Hadley v. The Illinois Department of Corrections

Docket No. 101979.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

WILLIE B. HADLEY, Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant.

Opinion filed February 16, 2007.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the court,

with opinion.

Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the

judgment and opinion.

Justice Karmeier dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice

Thomas.

OPINION

Plaintiff, Willie B. Hadley, an inmate at Big Muddy River

Correctional Center, filed a class action complaint in the circuit court

of Sangamon County, seeking to enjoin defendant, the Illinois

Department of Corrections (DOC or the Department), from charging

him and other allegedly indigent inmates a $2 co-payment for

nonemergency medical and dental services. See 730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f)

(West 2004). The circuit court granted DOC’s section 2–615 motion

to dismiss. 735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2004). A divided appellate court

reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 362 Ill.

App. 3d 680. We allowed DOC’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.

2d R. 315.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the

appellate court.

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff has been

incarcerated since his arrest in 1976 and is serving an indeterminate

sentence of 24 to 74 years. Plaintiff claimed that during the two-year

period beginning in February 2002, DOC charged his inmate trust

fund account a total of $44 in co-payments for nonemergency medical

and dental services. Plaintiff claimed that such charges ran afoul of

section 3–6–2(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections, under which an

“indigent” inmate is “exempt” from the $2 co-payment (730 ILCS

5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004)). More specifically, plaintiff alleged that DOC

implemented a policy, through its administrative directives, of

deducting the statutory co-payment from an inmate’s trust fund

account irrespective of whether funds were available, and requiring

inmates who requested nonemergency medical or dental services to

first sign a “Request for Payment” form authorizing DOC to deduct

the co-payment from present or future funds in the inmate’s account.

In addition to violating the statute, plaintiff argued, this policy thrust

indigent inmates into further debt. Plaintiff noted that he had filed an

institutional grievance challenging DOC’s practice, which was denied.

Through his complaint, plaintiff sought to enjoin DOC from forcing

indigent inmates to sign the request-for-payment form prior to

receiving nonemergency medical and dental services.

DOC filed a section 2–615 motion to dismiss the complaint. 735

ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2004). DOC argued that section 3–6–2(f), when

read in its entirety, “states that an indigent inmate must be treated the

same as a solvent inmate, and is thus exempt from the requirement to

pay the co-payment before receiving treatment,” but that the “statute

does not forever relieve the inmate of his requirement to pay.”

(Emphasis in original.) According to DOC:

“Treatment will not be withheld, nor will an inmate be treated

differently, because the inmate is a pauper; however, the

inmate will be expected to pay the required amount when and

if he is financially able to do so. Plaintiff has not alleged, and

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indeed cannot claim, that he is certain to remain indigent for

the entire period of his incarceration. If his financial

circumstances change and he is at some point capable of

remitting the co-payments he has accrued, he will be required

to do so. In the event that Plaintiff remains indigent and is

released with a negative balance on his trust fund account, that

indebtedness will not follow him into the free world.”

In response, plaintiff argued that section 3–6–2(f) nowhere states

that an indigent inmate is required to pay the $2 co-payment once the

inmate becomes solvent. Plaintiff relied on the plain and ordinary

meaning of the word “exempt.” The circuit court granted DOC’s

motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the

circuit court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 362 Ill.

App. 3d 680. The appellate court concluded that DOC’s regulatory

scheme was inconsistent with the statutory language. Specifically, the

appellate court held that DOC’s special definition of “indigent,” which

considers the inmate’s ability to remit the co-payment “during the

entire term of his or her incarceration” (20 Ill. Adm. Code

§415.30(g)(3) (2005)), and DOC’s practice of restricting future funds

in the inmate’s account (20 Ill. Adm. Code §415.30(g)(2) (2005)),

conflicted with the plain language of the statute and the ordinary

definitions of “indigent” and “exempt.” 362 Ill. App. 3d at 686-87.

The appellate court concluded that section 3–6–2(f) “gave plaintiff a

clear right to an exemption from the $2 co-payment if, at the time he

sought nonemergency medical or dental services, he lacked the means

to pay it.” 362 Ill. App. 3d at 687. Based on plaintiff’s allegation that

DOC charged the co-payments to his inmate trust account even

though he had no funds or assets, thus putting his account balance in

“negative territory,” the appellate court found that “plaintiff has

alleged the first of the three conditions for granting an injunction: a

certain and clearly ascertainable right that needs protection.” 362 Ill.

