under section 17, respondent’s parental

responsibilities ended with the termination of his parental rights. In

support, the dissent points to In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255

(1990), and In re C.B., 221 Ill. App. 3d 686 (1991). According to the

dissent, these cases articulate a “bright-line rule” that the termination

of parental rights “forever sever[s] all relations between parent and

child.” Slip op. at 18 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and

Karmeier, JJ.). The dissent notes that Syck and C.B. were cited by

respondent. Slip op. at 18 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald

and Karmeier, JJ.).

There are three reasons why our analysis does not include Syck

and C.B., which appear to support respondent’s claim that, under

section 17, the termination of his parental rights ended his parental

responsibilities as well. First, regardless of whether Syck and C.B.

support respondent’s position with regard to section 17, they are

irrelevant to our opinion, which holds that section 17 does not apply.

A second, related reason for not incorporating these cases in our

analysis is that, in his brief to this court, respondent cited Syck and

C.B. solely in opposition to the Department’s alternative, “residual

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duty of support” argument, a claim which we expressly do not reach.

Under the Department’s argument, a natural parent has a residual,

common law duty of support which survives a termination of parental

rights, and this residual obligation stands as an exception to section

17. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1993) (observing that, “[w]ith

the exception of the biological parents’ residual duty to support their

children [citation] *** adoption constitutes a complete and permanent

severance of all legal and natural rights between such parents and

children”). Syck and C.B. appear to contradict this residual-duty

contention. However, it is irrelevant whether Syck and C.B. support

or contradict this claim. As previously indicated, because of our

holding that section 17 does not apply to this case, it is unnecessary

to address the Department’s alternative argument regarding a residual-

duty exception to section 17.

A third reason why Syck and C.B. are not incorporated in our

analysis is that, while each of these opinions quotes section 17, neither

deals with the central issue in the case at bar: whether, under section

17, a termination of parental rights ends all parental responsibilities,

including the duty to pay child support. In addition, neither Syck nor

C.B. expressly analyzes the “sought to be adopted” language in

section 17.

For these reasons, Syck and C.B. are not helpful in resolving the

question of whether section 17 applies to this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the appellate

court, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court, and affirm the

judgment of the circuit court.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, the majority’s narrow

interpretation of section 17’s “sought to be adopted” language, as

meaning exclusively the filing of a petition for adoption, creates

untenable inconsistencies between section 17 of the Adoption Act

(750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)), and section 2–29(2) of the Juvenile

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Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2–29(2) (West 2004)), addressing parental

obligations after the termination of parental rights. See In re M.M.,

156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993) (“we consider the Juvenile Court Act in

concert with the Adoption Act”). Second, the majority’s holding is

also inconsistent with prior judicial holdings on the effect of the

termination of parental rights. The majority avoids these issues by

inappropriately finding that Warner procedurally forfeited the

argument. A proper analysis of section 17 requires the construction of

“sought to be adopted” to include DCFS’s efforts to place C.S. and

B.S. with an adoptive family. Under a proper construction of the

statute, Warner’s duty of support to C.S. and B.S. ended with the

order terminating his parental rights and DCFS setting a goal of an

adoptive placement for the children. Therefore, I disagree with the

majority’s analysis and result.

To begin, section 2.1 of the Adoption Act specifically mandates:

“This Act shall be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of

1987.” 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2006). The majority’s construction of

section 17 of the Adoption Act conflicts with section 2–29(2) of the

Juvenile Court Act. The majority acknowledges that we are required

to “ ‘read the statute as a whole, considering all relevant parts.’ ” Slip

op. at 5, quoting Harshman v. DePhillips, 218 Ill. 2d 482, 493

(2006). Nevertheless, the majority ignores that section 2.1 mandates

that the Adoption Act be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court

Act and, instead, declines to address this argument because it

contends that Warner forfeited our review by raising pertinent sections

of the Juvenile Court Act for the first time on appeal here, by not

expounding on its significance to the present case, and by failing to

include any termination orders in the record demonstrating that his

parental rights were terminated pursuant to section 2–29(2). Slip op.

at 8.

