People v. Waid

Docket No. 101065.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

CRAIG WAID, Appellee.

Opinion filed June 2, 2006.

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the judgment of the court,

with opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald,

Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and

opinion.

OPINION

Defendant, Craig Waid, was charged with various drug- and

alcohol-related offenses in four separate cases in the circuit

court of Pike County. Prior to trial, on defendant=s motion, the

circuit court found defendant mentally unfit to stand trial. The

court also found that there was no substantial probability that

defendant, if provided with a course of treatment, would attain

fitness within one year. 725 ILCS 5/104B16, 104B23 (West

2004). The State moved for a discharge hearing to determine

the sufficiency of the evidence against defendant. 725 ILCS

5/104B23, 104B25 (West 2004). The State also moved,

pursuant to section 104B25(a), for the admission of certain

evidence at the discharge hearing. The circuit court denied the

State=s motion for admission of evidence, effectively finding

section 104B25(a) unconstitutional. The circuit court certified

for interlocutory appeal the question of whether this ruling was

correct. 155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a). The State appealed to the

appellate court, which transferred the appeal to this court.

Citing to Supreme Court Rule 365 (155 Ill. 2d R. 365), the

appellate court noted that the circuit court order effectively held

section 104B25(a) unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND

In case No. 03BDTB84, defendant was charged with driving

a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a Class A

misdemeanor. In a second case, No. 03BCMB227, defendant

was charged with three offenses: possession of drug

paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of

cannabis, a Class C misdemeanor; and delivery of alcoholic

liquor to a person under 21 years of age, a Class A

misdemeanor. In No. 04BCMB44, defendant was charged with

two of the same offenses as in No. 03BCMB227: possession of

drug paraphernalia and possession of cannabis. In the fourth

case, No. 03BTRB3632, defendant was cited for illegal

transportation of alcohol.

Prior to trial, defendant moved, pursuant to section 104B11

of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104B11

(West 2004)), for a hearing on whether defendant was fit to

stand trial. In his motion, defendant pointed to a previous

finding by the Social Security Administration that defendant

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was disabled because of Alow cognitive functioning@ and other

reasons. Defendant alleged that there was a bona fide doubt

as to his fitness to stand trial. Defendant also requested,

pursuant to section 104B12 (725 ILCS 5/104B12 (West 2004)),

that the hearing be held before a jury.

The jury found defendant Anot mentally fit to stand trial,@ and

the circuit court entered an order to that effect. Subsequently,

the circuit court found that there was no substantial probability

that defendant would become fit within one year. Under section

104B23 of the Code, if a court determines that there is no

substantial probability that a defendant will become fit to stand

trial within one year, the State may ask the court to set the

matter for a discharge hearing pursuant to section 104B25. On

July 29, 2004, the State filed a motion seeking a discharge

hearing. The purpose of such a hearing, which is to be

conducted Aby the court without a jury,@ is to determine the

sufficiency of the evidence against the defendant. 725 ILCS

5/104B25(a) (West 2004).

With regard to evidence that may be admitted at a

discharge hearing, subsection (a) provides:

AThe court may admit hearsay or affidavit evidence

on secondary matters such as testimony to establish the

chain of possession of physical evidence, laboratory

reports, authentication of transcripts taken by official

reporters, court and business records, and public

documents.@ 725 ILCS 5/104B25(a) (West 2004).

Pursuant to this provision, the State moved, prior to the

discharge hearing, for admission of various items of evidence

from the Pike County sheriff=s department and the Illinois State

Police. Included were sheriff=s department evidence-inventory

logs referring to Aseeds,@ a Agreen leafy substance,@ a Ametal

tube,@ Apills@ and Apipes.@ The State also sought to admit State

Police evidence receipts referring to these same items, as well

as State Police lab results on cannabis and blood. The circuit

court ordered the parties to file briefs on the issue of

Aadmission of evidence by affidavit/hearsay in a discharge

hearing pursuant to 725 [ILCS] 5/104B25.@

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A hearing was held on the State=s motion to admit

evidence, and the circuit court denied the motion. Relying on

People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127 (2000), which ruled

unconstitutional a statute that allowed the use of lab reports in

lieu of actual testimony in a criminal prosecution, the circuit

court in the case at bar held that the State=s evidence-inventory

logs, evidence receipts and lab reports would not be admissible

unless the persons who prepared this evidence were called to

testify. In the court=s view, to admit this evidence without

accompanying testimony would violate defendant=s

constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against

him. The circuit court stated:

A[T]he Court was very clear in McClanahan that

affidavit evidence was not available at the criminal trial.