App. 3d at 687. The appellate court also found that plaintiff

adequately pleaded the two remaining conditions for injunctive

relief–irreparable injury and lack of an adequate remedy at law–and

that the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. The

appellate court thus reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit

court for further proceedings. 362 Ill. App. 3d at 688-89. We allowed

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DOC’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

I

The present appeal arises from the grant of a section 2–615

motion to dismiss, a matter subject to de novo review. City of

Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d 351, 364 (2004).

Whether plaintiff’s complaint was properly dismissed turns on whether

plaintiff sufficiently alleged “a certain and clearly ascertainable right

that needs protection.” 362 Ill. App. 3d at 687. This, in turn, depends

upon an issue of statutory interpretation, namely, whether DOC’s

definition of what it means to be an “indigent” inmate, and its related

rules, appropriately implement section 3–6–2(f) of the Unified Code

of Corrections or, as the appellate court held, conflicts with that

statute. On this issue of law our review also proceeds de novo.

Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement

Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005); Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc.,

201 Ill. 2d 81, 86 (2002).

We acknowledge that where, as here, an agency is charged with

the administration and enforcement of the statute, courts will give

deference to the agency’s interpretation of any statutory ambiguities.

Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 595; People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago,

202 Ill. 2d 36, 48 (2002); Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. State of Illinois

Department of Employment Security, 131 Ill. 2d 23, 34 (1989);

Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n,

95 Ill. 2d 142, 152 (1983). Thus, “[a] court will not substitute its own

construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation

adopted by the agency charged with the statute’s administration.”

Church v. State of Illinois, 164 Ill. 2d 153, 162 (1995), citing

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Courts,

however, are not bound by an agency’s interpretation that conflicts

with the statute, is unreasonable, or is otherwise erroneous. Taddeo,

216 Ill. 2d at 595; Press v. Code Enforcement Board of Appeals, 149

Ill. 2d 281, 285 (1992); Carson Pirie Scott, 131 Ill. 2d at 34.

As in all cases of statutory interpretation, our duty is to ascertain

and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Donald A.G., 221

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Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). The best evidence of the legislature’s intent

is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and

ordinary meaning. Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d at 246; Lulay v. Lulay,

193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000). Where the statutory language is clear, it

will be given effect without resort to other aids of construction. Quad

Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 498, 508 (2004); Lulay,

193 Ill. 2d at 466.

With these principles in mind, we consider the statute at issue and

DOC’s interpretation thereof.

II

Section 3–4–3 of the Unified Code of Corrections requires DOC

to “establish accounting records with accounts for each person who

has or receives money while in an institution or facility of the

Department” and to “allow the withdrawal and disbursement of money

by the person under rules and regulations of the Department.” 730

ILCS 5/3–4–3 (West 2004)). Subject to DOC regulations, an inmate

may receive funds for deposit into his or her account from outside

sources or through employment with DOC. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code

§205.50 (1988) (describing restrictions on funds received for deposit

into a committed person’s account); 730 ILCS 5/3–12–2 (West 2004)

(describing the types of employment potentially available to

committed persons through DOC); 730 ILCS 5/3–12–5 (West 2004)

(authorizing compensation to persons performing a work assignment

under rules established by DOC). An inmate may use the funds in his

or her account to make purchases, primarily through the prison

commissary, of tobacco products and other approved items. See 730

ILCS 5/3–7–2a (West 2004) (setting maximum prices for tobacco and

nontobacco commissary items); 20 Ill. Adm. Code §210.20 (1992)

(“Items sold in the committed persons’ commissary shall be shown on

an approved listing of standard commissary items”); Beahringer v.

Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 366 (2003) (noting that the plaintiff inmate

purchased approved art supplies from commissaries in the several

DOC facilities where he had been housed).

In addition to the deductions DOC makes to an inmate’s account

for commissary purchases, section 3–6–2(f) requires DOC to deduct

a $2 co-payment for certain medical and dental services. Section

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3–6–2(f) states in relevant part:

“The Department shall require the committed person receiving

medical or dental services on a non-emergency basis to pay a

$2 co-payment to the Department for each visit for medical or

dental services. The amount of each co-payment shall be

deducted from the committed person’s individual account. A

committed person who has a chronic illness, as defined by

Department rules and regulations, shall be exempt from the $2

co-payment for treatment of the chronic illness. A committed

person shall not be subject to a $2 co-payment for follow-up

visits ordered by a physician, who is employed by, or contracts

with, the Department. A committed person who is indigent is

exempt from the $2 co-payment and is entitled to receive

medical or dental services on the same basis as a committed

person who is financially able to afford the co-payment.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection (f) to

the contrary, any person committed to any facility operated by

the Juvenile Division, as set forth in subsection (b) of Section

3–2–5 of this Code, is exempt from the co-payment

requirement for the duration of confinement in those

facilities.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West

2004).

