Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board

Docket No. 104471.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

JOHN F. CINKUS, Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF STICKNEY

MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed March 20, 2008.–Modified April 23, 2008.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

John Cinkus filed nomination papers to be a candidate in the April

17, 2007, election for village trustee in the Village of Stickney. The

Village of Stickney municipal officers electoral board (Board) found

Cinkus ineligible for office pursuant to section 3.1–10–5(b) of the

Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2006)). On

judicial review, the circuit court of Cook County set aside the Board’s

decision and ordered that Cinkus’ name be placed on the ballot. The

appellate court reversed the order of the circuit court and confirmed

the Board’s decision. 373 Ill. App. 3d 866. We allowed Cinkus’

petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315), and now affirm the

judgment of the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND

The record contains the following pertinent facts. On April 27,

2006, a law enforcement officer issued to Cinkus a citation for

disorderly conduct in violation of section 16–7 of the Stickney

Municipal Code (Stickney Municipal Code §16–7 (1981), now

codified as Stickney Municipal Code §50–32). On May 25, 2006, an

administrative hearing was held on the citation. Cinkus appeared and

contested the charge. The village hearing officer found Cinkus liable

as charged and ordered him to pay a fine of $100. Cinkus was granted

a continuance for payment pending administrative review. On

September 28, 2006, payment was continued to November 16, 2006.

On that date, Cinkus failed to appear, and the village entered judgment

against Cinkus for the $100 fine. On November 21, 2006, the Village

served notice of judgment on Cinkus.1

Cinkus filed his nomination papers on February 5, 2007, which

was the final day to do so, for the office of Stickney village trustee in

the April 17, 2007, consolidated election. On February 12, 2007, Sam

Esposito timely filed a petition objecting to Cinkus’ candidacy. See 10

ILCS 5/10–8 (West 2006). Esposito invoked section 3.1–10–5(b) of

the Illinois Municipal Code, which provides, in part, that a person “is

not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears

in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality.”

65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2006). In his objector’s petition,

Esposito alleged that Cinkus was “in arrears in the payment of

indebtedness in the amount of $100.00 to the Village of Stickney as

evidenced by the attached ‘Notice of Judgment Entered’ and therefore

is ineligible to be elected to Trustee of the Village of Stickney.”

Cinkus filed a motion to dismiss. Included with the motion was an

affidavit, in which Cinkus stated under oath as follows. The objector’s

petition informed Cinkus that he was indebted to the village in the

amount of $100. On February 14, 2007, Cinkus went to the village

hall and appeared at the business payment window. Cinkus showed a

village employee a copy of the notice of judgment and offered to pay

the debt. The employee was advised that she could not accept

1

See generally 65 ILCS 5/1–2.1–1 et seq. (West 2006) (home rule unit

adjudication of ordinance violations).

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payment; however, she suggested that Cinkus see Officer Torres, who

was the village code enforcement officer and who signed the notice of

judgment. On February 16, 2007, Cinkus met with Officer Torres,

who also refused to accept payment, but advised Cinkus to speak with

the village mayor or treasurer. Cinkus went to the village treasurer.

According to the affidavit: “I understood from my conversation with

the Treasurer that his hands were tied and he could not accept

payment.” Cinkus then wrote a check payable to the village for the

$100 judgment, wrote the case number on the check, and inserted it

through the payment window at the village business office,

announcing that he was paying his debt.2

On February 16 and 22, 2007, the Board held a hearing on

Esposito’s objection. 3 Esposito presented as evidence Cinkus’ citation

for disorderly conduct and the judgment entered against Cinkus in the

amount of $100. Esposito rested his case. Cinkus asked the Board to

grant his motion to dismiss “for failure of the Objector [Esposito] to

establish a prima facie case.” Cinkus’ sole contention at the hearing,

as stated in his motion to dismiss, was that section 3.1–10–5(b) of the

Illinois Municipal Code “limits eligibility to the office and not to

candidacy for the office.” (Emphases in original.) Relying on People

v. Hamilton, 24 Ill. App. 609 (1887), Cinkus contended: “All a

candidate must do is pay the debt before assuming the office and he

is eligible to hold the office.” At the close of the hearing, the Board

sustained Esposito’s objection, finding:

2

Section 1–2.1–8(e) of the Illinois Municipal Code sets forth the

following procedure:

“A hearing officer may set aside any judgment entered by

default and set a new hearing date, upon a petition filed within 21

days after the issuance of the order of default, if the hearing officer

determines that the petitioner’s failure to appear at the hearing was

for good cause or at any time if the petitioner establishes that the

municipality did not provide proper service of process.” 65 ILCS

5/1–2.1–8(e) (West 2006).

