Collinsville Community Unit School District v. Regional School Board St. Clair County

Docket Nos. 98649, 98668 cons.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

COLLINSVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.

10 et al., Appellants, v. THE REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL

TRUSTEES OF ST. CLAIR COUNTY et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed January 20, 2006.

CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court,

with opinion.

Justices Freeman, McMorrow, and Karmeier concurred in the

judgment and opinion.

Justice Garman concurred in part and dissented in part, with

opinion.

Justice Fitzgerald dissented, with opinion.

Justice Kilbride also dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

This appeal involves the joinder requirements of the

Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3B101 et

seq. (West 2000)). At issue is whether the circuit court erred in

allowing the plaintiff in an administrative review action additional

time to amend its complaint to join, as defendants, the petitioners in

the underlying administrative proceeding. The appellate court held

that the circuit court erred in allowing amendment of the complaint

and dismissed the cause of action. 348 Ill. App. 3d 685. For the

reasons discussed below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate

court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

On October 25, 2000, a group of Fairmont City residents filed a

APetition for Detachment and Annexation@ with the St. Clair County

Regional Board of School Trustees (Board). The petition sought to

detach a section of Fairmont City from East St. Louis School District

No. 189 (East St. Louis) and annex it to Collinsville Community Unit

School District No. 10 (Collinsville). The petition was signed by over

400 individuals, representing more than two-thirds of the registered

voters in the area proposed to be detached. In accordance with section

7B6 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7B6 (West 2000)), 10 of the

petitioners were designated the ACommittee of Ten@ to act as attorney

in fact for all of the petitioners. 1 The first page of the petition

identified the members of the Committee of Ten by name. The

petitioners were also represented by counsel.

In January 2001, the Board held a hearing on the petition. Both

school districts opposed detachment and annexation. After

considering the evidence, the Board granted the petition finding, inter

alia, that the educational welfare of the students subject to

detachment will be better served in Collinsville rather than East St.

Louis. The Board=s order granting the petition did not expressly

identify any party as a Aparty of record.@ The caption on the order

1

Section 7B6 states in part: AWhen a petition contains more than 10

signatures, the petition shall designate a committee of 10 of the petitioners

as attorney in fact for all petitioners, any 7 of whom may make binding

stipulations on behalf of all petitioners as to any question with respect to the

petition or hearing or joint hearing, and the regional board of school

trustees, *** may accept such stipulation in lieu of evidence or proof of the

matter stipulated.@ 105 ILCS 5/7B6(c) (West 2000).

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referred only to the petition for detachment from East St. Louis and

annexation to Collinsville, and did not otherwise identify the parties.

The text of the Board=s order referred generally to the APetitioners,@

and noted that a ACommittee of Ten@ had been appointed. The order

did not, however, identify the committee members by name.

Collinsville filed a petition for rehearing, which the Board denied.

The Board=s order denying rehearing, like the Board=s earlier order,

did not expressly identify the parties of record, nor did it identify the

committee members by name.

Within the statutory 35-day period (see 735 ILCS 5/3B103 (West

2000)), Collinsville filed a complaint for administrative review in the

circuit court of St. Clair County. Collinsville named as defendants the

Board, the members of the Board, the St. Clair County regional

superintendent of schools, East St. Louis, and the East St. Louis

superintendent of schools. East St. Louis and its superintendent

immediately joined in Collinsville=s complaint. Collinsville did not

name as a defendant the Committee of Ten, any member of the

committee, or any of the other numerous individuals who initiated the

administrative action that was the subject of Collinsville=s complaint.

Two weeks after Collinsville filed its complaint, two members of

the Committee of Ten, Mark Ostendorf and Paul Garcia, filed a

motion to intervene, which the circuit court granted. Ostendorf and

Garcia also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the committee

members and the other signatories to the petition for detachment and

annexation were necessary parties who had not been made defendants

within the statutory 35-day period. See 735 ILCS 5/3B103 (West

2000).

Prior to the circuit court=s disposition of the motion to dismiss,

Collinsville filed a motion to amend the complaint to add the

remaining eight members of the Committee of Ten as party

defendants. Collinsville relied on a statutory exception to the 35-day

rule that permits amendment of a complaint where the omitted

defendant Awas not named by the administrative agency in its final

order as a party of record.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). In

April 2002, the circuit court allowed the motion to amend and denied

the motion to dismiss. The case proceeded on the merits. The circuit

court affirmed the Board=s order granting the petition for detachment

and annexation.

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Collinsville and East St. Louis appealed. The individual members

of the Committee of Ten, on behalf of the petitioners, filed a cross-

appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to

dismiss. A majority of the appellate court agreed with the petitioners

and vacated the order of the circuit court. 348 Ill. App. 3d 685. The

appellate court held that the exception to the 35-day rule, set forth in

section 3B107(a) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West

2000)), was inapplicable where, as here, the petitioners were

referenced in the final administrative order en masse, were present

and testified, and were represented by counsel at all the relevant

hearings. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 698. The appellate court stated that it

Awould be stretching logic to find that because the names of the 10

petitioners were not spelled out in the order, their involvement in the

case is any less than as parties of record.@ 348 Ill. App. 3d at 696.

Because the school districts failed to name and serve the petitioners

as required by the Review Law, the appellate court concluded that

Athe trial judge lacked jurisdiction to allow the school districts=

request to amend their complaints and to thereafter specifically name

each of the parties of record. The trial judge should have granted the

petitioners= motion to dismiss.@ 348 Ill. App. 3d at 698-99. The

appellate court thus allowed the Board=s order, granting the petition

for detachment and annexation, to stand. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 699.