To implement the provisions of section 3–6–2(f), DOC adopted

certain administrative rules which provide, in pertinent part, as

follows:

“Section 415.30 Medical and Dental Examinations and

Treatment

***

g) Adult offenders who require non-emergency medical or

dental services shall authorize the Department to deduct a

$2.00 co-pay from present or future funds in his or her trust

fund account prior to each visit. Non-emergency services do

not include any follow-up visits determined necessary by a

Department physician.

1) The co-payment shall be paid from the offender’s

trust fund when the services are delivered.

2) Offenders who are without funds at the time

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services are delivered shall not be denied medical or dental

services. The offender’s trust fund account shall be

restricted for the amount of co-payment and shall be paid

upon receipt of future funds.

3) An offender who is found to be indigent shall be

exempt from the co-payment. An offender shall be

considered indigent if during the entire term of his or her

incarceration the offender is without funds to pay the

$2.00 co-payment.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code §415.30 (2005).1

Under DOC’s rules, an inmate’s account is debited for the $2 co-

payment against current funds or future funds. Thus, even if an

inmate’s account has no funds or insufficient funds at the time

nonemergency medical or dental services are rendered, the account is

debited, resulting in a negative balance. The inmate’s account is

“restricted” and the inmate remains liable for the co-payment, and any

successive co-payments, for the entire term of his or her incarceration,

be it a matter of weeks, months, or even decades. Only at discharge

can an inmate become eligible for the indigence exemption. The

appellate court could not square DOC’s regulatory scheme with the

statutory language:

“Just as a matter of pure logic, it is impossible to both charge

the co-payment to an inmate’s account and exempt the inmate

from the co-payment. One must choose one course of action

or the other. The only reasonable interpretation of section

3–6–2(f) is that DOC shall deduct the co-payment from the

inmate’s account unless the inmate is indigent, in which case

DOC shall exempt the inmate from the co-payment.” 362 Ill.

App. 3d at 687.

DOC argues that the appellate court erred in rejecting DOC’s

reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, and that the

1

This version of section 415.30 of title 20 of the Illinois Administrative

Code (see 29 Ill. Reg. 3883, eff. March 1, 2005) does not differ in any

material respect from the prior version of section 415.30 that was in effect

at the time of the events giving rise to the present litigation. See 21 Ill. Reg.

5911, eff. May 1, 1997. We note that the parties cite to the March 1, 2005,

version. For consistency, we will do likewise.

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legislative history supports DOC’s interpretation. Plaintiff responds

that the statute is unambiguous, but even if an ambiguity is found, the

legislative history does not provide clarity. Our analysis begins, as it

must, with the statutory language. See Wauconda Fire Protection

District v. Stonewall Orchards, LLP, 214 Ill. 2d 417, 430 (2005).

The statute provides that a “committed person who is indigent is

exempt from the $2 co-payment.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS

5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004). The term “indigent” is not expressly defined

in the statute, but is ordinarily understood to mean “being poor

usu[ually] without being destitute: IMPOVERISHED, NEEDY.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1151 (1993). Though

relevant, the dictionary definition of “indigent” does not explain what

it means to be an indigent committed person for purposes of the

statutory $2 co-payment.

Some insight into the legislature’s intent can be gleaned from other

words and phrases appearing in the same sentence of the statute. That

sentence reads in its entirety: “A committed person who is indigent is

exempt from the $2 co-payment and is entitled to receive medical or

dental services on the same basis as a committed person who is

financially able to afford the co-payment.” (Emphasis added.) 730

ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004). The statute thus recognizes two

groups of inmates: those who are indigent, and those who are

financially able to afford the co-payment. Accordingly, a committed

person who is indigent must be a committed person who is not

financially able to afford the co-payment. What this means in practice

is not clear from the statutory language. For example, should an

inmate’s financial ability to afford the co-payment be judged solely by

his account balance on the day he or she requests nonemergency

medical or dental services, or should some other measure of financial

ability be used? “[I]n terms of dollars or net worth, how destitute must

an inmate be to qualify as ‘indigent’ within the meaning of section

3–6–2(f)? The legislature does not say.” 362 Ill. App. 3d at 686. Thus,

an ambiguity or gap exists in the statute.