The majority bypasses section 2–29(2) because the juvenile orders

are not in the record. The record in this case indicates that the parties

stipulated to the termination proceedings and orders. Those

proceedings and the most recent review order were presented to the

court as evidence, and the court took judicial notice of the termination

proceedings.

Supreme Court Rule 321 (155 Ill. 2d R. 321) provides that “[t]he

record on appeal shall consist of *** the entire original common law

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record ***. The common law record includes every document filed

and judgment and order entered in the cause and any documentary

exhibits offered and filed by any party.” Thus, under Rule 321, the

juvenile proceedings offered in evidence should be part of the

common law record in this case. It may have been a clerical error in

omitting these orders from the record on appeal. Even though the

record does not contain a copy of the orders terminating Warner’s

parental rights, this court is required to take judicial notice of the

juvenile proceedings.

In People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 161 (1976), this court noted:

“In McCormick on Evidence, section 330, at 766 (2d ed.

1972), it is said to be ‘settled, of course, that the courts, trial

and appellate, take notice of their own respective records in

the present litigation, both as to matters occurring in the

immediate trial, and in previous trials or hearings. The

principle seemingly is equally applicable to matters of record

in the proceedings in other cases in the same court, and some

decisions have recognized this, but many courts still adhere to

the needless requirement of formal proof, rather than informal

presentation, of recorded proceedings in other suits in the

same court.’ *** Taking judicial notice of matters of record in

other cases in the same court is simply an application of the

increasingly recognized principle that matters susceptible of

judicial notice include facts ‘capable of immediate and

accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources

of indisputable accuracy.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Davis, 65 Ill.

2d at 161, quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §3301,

at 763 (2d ed. 1972).

Here, the circuit court properly took judicial notice of the

proceedings in the juvenile cases, and this court must also take judicial

notice of those proceedings. Section 8–1002 of the Code of Civil

Procedure provides, in relevant part:

“In case of the review by the Supreme Court of a judgment or

order of the appellate court, the Supreme Court shall take

judicial notice of all matters of which the circuit court was

required to take judicial notice ***.” 735 ILCS 5/8–1002

(West 2004).

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Under section 8–1002, therefore, this court is required to take judicial

notice of the termination proceedings and orders judicially noticed by

the circuit court. It is improper for the majority to avoid the issue by

finding that respondent has forfeited the issue.

On the issue of statutory construction, “[o]ur primary objective in

construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of

the legislature.” Barragan v. Casco Design Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 435,

441 (2005). We must, therefore, consider all authorities that weigh

upon the legislature’s intended meaning of section 17, regardless of

whether they were specifically cited by the parties. Indeed, it would be

improper to construe a statute in a manner that the legislature did not

intend based merely on a party’s shortcomings in argument. This court

has never confined itself to the research and argument of the parties,

or even of the courts below, in affirming a correct result in the

appellate court. See, e.g., People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 220 (1991)

(“The reasons assigned by the [court below] for its judgment are

immaterial if the decision is correct. *** An appellee may raise any

argument or basis supported by the record to show the correctness of

the judgment, even though he had not previously advanced such an

argument”). Most importantly, the legislature calls on us to interpret

the Adoption Act and Juvenile Court Act harmoniously. Accordingly,

section 2–29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act should be considered

because it is clearly relevant to construction of section 17 of the

Adoption Act.

Section 2–29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act states:

“If a petition or motion alleges and the court finds that it

is in the best interest of the minor that parental rights be

terminated and the petition or motion requests that a guardian

of the person be appointed and authorized to consent to the

adoption of the minor, the court, with the consent of the

parents, if living, or after finding, based upon clear and

convincing evidence, that a parent is an unfit person as defined

in Section 1 of the Adoption Act, may terminate parental

rights and empower the guardian of the person of the minor,

in the order appointing him or her as such guardian, to appear

in court where any proceedings for the adoption of the minor

may at any time be pending and to consent to the adoption.

