People v. Phyllis B.

Docket No. 106052.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

In re E.B. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v.

Phyllis B., Appellee).

Opinion filed November 20, 2008.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

In the circuit court of Champaign County, Phyllis B.’s parental

rights were terminated after her two children, E.B., age 6, and J.B.,

age 4, were adjudicated dependent under subsection (c) of section

2–4(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS

405/2–4(1)(c) (West 2006)), the so-called no-fault dependency

provision. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed

the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the cause for further

proceedings. No. 4–07–0717 (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23). The appellate court held that the plain language of

section 2–4(1)(c) prohibits termination of parental rights when

children have been adjudged dependent under that provision.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the

appellate court.

Background

Phyllis B. is the mother of E.B. and J.B. Because the children’s

putative father, Fred DePriest, has been incarcerated for the majority

of the children’s lives, Phyllis has maintained sole responsibility for

raising the children.

In November 2005, the State filed a petition for adjudication of

wardship under section 2–3 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2–3 (West

2006)), alleging that the children were (1) abused because Phyllis

inflicted physical injury and created a substantial risk of physical

injury to the children other than by accidental means and (2)

neglected because their environment was injurious to their welfare

since it exposed them to physical harm. Following a temporary

custody hearing, the Department of Children and Family Services

(DCFS) was awarded temporary custody and the children were placed

in a relative’s home.

In January 2006, the State filed an amended petition. In this

petition, the State removed the allegations of abuse and neglect and

alleged, instead, that the children were dependent under section

2–4(1)(c) of the Act because they lacked remedial or other care

necessary for their well-being through no fault, neglect, or lack of

concern by their parents.1 At an adjudicatory hearing, Phyllis

stipulated to the facts alleged in the amended petition. In return, the

State moved to withdraw the original abuse/neglect petition, which

motion the trial court granted. Thereafter, the trial court found that the

allegations of the petition brought under section 2–4(1)(c) had been

proven and found the children dependent. The dependency finding

was based on the following facts: J.B. had extensive behavioral

problems and ADHD, was verbally and physically abusive, and ran

away from home; Phyllis lacked stable housing, had trouble

maintaining J.B.’s ADHD medication, and was overwhelmed with

parenting.

1

Although the petitions related to both parents, DePriest is not a party

to this appeal. As such, only Phyllis is referenced.

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In April 2006, following a multipart dispositional hearing, the

court found Phyllis unfit based on its finding that she had a very

unstable lifestyle and had been evicted numerous times; she had an

unrealistic understanding of financial issues; she lacked parenting

skills; she repeatedly violated court orders in connection with

visitation; she repeatedly lied; and she failed to accept responsibility

for her poor decisionmaking. The children were again found to be

dependent and made wards of the court. Custody and guardianship

were removed from Phyllis and placed with DCFS. Phyllis was

advised that she must cooperate with DCFS to remedy the situation,

and she must comply with the terms of the service plans to correct the

conditions or risk termination of her parental rights.

In December 2006, the State petitioned to terminate Phyllis’

parental rights. At a permanency hearing in July 2007, the court found

Phyllis unfit on each of the grounds alleged by the State:

(1) she failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the

conditions that were the basis for removing the children;

(2) she failed to make reasonable progress toward her

children’s return within nine months after the no-fault

dependency adjudication; and

(3) she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,

concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of her children.

Thereafter, a best-interests hearing was held. After reiterating its

previous findings that the children were dependent and Phyllis was

unfit, the circuit court determined it was in E.B. and J.B.’s best

interests to terminate Phyllis’ parental rights. An order terminating

Phyllis’ parental rights was entered on August 15, 2007.

Phyllis appealed and the appellate court reversed, with one justice

dissenting. The appellate court held that the plain language of section

2–4(1)(c) prohibits the termination of parental rights when children

have been adjudicated dependent under the no-fault provision. Justice

Cook dissented, arguing that section 2–4(1)(c) was ambiguous and,

therefore, the court should consider the statute’s purpose of protecting

children’s best interests, and it was in E.B. and J.B.’s best interests to

terminate Phyllis’ parental rights.

We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315

(210 Ill. 2d R. 315).

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Analysis

A parent’s right to raise his or her biological child is a

fundamental liberty interest. In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d 287, 295 (2004).

As such, a proceeding to involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights is

a “drastic measure.” In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d at 295. In Illinois, the

authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is purely statutory

and the scope of the court’s authority is defined by the Juvenile Court

Act and the Adoption Act. In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d at 295. These acts

contain strict procedural requirements that embody Illinois’ policy

that favors parents’ superior right to the custody of their own

children. See In re Y.B., 285 Ill. App. 3d 385, 390 (1996). When a

court exercises its authority, it “must proceed within the confines of

that law and has no authority to act except as that law provides.”