Collinsville and East St. Louis each filed a petition for leave to

appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315), which we allowed and have

consolidated for review.

ANALYSIS

The operative facts in this case are undisputed. Thus, this appeal

concerns only the legal issue of whether amendment of the complaint

was proper under the joinder requirements of the Review Law.

Accordingly, our review proceeds de novo. See Hobbs v. Hartford

Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17 (2005) (applying de

novo standard where salient facts were undisputed and appeal

involved legal issue); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,

191 Ill. 2d 26, 29 (2000) (same).

Under the Illinois Constitution, final judgments from the circuit

courts are appealable as a Amatter of right,@ but final administrative

decisions are appealable only Aas provided by law.@ Ill. Const. 1970,

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art. VI, ''6, 9. Because review of a final administrative decision may

only be obtained as provided by statute, a court is said to exercise

Aspecial statutory jurisdiction@ when it reviews an administration

decision. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 30. Special statutory jurisdiction

Ais limited to the language of the act conferring it and the court has no

powers from any other source.@ Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v.

Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 210 (1985). A party seeking

to invoke a court=s special statutory jurisdiction must strictly comply

with the procedures prescribed by statute. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at

30; Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d at 210. See also Lockett v. Chicago

Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 353 (1990) (ASince the Administrative

Review Law is a departure from common law, the procedures it

establishes must be strictly adhered to in order to justify its

application@).

Here, section 7B7 of the School Code expressly provides for

judicial review of a decision of the Board in accordance with the

Review Law. See 105 ILCS 5/7B7 (West 2000). The Review Law

makes plain that Collinsville and East St. Louis were required to

comply strictly with its provisions: AUnless review is sought of an

administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein

provided, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative

agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of such

administrative decision.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B102 (West 2000).

As to the time and manner of proceeding, the Review Law states

that an action to review a final administrative decision Ashall be

commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons

within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be

reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision.@ 735

ILCS 5/3B103 (West 2000). If the complaint is not timely filed, no

jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court and judicial review of the

administrative order is barred. Nudell v. Forest Preserve District, 207

Ill. 2d 409, 423 (2003); Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 354-55. Here,

Collinsville timely filed its complaint in the circuit court.

The Review Law also directs who must be made a defendant

within the 35-day period: Athe administrative agency and all persons,

other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings

before the administrative agency, shall be made defendants.@ 735

ILCS 5/3B107 (West 2000). Although some panels of the appellate

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court, including the panel in the present case, have described the

joinder requirements of the Review Law as Ajurisdictional,@ this court

has not done so. See McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm=n,

165 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (1995). Rather, we have described the joinder

requirements as Amandatory.@ E.g., Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 355; Cox v.

Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 399, 403-04

(1983); Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 617 (1952). The failure to

join necessary parties, however, is no less serious for being

nonjurisdictional. Noncompliance with the joinder provisions of the

Review Law requires dismissal of the review proceeding. McGaughy,

165 Ill. 2d at 12.

In the present case, the petitioners, who instituted the detachment

and annexation proceedings before the Board, were clearly parties of

record who should have been joined in the administrative review

action. See ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 33 (state=s status as a party of

record Acould not be more clear@ where the state instituted the

proceedings before the agency). Collinsville and East St. Louis do not

dispute that the petitioners were parties of record. They argue,

however, that under the exception contained in section 3B107(a) of

the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000)), their failure to

name and serve the petitioners within the 35-day statutory period did

not require dismissal. Section 3B107(a) states:

AExcept as provided in subsection (b) [involving review

of decisions of a zoning board of appeals], in any action to

review any final decision of an administrative agency, the

administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff,

who were parties of record to the proceedings before the

administrative agency shall be made defendants. No action

for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an employee,

agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity, of

an administrative agency, board, committee, or government

entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or

government entity, has been named as a defendant as

provided in this Section. Naming the director or agency head,

in his or her official capacity, shall be deemed to include as

defendant the administrative agency, board, committee, or

government entity that the named defendants direct or head.

No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for

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lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an

administrative agency, board, committee, or government

entity, where the director or agency head, in his or her official

capacity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this

Section.

If, during the course of a review action, the court

determines that a party of record to the administrative

proceedings was not made a defendant as required by the

preceding paragraph, and only if that party was not named by

the administrative agency in its final order as a party of

record, then the court shall grant the plaintiff 21 days from

the date of the determination in which to name and serve the

unnamed party as a defendant. The court shall permit the

newly served defendant to participate in the proceedings to

the extent the interests of justice may require.@ (Emphasis

added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000).

Collinsville and East St. Louis argue that, because the Board=s order

did not explicitly name the petitioners or Committee of Ten as parties

of record, the circuit court was required to allow amendment of the

complaint. They contend that the appellate court misconstrued

section 3B107(a) by focusing on whether the petitioners were parties

of record, rather than whether the Board=s final order named the

petitioners as parties of record. The petitioners counter that the

exception to the 35-day rule applies only in two situations, neither of

which is present here. Alternatively, the petitioners argue that, under

the facts of this case, the Board=s order sufficiently identified the

petitioners as parties of record, thus precluding amendment of the

complaint under section 3B107(a).

