People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission

Docket No. 105131.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS

COMMERCE COMMISSION, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 20, 2008.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Plaintiff-Appellant, the Attorney General, electronically

transmitted an application for rehearing with the Illinois Commerce

Commission after the close of business on the application’s due date.

The Commission accepted the application, but ultimately denied

rehearing. The Attorney General then appealed to the Appellate

Court, First District. The appellate court transferred the appeal to the

Fourth District, which then dismissed the appeal. The Fourth District

relied on the Commission’s regulations to determine that the Attorney

General’s application for rehearing was not timely, and therefore

concluded the court lacked jurisdiction. The Attorney General

petitioned this court for leave to appeal the dismissal, which we

allowed pursuant to Rule 315 (210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). This case

presents the question whether the Commission’s regulations require

an electronic filing (e-filing) to be transmitted before the

Commission’s office closes in order to be timely filed and vest the

appellate court with jurisdiction to hear a subsequent appeal.

BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2005, Illinois Bell Telephone Company

(referred to by both parties as AT&T) requested the Commission to

reclassify certain residential local services as “competitive.” The

details of the underlying request are not necessary to understand the

question before this court, as the question here is purely procedural

and does not require a discussion on the merits. It is sufficient to note

the Commission had jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the

Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/13–502 (West 2006)). On August

30, 2006, after discovery and hearings, the Commission issued an

order partially approving AT&T’s request (original order). That

document was dated August 30 and served on the parties the

following day. That document was titled “Post Exceptions Proposed

Order.”

On September 7, the Commission served a second document on

the parties. The second document was also dated August 30. Both

parties acknowledge that the sole difference between the original

order and the September 7 document is that the words “Post

Exceptions Proposed” were removed from the title so that the title of

the second document contained only the word “Order.”

The Commission’s docket describes both documents. It describes

the original order as a “Final Order.” The docket describes the

September 7 document as a “Corrected Final Order.” The docket

entry for both documents is dated August 30. The docket lists no

other order between August 30 and September 7.

Pursuant to the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/10–113(a) (West

2006)) all parties had the opportunity to file an application for

rehearing within 30 days of the Commission’s order.

The parties dispute whether the due date for filing was October 2,

30 days from the service of the Commission’s original order dated

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August 30, or October 10, 30 days from the Commission’s “corrected

order” served September 7.1

The parties also dispute whether the Attorney General’s

application for rehearing was timely filed on October 2. Various

Commission documents indicate different filing dates for the

Attorney General’s application. The Commission’s docket entry lists

a “filed date” of October 3, 2006. The administrative law judge’s

recommendation of October 3, 2006, states the Attorney General’s

application as filed on October 2. The order denying the Attorney

General’s application for rehearing indicates an October 3 filing.

Although the parties dispute the actual filing date, both parties

acknowledge the date and times at which they each transmitted their

applications to the Commission. AT&T, using the Commission’s e-

filing system, transmitted its application at 4:04 p.m. on September

29, 2006. The Attorney General’s office transmitted its application

for rehearing, at issue in this case, at 5:34 p.m. on October 2, 2006.

The Commission accepted and considered both the Attorney

General’s and AT&T’s applications for rehearing and denied them

both on October 12. On October 13, AT&T submitted a petition for

review with the Appellate Court, Fourth District, and a second

petition for review with that same court on October 23. The Fourth

District consolidated those appeals. On October 24 the Attorney

General submitted its own petition for review with the Appellate

Court, First District. AT&T moved to transfer the Attorney General’s

appeal to the Fourth District or, in the alternative, to dismiss the

Attorney General’s appeal based on its untimely filing of its

application for rehearing. The cause was transferred to the Fourth

District, which dismissed AT&T’s appeals as premature. The Fourth

District also dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction, because it determined that the Attorney General’s

1

As this court held in Illini Coach Co. v. Illinois Greyhound Lines, Inc.,

403 Ill. 21 (1949), the 30-day period is measured in calendar days. Here,

the thirtieth day fell on a weekend, and so the following Monday, October

2, became the filing deadline. October 7, the thirtieth day from the second

order, also fell on a weekend.