We agree with the appellate court that, by implication, the

legislature has delegated to DOC the authority to fill this gap. 362 Ill.

App. 3d at 686; see also Church, 164 Ill. 2d at 161 (recognizing that

the legislature may implicitly delegate to an agency “the authority to

clarify and define a specific statutory provision”). Accordingly, DOC’s

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interpretation of what it means to be an “indigent” inmate, if

reasonable, is entitled to deference by this court. See Church, 164 Ill.

2d at 161-62. Conversely, to the extent DOC’s interpretation is

contrary to the statute, that interpretation is not binding on this court

and will be rejected. See People ex rel. Birkett, 202 Ill. 2d at 48;

Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 152. As discussed

below, we conclude that DOC’s interpretation of section 3–6–2(f)

conflicts with the statutory language.

The definition of “indigent” adopted by DOC reads in relevant

part: “An offender shall be considered indigent if *** the offender is

without funds to pay the $2.00 co-payment.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code

§415.30(g)(3) (2005). This portion of the definition mirrors the

statutory language which focuses on whether the inmate is “financially

able to afford the co-payment.” 730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004).

DOC’s definition, however, adds another element: “An offender shall

be considered indigent if during the entire term of his or her

incarceration the offender is without funds to pay the $2.00 co-

payment.” (Emphasis added.) 20 Ill. Adm. Code §415.30(g)(3)

(2005). This definition of indigent, together with DOC’s rule that an

inmate must authorize DOC to deduct the co-payment from present

or future funds, means that an inmate is always charged the $2 co-

payment, irrespective of the inmate’s financial ability to pay. Only at

discharge can an inmate be deemed indigent for purposes of the

exemption, at which point any outstanding co-payments are, to use

DOC’s phrasing, “written off.”

DOC’s regulatory scheme is problematic for several reasons. First,

DOC’s rules effectively exclude inmates serving life sentences from

the reach of the statutory exemption. This is so because under DOC’s

definition of “indigent,” no action is taken on the statutory exemption

until discharge from the Department–a day that will never arrive for

this group of inmates. Section 3–6–2(f), however, contains no

exception from the indigence exemption for inmates serving life

sentences. The same is true of inmates who have been sentenced to

death. An agency cannot, through its rulemaking, limit the scope of

the statute. Van’s Material Co. v. Department of Revenue, 131 Ill. 2d

196, 203 (1989).

Second, and more fundamentally, DOC’s rules fail to implement

the statutory exemption for any group of inmates. The statute

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mandates that a “committed person who is indigent is exempt from the

$2 co-payment.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West

2004). “Exempt” means “free or released from some liability to which

others are subject: excepted from the operation of some law or

obligation: not subject to.” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 795 (1993). Thus, pursuant to the plain language of section

3–6–2(f), a committed person who is indigent (i.e., who is not

financially able to afford the co-payment) is released from liability for

the co-payment; is excepted from the operation of the co-payment; is

not subject to the co-payment. Under DOC’s rules, however, every

inmate is subject to and liable for the co-payment each and every time

nonemergency medical and dental services are provided, irrespective

of the inmate’s ability to afford the co-payment. Indeed, the inmate’s

account is “restricted” for the amount of the co-payment. 20 Ill. Adm.

Code §415.30(g)(2) (2005). If all inmates are always subject to the

co-payment, then no inmate is ever not subject to the co-payment and

no exemption exists.

The fact that DOC writes off accrued co-payments at the time an

inmate is discharged is not tantamount to exempting the inmate from

the co-payment in the first place. To reiterate: to be “exempt” from

the co-payment means that the inmate is “excepted from the operation

of” the co-payment. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

795 (1993). An inmate who is charged the co-payment and remains

liable for the co-payment has not been excepted from the operation of

the co-payment.

The conflict between the statutory language and DOC’s peculiar

definition of “indigent” is exemplified in DOC’s section 2–615 motion.

In its motion, DOC made plain its position that even if it recognized

that an inmate was indigent, or a pauper, or insolvent, the inmate’s

account will be debited for the co-payment and the inmate “will be

expected to pay the required amount when and if he is financially able

to do so.” Under the statute, however, an inmate’s indigence is the

very condition that triggers application of the exemption. As the

appellate court aptly observed:

“The statute speaks of a present, not a future, state of affairs:

‘is indigent’ and ‘is exempt’; it speaks of the inmate’s financial

condition at a particular point in time, when the inmate is to

‘receive medical or dental services.’ (Emphases added.) 730

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ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004). The statute does not say: ‘A

committed person who remains indigent throughout the term

of his or her imprisonment shall be exempt from the $2 co-

payment.’ The statute does not say that inmates shall pay the

co-payment (to quote the State’s brief) ‘if and when they later

have the means to do so.’ (Emphasis in original).” 362 Ill.