We turn our attention first to the petitioners= argument that the

exception to the 35-day rule set forth in section 3B107(a) applies in

only two situations, neither of which is present here. In support of

this argument, the petitioners note that the exception, which is set

forth in the second paragraph of section 3B107(a), expressly applies

only if a party of record is not made a defendant Aas required by the

preceding paragraph.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). According

to the petitioners, the Apreceding paragraph,@ i.e., the first paragraph

of section 3B107(a), addresses two situations: where a plaintiff fails

to name as a defendant the appropriate administrative official, but

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names the administrative agency, and where a plaintiff fails to name

the administrative agency as a defendant, but names the appropriate

administrative official. The petitioners argue that under the doctrine

of in pari materia, the first and second paragraphs of section

3B107(a) must be read with reference to each other and construed

harmoniously, giving effect to both paragraphs. The petitioners

maintain that the exception to the 35-day rule contained in the second

paragraph of section 3B107(a) must be construed as limited to the two

situations described in the Apreceding paragraph.@ Because this is not

a case involving the failure to name either the agency or the

appropriate administrative official, the petitioners conclude that the

exception simply does not come into play.

Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with

the same subject will be considered with reference to each other, Aso

that they may be given harmonious effect.@ Land v. Board of

Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). This

doctrine is also applicable to different sections of the same statute

and is consonant with one of our fundamental rules of statutory

constructionBAto view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.@

Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. We agree that under this doctrine, we must

construe the second paragraph of section 3B107(a) harmoniously with

the Apreceding paragraph.@ In doing so, however, we are not at liberty

to disregard the plain language of the statute. The cardinal rule of

statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Sylvester v.

Industrial Comm=n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001); In re Estate of

Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 331 (2000). The language of the statute,

which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best

indicator of the legislature=s intent. In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 229

(2003). Based on the plain language of section 3B107, we conclude

that the exception to the 35-day rule may be applied where, as here, a

plaintiff fails to name as defendants the petitioners in the underlying

administrative proceeding.

Section 3B107 addresses, in broad terms, who must be made

defendants in an administrative review action: A[I]n any action to

review any final decision of an administrative agency, the

administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who

were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative

agency shall be made defendants.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West

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2000). The statute then addresses two frequently recurring scenarios:

where the plaintiff names the appropriate administrative official, but

fails to name the administrative agency, and where the plaintiff

names the administrative agency, but fails to name the appropriate

administrative official. The statute prohibits dismissal of the

complaint under either circumstance. The fact that the statute

addresses two scenarios involving certain defendants in greater detail

does not mean that the exception to the 35-day rule cannot apply to

other scenarios. The exception itself contains no such limiting

language. The exception refers generally to whether a party of record

was made a defendant Aas required by the preceding paragraph.@ The

universe of parties Arequired@ to be made defendants Aby the

preceding paragraph@ is not confined to the administrative agency and

administrative officialBthe only parties involved in the two scenarios

on which the petitioners focus. Rather, the Apreceding paragraph@

requires that the Aadministrative agency and all persons@ who were

parties of record be made defendants. AAll persons@ who were parties

of record include the petitioners here. To construe section 3B107(a) in

the manner the petitioners suggest would ignore the plain language of

the statute and render the first sentence of section 3B107(a)

superfluous. See Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d

498, 508 (2004) (AWe must construe the statute so that each word,

clause, or sentence is given reasonable meaning and not deemed

superfluous or void@); Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board,

158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994) (AStatutes should be construed, if

possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless@).

Justice Fitzgerald points out that, in reaching this result, Athe

majority overlooks the service of summons provisions contained in

section 3B105@ of the Review Law. Slip op. at 20 (Fitzgerald, J.,

dissenting). Indeed we do, for the simple reason that section 3B105

has absolutely nothing to do with this appeal. According to Justice

Fitzgerald, Asections 3B105 and 3B107 of the Review Law both

involve the joinder requirements for an administrative review action.@

(Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 21 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). The only

difference between the two statutes is that, while section 3B107(a)

sets forth the Ageneral requirement@ that A >the administrative agency

and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to

the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made

defendants,= @ section 3B105 sets forth the more Aspecific@

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requirement that, in school board proceedings involving a committee

of 10, A >only the administrative agency involved and each of the

committee of 10 shall be served.= @ (Emphasis added and omitted.)

Slip op. at 21 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), quoting 735 ILCS 5/3B105,

3B107(a). Justice Fitzgerald then suggests that, as the more specific

provision, section 3B105 controls. Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J.,

dissenting).

There are several problems with Justice Fitzgerald=s approach. To

begin with, Justice Fitzgerald never quite explains how a statement

concerning who must be served can possibly be characterized as a

more specific statement of who must be named. Such an explanation

would seem incumbent, as service and joinder are wholly distinct

legal concepts. Service relates to A[t]he formal delivery of a writ,

summons, or other legal process.@ Black=s Law Dictionary 1399 (8th

ed. 2004). Joinder, by contrast, relates to Athe uniting of parties *** in

a single claim.@ Black=s Law Dictionary 853 (8th ed.

2004).Obviously, these are not the same thing. As importantly, this

distinction is clearly manifested in the plain language of sections

3B105 and 3B107. Titled AService of Summons,@ section 3B105

speaks solely to where, how, and upon whom a A[s]ummons issued in

any action to review the final administrative decision of any

administrative agency shall be served.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105. Section

3B105 says absolutely nothing about who must be joined or named as

defendants in a complaint for administrative review. Section

3B107(a), by contrast, speaks solely to who Ashall be made

defendants@ in a complaint for administrative review and says

absolutely nothing about where, how, or upon whom a summons

must be served. 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). Simply put,

section 3B105 is a service statute, and section 3B107(a) is a joinder

statute. Neither statute speaks to the other. Justice Fitzgerald=s

assertion that Asections 3B105 and 3B107 *** both involve the joinder

requirements for an administrative review action@ is demonstrably

false.