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application for rehearing was not timely filed. The Attorney General

then sought leave to appeal in this court.

ANALYSIS

I. Effect of the Commission’s September 7, 2006, Order

We first consider the Attorney General’s argument that its

application was timely because the order served on September 7

constituted an amended order that reset the time period for filing a

petition for rehearing.

The Attorney General contends that the Public Utilities Act

applies to any and all alterations in a Commission order. The

Attorney General cites section 10–113, which authorizes the

Commission to “rescind, alter or amend” any order or decision made

by it. 220 ILCS 5/10–113 (West 2006). The Act provides that any

alteration or amendment shall have the “same effect” as the

Commission’s original order. We review questions of statutory

interpretation de novo. Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221 Ill. 2d 453, 460

(2006).

Although the issue is one of first impression for this court, the

United States Supreme Court has considered this precise issue in

Federal Trade Comm’n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,

344 U.S. 206, 97 L. Ed. 245, 73 S. Ct. 245 (1952).

In Minneapolis-Honeywell a dispute arose over whether the

appellant timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The appellant

claimed, as in this case, that a second order issued two months after

the first renewed the time period from which the parties could petition

for certiorari. The appellate court had made no substantive change to

the original order and, instead, made a change to the title of the

document. The first document was labeled “Decree,” while the

second document was labeled “Final Decree.”

In answering this question, the Supreme Court recognized that

“the mere fact that a judgment previously entered has been reentered

or revised in an immaterial way does not toll the time within which

review must be sought.” Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 211, 97

L. Ed. at 252, 73 S. Ct. at 248. “Only when the lower court changes

matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a judgment

previously rendered should the period *** begin to run anew.”

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Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 211-12, 97 L. Ed. at 252, 73 S.

Ct. at 248-29. The Court also noted the test is a practical one. “The

question is whether the lower court *** has disturbed or revised legal

rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly

and properly settled with finality.” Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S.

at 212, 97 L. Ed. at 252, 73 S. Ct. at 249. Although Minneapolis-

Honeywell does not bind this court, we find its reasoning sound and

persuasive.

The factual similarity between Minneapolis-Honeywell and the

present case is apparent. The only change to the Commission’s

August 30 order was removal of three words from the document’s

title. Rather than read “Order” the Commission’s original order read

“Post Exceptions Proposed Order.” As the Court concluded in

Minneapolis-Honeywell, “the question of whether the time *** was

to be enlarged cannot turn on the adjective which the court below

chose to use in the caption of its second judgment,” when the first

judgment “was for all purposes final.” Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344

U.S. at 212-13, 97 L. Ed. at 252, 73 S. Ct. at 249.

Here, the record and argument before us indicate that the August

30 order was for all purposes final. The September 7 document did

not disturb or revise either party’s legal rights and obligations that had

been plainly and properly settled with finality. The parties understood

the August 30 order to be a final order. Indeed, at oral argument,

counsel for the Attorney General acknowledged that the Attorney

General had been proceeding with the original order in mind, and

suggested that an application for rehearing based on either order

would be proper.

Rather than affect the parties’ legal rights, the alteration here was

de minimus, as removing three words from the document’s heading

merely corrected a trivial, clerical error. As such, the change did not

serve to extend the parties’ opportunity to file an application for

rehearing.

We further conclude that section 10–113 does not change this

analysis. Section 10–113 is a formal procedure the Commission must

follow if it intends to rescind, alter or amend one of its decisions.

However, the record indicates that the Commission did not rely on

section 10–113 when it served the September 7 document. Although

served on September 7, the second document was also dated August

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30. The Commission’s e-docket shows that the two orders were both

entered on August 30, 2006. The docket lists the first as a “Final

Order,” and the second as a “Corrected Final Order.” The docket

likewise contains no entry of an order on either September 6 or 7.

Further, nothing indicates the Commission intended to rely on its

statutory authority to rescind or amend its decision. Section 10–113

requires that the Commission notify the public utility, and provide the

utility an opportunity to be heard, if it decides to rescind or amend an

order. Here, the Commission did not serve notice, nor did it provide

an opportunity to be heard.