App. 3d at 687.

DOC argues that its regulatory scheme appropriately implements

section 3–6–2(f). According to DOC, inmates who have immediate

funds meet their statutory duty to pay the co-payment. Those who

cannot make immediate payment are exempt from payment for as long

as they are without funds, but are given the same nonemergency

medical and dental services as those who are financially able to afford

the co-payment.

DOC’s argument, that it applies an exemption from immediate

payment, is contrary to its own rules. As discussed above, under

DOC’s rules an indigence finding can only be made, and the

exemption can only be applied, after the person has completed “the

entire term of his or her incarceration.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code

§415.30(g)(3) (2005). Even if DOC’s rules could be read as providing

an exemption from immediate payment, the statute does not authorize

such an exemption. The statute plainly mandates that if the inmate is

indigent, the inmate is exempt–period.

DOC also argues that the indigence exemption must be examined

in light of the other statutory co-payment exemptions, particularly the

exemption for juveniles, and that when so examined, the

reasonableness of its rules is apparent.

The statute, as set forth in full above, contains four exemptions

from the $2 co-payment for nonemergency medical and dental

services: (1) “[a] committed person who has a chronic illness *** shall

be exempt from the $2 co-payment for treatment of the chronic

illness”; (2) “[a] committed person shall not be subject to a $2 co-

payment for follow-up visits ordered by a [Department] physician”;

(3) “[a] committed person who is indigent is exempt from the $2 co-

payment”; and (4) “any person committed to any facility operated by

the Juvenile Division[ ] *** is exempt from the co-payment

requirement for the duration of confinement in those facilities.” 730

ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004).

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DOC maintains that the first two exemptions are triggered by the

type of treatment rendered–a chronic illness or a follow-up visit–and

that “there is no disagreement here that the General Assembly

intended prisoners receiving such treatments never to be required to

make a co-payment.” DOC further maintains that the last two

exemptions are triggered by the type of prisoner–an indigent adult

inmate and a juvenile–and that the language of the two exemptions

establishes that the legislature intended a distinction to be drawn

between the two types of prisoners. According to DOC, juveniles

housed in DOC’s juvenile facilities are entitled to an exemption from

the co-payment “for the duration of confinement” (730 ILCS

5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004)), but in the absence of similar statutory

language applicable to indigent adult inmates, such adult inmates are

not exempt “for the duration of confinement.”

DOC’s argument erroneously assumes that if an inmate is found

to be indigent at any point during his or her incarceration, that finding

must remain with the inmate for the duration of his or her

confinement. The language in section 3–6–2(f) does not support

DOC’s once-an-indigent-always-an-indigent argument. We note, too,

that the appellate court did not so hold, and that plaintiff does not

argue that the statute authorizes some sort of permanent indigence

exemption.

Although DOC attempts to distinguish the indigence exemption

from the other three exemptions, we find nothing in the language of

the statute that supports DOC’s practice of considering an inmate’s

financial ability to afford the co-payment at discharge, rather than at

or near the time nonemergency medical or dental services are

rendered. We note that where an inmate pursues nonemergency

treatment for a chronic condition or a follow-up visit ordered by a

Department physician, DOC understands “that the General Assembly

intended prisoners receiving such treatments never to be required to

make a co-payment.” Similarly, where a juvenile who is housed in a

juvenile facility requests nonemergency medical or dental services, the

juvenile is not required to make a co-payment. DOC, however,

departs from this practice when the indigence exemption comes into

play. Only in that instance is the inmate required to pay the co-

payment, through a debit to his or her account, irrespective of whether

the inmate comes within the exemption. The statutory language does

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not evince an intent by the legislature that the indigence exemption

operate differently than the other three exemptions.

DOC further argues that the legislative debates and policy

concerns support its interpretation of the statute. During the

legislative debates on House Bill 3451, which ultimately added the $2

co-payment provision and the indigence exemption to section

3–6–2(f), the following exchange occurred between Representative

Pugh and Representative Bost, a sponsor of the bill:

“Pugh: Could you tell me how an individual who is in need

of medical services and does not have the ability to pay, will

prove that he does not have the ability to pay, will he be

judged based on his ... the monies that he has currently on the

books or would it be based on a bank account that he has

somewhere? Will it be based on previous inheritances that he

might have had? Could you tell me exactly how an individual

would be proven indigent?