People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 199 (2007). A court “ ‘ “is not free

to reject or expand its statutory authority despite the desirability or

need for such action.” ’ [Citations.]” In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d 526,

540 (2006). Any action the trial court takes that is outside the

statute’s stricture is void. In re Jamie P., 223 Ill. 2d at 540.

Section 2–3 of the Act defines the circumstances under which a

child is deemed neglected or abused. Section 2–4 defines the

circumstances under which a child is deemed dependent. Section 2–4

provides four bases for finding a child dependent. Subsection (c), as

noted above, is at issue in the case at bar. Prior to 1993, the text of

subsection (1)(c) provided:

“(1) Those who are dependent include any minor under 18

years of age ***

***

(c) who is without proper medical or other remedial care

recognized under State law or other care necessary for his or

her well being through no fault, neglect or lack of concern by

his parents, guardian or custodian, provided that no order may

be made terminating parental rights, nor may a minor be

removed from the custody of his or her parents for longer than

6 months, pursuant to an adjudication as a dependent minor

under this subsection (c)[.]” 705 ILCS 405/2–4(1)(c) (West

1992).

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In 1993, the legislature amended subsection (c), adding at the end of

the paragraph the following language: “, unless it is found to be in his

or her best interest by the court or the case automatically closes as

provided under Section 2–31 [when a child turns 19 (or 21 under

given circumstances)] of this Act.” 705 ILCS 405/2–4(1)(c) (West

2006).

The appellate court found that the phrase “unless it is found to be

in his or her best interest” modifies the prohibition against removing

a child “from the custody of his or her parents for longer than 6

months,” but does not modify the phrase “no order may be made

terminating parental rights.” Justice Cook, in his dissent, argued that

the phrase “unless it is found to be in his or her best interest,”

grammatically, could modify both the prohibition against removing

a child “from the custody of his or her parents for longer than 6

months” and the provision that “no order may be made terminating

parental rights.”

Prior to the 1993 amendment, the plain language of subsection (c)

was interpreted as prohibiting termination of parental rights following

a finding of dependency under that provision. See In re Y.B., 285 Ill.

App. 3d 385, 391 (1996); In re A.F., 234 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1015-16

(1991). The State, in its brief to this court, concedes this point,

admitting that, under the preamended statute, parental rights could not

be terminated following a determination of dependency under

subsection (c), although parental rights could be terminated if a

finding of dependency was made under the other dependency

subsections of 4–2(1).

The question in the case at bar is whether subsection (c) of section

2–4(1), as amended, prohibits the State from seeking termination of

parental rights. This is an issue of statutory interpretation.

Specifically, we must determine whether the phrase “unless it is

found to be in his or her best interest,” which was added to the

statutory provision in 1993, modifies only the phrase prohibiting the

removal of a child “from the custody of his or her parents for longer

than 6 months,” as the appellate court majority held, or whether it

also modifies the phrase “no order may be made terminating parental

rights.”

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and

give effect to the legislature’s intent. People v. Pack, 224 Ill. 2d 144,

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147 (2007). The language of the statute is the best indication of

legislative intent, and we give that language its plain and ordinary

meaning. Pack, 224 Ill. 2d at 147. We construe the statute as a whole

and cannot view words or phrases in isolation but, rather, must

consider them in light of other relevant provisions of the statute.

People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 243 (2008).

The State contends that the appellate court erred in finding the

statute unambiguous. According to the State, as Justice Cook opined,

section 2–4(1)(c) is ambiguous because it is reasonable to interpret

the phrase “unless it is found to be in his or her best interest” to

modify both “from the custody of his or her parents for longer than 6

months” and “no order may be made terminating parental rights,” but

equally reasonable to interpret the phrase as modifying only the

prohibition against removing a child “from the custody of his or her

parents for longer than 6 months.” The State maintains that it is

impossible to determine from a plain reading of the statute which

interpretation is correct and, thus, we must look beyond the plain

language to the purpose of the Act, which is to promote and protect

the best interests of children. According to the State, an interpretation

of the amended statute as permitting the added phrase “unless it is

found to be in his or her best interest” as modifying both “from the

custody of his or her parents for longer than 6 months” and “no order

may be made terminating parental rights” better promotes and

protects the best interests of children and, therefore, should be

adopted.

As noted, the appellate court held that the phrase “unless it is

found to be in his or her best interest” modified only the phrase “from

the custody of his or her parents for longer than 6 months.” Although

the appellate court did not expressly reference the last antecedent

doctrine, it effectively employed that doctrine in its analysis. The last

antecedent doctrine, a long-recognized grammatical canon of

statutory construction, provides that relative or qualifying words,

phrases, or clauses are applied to the words or phrases immediately

preceding them and are not construed as extending to or including

other words, phrases, or clauses more remote, unless the intent of the

legislature, as disclosed by the context and reading of the entire

statute, requires such an extension or inclusion. City of Mount Carmel

v. Partee, 74 Ill. 2d 371, 375 (1979).