3

Cinkus’ check was brought to the hearing, placed in an envelope and

retained to determine what was to be done with it at the conclusion of the

hearing. The record does not indicate the disposition of the check.

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“That the candidate [Cinkus] is not eligible to be a candidate

for the elected municipal office sought under [section

3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code], as he is indebted

to the Village of Stickney in the amount of $100.00 by virtue

of a judgment entered against him in that amount which, as of

the date of the filing of the Objector’s Petition, was unpaid.”

The Board declared Cinkus’ nomination papers to be invalid and

ordered that his name not be printed on the ballot for the April 17,

2007, consolidated election.

Cinkus timely filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court

(see 10 ILCS 5/10–10.1 (West 2006)). In his petition and supporting

brief, Cinkus initially denied that he was in arrears in the payment of

a debt owed to the village. He argued that: (1) the notice of judgment

did not prescribe the procedure or time for payment; and (2) he did

pay the debt prior to the Board hearing. Cinkus alternatively

contended that, even if he was in arrears in the payment of a debt to

the village, section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code is not

a basis to strike his nomination papers and exclude his name from the

ballot. On March 15, 2007, the circuit court set aside the Board’s

decision and ordered Cinkus’ name to be placed on the April 17,

2007, ballot.

Esposito appealed, and on April 6, 2007, the appellate court filed

its decision. Relying on the plain language of section 3.1–10–5(b) of

the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2006)),

read as a whole, the court concluded that being in arrears of a debt to

a municipality precludes eligibility to run for municipal office. The

appellate court reversed the order of the circuit court, confirmed the

Board’s decision, and further ordered that “if removal of Mr. Cinkus’

name from the ballot cannot be accomplished prior to election day, the

Board shall be required to disregard any votes cast for him in

determining the winner of the election.” No. 1–07–0700 (unpublished

order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court

subsequently refiled its decision as a published opinion. 373 Ill. App.

3d 866. On April 17, 2007, Cinkus filed his petition for leave to

appeal to this court (210 Ill. 2d R. 315). We will refer to additional

pertinent background in the context of our analysis of the issues.

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II. ANALYSIS

The “sole question presented” to the appellate court involved the

interpretation of section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code

(65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2006)). 373 Ill. App. 3d at 868. We

view this issue as dispositive. However, prior to addressing the merits,

we must first address several preliminary matters.

A. Mootness

Esposito invites us to declare this case moot. A case on appeal

becomes moot where the issues presented in the trial court no longer

exist because events subsequent to the filing of the appeal render it

impossible for the reviewing court to grant the complaining party

effectual relief. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255 (1989) (collecting

cases). In this case, the April 17, 2007, election obviously has come

and gone. Indeed, Cinkus filed his petition for leave to appeal on the

day of the election. According to Esposito, Cinkus sought to have his

name placed on the April 17, 2007, ballot and that is no longer

possible.

However, one exception to the mootness doctrine allows a court

to resolve an otherwise moot issue if that issue involves a substantial

public interest. The criteria for application of the public interest

exception are: (1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) an

authoritative resolution of the question is desirable to guide public

officers; and (3) the question is likely to recur. Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill.

2d 166, 170 (1997); A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 257. A clear showing of

each criterion is necessary to bring a case within the public interest

exception. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d

391, 395 (1994). The present case meets this test. This appeal raises

a question of election law, which inherently is a matter of public

concern. Also, this issue is likely to recur in a future municipal

election. Being in arrears of a debt owed to a municipality can involve

common items, such as unpaid parking tickets or village utility bills.

Thus, an authoritative resolution of the issue is desirable to guide

public officers. Therefore, we decline to dismiss this appeal as moot.

We proceed to additional preliminary matters.