***

Bost: The Department already keeps those accounts and

those records, and based on that, he would be able to, he or

she would be able to pay out of that fund and he can also incur

a negative balance so that as the [sic] accumulated funds, later

on, that debt could be paid off.

***

Pugh: So ... so you’re saying that if an individual does not

have the money on the books, if the individual does not have

the money ... have money on his personal account, then he

would be considered indigent.

***

Bost: If he does not have the money in his personal

account, he can not and will not be refused or denied the

opportunity to go to seek medical treatment, but there will be

a negative balance applied to that account.” 89th Ill. Gen.

Assem., House Proceedings, May 23, 1996, at 86-87

(statements of Representatives Pugh and Bost).

This brief exchange during the legislative debates does not address

the only uncertainty in the statute, namely, how the indigence

determination should be made. Although Representative Pugh

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attempted twice to clarify the circumstances under which an inmate

would be deemed indigent, his inquiry was never answered. Indeed,

Representative Pugh’s understanding was that “if the individual does

not have the money *** on his personal account, then he would be

considered indigent.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May

23, 1996, at 86-87 (statements of Representative Pugh).

Representative Bost’s reference to a possible negative balance that

would be paid off later when the inmate accumulated funds does not

ipso facto demonstrate the reasonableness of DOC’s rules. Whatever

Representative Bost envisioned, his comment cannot supercede or

undo the statute that was adopted by the General Assembly. See

Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 536 (1997) (noting that “while

courts give some consideration to statements by a sponsor of a bill,

such statements are not controlling”); accord People v. Burdunice,

211 Ill. 2d 264, 270 (2004). The statute mandates that an “indigent”

inmate “is exempt” from the $2 co-payment. 730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f)

(West 2004). It does not mandate or authorize a system under which

an inmate’s trust fund account is debited for the co-payment

irrespective of whether the inmate is “financially able to afford the co-

payment.” 730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004).

We note that it is possible to implement a system that does not do

violence to the statutory language and yet still leaves open the

possibility that some inmates may, at some point, have a negative

balance in their trust fund accounts after a debit is made for the $2 co-

payment. For example, in judging an inmate’s financial ability to afford

the co-payment, DOC (pursuant to properly promulgated rules) could

consider the balance in the inmate’s trust fund account on the day the

inmate requests nonemergency medical or dental services, as well as

his balance during a reasonable period of time immediately prior or

after thereto. This is the method the Massachusetts Department of

Correction adopted for determining whether an inmate is considered

“indigent” for purposes of a mail fee waiver. The Massachusetts

regulation provides:

“Upon request for waiver of fees or cost, an inmate may

be declared indigent if:

(a) At the time of the request, the inmate has, in all

accounts to which he or she has access, a total amount less

than or equal to ten dollars ($10.00) plus the cost or fees

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sought to be waived; and

(b) At no time for the sixty days immediately

preceding said request, have the inmate’s accounts

contained more than ten dollars ($10.00) plus the cost or

fees sought to be waived. (e.g. request to waiver $5.00 on

7/1/98; indigent if, at no time since 5/1/98, total in

accounts has been more than $15.00).” 103 Mass. Code

Regs. 481.06 (2006).

See also Reynolds v. Wagner, 936 F. Supp. 1216, 1230-31 (E.D. Pa.

1996) (stating that the prison handbook for Berks County prison

defined an indigent inmate as one who is without funds or who has not

received more than $5 within a 14-day period).

Of course, DOC is under no compulsion to adopt a regulatory

scheme similar to the one adopted by the Massachusetts Department

of Correction. The Massachusetts regulation merely provides an

example of a type of regulation that could allow for the creation of

negative balances, yet still focus on an inmate’s current financial

ability to afford the co-payment.

DOC further argues that the reasonableness of its interpretation of

section 3–6–2(f) is apparent when one considers the purpose behind

the co-payment requirement. Although a statement of purpose is not

found in the statute, DOC maintains that co-payment programs of this

type help teach inmates to be financially responsible by encouraging

them to conserve their property and order their priorities; deter abuse

of health-care services; and conserve limited medical resources. See

Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 1997). DOC argues

that its definition of indigent, which covers a span of time–the entire

period of incarceration–supports these valid penological goals by

providing some assurance that the system is not abused by inmates.