The legislature, in enacting section 10–113, intended to provide

for notice and opportunity to the parties in the event that the

Commission decided to reconsider its decision. The procedure

ensures that any amendment to a Commission decision will not be

undertaken without serious consideration. It is equally evident that the

legislature did not intend to require notice, and an opportunity to be

heard, for mere clerical mistakes that do not materially affect the

decision.

Section 10–113 cannot be read to apply to nonsubstantive

corrections to the Commission’s orders. Therefore, we hold that the

Commission’s September 7 order did not extend the time in which

the Attorney General could file its application for rehearing.

II. Whether E-Filing Outside Business Hours Results in an

Untimely Application

We next turn to whether the Attorney General’s electronic

transmission of an application for rehearing, transmitted at 5:34 p.m.

on the last day of filing, was timely filed, and therefore whether the

appellate court has jurisdiction over the Attorney General’s appeal.

The timeliness of the Attorney General’s application for rehearing

turns on whether the Commission’s rules require filing during

business hours.

Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of

law, and must be construed under the same standards which govern

the construction of statutes. Union Electric Co. v. Department of

Revenue, 136 Ill. 2d 385 (1990). The interpretation of a statute is a

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question of law, which we review de novo. Kownacki, 221 Ill. 2d at

460. Thus, de novo review is also required here.

In interpreting an agency regulation, our primary objective is to

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the agency, in this case, the

Commission. MD Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Abrams, 228 Ill. 2d

281, 287 (2008). The surest and most reliable indicator of intent is the

language of the regulation itself. MD Electrical, 228 Ill. 2d at 287. In

determining the plain meaning, we consider the regulation in its

entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the apparent

intent of the Commission in enacting it. MD Electrical, 228 Ill.2d at

287. Where the language of the regulation is clear and unambiguous,

we must apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of

statutory construction. MD Electrical, 228 Ill.2d at 287-88.

The regulation at issue states that “[t]he filing of an electronic

document is effective upon acceptance of the complete document and,

if applicable, any required original paper verification or affidavit

pages by the Chief Clerk of the Commission.” 83 Ill. Adm. Code

§200.1040(b) (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000).

The Attorney General argues that the Commission’s regulation does

not require filing during business hours. AT&T contends that the

regulation requires physical acceptance of any electronic filing.

AT&T further reasons that there can be no acceptance if the chief

clerk or his personnel are not present in the building. AT&T therefore

concludes that electronic documents must be filed during business

hours when Commission personnel are present.

Looking first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language,

we note that acceptance means “favorable reception,” or “the act of

accepting.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 11 (2002).

Accept means “to receive with assent.” Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 10 (2002). These definitions suggest that

acceptance requires something more than mere transmittal, but the

word acceptance alone does not provide guidance as to how a

document may be accepted.

However, the word acceptance does not stand alone. The

regulation, read in its entirety, establishes that electronic documents

may be accepted “by the Chief Clerk of the Commission.” Neither

party argues that “Chief Clerk,” as used in this regulation, means only

the chief clerk. AT&T acknowledges that the regulation extends at

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least to the chief clerk’s personnel, who may also accept e-filings.

This position reflects the reality of modern administrative agencies

that department heads must necessarily delegate certain authority and

responsibility in order for the agency to function properly. Both

parties agree that the intent of the regulation was not to require the

chief clerk to personally accept every e-filing.

Because “Chief Clerk” cannot be read literally, the language of

the statute gives rise to an ambiguity as to who, or what, may

“accept” electronic filings. An ambiguity exists where the regulation

is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. See General

Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill.

2d 1, 13 (2007). AT&T reasonably interprets “Chief Clerk” to mean

the chief clerk or a member of his staff. However, interpreting chief

clerk to refer to the office of the chief clerk, and not to any particular

person, an interpretation more in line with that of the Attorney

General, is also reasonable. Implementing an e-filing system, like

delegating responsibility to the chief clerk’s staff members, serves the

same purpose of promoting efficiency, and reducing the burden on the

Commission’s employees. Under that interpretation, the Commission

e-docket system is authorized to accept filings from the various

parties having business with the Commission. We find the regulation

ambiguous because on its face it contains no indication whether filing

requires actual physical acceptance by a human being in the chief

clerk’s office.