*** [T]hey said it violated the right of confrontation, and it

violated the right of the defendant to confront the

witness.@

The circuit court also noted that, while a discharge hearing

apparently was a civil proceeding, a finding of no acquittal (not

not guilty) could result in the loss of defendant=s freedom. The

court stated: A[Defendant] could be, although not incarcerated,

he certainly could lose his freedom if he were to be

hospitalized or placed in a facility of some sort.@

The circuit court=s order effectively held section 104B25(a)

unconstitutional. The court also certified for interlocutory

appeal the question of whether its ruling denying the State=s

motion to admit evidence was correct.

The State appealed, and the case was docketed in the

appellate court. On August 1, 2005, the appellate court entered

an order transferring the appeal to this court pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 365 (155 Ill. 2d R. 365). The order stated:

AThe State appeals from an order effectively holding

section 104B25(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of

1963 unconstitutional. Under either civil or criminal

Supreme Court Rules, such appeals are within the

direct jurisdiction of the supreme court. Accordingly,

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 365, this appeal is

transferred to the Supreme Court of Illinois.@

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ANALYSIS

At the outset, we clarify the basis of our jurisdiction. The

parties, in their briefs, raise the question of whether this case

falls under the rules for appeal in criminal cases (Rules 603

and 604(a)) or civil cases (Rule 302). We turn to the issue of

whether a discharge hearing is civil or criminal in nature.

The State argues that a discharge hearing is not a criminal

prosecution. Instead, it is an Ainnocence only@ proceeding that

results in a final adjudication of charges only if the evidence

fails to establish the defendant=s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt (resulting in the defendant=s acquittal) or the defendant is

found not guilty by reason of insanity. If the evidence is found

to be sufficient to establish the defendant=s guilt, no conviction

results. Instead, the defendant is found not not guilty (People v.

Lavold, 262 Ill. App. 3d 984 (1994)) and may be held for

treatment. A criminal prosecution of the charges against the

defendant does not take place unless or until the defendant is

found fit to stand trial.

Defendant argues, to the contrary, that a discharge hearing

is more criminal than civil in nature. Under section 104B25, a

defendant who is found not not guilty is subject to an initial

period of treatment, which may be followed by civil

commitment. Defendant likens this period of treatment and

possible civil commitment to incarceration resulting from a

criminal conviction. According to defendant, a discharge

hearing is meant to determine whether a defendant is guilty

and to impose punishment.

We agree with the State that a discharge hearing is not a

criminal prosecution. It is well settled that the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV)

bars the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not

competent to stand trial. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,

439, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574 (1992). In

Illinois, a section 104B25 discharge hearing takes place only

after a defendant has been found unfit to stand trial.

Accordingly, in keeping with due process requirements, a

discharge hearing under section 104B25 is Aan >innocence only=

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hearing, that is to say, a proceeding to determine only whether

to enter a judgment of acquittal, not to make a determination of

guilt.@ People v. Rink, 97 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (1983); see also

People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 200 (1995) (Aa defendant

who is not acquitted at a discharge hearing has not gained a

definitive resolution of the charges against him@). AThe question

of guilt is to be deferred until the defendant is fit to stand trial.@

Rink, 97 Ill. 2d at 543.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant points to the

Atreatment period@ that results from a finding of not not guilty.

According to defendant, section 104B25 requires this Aterm of

>treatment= to be equal to the maximum term available for the

crime >committed.= @ In defendant=s view, this alleged

requirement that the treatment period be equal to a defendant=s

maximum potential prison sentence indicates that the purpose

of the proceeding is to impose punishment.