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B. Standard of Review

We next determine our standard of review. The circuit court

reviewed the Board’s decision pursuant to section 10–10.1 of the

Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10–10.1 (West 2006)). This court views an

electoral board as an administrative agency. See Kozel v. State Board

of Elections, 126 Ill. 2d 58, 68 (1988) (“As an administrative agency

established by statute, an electoral board may exercise only the powers

conferred upon it by the legislature”). A circuit court does not have

original jurisdiction over objections to nomination papers. The

legislature has vested the electoral boards, and not the courts, with

original jurisdiction to hear such disputes. Geer v. Kadera, 173 Ill. 2d

398, 407 (1996); 10 ILCS 5/10–9 (West 2006) (designating electoral

boards “for the purpose of hearing and passing upon the objector’s

petition”).

Prior to 1967, the Election Code provided that “the decision of a

majority of the electoral board shall be final.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch.

46, par. 10–10. Courts interpreted this language as precluding judicial

review of electoral board decisions, except upon the limited issue of

whether a decision was clearly fraudulent. See Telcser v. Holzman, 31

Ill. 2d 332, 339 (1964); People ex rel. Schlaman v. Electoral Board,

4 Ill. 2d 504, 507-09 (1954); Wiseman v. Elward, 5 Ill. App. 3d 249,

253 (1972). However, in 1967, the legislature added section 10–10.1

to the Election Code. 1967 Ill. Laws 597, 604. Section 10–10.1 now

provides that “a candidate or objector aggrieved by the decision of an

electoral board may secure judicial review of such decision in the

circuit court of the county in which the hearing of the electoral board

was held.” 10 ILCS 5/10–10.1 (West 2006). By use of the phrase

“judicial review,” the legislature did not intend to vest a circuit court

with jurisdiction to conduct a de novo hearing into the validity of a

candidate’s nomination papers. Rather, the statute manifests the

legislative intent that judicial review of discrepancies in nomination

papers is limited to, and must not exceed, a board’s record. Geer, 173

Ill. 2d at 407-08; Wiseman, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 254-55. Although the

applicable provision in section 10–10.1 does not expressly adopt the

procedure provided in the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS

5/3–101 et seq. (West 2006)), it is substantially the same. See

Dillavou v. County Officers Electoral Board, 260 Ill. App. 3d 127,

131 (1994); Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill. App. 3d 532, 538 (1976).

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In City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181

Ill. 2d 191 (1998), this court identified three types of questions that a

court may encounter on administrative review of an agency decision:

questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of fact and

law. As a result, “[t]he applicable standard of review depends upon

whether the question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed

question of fact and law.” American Federation of State, County &

Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois State Labor Relations

Board, 216 Ill. 2d 569, 577 (2005), citing AFM Messenger Service,

Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390

(2001). An administrative agency’s findings and conclusions on

questions of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct. In

examining an administrative agency’s factual findings, a reviewing

court does not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that

of the agency. Instead, a reviewing court is limited to ascertaining

whether such findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the

evidence. An administrative agency’s factual determinations are

against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion

is clearly evident. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 204; see Reyes v.

Bloomingdale Township Electoral Board, 265 Ill. App. 3d 69, 72

(1994); Dillavou, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 131 (collecting cases). In

contrast, an agency’s decision on a question of law is not binding on

a reviewing court. For example, an agency’s interpretation of the

meaning of the language of a statute constitutes a pure question of

law. Thus, the court’s review is independent and not deferential. City

of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205; see Reyes, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 72.

Mixed questions of fact and law “are ‘questions in which the

historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is

undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory

standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied

to the established facts is or is not violated.’ ” American Federation

of State, County & Municipal Employees, 216 Ill. 2d at 577, quoting

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66,

80 n.19, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1790 n.19 (1982). Prior to City of

Belvidere, this court had held that where the “facts are undisputed,”

the legal result of those facts is “a question of law,” which is reviewed

de novo. See, e.g., Chicago Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. Department of

Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 271 (1996). However, in City of Belvidere,

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this court held for the first time that an examination of the legal effect

of a given state of facts involves a mixed question of fact and law with

a standard of review of “clearly erroneous.” City of Belvidere, 181 Ill.

2d at 205. In AFM Messenger Service, this court explained that an

administrative agency’s decision is deemed “clearly erroneous” when

the reviewing court is left with the “ ‘definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed.’ ” AFM Messenger, 198 Ill. 2d at 391-

95, quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.

364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948).

