Samour v. The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago

Docket Nos. 101902, 102227 cons.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

SAMOUR, INC., et al., Appellees, v. THE BOARD OF ELECTION

COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.–

MASHNI CORPORATION et al., Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF

ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et

al., Appellees.

Opinion filed January 19, 2007.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Garman,

and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Burke took no part in the decision.

OPINION

In separate complaints, the two sets of plaintiffs in these

consolidated appeals, Mashni Corporation et al. (Mashni) and

Samour, Inc., et al. (Samour), challenged the validity of a local option

election held under the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (Act) (235 ILCS

5/9–1 et seq. (West 2002)), based on alleged errors in the form of the

ballots. The complaints both alleged that the Chinese version of the

ballots failed to comply substantially with the statutory form in section

9–6 of the Act (235 ILCS 5/9–6 (West 2002)). The circuit court of

Cook County invalidated the election because it found that a

transposition error in the precinct and ward numbers violated the

substantial compliance requirement of the Act.

In separate appeals, the appellate court in Mashni reversed the

trial court judgment (362 Ill. App. 3d 730), while the appellate court

in Samour affirmed (362 Ill. App. 3d 12). This court consolidated the

two appeals. We conclude that the ballots complied substantially with

section 9–6 of the Act and, therefore, the circuit court erred in

invalidating the election. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in

Mashni, No. 102227, reversing the trial court’s decision, and reverse

the judgments in Samour, No. 101902.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 25, 2003, a local option election was held in the 45th

Precinct of the 15th Ward and the 32nd Precinct of the 48th Ward in

Chicago. The Board of Election Commissioners for the City of

Chicago (Board) submitted propositions to the voters of those

precincts asking whether the sale at retail of alcoholic liquor should be

prohibited within their precincts. The ballots in each precinct were

printed in English, Spanish, and Chinese.

The ballots listed the ward and precinct numbers in the upper left

corner. A section entitled “Description of Area to be Affected,”

containing a common description of the precincts using street

boundaries, landmarks, and addresses, was printed after the ward and

precinct numbers. In the 45th Precinct of the 15th Ward, the English

version of the proposition stated, “Shall the sale at retail of alcoholic

liquor be prohibited in this 45th Precinct of the 15th Ward of the City

of Chicago (as such precinct existed as of the last General

Election[)]?” The proposition in the 32nd Precinct of the 48th Ward

stated, “Shall the sale at retail of alcoholic liquor be prohibited in this

32nd Precinct of the 48th Ward of the City of Chicago (as such

precinct existed as of the last General Election)?”

Following the election, the plaintiffs in these cases filed separate

complaints against the Board contesting the validity of the local option

election in their respective precincts. In Samour, plaintiff Samour,

Inc., alleged it is an Illinois corporation holding retail liquor licenses

and conducting business within the 45th Precinct of the 15th Ward in

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Chicago. In Mashni, the plaintiffs included Mashni Corporation and

S & T, Inc., Illinois corporations holding retail liquor licenses and

conducting business within the 32nd Precinct of the 48th Ward. In

both cases, there were also a number of individual plaintiffs who were

identified as registered voters residing within the respective precincts.

Barbara Stanley and Paul Uhl intervened in the Mashni trial

proceedings but not in the Samour proceedings.

The plaintiffs’ complaints were virtually identical with respect to

the claims at issue here, and they were consolidated for purposes of

the trial court proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged that the election was

invalid because the Chinese translation of the proposition did not

comply with the ballot form required by section 9–6 of the Act. In

pertinent part, the plaintiffs alleged that: (1) the English ballots asked

voters whether the sale of alcohol should be prohibited at retail as

required by the Act, while the Chinese translation asked whether the

sale of alcohol should be prohibited generally; and (2) the precinct and

ward numbers were transposed on the Chinese ballots, thus incorrectly

identifying the affected areas as the 15th Precinct of the 45th Ward

and the 48th Precinct of the 32nd Ward.

At the bench trial, two expert witnesses testified, one for the

plaintiffs and one for the Board and the intervenors. None of the

plaintiffs testified and the parties did not present any other witnesses.