Such consent is sufficient to authorize the court in the

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adoption proceedings to enter a proper order or judgment of

adoption without further notice to, or consent by, the parents

of the minor. An order so empowering the guardian to consent

to adoption deprives the parents of the minor of all legal rights

as respects the minor and relieves them of all parental

responsibility for him or her, and frees the minor from all

obligations of maintenance and obedience to his or her natural

parents.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2–29(2) (West

2004).

Section 2–29(2) specifically provides that an appointed guardian

empowered to consent to adoption may give consent when an

adoption “may at any time be pending.” The section’s employment of

“may” and “any time” indicates the termination of parental rights

accompanied by an order appointing a guardian with power to consent

to adoption strips the natural parent of all rights and relieves him or

her of all responsibilities toward the child even though no adoption

action may be pending at that time.

The majority’s interpretation of section 17 of the Adoption Act

creates disharmony between that section and section 2–29(2) of the

Juvenile Court Act. Both statutes address the rights and

responsibilities of natural parents upon termination of parental rights.

Both statutes also address a context where adoption is encouraged,

either through a judicial order appointing a guardian with power to

consent to an adoption at some time, or through DCFS’s promotion

of an adoptive placement. Yet, under the majority’s construction of

section 17, the statutes resolve natural parents’ subsequent

responsibilities differently. Under the Adoption Act, the natural

parent’s duty of support continues unless, fortuitously, a third party

seeks an adoption. Under the Juvenile Court Act, however, the natural

parent’s duty of support ends irrespective of whether any party

actually seeks an adoption.

To allow this disparity invites absurdity into the overall statutory

scheme surrounding the termination of parental rights. I can conceive

of no reason why the legislature would treat similarly situated natural

parents differently under the Adoption Act and the Juvenile Court

Act. See Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty

Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 134 (2005) (“we must

presume that when the legislature enacted a law, it did not intend to

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produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust results”). Moreover, allowing

an inconsistency between the statutes violates standard principles of

statutory construction requiring us to harmonize the effect of different

statutes addressing the same subject matter. See People v. McCarty,

223 Ill. 2d 109, 133 (2006) (“Under the doctrine of in pari materia,

two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with

reference to one another to give them harmonious effect”). Embracing

a construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act that allows this

disparity violates the legislature’s specific instruction to the courts to

harmonize the Adoption Act with the Juvenile Court Act. See 750

ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2004) (“This Act shall be construed in concert

with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987”); see also In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d

at 61 (“we consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the

Adoption Act”).

To create harmony, both statutes must operate to relieve natural

parents of their ongoing responsibilities when their parental rights

have been terminated and when DCFS or the circuit court takes some

action to promote the child’s adoption. This goal is achieved by

construing “sought to be adopted” to include DCFS’s seeking an

adoptive placement for C.S. and B.S. In fact, the majority concedes

that this construction is reasonable. Slip op. at 6; see also Barragan,

216 Ill. 2d at 441-42 (“Where two statutes are allegedly in conflict, a

court has a duty to interpret the statutes in a manner that avoids an

inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an

interpretation is reasonably possible”).

The reasonableness of this interpretation is demonstrated by the

legislature’s repeated instructions to DCFS to facilitate adoptive

placements, and DCFS’s extensive efforts to adhere to the

legislature’s commands. See 20 ILCS 505/5(r) (West 2006) (“The

Department [DCFS] shall promulgate regulations encouraging all

adoption agencies to voluntarily forward to the Department or its

agent names and addresses of all persons who have applied for and

have been approved for adoption of a hard-to-place or handicapped

child and the names of such children who have not been placed for

adoption. [A list of such persons] shall be made available, without

charge, to every adoption agency in the State to assist the agencies in

placing such children for adoption”); 20 ILCS 505/7.1 (West 2006)