Which is not to say that section 3B105=s Acommittee of 10@ clause

is not a more specific statement of legislative intent. It undeniably is.

The question is, more specific in relation to what? Section 3B105

answers this question clearly:

ASummons issued in any action to review the final

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administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be

served by registered or certified mail on the administrative

agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case

of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional

board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools,

or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be,

when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided in

Section 7B6 of the School Code, and in such case only the

administrative agency involved and each of the committee of

10 shall be served.@ (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105

(West 2000).

This statute could not be more clear. The general rule is that

summons must be served on Athe administrative agency and on each

of the other defendants.@ In certain school board cases, however,

summons must be served Aonly [on] the administrative agency

involved and each of the committee of 10.@ In other words, the

Acommittee of 10 clause@ is an exception not to the general joinder

requirements of section 3B107(a), but to the general service

requirements of section 3B105.

Be that is it may, there is absolutely nothing in the text of either

section 3B105 or section 3B107(a) to support Justice Fitzgerald=s

conclusion that lack of compliance with section 3B105 is a bar to

invoking section 3B107(a)=s exception to the 35-day rule. The second

paragraph of section 3B107(a) sets forth two, and only two,

conditions for application of that exception: (1) a party of record was

not made a defendant Aas required by the preceding paragraph;@ and

(2) that same party was not named by the administrative agency in its

final order as a party of record. 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000).

Compliance with section 3B105 is mentioned nowhere.

Nevertheless, both Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman insist

that we should disregard the plain language of the exception because

Collinsville was Aon notice, by virtue of section 3B105, that they were

required to serve >each of the committee of 10.= @ Slip op. at 21

(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), quoting 735 ILCS 5/3B105; slip op. at 19

(Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ASection

3B105 precisely informed the district of whom to serve when

appealing a decision of the regional school board of trustees@). The

obvious problem with this position, aside from a complete lack of

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support in the statutory text, is the fact that it effectively renders the

exception to the 35-day rule a nullity. This is because section 3B105

puts every administrative review plaintiff Aon notice@ as to who must

be served. In most actions, this will be Athe administrative agency and

*** each of the other defendants.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). In

school board proceedings involving a committee of 10, this will be

Athe administrative agency and each of the committee of 10.@ 735

ILCS 5/3B105. Either way, section 3B105 leaves no doubt as to who

must be served. Consequently, if simply knowing who must be served

is a bar to invoking section 3B107=s exception to the 35-day rule, then

no party will ever be able to avail itself of that exception.

Justice Fitzgerald goes on to suggest that our reading of section

3B105 and 3B107 is Aartificially narrow@ because A[s]ection 3B107 is

not simply a naming provision.@ Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J.,

dissenting). According to Justice Fitzgerald, A[s]ection 3B107

addresses who must be >made= a defendant,@ and Aa party is not >made=

a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the

complaint.@ Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice

Fitzgerald maintains, to be Amade@ a defendant, Aa party must be both

named and served within the statutory period.@ Slip op. at 22

(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Conspicuously absent from Justice

Fitzgerald=s analysis on this point is any citation to authority, which

is likely attributable to the fact that its conclusion is flatly

contradicted by the plain language of the Review Act, this court=s

established case law, and the legislative history surrounding the

enactment of section 3B107=s exception to the 35-day rule.

As for the plain language, Justice Fitzgerald asserts that a party is

not Amade@ a defendant until it is both named in the complaint and

served with a summons. Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).

Section 3B105 says otherwise. Indeed, that section states that A[t]he

plaintiff shall, by affidavit filed with the complaint, designate the last

known address of each defendant upon whom service shall be made.@

(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). Likewise, section

3B105 directs the clerk of the court to Amail a copy of the summons to

each of the *** defendants, addressed to the last known place of

residence or principal place of business of each such defendant.@

(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). This language

confirms that, under the Review Law, a Adefendant@ exists as such

before summons is served. In fact, by requiring the plaintiff to file

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with the complaint an affidavit setting forth Athe last know address of

each defendant,@ section 3B105 confirms that a Adefendant@ is anyone

designated as such by the plaintiff. In other words, a party is made a

defendant simply by being named in the complaint.

As for this court=s case law, McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights

Comm=n, 165 Ill. 2d 1 (1995), is instructive. The Review Law, of

course, governs circuit court review of administrative orders. Not all

administrative orders, however, are reviewed in the circuit court.

Some are directly reviewed in the appellate court. The procedures

governing direct appellate court review of administrative orders are

set forth in Supreme Court Rule 335. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(a). In

McGaughy, this court was asked to consider the consequences of a

petitioner=s failure to comply strictly with Supreme Court Rule

335(a), which states:

AThe petition for review shall be filed in the Appellate

Court and shall specify the parties seeking review and shall

designate the respondent and the order or part thereof to be

reviewed. The agency and all other parties of record shall be

named respondents.@ (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(a).

Two petitions were at issue in McGaughy. The first Afailed to name

the Department of Human Rights ***, joining only the [Human

Rights] Commission and the Department of State Police as

respondents.@ McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 1. As for the second, A[t]he

caption *** read only, >In the Matter of the Request for Review by:

Betty L. Barnes,= and failed to name the Commission, the

Department, or [the employer] as respondents.@ McGaughy, 165 Ill.