Hanlelore Mui, a freelance interpreter and translator of the Chinese

language, testified on behalf of the plaintiffs. During her testimony,

Mui referred to a ballot from the 32nd Precinct of the 48th Ward, but

the parties stipulated that her testimony was also applicable to the

ballot used in the 45th Precinct of the 15th Ward. Mui testified that

the Chinese translation asked whether “the sale of liquor in general

should it be prohibited *** in the 48th Precinct of 32nd District in

Chicago City.” In her opinion, the Chinese translation had “omissions

of important meaningful words” and was not a correct translation.

Mui testified that the transposition of the ward and precinct numbers

on the Chinese ballots “could be easily confusing” because people who

could not read the description of the area affected would probably

think they were given the wrong ballot. She acknowledged, however,

that voters could “easily solve that problem” if they read the

description of the area affected.

Mui also testified that the Chinese translation was not accurate

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because it used the word “sale” without the term “retail.” The

translation should have included the character “ling shou,” the term

for “retail sale” or “for sale at retail.” She believed that the Chinese

translation printed on the ballot encompassed all types of sales,

including wholesale, resale, or for personal consumption.

On cross-examination, Mui acknowledged that the common

description of the precinct would be easy for Chinese readers to

understand. She also explained that “retail” can have multiple

meanings referring to price, quantity, and the sales location. The term

“sale” could also have multiple meanings. According to Mui, the

general public is familiar with the character ling shou because it is a

commonly used term. She conceded that “sale at retail” could be

translated using “xiao shou” as it appeared on the ballots, but

maintained that a more accurate translation would have used the

character ling shou to indicate the difference between retail sale and

wholesale.

Dr. Richard Gu, a professor of Chinese language at Northwestern

University, testified on behalf of the Board and the intervenors. Gu

stated there was always a choice of characters to use in translating and

it was preferable to use plain or simplified Chinese with the general

public. Xiao shou, the character used by the Board, was the best

translation for “sale at retail” because that character is generally taught

and understood to mean retail sales. In Gu’s opinion, voters would

understand that the ballot was referring to retail sales.

According to Gu, adding ling shou would not clarify the ballot

because xiao shou meant sale. He asserted the “meaning is clearly

there already. No one would misunderstand it.” In fact, fewer people

would be able to understand the proposition if ling shou, the character

for “retail,” was added to the translation. Gu explained that the

Chinese language has over 40,000 characters and only the most

commonly used characters are generally taught. The general public is,

therefore, unfamiliar with less commonly used characters. Xiao shou

is much more commonly used and taught than ling shou. Gu did not

even teach ling shou to his college and graduate students. Although

xiao shou could be understood to include both retail and wholesale,

the general public would understand it to mean retail sale. In Gu’s

opinion, xiao shou was the best character to convey the idea of retail

sale to the general public.

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Dr. Gu further stated that Chinese voters would not be confused

by the transposition of the precinct and ward numbers because it is a

“very, very common error” in translating between English and

Chinese. Chinese speakers always put the larger number before the

smaller one and are always cautious when viewing numbers in a

translation. Thus, Chinese voters would identify this common problem

and would rely on the narrative description of the area affected rather

than the precinct and ward numbers on the ballots.

Based on Dr. Gu’s testimony, the trial court found that the

Chinese translation using the character xiao shou complied

substantially with the statutory form set forth in section 9–6 of the

Act. The court concluded that Chinese voters “were given a clear and

meaningful choice to vote for or against the proposition.” As for the

transposition of the precinct and ward numbers, the court stated that

the question was whether the error “put a Chinese-speaking person in

a different position *** than it does an English-speaking and a

Spanish-speaking person.” The court concluded that the Chinese

translation failed to comply substantially with section 9–6 of the Act

“based upon the error in the ballot and the transposition of the ward

and precinct and the fact that a Chinese-speaking person is put in a

different position based upon the ballot that was submitted, than the

English and Spanish-speaking people.” The trial court, therefore, held

that the election was invalid.

Separate appeals were filed in these cases. In Samour, Inc. v.

Board of Election Commissioners, the Second Division of the First

District held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the

Chinese ballot did not comply substantially with the Act due to the

transposition of the precinct and ward numbers. 362 Ill. App. 3d at

16-19. The appellate court invalidated the election on that basis,

making it unnecessary to consider whether omission of the ling shou

character also voided the election. 362 Ill. App. 3d at 19. Thus, the

appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 362 Ill. App.

3d at 19.