Defendant is incorrect in asserting that the treatment period

must be equal to a defendant=s maximum potential prison

sentence. Under section 104B25(d), if a defendant is found not

not guilty, he is initially subject to a treatment period of from

one to five years, depending on the seriousness of the

offenses charged. 725 ILCS 5/104B25(d) (West 2004). In the

case at bar, where the charges against defendant are for

misdemeanors rather than felonies, defendant is subject to a

one-year period of treatment. If, at the expiration of this initial

treatment period, a defendant continues to be unfit to stand

trial, the court must determine whether he is subject to

involuntary admission under the Mental Health and

Developmental Disabilities Code, or if he constitutes a serious

threat to the public safety. 725 ILCS 5/104B25(g)(2) (West

2004). If so, the defendant is remanded to the Department of

Human Services (DHS) for further treatment. 1 However, A[i]n

1

During the period of the defendant=s commitment to DHS for treatment,

the original court having jurisdiction over the defendant must hold a hearing

every 180 days to determine whether the defendant: (1) remains subject to

involuntary commitment, or (2) is in need of mental-health services in the

form of inpatient care, or (3) is in need of mental-health services but is not

subject to involuntary commitment or inpatient care. 725 ILCS

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no event may the treatment period be extended to exceed the

maximum sentence to which a defendant would have been

subject had he or she been convicted in a criminal proceeding.@

725 ILCS 5/104B25(g)(4) (West 2004). The potential maximum

prison sentence thus serves as a ceiling rather than a floor.

Contrary to defendant=s assertion, this sentence represents the

upper limit of a commitment term rather than its required

length.

Defendant also is incorrect in asserting that the purpose of

a discharge hearing is to impose punishment. As previously

noted, a discharge hearing is Aan >innocence only= hearing, that

is to say, a proceeding to determine only whether to enter a

judgment of acquittal, not to make a determination of guilt.@

Rink, 97 Ill. 2d at 543. It Aenables an unfit defendant to have

the charges dismissed if there is not enough evidence to prove

he committed the acts charged beyond a reasonable doubt.@

People v. Christy, 206 Ill. App. 3d 361, 365 (1990). The only

possible final outcome is one that is favorable to the defendant:

a determination that he is not guilty, or not guilty by reason of

insanity.

We conclude that a section 104B25 discharge hearing is

civil rather than criminal in nature. It follows that our jurisdiction

in this case falls under our rules for civil appeals. The State

argues that jurisdiction lies pursuant to Rule 302(a)(1).

However, Rule 302(a)(1) does not expressly allow for direct

appeal to this court from an interlocutory order declaring a

statute unconstitutional. In re H.G., 197 Ill. 2d 317, 328 (2001).

Rule 302(a)(1) states: AAppeals from final judgments of circuit

courts shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court (1) in cases

in which a statute of the United States or of this State has been

held invalid ***.@ (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1).

We need not decide whether jurisdiction exists in this cause

under Rule 302(a)(1). Rule 302(b) authorizes this court to grant

direct appeal in cases in which the public interest requires

prompt adjudication. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b). In our view, the

5/104B25(g)(2) (West 2004).

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instant appeal, which is from the circuit court=s declaration that

section 104B25(a) is unconstitutional, presents such a case.

See People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 334 (2002). Accordingly,

on our own motion, we grant the State leave to appeal the

circuit court=s interlocutory order under Rule 302(b). See H.G.,

197 Ill. 2d at 329.

Before addressing the constitutionality of section 104B25(a),

we consider a nonconstitutional issue raised by defendant as a

possible basis for upholding the trial court Awithout need of

reaching the constitutional issue.@ It is well settled that Athis

court will not address constitutional issues that are

unnecessary for the disposition of the case under review

[citation] even though the court acquires jurisdiction of the case

because a constitutional question is involved.@ People v.

Sklodowski, 162 Ill. 2d 117, 131 (1994). Defendant argues that

the police laboratory reports sought to be introduced by the

State at the discharge hearing do not constitute Asecondary

matters@ within the meaning of section 104B25(a), and the

reports therefore are not admissible under section 104B25(a).