We acknowledge that the distinction between these three different

standards of review has not always been apparent in our case law

subsequent to AFM Messenger. See, e.g., International Union of

Operating Engineers, Local 148 v. Illinois Department of

Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 62 (2005); Eden Retirement

Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d 273, 284 (2004).

However, we reaffirm City of Belvidere’s distinction between the

three standards of review, as well as AFM Messenger’s elucidation of

the “clearly erroneous” standard of review. See, e.g., Elementary

School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 142-44 (2006);

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 216

Ill. 2d at 577-78; Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of

Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 368-69 (2002).

Also, where a circuit court reviews an electoral board’s decision

pursuant to section 10–10.1 of the Election Code, we review the

decision of the board, not the court. See Pascente v. County Officers

Electoral Board, 373 Ill. App. 3d 871, 873 (2007); Lockhart v. Cook

County Officers Electoral Board, 328 Ill. App. 3d 838, 841 (2002).

We now must ascertain what issues are–and are not–properly before

us.

C. Issues Not Preserved for Review

Before this court, Cinkus raises what he describes as a factual

issue. Cinkus argues that the judgment entered against him was

“ambiguous and uninformative. *** The judgment itself gave no date

as to when it was to be paid, and absent a due date, there could be no

arrearage. Even if it had, the candidate did, in fact, tender payment.”

Therefore, according to Cinkus, the Board’s finding that he was in

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arrears in the payment of a debt owed to the village was against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

Esposito initially responds that Cinkus failed to present this

argument to the Board and, therefore, it is procedurally defaulted. It

is quite established that if an argument, issue, or defense is not

presented in an administrative hearing, it is procedurally defaulted and

may not be raised for the first time before the circuit court on

administrative review. Leffler v. Browning, 14 Ill. 2d 225, 227-29

(1958); see Lebajo v. Department of Public Aid, 210 Ill. App. 3d 263,

268 (1991). The rule of procedural default in judicial proceedings

applies to administrative determinations, so as to preclude judicial

review of issues that were not raised in the administrative proceedings.

The rule is based on the demands of orderly procedure and the justice

of holding a party to the results of his or her conduct where to do

otherwise would surprise the opponent and deprive the opponent of

an opportunity to contest an issue in the tribunal that is supposed to

decide it. Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co. v. Annunzio, 414 Ill. 559,

565 (1953). Additionally, raising an issue for the first time in the

circuit court on administrative review is insufficient. The rule of

procedural default specifically requires first raising an issue before the

administrative tribunal rendering a decision from which an appeal is

taken to the courts. Given that in administrative review cases the

circuit courts act as the first-tier courts of review, the reason and logic

behind that requirement are clear. See Smith v. Department of

Professional Regulation, 202 Ill. App. 3d 279, 287 (1990).

In his reply brief, Cinkus claims that he “did, indeed, argue the

insufficiency of the evidence of the judgment at the hearing before the

Board, so he has not waived the issue for review.” To say the least,

Cinkus misapprehends the record. He does not–and cannot–cite to

anywhere in the record before the Board where he contested the

sufficiency of the evidence of the judgment entered against him. In his

motion to dismiss the objector’s petition, Cinkus did not mention the

sufficiency of the judgment. Rather, Cinkus contended solely that

section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code did not preclude

his eligibility to run for office. At the Board hearing, Cinkus did not

argue that the judgment entered against him was invalid or insufficient

in any way. Again, his argument focused exclusively on his

interpretation of section 3.1–10–5(b), under which the judgment did

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not preclude his eligibility to run for office. We hold that Cinkus’

arguments pertaining to the validity of the judgment are procedurally

defaulted.

In the course of his argument that section 3.1–10–5(b) of the

Illinois Municipal Code did not preclude his eligibility to run for

office, Cinkus briefly refers to due process principles. In his petition

for judicial review in the circuit court, Cinkus sought reversal of the

Board’s decision “as it is contrary to law, against the manifest weight

of the evidence, arbitrary and capricious and violates Due Process.”

The circuit court entered an order, prepared by Cinkus’ counsel,

which found that the Board’s decision was “contrary to law, arbitrary

and capricious, violates Due Process and is against the manifest

weight of the evidence.” Cinkus contends that his interpretation of

section 3.1–10–5(b) comports with constitutional principles and that

the contrary interpretation would be unconstitutional.