In Mashni Corp. v. Board of Election Commissioners, the First

Division of the First District held that the trial court erred in

invalidating the election based on the transposition of the precinct and

ward numbers. 362 Ill. App. 3d at 739-43. According to the appellate

court, the common description of the precinct would be more useful

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to voters in clarifying any confusion on the area affected than the

precinct and ward numbers. 362 Ill. App. 3d at 743. While

acknowledging a contrary result was reached on this issue in Samour,

the appellate court held that the ballot as a whole, including the

common description of the area affected, complied substantially with

section 9–6 because it portrayed the chief features of the proposition

and the area affected in words of plain meaning. 362 Ill. App. 3d at

743. The appellate court further held that the trial court did not err in

determining that the Chinese translation of “at retail” complied

substantially with the statutory form in section 9–6. 362 Ill. App. 3d

at 744. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s

judgment invalidating the election. 362 Ill. App. 3d at 743.

We allowed petitions for leave to appeal filed by the parties in

both Samour and Mashni. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). The appeals were

consolidated for review.

II. ANALYSIS

In these consolidated appeals, we must decide whether the

Chinese translation on the ballots submitted in the 45th Precinct of the

15th Ward and the 32nd Precinct of the 48th Ward complied

substantially with the statutory form provided in section 9–6 of the

Act. The plaintiffs renew their claims that the translation failed to

comply substantially with section 9–6 because: (1) the precinct and

ward numbers were transposed, thus incorrectly identifying the areas

affected by the propositions; and (2) the Chinese translation asked

whether the sale of alcohol should be prohibited generally rather than

“at retail” as required by section 9–6.

Section 9–6 requires the proposition used in a local election to ban

the sale of alcohol to be “in substantially the following form”:

“Shall the sale at retail of alcoholic liquor (or alcoholic

liquor other than beer containing not more than 4% of alcohol

by weight) (or alcoholic liquor containing more than 4%

alcohol by weight in the original package and not for

consumption on the premises) be prohibited in (or at) ..........?”

235 ILCS 5/9–6 (West 2002).

The proper name of the precinct is to be inserted in the blank. 235

ILCS 5/9–1 (West 2002). The ballot must also contain a common

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description of the precinct in plain language unless the election official

determines that the description will not fit on the ballot. 235 ILCS

5/9–6 (West 2002). If the common description is not included on the

ballot, large printed copies of the description must be displayed

prominently in the precinct polling location. 235 ILCS 5/9–6 (West

2002).

When a special statute dictates the form of a ballot, the ballot used

in the election must comply substantially with the statutory mandate

or the election is void. Smith v. Calhoun Community Unit School

District No. 40, 16 Ill. 2d 328, 332 (1959). In determining whether a

ballot is in substantial compliance with a statutory form, we must ask

whether voters were given as clear an alternative as if the statutory

form had been identically followed. Dick v. Roberts, 8 Ill. 2d 215, 221

(1956). To render an election void, a deviation from the statutory

form must be in a matter of substance. People ex rel. Davis v.

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 48 Ill. 2d 176, 182 (1971).

In construing the term “substantial,” this court has stated:

“ ‘The word “substantial,” as ordinarily used, means essential,

material or fundamental. A substantial copy of the form of the

ballot designated in the statute must evidently be one that

contains the essence of the form in the statute–one giving the

correct idea but not necessarily the exact expressions in the

statutory form. The words of the statute, “The ballots at said

election shall be substantially in the following form,”

necessarily convey the idea that the ballot to be used or voted

by the voters is not required to be an accurate or exact copy

but one which embodies or contains the substance or main

features of the ballot found in the statute. The legislature

evidently did not intend that every word of the statutory form

should be found in the form furnished the voter, and if enough

of the words found in the statutory form, coupled with other

apt words, are printed on the ballot furnished to the voter that

will mean the same thing to all of the voters as the words used

in the statutory form, the statute will be substantially complied

with.’ ” Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 183, quoting People ex rel.

Howard v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co., 296 Ill. 246,

249-50 (1921).

The substance of a public measure is, therefore, adequately stated

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if the ballot contains a fair portrayal of the proposition’s chief features

in words of plain meaning. Smith, 16 Ill. 2d at 335. Moreover, when

a deviation from the statute has occurred, this court has refused to

elevate form over substance and has instead considered the likelihood

that the deviation in wording confused the voters or obstructed them

in voting in accordance with their intentions. Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 182.

“The focus is on the existence of a meaningful choice for the voters.