According to defendant, the laboratory reports, which deal with

cannabis and blood, are being offered to prove the main point

of the prosecution, which is that defendant possessed

cannabis. In defendant=s view, these reports therefore cannot

be secondary. We disagree.

The primary objective in construing a statute is to give

effect to the intention of the legislature. The best indication of

this intent are the words of the statute. People v. Collins, 214

Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005). AWhere the language [of the statute] is

plain and unambiguous[,] we must apply the statute without

resort to further aids of statutory construction.@ Collins, 214 Ill.

2d at 214.

Section 104B25(a) provides, in pertinent part:

AThe court may admit hearsay or affidavit evidence

on secondary matters such as testimony to establish the

chain of possession of physical evidence, laboratory

reports, authentication of transcripts taken by official

reporters, court and business records, and public

documents.@ (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 5/104B25(a)

(West 2004).

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The plain language of section 104B25(a) unambiguously

includes Alaboratory reports@ in its list of Asecondary matters.@

The clear intent of the legislature was to designate Alaboratory

reports@ as Asecondary matters.@ We reject defendant=s

contrary construction of section 104B25(a).

We turn to the question of the constitutionality of section

104B25(a). As noted, the circuit court found section 104B25(a)

unconstitutional on the ground that it violated defendant=s right,

under the confrontation clauses of the United States and the

Illinois Constitutions, to be confronted with the witnesses

against him. In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court relied

on People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127 (2000), which

considered a different provision of the Code of Criminal

Procedure that also dealt with laboratory reports. This statute,

section 115B15 (725 ILCS 5/115B15 (West 1998)), allowed the

State, in prosecutions under the Cannabis Control Act or the

Illinois Controlled Substances Act, to use laboratory reports in

lieu of actual testimony as prima facie evidence of the contents

of the substance at issue. Under section 115B15(c), however,

the State was not allowed to use these reports as prima facie

evidence if the defendant filed, within seven days, a demand

for the testimony of the witness who prepared the report. 725

ILCS 5/115B15(c) (West 1998).

In McClanahan, this court held that section 115B15 was

unconstitutional. Analyzing the statute under Ohio v. Roberts,

448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980),

overruled, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d

177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), which was controlling at the time,

this court concluded that section 115B15 violated the

confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions

because the laboratory-report evidence neither fell within a

firmly rooted hearsay exception nor contained particularized

guarantees of trustworthiness. McClanahan also held that, in

compelling the defendant to make a demand for live testimony,

the statute Aimpermissibly requires the defendant to take

affirmative action to secure a right that he has already been

constitutionally guaranteed or be deemed to have waived that

right.@ McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 136.

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McClanahan is distinguishable from the case at bar. In

McClanahan, the evidence in question was admitted in a

criminal prosecution, a proceeding to which the confrontation

clause clearly applies. The sixth amendment of the United

States Constitution states, in pertinent part: AIn all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be

confronted with the witnesses against him ***.@ (Emphasis

added.) U.S. Const., amend. VI. Similarly, the confrontation

clause of the Illinois Constitution provides: AIn criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall have the right *** to be

confronted with the witnesses against him or her ***.@

(Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, '8. In the case at

bar, we have determined that a discharge hearing under

section 104B25 is not a criminal prosecution. Neither the

federal nor the state confrontation clause applies to a

discharge hearing. McClanahan is inapposite, and the circuit

court was incorrect in ruling, based on McClanahan, that

section 104B25(a) violated defendant=s rights under the

confrontation clause.

We find support for our conclusion in Commonwealth v.