DOC explains that if, as the appellate court held, indigence is only

determined at a point in time, i.e., when nonemergency services are

requested, inmates could spend down their trust fund accounts with

commissary purchases and only then request nonemergency health-

care services, knowing that they can claim indigent status and avoid

the $2 co-payment. An inmate could also avoid the co-payment by

seeking nonemergency health-care services immediately before an

expected deposit into his or her account created a positive balance. In

addition, without the possibility of being assessed the co-payment,

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“prisoners might view going to the prison healthcare unit as nothing

more than an opportunity to leave their cells or assigned areas, avoid

other prison programs or restrictions, or use the service in such a way

as to waste the prison’s limited medical resources.” Thus, DOC

argues that the indigence exemption should not be tied to an inmate’s

current balance in his trust fund account.

We agree that if indigence is only determined with reference to the

balance in an inmate’s trust fund account on the day nonemergency

services are requested, the potential for abuse exists, as the current

balance may not truly reflect whether the inmate “is financially able to

afford the co-payment.” 730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004). The

appellate court’s holding, however, is not so narrow. Although the

appellate court referred to the inmate’s financial status “at a particular

point in time,” i.e., when the inmate is to receive medical and or dental

services, the court went on to hold that plaintiff had a clear right to an

exemption from the $2 co-payment if, at the time he sought

nonemergency services, he “lacked the means to pay it.” 362 Ill. App.

3d at 687. The appellate court’s inquiry, like the statutory language,

focuses on an inmate’s current ability to pay the co-payment, but does

not dictate how that determination should be made. As indicated

earlier, assessing an inmate’s current ability to afford the co-payment

could include reviewing the inmate’s account activity during some

reasonable period of time immediately prior to or after the date

nonemergency services are requested. This approach would minimize

the opportunity for an inmate, who periodically maintained a positive

account balance, to avoid the co-payment by spending down his

account before seeking health-care services or seeking health-care

services immediately before an expected deposit. The problem with

DOC’s approach, however, is that, in an effort to remove any

possibility of abuse by inmates, the exemption has been swallowed up.

Under DOC’s rules, the statutory co-payment requirement is

imposed on all inmates regardless of whether they are “financially able

to afford the co-payment.” 730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004). DOC’s

rules cannot be reconciled with the statute. Where an administrative

rule conflicts with the statute under which it was adopted, the rule is

invalid. See Carson Pirie Scott, 131 Ill. 2d at 34 (recognizing that

agency action that is inconsistent with the statute must be overturned);

Ruby Chevrolet, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 6 Ill. 2d 147, 151

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(1955) (declining to uphold agency rule that was “in clear

contravention of the specific wording of the statute” under which the

rule was adopted); Greaney v. Industrial Comm’n, 358 Ill. App. 3d

1002, 1026 (2005) (noting that “[w]henever an administrative rule

conflicts with a statute, the rule will be held invalid”).

Because DOC has not challenged the appellate court’s reversal of

the trial court’s grant of DOC’s section 2–615 motion on any basis

other than that discussed above, we affirm the judgment of the

appellate court.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KARMEIER, dissenting:

The majority holds that the DOC’s definition of the term

“indigent” contained in section 415.30(g)(3) of its regulations

governing inmate health care (20 Ill. Admin. Code §415(g)(3))

conflicts with section 3–6–2(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections

(730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004)) because the DOC’s definition,

together with its rule that an inmate must authorize the DOC to

deduct the co-payment from present or future funds means that,

contrary to the mandate of the statute, the inmate is always subject to

the co-payment, irrespective of his financial ability to afford it.

Because I do not believe the regulation conflicts with the statute and

that the DOC’s definition of indigent is not unreasonable, I dissent.

Section 3–6–2(f) provides that the Department shall require

committed persons receiving nonemergency medical or dental services

to pay a $2 co-payment, but that a committed person who is indigent

is exempt from the co-payment and is eligible to receive

nonemergency medical or dental services on the same basis as a

committed person who is financially able to afford the co-payment.

730 ILCS 5/3–6–2(f) (West 2004). Section 3–6–2(f) does not define

the term “indigent.”

To implement section 3–6–2(f), the DOC promulgated section

415.30(g), which provides that adult offenders who require

nonemergency medical or dental services shall authorize the

Department to deduct a $2 co-payment from present or future funds

in his or her trust fund account. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §415(g).