If the language of a particular regulation is ambiguous, we then

look to the purpose and necessity of the regulation, the evils sought

to be remedied and the goals to be achieved. Alvarez v. Pappas, 229

Ill. 2d 217, 231 (2008). In doing so, we view all provisions of an

enactment as a whole. J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182 (2007). In this

case we look to the Commission’s formal rules for electronic filing,

enacted on October 15, 2000, in their entirety. When there is still

doubt as to a regulation’s meaning, we also properly consider

extrinsic matters in order to determine legislative intent. Land v.

Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 426

(2002).

In its “Overview of Electronic Filing,” the Commission affirms

its commitment “to facilitating the filing, distributing, and accessing

of documents electronically,” subject to the Commission’s Rules of

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Practice. 83 Ill. Adm. Code §200.1000 (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019,

eff. October 15, 2000). The Commission allows all documents

initiating a proceeding, or filed in a docketed proceeding, to be filed

electronically. 83 Ill. Adm. Code §200.1045 (added at 24 Ill. Reg.

16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The Commission’s rules also provide

for service by electronic means. 83 Ill. Adm. Code §200.1050 (added

at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000).

The rest of the Commission’s regulations reinforce this overall

purpose of facilitating e-filing. For example, the Commission’s e-

filing system accepts a variety of document formats. Although the

Commission encourages parties to submit documents in PDF format,

it will accept both Microsoft Word and Corel WordPerfect

documents, as well as ASCII text. 83 Ill. Adm. Code §200.1010

(added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The Commission

also accepts two spreadsheet formats. 83 Ill. Adm. Code §200.1010

(added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 16, 2000).

Thus, while the Commission’s rules do not require parties to file

electronically, the rules reflect the Commission’s intent to encourage,

rather than restrict, the practice. The Commission’s rules do contain

restrictions on electronic filing. For example, only registered account

holders may use the system, and only members of the service list for

a docketed case may file documents electronically in that case. 83 Ill.

Adm. Code §200.1020 (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15,

2000). However, these practices ultimately encourage electronic filing

by instilling confidence in the security and efficiency of the system.

In light of the regulations’ emphasis on facilitating e-filing, we cannot

say that the regulations themselves indicate an intent to restrict e-

filing to business hours.

Still, AT&T suggests that the disclaimer printed on the Attorney

General’s electronic receipt confirming the transmission of its

application for rehearing reveals the intent of the Commission to

restrict filing to actual office hours because a person must physically

review the filing. The disclaimer reads:

“Electronic file(s) are not officially filed with the Illinois

Commerce Commission until reviewed for compliance with

Commission rules and accepted by Commission personnel.”

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The disclaimer refers to acceptance by Commission personnel.

However, this statement is equally applicable to in-person filings and

mail filings. Neither are officially filed until reviewed for compliance.

What is different between in-person and mail filings is when they are

deemed filed. While both must be reviewed for compliance before

being officially filed, in-person filings must be made during business

hours, while mail filings do not. The disclaimer therefore says

nothing about whether e-filings must be transmitted during business

hours. Instead, the disclaimer indicates that a document will not be

officially filed at all if it does not comply with Commission rules.

Because the disclaimer does not suggest that a document transmitted

after business hours will be deemed filed the following day, the

disclaimer cannot provide guidance as to the Commission’s intent.

Even if the regulation and disclaimer could be interpreted to

require actual physical acceptance, it would prove to be an

unworkable standard. The burden of timely filing rests on parties to

an action, who are responsible for the proper formatting and delivery

of filings. Agencies and courts need not issue reminders. Along with

the parties’ responsibility to adhere to deadlines, however, comes the

assurance that a filing will be deemed filed when submitted, even if

not checked for compliance until later. In re Estate of Davison, 102

Ill. App. 3d 644, 645 (1981) (“Delivery alone has been held to

constitute filing since the person filing has no control over the officer

who receives documents”), citing Dowie v. Chicago, Waukegan &

North Shore Ry. Co., 214 Ill. 49 (1905).

