In re Randall M.

Docket No. 105137.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

In re RANDALL M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,

Appellant, v. Randall M., Appellee).

Opinion filed September 18, 2008.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

The issue is whether the appellate court properly construed the

detention provisions contained in section 5–410 of the Juvenile Court

Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5–410 (West 2006)). For the reasons that

follow, we vacate the appellate court’s decision and dismiss the

appeal as moot.

BACKGROUND

The Trial Court

In April 2005, the State filed a delinquency petition against

Randall M. alleging one count of domestic battery. Randall admitted

to the offense and was placed on probation.

In September 2006, and while Randall was still on probation, the

State filed a new delinquency petition alleging unlawful possession

of a firearm and unlawful use of a weapon. At the same time, the

State petitioned to revoke Randall’s probation. On the day that the

new delinquency petition was filed, a detention hearing was held

before the juvenile division of the circuit court of Lake County. At the

hearing, the trial court found (1) sufficient probable cause to believe

that Randall was a delinquent minor, and (2) that it was matter of

immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of both Randall and

the community that Randall be held in secure detention. Pursuant to

local rule, a minor requiring secure detention is lodged in the Hulse

Detention Center “unless otherwise ordered by a Juvenile Court

Judge.” 19th Jud. Cir. Ct. R. 9.13 (eff. January 2, 1997). At the

hearing’s conclusion, the trial court noted that Randall would soon be

turning 17, and asked specifically for the date of Randall’s birthday.

When counsel responded that Randall would be turning 17 on the

following Monday, the trial court responded, “Monday? Monday you

will be transferred to Lake County [jail].”

A few days later, Randall’s attorney filed an emergency motion

to enjoin Randall’s transfer from the Hulse Detention Center to the

Lake County jail. The petition alleged, “based on [counsel’s]

information and belief from past practices,” that once Randall turned

17, he would be transferred automatically from the Hulse Detention

Center to the Lake County jail and housed in the general adult

population. A hearing was held, and the trial court denied the motion

and ordered Randall “transferred to the Lake County jail pursuant to

statute.” In so doing, the court specifically invoked section

5–410(2)(c)(v) of the Juvenile Court Act, which states that, as long

as certain factors are first considered, “[p]ersons 17 years of age and

older who have a petition of delinquency filed against them may be

confined in an adult detention facility.” See 705 ILCS

405/5–410(2)(c)(v) (West 2006).1

1

Section 5–410(2)(c)(v) was amended effective January 1, 2004. See

Pub. Act 93–255, eff. January 1, 2004 (amending 705 ILCS 405/5–410). In

this case, it is unclear whether the trial court was applying the

preamendment or postamendment version of that section, as its analysis

contains elements of both.

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The Appeal

Randall filed a petition for leave to appeal under Supreme Court

Rule 306(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5)), and the appellate court

allowed the petition. As framed by the appellate court, the issues to

be considered were (1) “whether section 5–410 authorizes the

automatic transfer of a minor with pending delinquency matters from

a juvenile detention facility to an adult detention facility upon the

minor’s seventeenth birthday”; and (2) “whether, under section

5–410, a minor 17 years of age or older with pending delinquency

matters may be housed in the general population of a county jail.” 374

Ill. App. 3d 808, 809.

Mootness

Before addressing the merits, the appellate court noted that both

issues had become moot because, since filing his petition for leave to

appeal, Randall had pleaded guilty and been sentenced. Consequently,

Randall was no longer subject to section 5–410, which governs a

minor’s detention pending adjudication. Nevertheless, the court

invoked the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine on the

grounds that (1) the issues relate to the detention of minors and

therefore are of a public nature; (2) there are no published decisions

construing section 5–410; and (3) the issues are likely to recur. 374

Ill. App. 3d at 811-12.

Automatic Transfer

On the merits, the appellate court first addressed the automatic-

transfer question. The court observed that, until recently, section

5–410(2)(c)(v) stated that persons 17 years of age and older who have

a pending delinquency petition “shall be confined in an adult

detention facility.” (Emphasis added.) See 705 ILCS

405/5–410(2)(c)(v) (West 2002). Clearly, this language was

mandatory and required the minor to be transferred to the county jail

on his or her seventeenth birthday. 374 Ill. App. 3d at 814. In 2004,

however, section 5–410(2)(c)(v) was amended to state that persons 17

years of age and older “may be confined in an adult detention

facility,” provided certain factors are considered. (Emphasis added.)