Esposito initially responds that this argument is procedurally

defaulted. Again, issues or defenses not presented to the

administrative agency will not be considered for the first time on

administrative review. This rule of procedural default encompasses a

litigant’s right to question the validity of a statute. To be sure, an

administrative agency lacks the authority to declare a statute

unconstitutional, or even to question its validity. Nonetheless, this

court has repeatedly advised that a party in an administrative

proceeding should assert a constitutional challenge on the record

before the administrative tribunal, because administrative review is

confined to the evidence offered before the agency. Such a practice

avoids piecemeal litigation and, more importantly, allows opposing

parties a full opportunity to refute the constitutional challenge.

Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d at 396-97, quoting Texaco-Cities Service

Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 278-79 (1998); see Smith,

202 Ill. App. 3d at 287 (observing that rule of procedural default in

administrative review “applies equally to issues involving

constitutional due process rights”); Benjamin v. Board of Election

Commissioners, 122 Ill. App. 3d 693, 696-97 (1984) (holding that

constitutional argument was procedurally defaulted for failure to

present it to board).

In his reply brief, Cinkus attempts to avoid the procedural default

of this issue. He first contends that he presented his due process

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argument in his petition for judicial review in the circuit court.

However, as we explained above, this contention “is meritless.” Smith,

202 Ill. App. 3d at 287 (raising issue for first time in circuit court is

insufficient to preserve issue for administrative review). Further,

Cinkus invokes the principle that procedural default is a limitation on

the parties rather than on this court’s jurisdiction, and that the

doctrine of procedural default may be relaxed when necessary to

maintain a uniform body of precedent or where the interests of justice

so require. See Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d at 397; Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill.

2d at 279. However, after reviewing the record, we conclude that this

not such a case. We hold that Cinkus’ constitutional argument is

procedurally defaulted.

D. Eligibility for Office: Arrearage of Debt Owed to Municipality

We are left with the sole question that was presented to the

appellate court: the correct interpretation of section 3.1–10–5(b) of

the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2004)). As

he argued before the Board, Cinkus contends that section 3.1–10–5(b)

applies to ineligibility to hold elective office, not ineligibility to run for

elected office. Therefore, according to Cinkus, the arrearage did not

render him ineligible to be a candidate for office and section

3.1–10–5(b) was not a basis to strike his nomination papers and

exclude his name from the ballot. Cinkus argues that he was eligible

to be a candidate on the ballot as long as he paid the arrearage prior

to taking office. In support of the Board’s decision, Esposito argues

that section 3.1–10–5(b) applies to ineligibility to run for office.

According to Esposito, the Board correctly decided that Cinkus was

“not eligible to be a candidate” for the office of Stickney village

trustee due to his being in arrears of a debt owed to the village at the

time Cinkus filed his nomination papers.

Section 3.1–10–5 of the Municipal Code, captioned

“Qualifications; elective office,” provides as follows:

“(a) A person is not eligible for an elective municipal office

unless that person is a qualified elector of the municipality and

has resided in the municipality at least one year next preceding

the election.

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(b) A person is not eligible for an elective municipal office

if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other

indebtedness due to the municipality or has been convicted in

any court located in the United States of any infamous crime,

bribery, perjury, or other felony.

(c) A person is not eligible for the office of alderman of a

ward unless that person has resided in the ward that the

person seeks to represent, and a person is not eligible for the

office of trustee of a district unless that person has resided in

the municipality, at least one year next preceding the election

or appointment, except as provided in subsection (c) of

Section 3.1–20–25, subsection (b) of Section 3.1–25–75,

Section 5–2–2, or Section 5–2–1.” 65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5

(West 2006).

Article 3.1 was added to the Illinois Municipal Code by Public Act

87–1119, which collected and recodified several predecessor

provisions. Pub. Act 87–1119, eff. May 13, 1993 (adding 65 ILCS

5/3.1–5–5 et seq. (West 2006)). Compare 65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5 (West

2006) with 65 ILCS 5/3–4–15, 3–14–1, 5–2–10 (West 1992).

The controlling principles are familiar. The primary rule of

statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention

of the legislature. The best evidence of legislative intent is the

language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and

ordinary meaning. The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with

each provision construed in connection with every other section. Paris

v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997); Abrahamson v. Illinois

Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 91 (1992).

When the statutory language is clear, no resort is necessary to other

tools of construction. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996);

Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill.