Requiring physical acceptance undermines the reasoning in

Dowie, because e-filers have no control over the physical acceptance

of documents by Commission personnel. A physical-acceptance

standard gives rise to uncertainty as to whether an electronically

submitted document has been filed. We note in particular the example

raised by the Attorney General, of a filing transmitted at 4:59 p.m. If

Commission personnel are unable to review and accept that filing

until the following morning, under a physical-acceptance rule the

document will not be filed until that following morning. Similarly, a

brief filed at 5:01 p.m. and reviewed by Commission personnel

working late would be deemed filed that same day. The physical-

acceptance standard eliminates the parties’ ability to know, in

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advance, what time their documents will be deemed filed, as they

have no control over the chief clerk’s personnel.

Uncertainty of that kind does not occur with either in-person

filings or mail filings. In-person submissions are officially filed when

received at the principal office of the Commission. 83 Ill. Adm. Code

§200.70(a) (amended at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000).

Filing by mail is official based on the cancellation mark of the United

States Postal Service, or upon delivery to a private express courier

service. 83 Ill. Adm. Code §200.70(a)(1) (amended at 24 Ill. Reg.

16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The Commission’s regulation and

disclaimer, read literally to require physical acceptance of an

electronic filing, would place e-filers at a comparative disadvantage.

AT&T suggests that using the Commission’s business hours

sufficiently reduces the potential for uncertainty. We agree with

AT&T that imposing a 5 p.m. deadline is perfectly compatible with

e-filing, and acknowledge AT&T’s extensive list of other agencies

and jurisdictions that have imposed rules and regulations providing

for such a deadline. However, in the absence of a specific regulation,

we cannot read a 5 p.m. deadline into the Commission’s rules.

Indeed, the extent to which other jurisdictions have enacted business

hours deadlines also serves to underscore the Commission’s own

decision not to issue an explicit rule. Rather, the Commission chose

the word “acceptance,” which, standing alone, does not fairly imply

a 5 p.m. deadline.

AT&T’s interpretation requiring physical acceptance would

undermine the expressed intent of the Commission to facilitate and

encourage the use of electronic filing. We do not depart from the

plain language of the regulation by reading into it exceptions,

limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent. See

Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 559, 567

(2007).

The entirety of the Commission’s enactment seeks to expand,

rather than limit, the ability of parties to make use of the e-docket

system. Insisting on a deadline of 5 p.m. would have the opposite

effect, limiting the use of e-filing. When faced with a tight deadline,

a 5 p.m. rule would encourage attorneys to print, and mail, large

documents rather than use the efficient and economical method of

electronic filing that the Commission’s rules promote.

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Accordingly, we hold that the Commission’s regulations do not

require that electronic documents to be transmitted by 5 p.m. on their

due date. So long as the document is transmitted prior to midnight of

the due date, and otherwise complete under the Commission’s rules,

that document is timely filed, and the appellate court properly has

jurisdiction over subsequent appeals.

III. Appropriate Court on Remand

The Attorney General asks this court to remand this appeal to the

First District, as the First District is the court that first acquired

jurisdiction of its appeal under the Public Utilities Act. AT&T argues

that the Attorney General has forfeited this issue because it was not

raised in the Attorney General’s petition for leave to appeal.

The Attorney General asserts it has previously raised the

argument that the First District first acquired jurisdiction of this

appeal. Specifically, the Attorney General raised the argument in

defending against AT&T’s original motion to transfer to the Fourth

District, in the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss AT&T’s

appeals, and in the Attorney General’s petition for rehearing in the

Fourth District.

However, forfeiture is ultimately irrelevant, as the issue in this

case is one of jurisdiction, which any reviewing court has an

obligation to consider. Franson v. Micelli, 172 Ill. 2d 352, 355

(1996).