2d at 2. The court began its analysis by thoroughly reviewing Lockett,

which held that the failure to comply strictly with section 3B107(a)=s

joinder requirements mandates dismissal of a complaint for

administrative review. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 9-12. The court then

concluded that the same consequence should attach to the failure to

comply strictly with the joinder requirements of Rule 335(a). In

reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized:

A[T]he joinder requirements of section 3B107(a) of the

Administrative Review Law and of Supreme Court Rule

335(a) are substantively similar. (Compare 735 ILCS

5/3B107(a) (West 1992) (>the administrative agency and all

persons * * * who were parties of record * * * shall be made

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defendants=) with 134 Ill.2d R. 335(a) (>The agency and all

other parties of record shall be named respondents=).) There is

nothing in the plain language of the statute or the rule that

would justify the development of two divergent procedural

standards for the review of administrative matters, and we do

not believe that the meanings of these similar requirements

should vary.@ (Emphasis added.) McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 12.

In other words, McGaughy treated Rule 335(a)=s requirement that

A[t]he agency and all other parties of record shall be named

respondents@ as synonymous and therefore legally indistinguishable

from section 3B107(a)=s requirement that Athe administrative agency

and all *** parties of record *** shall be made defendants.@ Once

again, contrary to the Justice Fitzgerald=s unsupported assertion, a

party is Amade@ a defendant simply by being Anamed.@ Indeed, the

linchpin of McGaughy is that, in this context, the two words mean

exactly the same thing.

As it turns out, McGaughy=s reading of section 3B107(a) perfectly

vindicates the General Assembly=s intent, as evidenced by the

relevant legislative history. The exception to the 35-day rule was

enacted on January 1, 1994, as part of Public Act 88B1. See Pub. Act

88B1, '7, eff. January 1, 1994. Speaking on the floor of the Illinois

Senate, the bill=s chief sponsor in that body described the purpose of

the exception as follows:

AAs amended in the Senate, [the bill] also deals with who

should be named parties in an administrative review ***.

***

There have been some difficulties because, on occasion,

the final order in the administrative agency does not name all

parties who ought to be named. Therefore, this bill, as

amended, provides that the petitionerBthe person bringing the

action for administrative reviewBwill name all those parties

who are named in the final order of the administrative action,

and then if a court subsequently determines that another party

ought to be named, the person bringing the action will be

granted leave of twenty-one days to add those other parties to

the petition for administrative review.@ (Emphases added.)

88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 12, 1993,

at 20 (remarks of Senator Hawkinson).

-14-

These remarks, which describe the focus of section 3B107, speak

exclusively to who must be named and make no mention whatsoever

of service. Moreover, Senator Hawkinson=s statement that the

exception grants 21 days Ato add those other parties to the petition@

flatly refutes the Justice Fitzgerald=s assertion that Aa party is not

>made= a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the

complaint.@As Senator Hawkinson=s statement confirms, that=s

exactly what it means to be Amade@ a defendant.

Finally, we note that, even if the Justice Fitzgerald=s reading of

section 3B107(a) is correct, the school districts still may invoke the

exception to the 35-day rule. Again, the exception states:

AIf, during the course of a review action, the court determines

that a party of record to the administrative proceedings was

not made a defendant as required by the preceding paragraph,

and only if that party was not named by the administrative

agency in its final order as a party of record, then the court

shall grant the plaintiff 21 days from the date of the

determination in which to name and serve the unnamed party

as a defendant.@ (Emphasis added.)

According to Justice Fitzgerald , to be Amade@ a defendant, Aa party

must be both named and served within the statutory period.@

(Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). If this is

true, then the school districts= lack of compliance with section

3B105=s service requirement is not a barrier to the invocation of

section 3B107(a)=s exception. On the contrary, it triggers the

exception. Indeed, by Justice Fitzgerald=s own reasoning, as long as

the Committee of Ten was unserved, it Awas not made a defendant.@

The exception therefore applies. 2

2

We also note that, if Justice Fitzgerald is correct in asserting that a

-15-

party is not Amade@ a defendant until it is both named and served, then the

exception set forth in the second paragraph section 3B107(a) is easily the

most specific statutory provision at play, as it excuses noncompliance with

both section 3B105 and section 3B107. Indeed, under Justice Fitzgerald=s

approach, the exception would apply when a party omitted from the

agency=s final order is (1) not named in the petition for administrative

review, (2) not served with the petition for administrative review, or (3)

neither named in nor served with the petition for administrative review.

-16-

The only question remaining, then, is whether the Board=s order

identified the petitioners as parties of record. Clearly, it did not. As

discussed above, the Board=s order granting the petition did not

identify any party as a Aparty of record.@ The caption on the order

referred only to the petition for detachment from East St. Louis and

annexation to Collinsville, and it did not otherwise identify the

parties. And while the text of the Board=s order referred generally to

the APetitioners@ and noted that a ACommittee of Ten@ had been

appointed, the order did not identify any of the petitioners or

committee members by name. Even the appellate court conceded this

point, noting that A[n]either the school districts involved nor the

petitioners seeking detachment and annexation were explicitly

labeled as >parties of record= in the final orders at issue.@ 348 Ill. App.