A ballot is sufficient if the voter has a clear opportunity to express a

choice either for or against it.” Krauss v. Board of Election

Commissioners, 287 Ill. App. 3d 981, 984 (1997), citing Hoogasian

v. Regional Transportation Authority, 58 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1974).

This court has also recognized that the intent of the statute

ultimately controls in determining what constitutes statutory

compliance and the effect of noncompliance. Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 182.

Here, the Act states that it shall be liberally construed to protect the

health, safety, and welfare of the people of Illinois and to promote

temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquor by sound and

careful regulation of the manufacture, sale, and distribution of

alcoholic liquor. 235 ILCS 5/1–2 (West 2002).

A. Standard of Review

The first issue we must address is the proper standard of review.

In Samour, the appellate court applied the “clearly erroneous”

standard (362 Ill. App. 3d at 15), while in Mashni the court

considered whether an election complied substantially with the Act to

be a question of law subject to de novo review (362 Ill. App. 3d at

739). Before this court, the parties continue to dispute the applicable

standard of review.

This court has cited the clearly erroneous standard of review only

in cases governed by the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS

5/3–101 et seq. (West 2002)). We have limited the application of that

standard to reviewing administrative decisions on mixed questions of

fact and law. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of

Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 369 (2002); AFM Messenger

Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380,

392 (2001); City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board,

181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). Thus, this court has only applied the

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clearly erroneous standard to decisions of administrative agencies.

Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 153 (2005). In all

other civil cases, we review legal issues de novo and factual issues

under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. See Corral, 217 Ill.

2d at 153.

This appeal arises not from an administrative review proceeding,

but from an election challenge filed in circuit court. There is no

decision of an administrative agency at issue in this appeal. We,

therefore, review any factual questions under the manifest weight of

the evidence standard, but review de novo the legal determination of

substantial compliance with the Act. See Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 153.

Having clarified the correct standard of review in these consolidated

appeals, we proceed to the merits of the parties’ substantive

arguments.

B. Transposition

The Board contends that the trial court improperly used a strict

compliance test in concluding that the transposition of the precinct

and ward numbers put Chinese-speaking voters “in a different

position” than other voters. According to the Board, the trial court’s

decision is inconsistent with our case law requiring only substantial

compliance, as well as with the express legislative intent requiring the

Act to be liberally construed. The Board maintains the evidence

established that the ballots gave Chinese-speaking voters a clear and

meaningful choice to vote for or against the proposition. See Krauss,

287 Ill. App. 3d at 984, citing Hoogasian, 58 Ill. 2d at 124. Thus, the

Chinese translation complied substantially with section 9–6, and the

trial court erred in invalidating the election based upon the

transposition of the precinct and ward numbers.

Similarly, the intervenors argue that the evidence does not support

a finding that the ballots failed to comply substantially with section

9–6. The expert witnesses agreed that the common descriptions of the

precincts were accurate and easy to understand. Moreover, plaintiffs’

expert, Mui, testified that any confusion due to the transposition of the

numbers would be easily resolved by reading the common

descriptions. Thus, it is clear that the ballots, considered as a whole,

were not confusing or misleading. Accordingly, the intervenors assert

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that the ballots gave Chinese-speaking voters a clear opportunity to

express their choice either for or against the proposition.

Conversely, the plaintiffs contend that the Chinese translation is

not in substantial compliance with section 9–6 because the Board

mistakenly identified the area affected both at the top of the ballots

and in the proposition. The plaintiffs claim that the Chinese translation

in the ballots presents a different question than the one required by the

statute. The common description does not remedy this defect because

there is no guarantee that voters consulted the description or that they

were familiar with the boundaries stated in the description. Thus, the

plaintiffs maintain the trial court properly found that the error in

identifying the affected area resulted in an invalid election.

We note that the trial court did not make specific findings of fact

or credibility determinations on the transposition issue. The court

simply reviewed the evidence and found that the ballots failed to

comply substantially with section 9–6 as a result of the transposition

of the precinct and ward numbers. Nonetheless, we will review the

factual issues under the manifest weight standard. See Corral, 217 Ill.

2d at 153. A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the

evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the finding

is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based in evidence. Best v. Best, No.

101135, slip op. at 6 (September 21, 2006).

A review of the record demonstrates that the experts agreed on

the critical factual issues supporting the legal conclusion that the

Chinese translation was in substantial compliance with section 9–6.