(“There is created the One Church One Child Advisory Board to

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advise the Department [DCFS] in the placement of children by

encouraging black churches to help find permanent homes for black

children waiting to be adopted”); http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/adoption/

index.shtml (last visited December 12, 2007) (“The Department helps

thousands of adoptable children to find a new home each year. ***

DCFS provides and funds a variety of financial and non-financial

benefits after adoption or guardianship, including subsidies for families

who adopt waiting children or become guardians of children in DCFS

care”). These legislative commands and executive undertakings by

DCFS contradict the majority’s assertion that “it is clear that the state

cannot seek the adoption of a child.” Slip op. at 6. Contrary to the

majority’s conclusion, section 2 of the Adoption Act, requiring certain

qualifications of individuals seeking to adopt, in no way undermines

the fact that the state may seek to facilitate a child’s adoption. See 750

ILCS 50/2 (West 2004).

Additionally, the majority’s holding is also inconsistent with prior

judicial holdings on the effect of the termination of parental rights.

Construing “sought to be adopted” to include DCFS’s efforts at

facilitating adoption, and relieving a natural parent of the duty to

support, is consistent with our prior holding interpreting the

termination of parental rights as a bright-line event forever severing all

relations between parent and child. This court has stated:

“Termination of parental rights destroys the parent-child relationship.

The effect of a termination of parental rights is made grimly clear by

section 17 of the Adoption Act.” (Emphasis added.) In re Adoption of

Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274-75 (1990). Likewise, in In re C.B., 221 Ill.

App. 3d 686 (1991), the appellate court observed: “When viewed

from the perspective of the child, the parent whose parental rights

have been terminated no longer exists. To be blunt, the situation is as

if the parent had died.” C.B., 221 Ill. App. 3d at 688. Warner, in fact,

presented these persuasive authorities to us, yet the majority refuses

to acknowledge that these cases support respondent’s claim that

termination of his parental rights ended his parental responsibilities.

The majority’s interpretation of section 17, blurs the previous

bright-line rule and creates potential practical difficulties. For example,

if the filing of an adoption petition triggers the effect of section 17,

what is the status of a natural parent’s obligations when a petitioner

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voluntarily withdraws the petition, or is found unqualified to adopt

under section 2?

The majority’s interpretation of section 17 of the Adoption Act

also requires us to overlook whether a residual common law duty of

support remains even in the wake of the termination of parental rights.

See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 62 (“With the exception of the

biological parents’ residual duty to support their children ***

adoption constitutes a complete and permanent severance of all legal

and natural rights between such parents and children”). The parties

presented this issue, but the majority sidesteps it by its construction of

section 17 of the Adoption Act. Slip op. at 9.

I believe that we must determine this issue to avoid confusion, and

we must hold that the common law residual duty to support is

abrogated when section 17 applies. In reviewing the residual duty,

M.M. and its predecessors all relied on Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630

(1937). The applicable section of the Adoption Act at the time of

Dwyer, unlike section 17 of the current version of the Adoption Act,

never addressed the duties of natural parents to their children; rather,

it only removed the natural parents’ rights respecting the children and

relieved the child of any duties to the natural parents. Compare 750

ILCS 50/17 (West 2004) (“After either the entry of an order

terminating parental rights or the entry of a judgment of adoption, the

natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all

parental responsibility for such child and shall be deprived of all legal

rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free from all

obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural

parents”) with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 4, par. 8 (“The natural parents

of a child so adopted shall be deprived, by the decree, of all legal

rights, as respects the child, and the child shall be freed from all

obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such parents”).

Given this change in the statutory language, the legislature intended

natural parents’ common law residual obligation of support to end

with the termination of parental rights under section 17.

To conclude, I cannot concur with an interpretation of section 17

creating conflict with another statute on the same subject, when a

reasonable construction exists that will both harmonize the overall

statutory scheme addressing the termination of parental rights and

adoptions, and acknowledge DCFS’s adoptive placement efforts.

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Today’s opinion is also inconsistent with prior judicial holdings on the

effect of the termination of parental rights. Therefore, I respectfully

dissent.

JUSTICES FITZGERALD and KARMEIER join in this dissent.

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