See 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(c)(v) (West 2006). Clearly, this new

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language is discretionary and leaves no room for an automatic

transfer on the minor’s seventeenth birthday. 374 Ill. App. 3d at 814.

Consequently, the court held that any policy providing for automatic

transfer is invalid. 374 Ill. App. 3d at 814.

The court then added that it was uncomfortable with the lack of

procedural safeguards in section 5–410, most especially that Randall

had to initiate a proceeding to prevent his transfer to the county jail.

374 Ill. App. 3d at 814. The court compared section 5–410 with

section 3–10–7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS

5/3–10–7 (West 2006)), which governs the transfer of minors

prosecuted as adults from the Department of Juvenile Justice to the

Adult Division of the Department of Corrections. Specifically, the

court noted that section 3–10–7 provides for a formal notice

requirement, an evidentiary hearing, the right to counsel, and a

statement from the trial court setting forth the bases for its transfer

ruling. 374 Ill. App. 3d at 814-15. Section 5–410, by contrast,

contains no procedural guidelines whatsoever. Accordingly, the court

held that, in the interests of due process, “a procedure similar to the

one outlined in section 3–10–7 of the Code should be employed in

applying the transfer provision set forth in section 5–410(2)(c)(v) of

the Act, albeit in an expedited manner.” 374 Ill. App. 3d at 815.

General Population

The court then addressed whether, under section 5–410, a minor

17 years of age or older with pending delinquency matters may be

housed in the general population of a county jail. In arguing that such

minors may be housed in the general population, the State relied on

section 5–410(2)(c)(v), which states:

“Minors under 17 years of age shall be kept separate from

confined adults and may not at any time be kept in the same

cell, room or yard with adults confined pursuant to criminal

law. Persons 17 years of age and older who have a petition of

delinquency filed against them may be confined in an adult

detention facility. In making a determination whether to

confine a person 17 years of age or older who has a petition

of delinquency filed against the person, these factors, among

other matters, shall be considered:

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(A) The age of the person;

(B) Any previous delinquent or criminal history of the

person;

(C) Any previous abuse or neglect history of the person;

and

(D) Any mental health or educational history of the

person, or both.” 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(c)(v) (West 2004).

According to the State, this language is clear and unambiguous. If

housed in the county jail, minors under 17 years of age must be kept

separate from the confined adults. By contrast, minors 17 years of age

and older “may be confined in an adult detention facility” without

restriction.

In rejecting this argument, the appellate court focused not upon

section 5–410(2)(c)(v), but instead upon section 5–410(2)(d)(i),

which states:

“If a minor 12 years of age or older is confined in a county

jail in a county with a population below 3,000,000

inhabitants, then the minor’s confinement shall be

implemented in such a manner that there will be no contact by

sight, sound or otherwise between the minor and adult

prisoners. Minors 12 years of age or older must be kept

separate from confined adults and may not at any time be kept

in the same cell, room, or yard with confined adults.” 705

ILCS 405/5–410(2)(d)(i) (West 2004).

After noting that Lake County has a population below 3 million

inhabitants, the appellate court explained that section 5–410(2)(d)(i)

was clear and unambiguous. With only limited exceptions that are

inapplicable here, if a minor 12 years of age or older is confined in

the county jail, that minor “must be kept separate from the adults”

and “in such a manner that there will be no contact by sight, sound or

otherwise between the minor and adult prisoners.” Accordingly, the

appellate court concluded that, “even if he was properly transferred

to the Lake County jail, [Randall] should have been confined

separately from any adult prisoners.” 374 Ill. App. 3d at 818.

We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R.

315.

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DISCUSSION

Both sides concede that the issues in this case are moot.

Nevertheless, they invite this court to consider them anyway, given

the public interest in an authoritative construction of the detention

guidelines set forth in section 5–410.