Both Dr. Gu and Mui testified that the precinct and ward numbers

were transposed in the Chinese translation on the ballots. Although

Mui testified that, read alone, the transposition of the precinct and

ward numbers “could be easily confusing,” she acknowledged that

voters could “easily solve that problem” by reading the common

description. Mui further testified that the common description of the

precincts would be easy for Chinese readers to understand. In

addition, Dr. Gu testified that Chinese-speaking voters would not be

confused by the transposition of the numbers because it is a “very,

very common error” in translation. Gu testified that voters would

identify this common error and would rely on the common description

of the area affected rather than the precinct and ward numbers on the

ballots.

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The plaintiffs’ expert, Mui, established several essential facts.

First, Chinese-speaking voters could easily resolve any confusion

caused by the transposition by reading the common description of the

precincts and, second, the common description would be easy for

Chinese readers to understand. Reviewed under the manifest weight

standard, these facts alone are sufficient to conclude that, taken as a

whole, the ballots’ description of the affected area did not confuse

Chinese-speaking voters or deprive them of a meaningful choice either

for or against the proposition. See Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 182; Krauss,

287 Ill. App. 3d at 984, citing Hoogasian, 58 Ill. 2d at 124.

Nonetheless, the plaintiffs assert there is no guarantee that voters

would be familiar with the boundaries stated in the common

description. The evidence, however, does not indicate that the

precinct and ward numbers would be more likely to inform voters of

the area affected than the common description that is required to be

communicated “in plain and nonlegal language.” 235 ILCS 5/9–6

(West 2002). To the contrary, Dr. Gu testified that voters would rely

on the common description rather than the precinct and ward numbers

on the ballots. The plaintiffs’ own expert testified that Chinese readers

could easily understand the common description of the precincts.

Moreover, in evaluating substantial compliance, this court has favored

“words of plain meaning” over technical or legal language. See Smith,

16 Ill. 2d at 335 (stating that the substance of a proposition is

adequately set forth if the ballot contains a fair portrayal of the

proposition’s chief features “in words of plain meaning, so that it can

be understood by persons entitled to vote”). It would be contrary to

both our established precedent and common sense to conclude that the

legal description in the form of precinct and ward numbers is more

intelligible to voters than the common description set forth “in plain

and nonlegal language.” See Smith, 16 Ill. 2d at 335.

The plaintiffs also argue that we cannot be sure that voters would

actually read the common description. Thus, the plaintiffs apparently

contend that Chinese-speaking voters would read the precinct and

ward numbers and be confused by them, but would not read other

parts of the ballot, including the common description of the precincts.

If we were to accept the plaintiffs’ argument, the legislative

purpose in requiring a common description would be defeated. The

legislature added the common description requirement to section 9–6

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with the intent to clarify any voter confusion about the area affected

by a proposition. The legislative history shows that the inclusion of a

common description was “designed to reduce the confusion” of

voters. See 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 15, 1977,

at 83 (statements of Representative Capparelli); 80th Ill. Gen. Assem.,

Senate Proceedings, May 17, 1977, at 180-81 (statements of Senator

Kosinski) (same comment). Thus, the legislature intended for voters

to rely upon the common description in voting on a proposition

submitted under section 9–6.

Additionally, this court has consistently held that all provisions of

a statute should be viewed as a whole. People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d

495, 519 (2006). Statutes should be construed so that no term is

rendered meaningless or superfluous. Stroger v. Regional

Transportation Authority, 201 Ill. 2d 508, 524 (2002). If we were to

assume that voters would disregard the common description appearing

in a ballot, the common description requirement would be read out of

section 9–6. We must, therefore, presume that voters will read the

entire ballot, including the common description mandated by section

9–6. The common description in the ballots cannot simply be ignored

by this court, but must be given the effect intended by the legislature.

In sum, we conclude that the manifest weight of the evidence

establishes that the common description contained in the ballots would

alleviate any confusion created by the transposed precinct and ward

numbers. The transposition of the precinct and ward numbers did not

obstruct Chinese-speaking voters from voting in accordance with their

intentions or deny them a meaningful choice either for or against the

proposition. See Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 182; Krauss, 287 Ill. App. 3d at

984, citing Hoogasian, 58 Ill. 2d at 124. Thus, as a matter of law, the

ballots were in substantial compliance with section 9–6 on the

identification of the areas affected by the proposition. We conclude

that the trial court erred in invalidating the election based on the

transposition of the precinct and ward numbers on the ballots.

Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court judgment in Samour

upholding the trial court’s ruling and affirm that portion of the Mashni

judgment reversing the trial court on this issue.

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C. Translation of “At Retail”

Having concluded that the transposition of the precinct and ward

numbers did not violate the Act, we consider whether the use of the

Chinese character xiao shou rather than the character ling shou

complied substantially with section 9–6. Based on Dr. Gu’s testimony

and the reasoning in Krauss, 287 Ill. App. 3d 981, the trial court

found substantial compliance. On appeal, the Samour court did not

reach this issue because it held that the transposition problem

invalidated the referendum. 362 Ill. App. 3d at 19. The appellate court

in Mashni, however, upheld the trial court’s finding, stating that it

would not overturn that court’s reliance on Dr. Gu’s testimony.

Relying on Dr. Gu’s testimony, the Mashni court determined that “the

term xi~o shòu gave the correct idea to the voters *** even if the term

used was not necessarily the exact expression utilized by the statutory

form.” 362 Ill. App. 3d at 744. The court distinguished Krauss and

concluded that the trial court “did not err in determining that the ‘at

retail’ translation was in substantial compliance with the Act.” 362 Ill.

App. 3d at 744.

We again note that different standards of review apply to the

factual and legal components of this issue. While the ultimate legal

question of whether the use of the character xiao shou was in

substantial compliance with the Act is reviewed de novo, the

underlying factual matters will be reviewed under a manifest weight

of the evidence standard. Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 153. As the Mashni

court correctly recognized, under the manifest weight standard a trial

court’s credibility decision is subject to great deference in a bench

trial. 362 Ill. App. 3d at 744. Indeed, we will not substitute our

judgment on credibility matters because the fact finder is in the best

position to evaluate the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses. Best,

slip op. at 6. Here, because the relevant testimony of the experts is

closely balanced on this issue, we accept the trial court’s credibility

determination favoring Dr. Gu’s testimony.

Dr. Gu testified that it is generally better to use simplified Chinese

characters when addressing the general public. Applying that rule, Gu

stated that xiao shou is the best translation for “sale at retail” because

it is usually taught and understood by the public to mean retail sales.

Gu asserted that on seeing that character voters would understand that

the ballot was referring to retail sales. He added that there was no

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benefit to using the alternative character, ling shou, because the

“meaning is clearly there already. No one would misunderstand it.” He

explained that only the most common of the more than 40,000

Chinese characters are usually taught. The general public would,

therefore, more likely be confused by the less familiar character ling

shou than by the common character xiao shou. Gu added that while

xiao shou could include both retail and wholesale sales, most Chinese

speakers would understand that it referred to retail sales, making it the

best translation choice.

After reviewing this testimony, we agree with the Mashni court

that a preference for the use of the character xiao shou is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence. Based on Dr. Gu’s testimony, we

find that while the ballot translation may not have complied strictly

with the statutory form, it was in substantial compliance. Unlike

Krauss, where the Spanish translation completely altered the meaning

of the ballot proposition by using the Spanish word for “to owe”

instead of the word for “to drink,” here the error, if any, is relatively

minor. Krauss, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 986. Indeed, according to Dr. Gu’s

testimony, most Chinese-speaking voters would have more readily

understood this translation than the one suggested by the plaintiffs.

We conclude that the translation using the character xiao shou

conveyed the “sale at retail” requirement of section 9–6 to Chinese-

speaking voters in words of plain meaning. The translation did not

obstruct voters from voting in accordance with their intentions or

deny them a meaningful choice on the proposition. Thus, as a matter

of law, the use of the character xiao shou complied substantially with

the requirements of the Act.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the appellate court in Samour erred by affirming the

trial court’s decision invalidating the local option election based on the

transposition of the precinct and ward numbers in the Chinese version

of the ballot. Despite the transposition, the ballot’s overall description

of the affected area was in substantial compliance with the statutory

form in section 9–6 of the Act. In addition, we agree with the

appellate court in Mashni that the use of the Chinese character xiao

shou for the English phrase “sale at retail” complied substantially with

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the Act. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and

circuit courts in Samour and affirm the judgment of the appellate court

in Mashni reversing the trial court judgment.

No. 101902–Judgments reversed;

No. 102227–Appellate court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision

of this case.

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