DelVerde, 398 Mass. 288, 496 N.E.2d 1357 (1986). The

defendant in DelVerde was arrested for, and confessed to,

murder and rape. Prior to trial, the defendant, who had a

history of mental retardation, was found not competent to stand

trial. Subsequently, the defendant, acting through his defense

counsel and his guardian, reached a plea agreement with the

prosecutor, and offered to plead guilty to a reduced charge of

manslaughter. The trial court refused to accept the offer of

plea, and the case was appealed. The certified issue on appeal

was whether a criminal defendant who was found incompetent

to stand trial could enter a plea of guilty through his guardian

and have it accepted by the trial court. In support of his

position, the defendant argued, inter alia, that Aa criminal

defendant found incompetent to stand trial and who is likely to

remain that way for life faces a permanent denial of certain

constitutional rights, including specifically his Sixth Amendment

rights to a speedy trial, to an impartial jury, and to confront

witnesses.@ DelVerde, 398 Mass. at 291-92, 496 N.E.2d at

1359-60. The court in DelVerde answered the certified

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question in the negative. The court concluded that an

incompetent defendant could not enter a guilty plea knowingly

and intelligently, and therefore such a plea, if entered, would

be invalid. The court added that the defendant=s sixth

amendment rights to a speedy trial, an impartial jury, and the

confrontation of witnesses would become operative when the

State later prosecuted him. See also Spero v. Commonwealth,

424 Mass. 1017, 1018, 678 N.E.2d 435, 436 (1997) (noting

that incompetent defendant would have an opportunity to

confront the witnesses against her at trial when she became

competent).

In the case at bar, defendant argues that the sixth

amendment right to confrontation does apply to a discharge

hearing. However, he qualifies this contention by noting that

this right is tolled by a defendant=s unfitness. Defendant=s

position is essentially in accord with our holding regarding the

applicability of the confrontation clause to a discharge hearing.

Because a discharge hearing under section 104B25 is not a

criminal prosecution, a defendant=s confrontation clause rights

are not implicated at that point in the proceedings. If, pursuant

to section 104B25(g)(1), a defendant were found to be fit and a

trial were held, this proceeding would constitute a criminal

prosecution, and the confrontation clause then would apply.

Defendant argues in the alternative that even if a discharge

hearing is civil rather than criminal in nature, protections such

as the right to confrontation should apply. Defendant points to

proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act

(SDPA), which is civil in nature, and notes that the right to

confront witnesses is accorded defendants in such

proceedings under the due process clause of the fourteenth

amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const.,

amend. XIV. Defendant argues that the same right should be

accorded defendants in discharge hearings and that, if this

right does apply, the admission of hearsay evidence pursuant

to section 104B25(a) violates the due process clause.

Defendant is correct regarding the rights granted a

defendant in a proceeding under the SDPA. In People v.

Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 338 (2001), this court noted that, even

though proceedings under the SDPA are civil in nature, the

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application of the SDPA nevertheless Amay result in deprivation

of liberty.@ Trainor reaffirmed that Aa person proceeding under

the Act must be accorded the essential protections available to

a defendant in a criminal trial.@ Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 338-39.

Included among these protections is the right to confront

witnesses. The court stated: A[W]e agree[ ] that the right to due

process entitles the defendant to the right to confront and

cross-examine witnesses testifying against him ***.@ Trainor,

196 Ill. 2d at 329.

Proceedings under the SDPA are distinguishable from a

section 104B25 discharge hearing. Unlike a discharge hearing,

an SDPA proceeding is an adjudicatory proceeding. It is

conducted in lieu of criminal prosecution (Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at

327) and results in a final determination of the charges against

a defendant. Under section 8 of the SDPA, a defendant who is

found to be a sexually dangerous person is committed to the

guardianship of the Director of Corrections for care and

treatment for an indeterminate period. 725 ILCS 205/8 (West

2004).

A discharge hearing, by contrast, is an Ainnocence only@

proceeding that results in a final determination of the charges

against the defendant only if he is found not guilty, or not guilty

by reason of insanity. If the evidence presented at a discharge

hearing is sufficient to establish the defendant=s guilt, no

conviction results. Instead, the defendant is found not not

guilty. AThe question of guilt is to be deferred until the

defendant is fit to stand trial.@ Rink, 97 Ill. 2d at 543. Moreover,

a defendant who is found not not guilty at a discharge hearing

is not immediately subject to an indeterminate period of

commitment, as is a defendant who is found to be a sexually

dangerous person under the SDPA. As previously indicated, a

defendant who is found not not guilty at a discharge hearing is

initially subject to a treatment period of from one to five years,

depending on the seriousness of the offenses charged. 725

ILCS 5/104B25(d) (West 2004). If, at the expiration of this initial

treatment period, a defendant continues to be unfit to stand

trial, the court must determine whether he is subject to

involuntary admission under the Mental Health and

Developmental Disabilities Code, or constitutes a serious threat

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to the public safety. 725 ILCS 5/104B25(g)(2) (West 2004). If