The appellate court has jurisdiction to review administrative

decisions only as provided by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6; Town

& Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill.

2d 103, 121-22 (2007). When the appellate court undertakes direct

review of an administrative decision, it exercises special statutory

jurisdiction. Town & Country Utilities, 225 Ill. 2d at 122. Special

statutory jurisdiction is limited to the language of the act conferring

it. Town & Country Utilities, 255 Ill. 2d at 122, quoting Collinsville

Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School

Trustees, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 182 (2006), quoting Fredman Brothers

Furniture v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 210 (1985).

Thus, we are presented with the question whether the Public Utilities

Act has conferred jurisdiction on either the First or Fourth District.

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The Public Utilities Act specifically requires appeals to be

brought in particular judicial districts. The Act provides that parties

“may appeal to the appellate court of the judicial district in which the

subject matter of the hearing is situated.” 220 ILCS 5/10–201(a)

(West 2006). The Act further states:

“The court first acquiring jurisdiction of any appeal from

any *** order *** shall have and retain jurisdiction of such

appeal and of all further appeals from the same *** order ***

until such appeal is disposed of in such appellate court. 220

ILCS 5/10–201 (West 2006).

The Public Utilities Act thus limits the appellate court’s special

statutory jurisdiction to districts that encompass the matter under

review by the Commission.

This court has recognized that it is the notice of appeal which,

when timely filed with the trial court, vests jurisdiction with the

appellate court. In re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (2002). Berg v.

Allied Security, Inc., 193 Ill. 2d 186, 189 (2000). 155 Ill. 2d R. 301.

In the context of administrative review, the petition for review

submitted to the appellate court serves the function of the notice of

appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 335, Committee Comments, at cxxxii; ESG

Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 31 (2000).

Therefore, for the appellate court to acquire jurisdiction, the petition

for review must be timely filed. In this case, the Attorney General

acknowledges that AT&T first filed its petitions for review in the

Fourth District. Still, the Attorney General contends that because

those petitions were not timely filed, jurisdiction never vested with

the Fourth District.

We note neither the First nor the Fourth District has made a

determination whether, under the Public Utilities Act, it “first

acquir[ed] jurisdiction.” The Fourth District merely concluded, in its

dismissal of the Attorney General’s appeal, that the Attorney

General’s petition for rehearing was not timely. The First District also

declined to make a determination of its jurisdiction in transferring the

Attorney General’s appeal to the Fourth District. That court strongly

emphasized it made no finding as to whether it or the Fourth District

had jurisdiction over either of the parties’ appeals. People ex rel.

Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 369 Ill. App. 3d 126, 127

(2006).

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Nor did the appellate court make a determination as to whether

the subject matter of the Commission’s review was “situated” in the

reviewing court’s district. Because an appeal of a Commission

decision is allowed by law only in those districts where the subject

matter of the appeal is situated, the appellate court must meet that

statutory requirement, even before it can determine which district first

acquired jurisdiction. We note the Attorney General contends that the

matter is situated in the First District, because the bulk of AT&T’s

affected customers are geographically located there, while AT&T

asserts that its customers are also located in the Fourth District. The

record before this court is not sufficiently developed to make that

determination.

Thus, although we hold that the appellate court has jurisdiction

over the Attorney General’s appeal with respect to the timeliness of

her application for rehearing with the Commission, we remand to the

Fourth District with instruction to consider whether the subject matter

of the Commission’s order is situated in the First or the Fourth

District, if either, and for a determination whether the First or the

Fourth District first acquired jurisdiction over the Attorney General’s

appeal, pursuant to section 10–201(a).

Finally, we note that Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (210 Ill. 2d

R. 303) and Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335) may be applicable to the

question of jurisdiction. However, neither party has briefed the issue,

and so we instruct the Fourth District to also consider its jurisdiction

in light of Rules 303 and 335.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Attorney General’s

application for rehearing was timely filed, and that the Fourth District

did not lack jurisdiction on timeliness grounds. The judgment of the

appellate court is reversed, and we remand the cause to the Fourth

District for further proceedings.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

cause remanded.

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