3d at 698. 3

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court properly granted the

school districts= motion to amend. The exception set forth in the

second paragraph of section 3B107(a) sets forth two, and only two,

conditions for application of that exception: (1) a party of record was

not made a defendant as required by the first paragraph of section

3B107(a), and (2) that same party was not named by the

administrative agency in its final order as a party of record. 735 ILCS

5/3B107(a). Both of those conditions are present in this case, and the

school districts therefore were entitled to 21 days in which to name

and serve the additional defendants.

CONCLUSION

3

The appellate court got around this point by insisting that Athe omission

of their names, purposefully or by clerical error, from the final order does

not convert the petitioners into nonparties.@ 348 Ill. App. 3d at 694. This is

undeniably true. But whether the petitioners were parties of record is not the

issue. Rather, the issue is whether the petitioners were named as parties of

record in the Board=s final order.

-17-

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the appellate

court is reversed, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, and

the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

decision.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed;

cause remanded.

JUSTICE GARMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the Justice Fitzgerald=s conclusion that Collinsville

Community Unit School District No. 10 is barred from obtaining

judicial relief because of its failure to strictly comply with section

3B105 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West

2000)). However, I also agree with the majority=s determination that

section 3B105 addresses service, not joinder. Accordingly, it is the

school district=s failure to serve the committee of 10 and its members,

rather than its failure to join them, that mandates dismissal of this

action.

As both the majority and the Justice Fitzgerald=s dissent note, a

party seeking review of an administrative decision must strictly

comply with the procedures established by the Review Law. ESG

Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 30 (2000);

Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 353 (1990). Strict

compliance must begin with section 3B103 of the Review Law,

entitled ACommencement of Action@:

AEvery action to review a final administrative decision

shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the

issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy

of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the

party affected by the decision[.]@ 735 ILCS 5/3B103 (West

2000).

Section 3B105 goes on to establish how summons, once issued, must

be served:

ASummons issued in any action to review the final

administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be

-18-

served by registered or certified mail on the administrative

agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case

of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional

board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools,

or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be,

when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided in

Section 7B6 of the School Code, and in such case only the

administrative agency involved and each of the committee of

10 shall be served.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000).

Thus, sections 3B103 and 3B105 require summons to be issued

within 35 days for the administrative agency and each of the other

defendants, except in cases where a committee of 10 has been

appointed. Where there is a committee of 10, the Review Law

requires issuance of summons for the administrative agency and each

member of the committee of 10. As the majority correctly notes, this

provision says nothing about whether the committee and its members

should be joined as defendants. Slip op. at 10. However, it does

require that they be served with summons properly issued within 35

days, regardless of whether they are joined.

Section 3B107, in contrast, speaks solely to joinder. 735 ILCS

5/3B107 (West 2000). In addition to establishing who must be joined,

it allows petitioners a second chance to join defendants who were not

named as parties of record in the final administrative order. 735 ILCS

5/3B107 (West 2000). However, the district=s failure to join the

committee of 10 was not the district=s critical shortcoming. Rather,

the district failed to strictly comply with the Review Law when it

failed to obtain issuance of summons for the committee of 10 and its

members within the 35 days mandated by section 3B103 (735 ILCS

5/3B103 (West 2000)). Although the application of section 3B107

allows the belated joinder of certain parties, it cannot excuse the

district=s failure to timely serve the committee of 10 and its members

in accordance with the requirement of sections 3B103 and 3B105. The

consequence for this failure to comply is dismissal of the review

proceeding. McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm=n, 165 Ill. 2d

1, 12 (1995).

Most petitioners for administrative review will not find

themselves in the school district=s position. The section 3B105

requirements for service are unique and specific only in their

-19-

treatment of cases involving a committee of 10 under the School

Code. Other petitioners are merely required to serve Athe

administrative agency and *** each of the other defendants.@ 735

ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). As the majority notes, a party is made a

defendant by being named in the complaint. Slip op. at 12. Thus, in

most cases section 3B105 does not require service until a defendant is

named. When petitioners fail to name a party of record who was not

named in the agency=s final order, most will be able to fall back on

the section 3B107 exception that allows extra time to join and then to

serve that defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3B107 (West 2000). However,

when a committee of 10 is involved, the Review Law requires

issuance of summons within the 35-day limit of section 3B103 no

matter whether or when the committee is named as a defendant. Slip

op. at 23 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).

In cases where the appellate court has properly applied the

language at issue in the section 3B107 exception, the facts suggest

legitimate confusion about the appropriate defendants to join. In

United Methodist Village Retirement Communities, Inc. v. Property

Tax Appeal Board, 321 Ill. App. 3d 456 (2001), the petitioner

taxpayer appealed a notice of assessment change to the county board

of review. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458. He then

appealed the board of review decision to the Property Tax Appeal

Board, which did not name the board of review as a party in its final

order. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458-59. On appeal of the

Appeal Board=s decision, the petitioner joined only the Appeal Board.

The appellate court applied section 3B113(b) of the Review Law (735

ILCS 5/3B113(b) (West 1998)), which contains language identical to

the section 3B107 exception, and allowed amendment of the petition

for review to add the board of review as a defendant. United

Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 460-61. In an earlier property tax case,

the petitioner appealed directly to the Appeal Board, bypassing the

board of review entirely. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc. v.

Property Tax Appeal Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d 745, 750-51 (1999).

Holding that the board of review was nevertheless a party of record,

the appellate court determined that the petitioner was entitled to

amend its complaint to add the board of review as a defendant. Villa

Retirement, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 751-52.