There is a fundamental problem with this request: section 5–410

does not apply to this case. Section 5–410 appears in part 4 of the

Juvenile Court Act, which governs the “arrest and custody” of

minors. This part of the Act does not govern or even speak to the trial

court at the detention hearing. Instead, it governs what the police may

do with a minor between the time of his arrest and the time he is first

brought before the court. For example, section 5–401 addresses the

arrest and taking into custody of minors, section 5–401.5 governs the

custodial interrogation of arrested minors, section 5–405 outlines a

police officer’s duties following the arrest of a minor, and section

5–415 defines how long an arrested minor may be held in temporary

custody before he or she must be either released or brought before the

court for a detention or shelter care hearing. See 705 ILCS

405/5–401, 5–401.5, 5–505, 5–415 (West 2006).

Not surprisingly, then, a careful reading of section 5–410 reveals

that it governs not the pretrial detention of minors generally, but

rather only the detention of minors while they are in police custody.

Section 5–410(2) begins by stating that, when warranted, arrested

minors 10 years of age or older “may be kept or detained in an

authorized detention facility.” 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(a) (West

2006). If the arrested minor is under 12 years of age, he or she may be

detained in a county jail or municipal lockup for no more than six

hours. 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(a) (West 2006). If the arrested minor

is 12 years of age or older, he or she may be detained in a county jail

or municipal lockup for no more than 12 hours, unless the crime is

one of violence, in which case the minor may be detained for up to 24

hours. 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(c) (West 2006). Once this initial time

limit expires, an arrested minor12 years of age or older may remain

in the county jail only if that jail complies with the detention

standards enumerated in section 5–410(2)(d) (705 ILCS

405/5–410(2)(d) (West 2006)).

Notably, the statute relied upon by both the trial court and the

State in this case–section 5–410(2)(c)(v)–applies only during the

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initial 12- to 24-hour period immediately following the minor’s arrest.

Again, section 5–410(2)(c) provides that “no minor shall be detained

in a county jail or municipal lockup for more than 12 hours, unless

the offense is a crime of violence in which case the minor may be

detained up to 24 hours.” 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(c) (West 2006).

This section is then followed by five subsections, each of which in

some way regulates this initial holding period. Section 5–410(2)(c)(i)

defines when that period begins. 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(c)(i) (West

2006). Section 5–410(2)(c)(ii) provides for periodic supervision and

prohibits the minor from coming or remaining in contact with

confined adults. 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(c)(ii) (West 2006). Section

5–410(2)(c)(iii) requires the police to inform the minor of the purpose

of the detention, the time it is expected to last, and the fact that it

cannot exceed the time specified under the Act. 705 ILCS

405/5–410(2)(c)(iii) (West 2006). Section 5–410(2)(c)(iv) requires

the police to keep a log showing the basis for the detention, the bases

for the decision to detain, and the length of time the minor was in

detention. 705 ILCS 405/5–410(2)(c)(iv) (West 2006). Finally, and

most importantly, section 5–410(2)(c)(v) describes the conditions

under which the arrested minor may be confined during this initial

holding period. If the minor is under 17 years of age, he or she must

be kept separate from confined adults and may not at any time be kept

in the same cell, room or yard with confined adults. If the minor is 17

years of age or older, he or she may be confined in an adult detention

facility, provided certain factors are first considered. 705 ILCS

405/5–410(2)(c)(v) (West 2006). Read in its proper context, then,

section 5–410(2)(c)(v) is not, as the State insists, a general statute

governing the pretrial detention of minors with pending delinquency

petitions. Rather, it is a narrowly focused subsection from a statute

regulating only the initial hours of an arrested minor’s custodial

detention.

Once the initial 12- or 24-hour holding period expires, a minor 12

years of age or older may remain in the county jail only if that jail

complies with the standards set forth in section 5–410(d) (705 ILCS

405/5–410(d) (West 2006)).2 Under these standards, a county jail may

hold a minor for up to 40 hours if it (1) ensures that there is no

2

These same standards are set forth again in section 5–501(4).