so, the defendant is remanded to the DHS for further

treatment. However, A[i]n no event may the treatment period be

extended to exceed the maximum sentence to which a

defendant would have been subject had he or she been

convicted in a criminal proceeding.@ 725 ILCS 5/104B25(g)(4)

(West 2004).

Contrary to defendant=s contention, a discharge hearing is

not analogous to an SDPA proceeding. Given the differences

between these two proceedings, we conclude that a defendant

subject to the SDPA has a greater liberty interest than does a

defendant at a discharge hearing. It follows that a defendant at

a discharge hearing is not accorded, under the due process

clause, the same degree of Aprotections available at a criminal

trial@ (Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 328) as is given a defendant who is

subject to an SDPA proceeding.

This court has come to a similar conclusion regarding a

juvenile transfer hearing, which is a proceeding to determine

whether a juvenile may be tried as an adult (705 ILCS

405/5B805 (West 2004)). In People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289,

303 (1979), we stated: AThe transfer hearing not being

adjudicatory, the procedural safeguards required at criminal

trials and adjudications of delinquency are not mandated by

due process.@ As a consequence, reliable hearsay, including

documentary or testimonial evidence, is admissible at such a

proceeding. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 305.

In In re W.J., 284 Ill. App. 3d 203 (1996), our appellate

court stated:

A[T]he salient feature of the transfer hearing is that,

analogous to the preliminary or detention hearing, it

does not result in a determination of guilt or innocence.

[Citations.] As such, the requisite due process

safeguards need not rise to the level mandated in a

criminal or adjudicatory proceeding. [Citations.] Like the

preliminary hearing, transfer proceedings may be based

upon hearsay evidence.@ W.J., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 208.

Defendant argues that a discharge hearing is not analogous

to a juvenile transfer hearing, which is nonadjudicatory. In

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defendant=s view, a discharge hearing is adjudicatory.

Defendant asserts: AThe hearing process under the Statute in

issue does result in a finding of guilt or innocence.@ This is

simply not the case. As we have previously noted, a discharge

hearing under section 104B25 is an Ainnocence only@ hearing.

AThe question of guilt is to be deferred until the defendant is fit

to stand trial.@ Rink, 97 Ill. 2d at 543. A discharge hearing

simply enables an unfit defendant to have the charges

dismissed if the State does not have the evidence to prove he

committed the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

Christy, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 365.

In determining whether a statute has been shown to be

unconstitutional, we are guided by the principle that all statutes

are presumed to be constitutional. The burden of rebutting that

presumption is on the party challenging the validity of the

statute to demonstrate clearly a constitutional violation. People

v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406 (2003). AIf reasonably possible, a

statute must be construed so as to affirm its constitutionality

and validity.@ Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 406.

In the case at bar, there has been no clear showing of a

constitutional violation. The sixth amendment confrontation

clause does not apply to a discharge hearing, which is not a

criminal prosecution. Therefore, section 104B25(a), which

allows the admission of hearsay or affidavit evidence at a

discharge hearing, does not violate the confrontation clause.

Nor does the admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to

section 104B25(a) violate the due process clause. A defendant

in a discharge hearing is not accorded, under the due process

clause, the same degree of Aprotections available at a criminal

trial@ (Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 328) as is given a defendant subject

to an SDPA proceeding. Therefore, reliable hearsay of the type

allowed under section 104B25(a) is admissible at a discharge

hearing.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the circuit court denying the

State=s motion to admit evidence-inventory logs, evidence

receipts, and laboratory reports pursuant to section 104B25(a).

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We remand the cause to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Circuit court judgment reversed;

cause remanded.

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