In each of these cases, it was unclear whether the Board of

Review was an appropriate party to join and serve. But no confusion

-20-

as to service exists in the instant case. Section 3B105 precisely

informed the district of whom to serve when appealing a decision of

the regional school board of trustees. 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000).

In contravention of this explicit language, the district did not obtain

issuance of summons for the committee of 10 and its members within

35 days.

The section 3B107 exception allowing belated joinder cannot

excuse this failure to comply with the Review Law=s service

requirements. In this regard, I join Justice Fitzgerald=s dissent.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting:

I agree with the majority that one of our fundamental rules of

statutory construction is A >to view all of the provisions of a statute as

a whole.= @ Slip op. at 16, quoting Land v. Board of Education of the

City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). Under this rule, each

provision of a statute must be construed in connection with every

other section (Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000)), and not as

isolated provisions (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of

Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000)). The majority, however, fails to

follow this rule by overlooking other provisions of the Administrative

Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3B101 et seq. (West 2000),

relevant to the issue before us. In particular, the majority overlooks

the service of summons provisions contained in section 3B105 (735

ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000)). Consideration of section 3B105, in

conjunction with section 3B107 (735 ILCS 5/3B107 (West 2000)),

leads to the conclusion that the appellate court judgment, dismissing

the complaint for administrative review, should be affirmed.

Accordingly, I dissent.

Section 3B105 of the Review Law states, in relevant part:

ASummons issued in any action to review the final

administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be

served by registered or certified mail on the administrative

agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case

of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional

board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools,

or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be,

when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided by

Section 7B6 of the School Code, and in such case only the

-21-

administrative agency involved and each of the committee of

10 shall be served.@ (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105

(West 2000).

The relevance of section 3B105 to this appeal is evident.

Collinsville challenged a Afinal administrative decision of the

regional board of school trustees@ and a Acommittee of 10@ was

designated in accordance with the School Code. See 105 ILCS 5/7B6

(West 2000). Pursuant to section 3B105, Aeach of the committee of 10

shall be served.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). The focus of this

appeal, therefore, is not solely section 3B107. Rather, we must

consider the interplay between sections 3B107 and 3B105.

A[S]ettled principles of statutory construction call for the specific

to control over the general.@ People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345

(1984). Accordingly, where a statute contains two provisions relating

to the same subject, one specific and one general, the specific

provision controls and should be applied. Knolls Condominium Ass=n

v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002). Here, sections 3B105 and

3B107 of the Review Law both involve the joinder requirements for

an administrative review action. Section 3B107 sets out the general

requirement: Athe administrative agency and all persons, other than

the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the

administrative agency shall be made defendants.@ 735 ILCS

5/3B107(a) (West 2000). Section 3B107(a) also contains an exception

to this general rule, allowing amendment of the complaint where the

omitted defendant was Anot named by the administrative agency in its

final order as a party of record.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000).

Section 3B105, on the other hand, addresses a specific case: Athe

case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional

board of school trustees,@ where a Acommittee of 10 has been

designated.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). A[I]n such case only the

administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall

be served.@ (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000).

Section 3B105 specifically addresses the present situation and

controls over the more general provisions of section 3B107(a).

Accordingly, the school districts= argument that the petitioners or the

Committee of Ten were not Anamed@ in the Board=s final order as

Aparties of record@ is irrelevant. The school districts were on notice,

by virtue of section 3B105, that they were required to serve Aeach of

-22-

the committee of 10.@ Under the statute, and our case law,

Collinsville=s failure to comply strictly with the Review Law is fatal

to its complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/3B102 (West 2000) (barring review

unless sought within the time and manner provided by the Review

Law); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26

(2000) (affirming dismissal of administrative review petition based

on failure to join the party who instituted the underlying

administrative proceeding); McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights

Commission, 165 Ill. 2d 1 (1995) (in consolidated appeal, dismissing

one administrative review action and affirming dismissal of the other,

where petitioners served respondents but failed to name those parties

in their review petitions); Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill.

2d 349 (1990) (affirming dismissal of complaint for administrative

review for failure to name a party of record).

The majority maintains that because section 3B105 addresses

service of process, and section 3B107 addresses who must be named

as a defendant, section 3B105 cannot be deemed the more specific

and controlling of the two statutory provisions. Slip op. at 10. The

majority=s reading of these statutory sections is artificially narrow.

Section 3B107 is not simply a naming provision. Section 3B107

addresses who must be Amade@ a defendant in an administrative

review proceeding. 735 ILCS 5/3B107 (West 2000). A party is not

Amade@ a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the

complaint for administrative review. A party must be both named and

served within the statutory period. Thus, section 3B107 allows

additional time to Aname and serve@ an unnamed party. 735 ILCS

5/3B107 (West 2000). Similarly, section 3B105 is not simply a service

statute as the majority contends. To be sure, section 3B105 addresses

how service shall be made on defendants in a review actionBby

registered or certified mail. Section 3B105, however, also addresses

who must be served as defendants in a case such as the present one:

Athe administrative agency involved and each of the committee of

10.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). Thus, section 3B107 and 3B105

both speak, in some fashion, as to who must be joined or Amade@ a

defendant in a case such as the present one, but section 3B105 is the

more specific.