2d 210, 216-17 (1994). Where the meaning of a statute is ambiguous,

courts may look beyond the statutory language and consider the

purpose of the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and the

legislative history of the statute. Stroger v. Regional Transportation

Authority, 201 Ill. 2d 508, 524 (2002); see Advincula v. United Blood

Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 16-19 (1996).

The parties disagree on what the legislature meant when it used

the word “eligible” in section 3.1–10–5(b). Cinkus and Esposito each

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cite the section’s plain language in support of their respective

positions. Cinkus argues that the section “says nothing about eligibility

to run for office, or that an individual may not file nominating papers

to appear on the ballot. Thus, the plain language which the legislature

has used concerns only the holding of office, not the running for

office.” (Emphasis in original.) In support of the Board’s decision,

Esposito cites to a dictionary definition of eligible as “fit to be

chosen.” He posits that a candidate may be chosen for an elective

office through the filing of nomination papers, running for office, and

being chosen by the voters. Esposito reasons: “Accordingly, when the

express provisions of §3.1–10–5 speak of a person’s eligibility for an

elective office, the language clearly compels a connotation to

disqualify those who are unqualified to run for office; a candidate unfit

to be chosen by the electors.” As Cinkus failed to satisfy the arrearage

by the time he filed his nomination papers, Esposito concludes that the

Board correctly ruled that Cinkus was ineligible to run for office

pursuant to section 3.1–10–5(b).

If we were to construe the word “eligible” in isolation, we

obviously would be forced to conclude that the word is ambiguous in

that it relates to being elected to office as well as being capable of

holding office. A standard dictionary defines the word “eligible” as

both “fitted or qualified to be chosen,” as in candidacy, and as

“entitled to something,” as in holding office. Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 736 (1993). Another dictionary sets forth

both meanings more simply: “Fit and proper to be selected ***; legally

qualified for an office.” Black’s Law Dictionary 559 (8th ed. 2004);

accord Black’s Law Dictionary 612 (4th rev. ed. 1968) (defining

“eligible” as being fit to be chosen, or capable of being chosen; and as

being legally qualified to serve, or capable of serving and holding

office).

In the event of this conclusion, Cinkus and Esposito suggest that

we construe section 3.1–10–5 of the Illinois Municipal Code in pari

materia with section 10–5 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10–5

(West 2006)). The suggestion is well taken. Section 3.1–10–10 of the

Illinois Municipal Code expressly provides: “The general election law

applies to the scheduling, manner of conducting, voting at, and

contesting of municipal elections.” (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS

5/3.1–10–10 (West 2006). A court presumes that the legislature

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intended that two or more statutes which relate to the same subject

are to be operative and harmonious. A court must compare statutes

relating to the same subject and construe them with reference to each

other, so as to give effect to all of the provisions of each if possible.

Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 458-59 (2002);

Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414,

422 (2002); Ashton v. County of Cook, 384 Ill. 287, 298 (1943). This

court has held that provisions of the Election Code and of the Illinois

Municipal Code may be considered in pari materia for purposes of

statutory construction. United Citizens of Chicago & Illinois v.

Coalition to Let the People Decide in 1989, 125 Ill. 2d 332, 338-39

(1988).

Section 10–5 of the Election Code prescribes the content of a

candidate’s nomination papers. Among the various requirements,

nomination papers

“must include a statement of candidacy ***. Each such

statement shall set out the address of such candidate, the

office for which he is a candidate, shall state that the candidate

is qualified for the office specified and has filed (or will file

before the close of the petition filing period) a statement of

economic interests as required by the Illinois Governmental

Ethics Act, shall request that the candidate’s name be placed

upon the official ballot and shall be subscribed and sworn to

by such candidate *** and may be in substantially the

following form:

***

I, . . . . , being first duly sworn, say that I reside at . . . .

street, in the city (or village) of . . . . , in the county of . . . . ,

State of Illinois; and that I am a qualified voter therein; that I

am a candidate for election to the office of . . . . to be voted

upon at the election to be held on the . . . . day of . . . . , . . . . ;

and that I am legally qualified to hold such office ***.”

(Emphases added.) 10 ILCS 5/10–5 (West 2006).

This statement of candidacy and accompanying oath are mandatory

requirements. See Serwinski, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 259-61.