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Subsection (3) further provides that “[a]n offender who is found to be

indigent shall be exempt from the co-payment. An offender shall be

considered indigent if during the entire term of his incarceration the

offender is without funds to pay the $2 co-payment.” 20 Ill. Admin.

Code §415(g)(3). If the inmate has no funds, or insufficient funds, at

the time the nonemergency medical or dental services are requested,

the inmate’s account is debited, resulting in a negative balance. The

inmate remains liable for the co-payment for the entire term of his

incarceration, only becoming eligible for the indigence exclusion at

discharge.

The majority concludes that the term “indigent” as used in section

3–6–2(f) is ambiguous because the statute is unclear as to whether the

inmate’s financial ability to afford the co-payment should be judged by

his account balance on the day services are requested, or by some

other measure. The majority acknowledges the well settled rule that

where an agency is charged with the administration and enforcement

of a statute, courts will give deference to the agency’s interpretation

of any statutory ambiguities and will not substitute its own

interpretation where the agency’s interpretation does not conflict with

the statute or is not unreasonable. Church v. State of Illinois, 164 Ill.

2d 153, 161-62 (1995). The majority finds the DOC’s definition of

indigent to be in conflict with the statute because section 413.30(g)’s

requirement that an inmate’s account be charged for the co-payment

at the time nonemergency medical or dental services are provided,

irrespective of whether he has any funds in his account, means that he

is not “exempt” from the co-payment as required by the statute. The

majority’s argument is unpersuasive.

The conflict between section 3–6–2(f) and regulation 415.30(g)

arises only because the majority interprets the statute as meaning that

an indigent inmate cannot be charged the co-payment. If section

3–6–2(f) is so interpreted, then the majority is correct. If, however,

section 3–6–2(f) is interpreted as meaning that the inmate is not

required to pay the co-payment, then no conflict arises because an

inmate who never acquires the funds to pay the co-payment never has

to pay it. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the former

interpretation is not dictated by the definition of “exempt.” An inmate

who is charged the co-payment but who never acquires the funds to

pay the co-payment and therefore never has to pay is no less free from

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its operation.

Alternatively, because section 3–6–2(f)’s requirement that an

indigent inmate is exempt from the co-payment is subject to multiple

interpretations – being charged the co-payment as opposed to being

required to pay it – it is ambiguous. The DOC, which is charged with

resolving any statutory ambiguities, has implicitly chosen the latter

interpretation, and this court should defer thereto. Moreover, as the

DOC correctly observes, such an interpretation is clearly consonant

with the legislature’s intent, as demonstrated by the exchange between

Representative Pugh and Representative Bost, one of the sponsors of

the legislation which added the co-payment requirement and the

indigence exemption to section 3–6–2(f).

I also dissent because I believe that the majority’s suggestion that

an inmate’s ability to afford the co-payment could be determined by

examining his account over some reasonable period of time before and

after nonemergency medical or dental services are requested is

inconsistent with the reasoning behind the majority’s conclusion that

section 415.30(g)(3) conflicts with section 3–6–2(f).

The DOC argues that the purpose of the co-payment program is

to teach inmates financial responsibility and to deter abuse of

healthcare services. The DOC maintains that its definition of

“indigent” supports these goals by deterring abuse of the system by

inmates. If indigence is determined only at a point in time, inmates

could spend down their trust fund accounts with commissary

purchases prior to requesting services, or seek such services

immediately before an expected deposit.

The majority acknowledges the potential for abuse and the

legitimacy of the DOC’s concerns in this regard. The majority

responds by suggesting that assessing an inmate’s ability to afford the

co-payment could include reviewing the inmate’s account activity

during some reasonable period of time immediately prior to or after

the date nonemergency services are requested. However, this

suggestion is clearly inconsistent with the majority’s determination

that charging an inmate’s account for the co-payment if he does not

have the funds to pay it denies the inmate the statutorily mandated

exemption.

The majority’s suggestion also leads to the questions of what

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constitutes a “reasonable” period of time and who should make that

determination. The answer to the second question is clear. Because

the statute is ambiguous as to how an inmate’s financial ability to pay

is determined, it would be the responsibility of the DOC, the agency

charged with implementing the statute, to determine what

“reasonable” period of time should be used. I submit that the DOC has

already made this determination.

In sum, there is a “conflict” between section 415.30(g)(3) and

3–6–2(f) only because the majority construes these sections in such a

manner as to create one. I would defer to the DOC’s interpretation of

the term “indigent” an interpretation which is both reasonable and

consonant with the intent of the legislature. Therefore, I respectfully

dissent.

CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.

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