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Here, the qualifying phrase “unless it is found to be in his or her

best interest by the court” is immediately preceded by the phrase

prohibiting a minor from being “removed from the custody of his or

her parents for longer than 6 months.” The phrase “no order may be

made terminating parental rights” is more remote. Under the last

antecedent doctrine, the qualifying phrase would only relate to the

immediately preceding phrase. Thus, this canon would suggest that

under subsection (c) custody can be removed for more than six

months if it is in the child’s best interests, but that parental rights

cannot be terminated based upon a finding of dependency under this

subsection.

Further, the presence of the term “nor” supports the same

interpretation. The phrase “provided that no order may be made

terminating parental rights, nor may a minor be removed from the

custody of his or her parents for longer than 6 months” introduces

conditions or limitations on the trial court’s authority under

subsection (c), i.e., it means on condition that. Black’s Law

Dictionary 1261 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, when the trial court finds a

child dependent under subsection (c), its authority is limited or

conditioned in two ways: (1) it may not terminate parental rights and

(2) it may not remove the child from his or her parents for longer than

six months. The term “nor” is a disjunctive conjunction. “Generally,

use of the disjunctive indicates alternatives and requires separate

treatment of those alternatives, hence a clause following a disjunctive

is considered inapplicable to the subject matter of the preceding

clause.” (Emphases added.) Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954

(Wyo. 1996). See also Webster’s Third International Dictionary 651

(1993). In section 2–4(1)(c), the phrase “unless it is found to be in his

or her best interest” follows the second condition or limitation, i.e.,

that the court cannot remove the child from his or her parents for

longer than six months. This would suggest that the phrase modifies

only the second condition or limitation and not the first.

However, there is a corollary rule to the last antecedent rule,

discussed above, which suggests that the qualifying phrase could

apply to both of the preceding phrases. According to this rule of

punctuation, which was not recognized by the appellate court,

“[e]vidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all

antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be

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found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a

comma.” 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47:33,

at 373 (6th ed. 2000). See Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176

Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1996) (“Significantly, there is no punctuation setting this

qualifying phrase apart from the sentence which precedes it, which

might connote that the phrase was intended to modify more remote

terms”). Here, the presence of the comma before “unless it is found

to be in his or her best interest” suggests that that phrase modifies

both “removed from custody of his or her parents for longer than 6

months” as well as “no order may be made terminating parental

rights.”

Nevertheless, this punctuation rule is itself countered by the

presence of the intervening clause, “pursuant to an adjudication as a

dependent minor under this subsection (c).” This intervening clause

comes after the clause expressing the conditions or limitations on the

trial court’s authority, thus suggesting the phrase “unless it is found

to be in his or her best interest” was intended to apply only to the

immediately preceding phrase.

The above aids to statutory construction fail to lead to an

inescapable answer as to whether the qualifying phrase applies only

to the immediately preceding phrase or whether it applies to both

preceding phrases. Rather, these aids only serve to highlight the fact

that the language of subsection (c) is “capable of being understood by

reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.”

People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). When statutory

language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the

statute is considered ambiguous. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d at 288. Here,

contrary to the appellate court’s holding, we find that the language of

subsection (c) is ambiguous. Since the intrinsic aids do not resolve

the ambiguity, resort to other aids or tools of interpretation, including

legislative history and transcripts from legislative debates, is

warranted.

Looking to the debates, we find that comments by the legislature

clearly and strongly favor an interpretation that the phrase “unless it

is found to be in his or her best interest” modifies only the phrase

prohibiting a minor from being “removed from the custody of his or

her parents for longer than 6 months.” Representative Dart, the

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sponsor of the bill which introduced the best-interests language,

offered this explanation:

“This Bill deals with a specific instance which is called

‘no-fault’ or lock-out cases in child abuse cases. This would

extend the period of time. Right now there’s an arbitrary six-

month period, which is the present period that’s allowed for

these children. This would expand it depending on how far

the court would need to deal with the child as far as his

medical needs may go.” (Emphases added.) 88th Ill. Gen.

Assem., House Proceedings, April 26, 1993, at 30-31

(statements of Representative Dart).

Thereafter, Representative Dart further specified the purpose of

adding “unless it is found to be in his or her best interest”:

“Basically, what it does, there’s a special scenario that

plays out where a child is not being able to get the medical

attention they need from their parents through no fault of the

parent, and so they’re what they call lock-out cases where

they physically are not allowed into the house by the parents.