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contact by sight, sound or otherwise between the minor and adult

prisoners; (2) ensures that the minor is kept separate from confined

adults and is not at any time kept in the same cell, room, or yard with

confined adults; and (3) complies with all monitoring standards

promulgated by the Department of Corrections and training standards

approved by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training Standards Board

(the Standards Board). 705 ILCS 405/5–410(d)(i) (West 2006). To

keep the minor for between 40 hours and one week, the county jail

must comply with all temporary detention standards promulgated by

the Department and with all training standards approved by the

Standards Board. 705 ILCS 405/5–410(d)(ii) (West 2006). And to

keep minors for longer than one week, a county jail must comply with

all programmatic and training standards for juvenile detention homes

promulgated by the Department. 705 ILCS 405/5–410(d)(iii) (West

2006).3

The next step of the process is set forth in section 5–415, which

requires that, “[u]nless sooner released, a minor alleged to be a

delinquent minor taken into temporary custody must be brought

before a judicial officer within 40 hours for a detention or shelter care

hearing to determine whether he or she shall be further held in

custody.” 705 ILCS 405/5–415(1) (West 2006). Once this occurs, as

it did here, section 5–410 is no longer applicable. Now, the process

is governed by section 5–501. See 705 ILCS 405/5–501 (West 2006).

Titled “Detention or shelter care hearing,” section 5–501 enumerates

the procedures and guidelines governing the trial court’s pretrial-

detention determination. And unlike section 5–410, which applies

3

A clarification is required here. At oral argument, the State argued that

sight and sound restrictions are required only during the first 40 hours of

a minor’s detention and that, after that, “the court would be free to order the

person transferred to an adult facility free of any sight and sound

restrictions.” In support, the State noted that section 5–410(d)(i) is the only

portion of section 5–410(d) that contains a sight and sound restriction, and

it is expressly limited to the first 40 hours of the minor’s confinement. The

State is incorrect. All three subsections of section 5–410(d) require the

county jail to comply with certain regulations promulgated by the

Department. All of these regulations contain an explicit sight and sound

restriction. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code §§701.270, 701.280, 702.5 (2003).

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before the commencement of any court proceedings, section 5–501

contains all of the procedural safeguards one would expect to find in

a statute governing a judicial detention hearing. 4 Indeed, section

5–501 specifically provides for an evidentiary hearing, the right to

counsel, and a written order setting forth the factual basis for the trial

court’s detention ruling. 705 ILCS 405/5–501(1), (2) (West 2006).

Moreover, like section 5–410(d), section 5–501(4) outlines the

conditions under which minors with pending delinquency matters

may be held pending adjudication. See 705 ILCS 405/5–501(4) (West

2006). This is the statute that governs trial courts during a detention

or shelter care hearing, and this is that statute that the trial court here

should have consulted.

So where does this leave us? The parties concede that any issues

relating to Randall’s pretrial detention are moot, as Randall has since

pleaded guilty and been sentenced. Nevertheless, they invite this court

to address these issues anyway, under the public interest exception to

the mootness doctrine. Unfortunately, the foregoing discussion

compels us to decline this invitation. Indeed, all of the issues

addressed by the courts below and briefed by the parties here relate

to section 5–410. But that statute is inapplicable to this case, as the

detention rulings at issue all arose in the course of Randall’s detention

or shelter care hearing. As importantly, no issues are raised, either by

the parties or by the courts below, under the statute that does apply to

this case, namely section 5–501.5 Consequently, we have no choice

4

The appellate court’s decision to invoke the public interest exception to

the mootness doctrine was based partially on the fact that there are “no

cases interpreting the statutory provisions at issue.” 374 Ill. App. 3d at 811.

However, the likely explanation for the absence of relevant case law is that

section 5–410 applies prior to the initiation of court proceedings and

therefore rarely, if ever, will form the basis for a judicial order. By contrast,

section 5–501 has been construed numerous times. See, e.g., In re T.W.,

381 Ill. App. 3d 603 (2008); In re C.J ., 328 Ill. App. 3d 103 (2002); In re

A.N., 324 Ill. App. 3d 510 (2001).

5

We note that Randall’s trial counsel attempted to bring this problem to

the trial court’s attention, to no avail. In his emergency motion to enjoin

Randall’s transfer, counsel argued that a close reading of section

5–410(2)(c)(v) “indicates that this provision applies only to the forty-hour

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but to vacate the appellate court’s decision below and dismiss this

appeal as moot.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the appellate court is vacated, and the appeal is

dismissed.

Appellate court judgment vacated;

appeal dismissed.

period preceding a detention hearing.” And then again, after the trial court

denied the emergency motion, counsel politely suggested that “the statute

that your Honor is forming its opinion on doesn’t apply at this juncture and

*** only applies to the 40 hour window during which time a detention

hearing would have to take place.” The trial court thanked counsel for his

input and stood on its ruling.

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