The plain language of section 10–5 of the Election Code supports

Esposito’s position that section 3.1–10–5(b) refers to ineligibility to

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run for office. The statement of candidacy and accompanying oath are

phrased in the present tense. Thus, when a candidate submits his or

her nomination papers to run for office, the candidate swears that he

or she is–not will be–qualified for the office sought. In other words,

the candidate is eligible to run for office and not merely to hold office.

Accordingly, reading these two statutes together, the disqualifications

provided by section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code render

a candidate ineligible to run for office if not remedied by the time the

candidate files his or her nomination papers. See Schumann v.

Fleming, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1066 (1994).

We note Cinkus’ argument that section 10–5 of the Election Code

actually supports his position that section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois

Municipal Code refers only to ineligibility to hold office. Cinkus points

to that portion of the candidacy oath that identifies the sought-after

office “to be voted upon” at a specified future date. 10 ILCS 5/10–5

(West 2006). According to Cinkus, the candidacy oath refers to being

qualified to hold the identified office on that future date and not when

the candidate submits nomination papers.

The plain language of section 10–5 of the Election Code refutes

Cinkus’ argument. The statutory language, which we earlier quoted

and emphasized, is phrased in the present tense. If the legislature

intended to speak of future events or contingencies it would have

expressly done so, as it expressly prescribed the requirement of filing

a statement of economic interests. 10 ILCS 5/10–5 (West 2006)

(providing that statement of candidacy “shall state that the candidate

*** has filed (or will file before the close of the petition filing period)

a statement of economic interests”).

We also note that the appellate court relied on Bryant v. Board of

Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 473 (2007), and Delgado v.

Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 481 (2007), in support

of its conclusion that being in arrears of a debt owed to a municipality

precludes eligibility to run for municipal office. 373 Ill. App. 3d at

869-70. However, Bryant and Delgado were supervisory orders

issued by this court. As a general rule, this court will issue a

supervisory order only when the normal appellate process will not

afford adequate relief and the dispute involves a matter important to

the administration of justice, or intervention is necessary to keep an

inferior tribunal from acting beyond the scope of its authority. People

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ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d 510, 513 (2001). We have

repeatedly noted that supreme court supervisory orders are

nonprecedential. People v. Phillips, 217 Ill. 2d 270, 280 (2005);

People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 295 (2005); see Scheidler v. Cook

County Officers Electoral Board, 276 Ill. App. 3d 297, 302 (1995)

(recognizing that supreme court supervisory order “could not be cited

as precedential as to the merits”).

Also, Cinkus relies on People v. Hamilton, 24 Ill. App. 609

(1887). According to Cinkus, Hamilton held that the arrearage

provision of a statutory predecessor to section 3.1–10–5(b) prescribed

disqualification as to the office and not the election. Cinkus argues

that the appellate court in Hamilton allowed the candidate to pay his

arrearage subsequent to the election and prior to his assumption of

office. We agree with the appellate court that Hamilton is not

persuasive because: (1) it was decided prior to 1935 and,

consequently, has no precedential value (see Bryson v. News America

Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 95 (1996); Basham v. Hunt, 332 Ill.

App. 3d 980, 992 n.3 (2002)); (2) Hamilton was not an election case,

and could not consider the current election scheme, which is very

different from that in 1887; and (3) the predecessor statute in 1887

was different from section 3.1–10–5(b). 373 Ill. App. 3d at 870.

In contrast to Hamilton, we consider Cahnmann v. Eckerty, 40 Ill.

App. 3d 180 (1976), to be exemplary. In that case, the electoral board

declared the candidate ineligible to run for office because he did not

meet the one-year residency requirement of a statutory predecessor to

section 3.1–10–5. The circuit court confirmed the board’s decision,

and the appellate court affirmed. In addressing the candidate’s equal

protection challenge, the court repeatedly described the affected right

not as the right to hold office, but as “the right to candidacy.”

Cahnmann, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 181.

We confirm the Board’s decision. We hold that, pursuant to

section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code, read in

conjunction with section 10–5 of the Election Code, Cinkus was not

eligible to run for trustee in the Village of Stickney because he was in

arrears of a debt owed to the village at the time he filed his nomination

papers.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court,

which confirmed the decision of the Village of Stickney Municipal

Officers Electoral Board, is affirmed.

Affirmed.

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