What this Bill would say is that the court, in these specific

cases, could allow for the court to monitor the cases longer

than six months. Right now in the statute, we have a six month

period of time that’s delineated, and everyone agrees it was an

arbitrary number that was put together. In certain instances, it

takes more than six months to get the child back into the

house, and we just want the period of time to reflect however

long it’s going to take to get the child in.

***

*** The lock-out basically is the term that they give it in

the juvenile court system for the situation where there’s

nothing physically that is allowing the court to take the child

out right now, but what they’re saying is that the parent and

the child basically are the mother’s not letting the child into

the house and physically the kid’s on the street, and this

would allow the court to intervene in that situation.”

(Emphases added.) 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,

April 26, 1993, at 31-32 (statements of Representative Dart).

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See also 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 18, 1993, at

133 (statements of Senator Barkhausen) (“It repeals the six-month

limitation during–period during which a minor could be removed

from the home if the court should find it is in the best interest of the

minor for the child to be removed or to stay removed for a longer

period of time”); 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 29,

1993, at 36 (statements of Senator Barkhausen) (“The original bill

and this current measure repeals a–a six-month limitation that a minor

is allowed to be declared a dependent–or allows a minor to be

removed from his parents if it is determined to be in the best interests

of the minor”).

The comments repeatedly and definitively establish that the

amendment was meant to expand the six-month time period. There is

no question that this time period applies solely to the removal of a

child from the custody of his or her parents. The purpose of the

amendment was to allow the trial court flexibility in determining

whether to allow a child to remain outside the custody of his or her

parents for longer than six months if it is in his or her best interests.

There is no reference in the debates to the provision prohibiting

termination of parental rights. Had the legislature intended for the

phrase “unless it is found to be in his or her best interest” to apply to

the prohibition against terminating parental rights, it would have

made reference to that limitation as well.

Having reviewed the legislature’s comments, we find that the

legislature intended the qualifying phrase “unless it is found to be in

his or her best interest” to modify only the phrase which prohibits the

removal of a child “from the custody of his or her parents for longer

than 6 months.” Absolutely nothing in the debates suggests that the

legislature intended to alter the directive that “no order may be made

terminating parental rights.”

As further support for our interpretation, we note that the

legislature added two exceptions through the 1993 amendment: the

best-interests exception and the automatic-closure exception based on

section 2–31. The phrase “no order may be made terminating parental

rights” cannot logically be modified by the second exception, “unless

the case automatically closes as provided under Section 2–31 of this

Act [addressing closure when the child turns 19].” Not only is an

order terminating parental rights not necessary when a child reaches

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19, but it would be impossible for the trial court to enter such an order

because the child’s age automatically terminates the proceedings and

closes the case. Since the phrase “no order may be made terminating

parental rights” cannot be modified by the second exception added by

the 1993 amendment, then that phrase also cannot be modified by

“unless it is found to be in his or her best interest by the court.”

Lastly, support for our interpretation comes from the procedural

requirements of the Act. It would be unreasonable to apply the

qualifying phrase “unless it is found to be in his or her best interest”

to the phrase “no order may be made terminating parental rights”

because a court may not terminate parental rights without first finding

the parent unfit. The termination of parental rights is a two-step

process under which the best interests of the child is considered only

after a court finds the parent unfit. In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d at 296; In re

D. F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494-95 (2002). Accordingly, the phrase “unless

it is found to be in his or her best interest” cannot reasonably modify

to the phrase “no order may be made terminating parental rights.”

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State argues that we must look

to the purpose of the Act, the promotion and protection of a child’s

best interests, in interpreting subsection (c). To support its argument,

the State points to section 1–2(3)(c) of the Act, which provides: “(3)

In all procedures under this Act, the following shall apply: *** (c)

The parents’ right to the custody of their child shall not prevail when

the court determines that it is contrary to the health, safety, and best

interests of the child.” 705 ILCS 401/1–2(3)(c) (West 2006).

While it is true that the best interests of children is a paramount

concern of the legislature, we note that section 1–2(3)(c) addresses

custody of children, not the termination of parental rights. Further, the

focus of the legislature is not solely on the child. We have recognized

that the Act favors natural parents having custody of their children

(see In re Arthur H., 212 Ill 2d 441, 467 (2004); see also In re

Custody of Menconi, 117 Ill. App. 3d 394, 396-97 (1983)), and that

parental rights are a basic fundamental interest, which may only be

taken away by strict adherence to those constitutionally permissible

processes mandated by statute. Here, the legislature has determined

that parental rights may not be terminated based upon a finding of

dependency under subsection (c). There is nothing in this

determination that conflicts with the underlying purpose of the Act to

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promote and protect the best interests of children. In light of the clear

intent of the amendment as gleaned from the legislative debates, we

decline to interpret the statute as urged by the State.

Conclusion

We conclude that the circuit court erred in terminating Phyllis’

parental rights after her children were found dependent under section

2–4(1)(c). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.

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