Even if the majority=s characterization of section 3B107 as a

naming provision and section 3B105 as a service provision is correct,

I disagree with the majority=s conclusion that section 3B105 is

-23-

irrelevant to this case. Lockett and its progeny firmly establish that

administrative review is barred unless the complaining party is in

compliance with the procedures set forth in the Review Law. As the

majority states, AA party seeking to invoke a court=s special statutory

jurisdiction must strictly comply with the procedures prescribed by

statute.@ (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 5. Section 3B105 expressly

required Collinsville to serve Aeach of the committee of 10.@ 735

ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). That obligation was not made dependent

on any obligation to name the committee, its members, or the

underlying petitioners as defendants. Collinsville failed to serve the

committee members and thus failed to Astrictly comply with the

procedures prescribed by statute.@

I recognize that the Review Law Awas not intended to be a trap

for the unwary to establish a bar to relief.@ Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill.

2d 567, 571 (1966). In this case, however, no trap was set. Section

3B105 of the Review Law set forth in explicit terms how a case of

this type must proceed. Accordingly, Collinsville=s failure to serve

the members of the Committee of Ten cannot be overlooked. I would

hold that because review was not sought in the manner provided in

the Review Law, the school districts are Abarred@ from obtaining

judicial review. 735 ILCS 5/3B102 (West 2000).

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:

I agree with Justice Fitzgerald=s dissent that section 3B105

controls in this appeal. I write separately to explain that, even if the

exception in section 3B107 were applicable, the conditions for

application of that exception have not been met in this case. The

appellate court=s dismissal of the complaint for administrative review

should be affirmed in either case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

The majority concludes that the exception contained in section

3B107 of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) allows the

school districts an opportunity to name and serve the members of the

Committee of Ten as defendants. Slip op. at 15. The exception in

section 3B107 only applies, however, if the party who was not made a

defendant Awas not named by the administrative agency in its final

order as a party of record.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). The

majority finds this exception applies because the Board=s order failed

to identify the petitioners as parties of record. Slip op. at 16. The

-24-

majority notes that the caption of the order did not identify the

parties, and the text of the order did not identify any of the individual

petitioners or members of the Committee of Ten by name. Slip op. at

16.

I disagree with the conclusion that the order did not sufficiently

identify the members of the Committee of Ten as parties of record

within the meaning of the Review Law. The body of the order recites,

in pertinent part, that Athe Petition was signed by more than two-

thirds (2/3) of the legal registered voters of the area involved, that a

Committee of Ten was appointed in the Petition and that the legal

requirements set forth in 105 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/7 have

been met by the Petitioners.@ Under the School Code, a committee of

10 is a group of petitioners designated in the petition as attorney in

fact for all of the petitioners. 105 ILCS 5/7B6(c) (West 2000). Thus,

the order, by referring to the appointment of the Committee of Ten,

identifies the members of that group as petitioners. Under any

characterization, the petitioners are parties of record. As noted by the

majority, the petitioners were Aclearly parties of record.@ Slip op. at 6.

Thus, the order is sufficient to identify the members of the Committee

of Ten as petitioners and as parties of record.

In my view, the majority gives the exception in section 3B107 too

broad of a construction. The majority would apparently require that

each member of the Committee of Ten must be specifically named

and referred to as Aa party of record@ for the exception not to apply. I

believe the exception should be construed more narrowly. The

identification of the Committee of Ten as petitioners in the order was

sufficient to name the members of that group as parties of record.

Thus, the exception in section 3B107 that would allow the school

districts to add the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants is

not applicable based on the facts of this case.

I would also note that the circumstances of this case show this

construction of the exception cannot be considered unfair or Aa trap

for the unwary.@ See Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 2d 567, 571 (1966)

(Review Law Awas not intended to be a trap for the unwary@). The

petitioners, who were represented by the Committee of Ten, instituted

the proceedings. The Committee of Ten represented the petitioners

throughout these proceedings. The record shows there were three

separate hearings before the Board on this petition. The attorney for

-25-

the petitioners appeared at each of these hearings. Julia Martinez, one

of the members of the Committee of Ten, testified during the

proceedings. The Board members referred to Athe petitioners@

repeatedly throughout the hearings. The entire administrative

proceeding focused on the petition, prominently identifying the

members of the Committee of Ten by name on page one. The petition

specifically states A[t]he following Petitioners are designated as the

Committee of Ten to act as attorney in fact for all Petitioners.@ In

sum, the record is replete with references to the petitioners and the

Committee of Ten.

Based on these facts, the school districts cannot claim that they

did not know that the members of the Committee of Ten were parties

of record. The status of the members of the Committee of Ten as

parties of record could not be more apparent. Thus, denying the

school districts additional time to add the members of the Committee

of Ten as defendants would not be unfair.

Finally, as noted by both Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman,

section 3B105 clearly required the school districts to serve each

member of the Committee of Ten. Slip op. at 21 (Fitzgerald, J.,

dissenting); Slip op. at 18 (Garman, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). The school districts failed to serve the members of

the Committee of Ten when this action was initiated. Additionally,

after the school districts were granted leave to add the members of

the Committee of Ten as defendants, the school districts were

obligated to arrange for the service of the defendants. Nonetheless,

according to the record, the school districts completely failed to serve

the members of the Committee of TenBeven after they were granted

leave to add these parties as defendants. In failing to serve the

committee members, the school districts failed to comply strictly with

the Review Law.

In sum, this appeal should be resolved based on application of

section 3B105 as explained in Justice Fitzgerald=s dissent. However,

even if the exception in section 3B107 were applicable to this appeal,

the conditions for application of that exception have not been met.

Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court dismissing the

complaint for administrative review should be affirmed.

-26-