Opinion

Darryl Walker, Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Henry Brown v. Lucy Traylor

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Filed
May 5, 2011
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.2%

holding appellate court only has jurisdiction over final judgments except for mostly statutory exceptions

How later courts described this case

  • holding appellate court only has jurisdiction over final judgments except for mostly statutory exceptions
  • holding probate order awarding attorneys’ fees is final
  • holding probate order finally disposing of particular issue between parties is final

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Opinion issued May 5, 2011

In The

Court of

Appeals

For The

First District

of Texas

————————————

NO. 01-09-01098-CV

———————————

Darryl Walker,

Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Henry Brown, Deceased ,

Appellant

V.

Lucy Traylor , Appellee

On

Appeal from the Probate Court No. 4

Harris

County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 323,033

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

Appellant Darryl Walker, dependent

administrator of the estate of Henry Brown, appeals the trial court’s order

denying his request to withdraw an earlier judgment and granting appellee Lucy

Traylor’s motion to enforce the judgment and sanctions. In four issues, Walker argues the trial court

erred by denying his request to withdraw the earlier judgment and grant a new

trial because (1) he did not receive appropriate notice of the trial setting

from the probate clerk; (2) Traylor’s attorney was not authorized to serve

notice of the trial setting on Walker; (3) Traylor was not entitled to an award

of attorneys’ fees beyond the original amount requested; and (4) there was

insufficient evidence to support the award of attorneys’ fees. Traylor argues that this court lacks

jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

We affirm.

Background

Henry Brown died in 2001.

George Brown, his son, filed an application to determine heirship,

alleging that Henry had died intestate.

Traylor, a long-time friend of Henry and his wife, filed an opposition

to George’s application, seeking to probate a copy of Henry’s March 13, 1999

will. George counter-sued Traylor and

her daughter, the notary public who had drafted the March 13, 1999 will.

The case went to trial and a jury found, among other

things, the will to be valid and effective.

Based on the jury’s findings, the trial court admitted the will copy to

probate, appointed Traylor to be dependent administratrix, and awarded Traylor

$20,000 in attorneys’ fees.

George appealed. [1] In that opinion, we affirmed the judgment of

the trial court except for the award of attorneys’ fees to Traylor, which we

remanded for a new trial on that ground alone. [2]

At some point before the new trial, Traylor stepped down

from her position as administratrix due to health reasons. Walker was appointed as administrator in her

place.

A trial on the matter of attorneys’ fees was held on April

26, 2007. Traylor and George were

present, but Walker was not. On May 14,

2007, the trial court rendered a judgment awarding Traylor $33,470.67 in

attorneys’ fees to be paid from the assets of the estate. The judgment recites that Walker was served

with notice of the trial through his attorney.

Over the next two years, Traylor’s attorney sent at least

two requests for payment to Walker, who refused to pay. In July 2009, Traylor’s attorney filed a

motion to enforce the award of attorneys’ fees.

In response, Walker sought—for the first time—for the court to withdraw

its 2007 judgment and reset the trial due to Walker’s alleged lack of notice of

the trial. The trial court signed an

order on August 31, 2009, finding that Walker had been properly served with

notice of the trial. The order awarded

an additional $500 in attorneys’ fees as sanctions and ordered the entire

amount owed be paid by September 15, 2009.

On September 8, 2009, Walker filed a notice of appeal,

appealing from “the Trial Court’s May 14, 2007 judgment granting Lucy Traylor’s

request for Attorney’s fees and the Trial Court’s Supplemental Order . . .

signed by the judge on August 31, 2009.”

Jurisdiction

Traylor asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider this appeal because Walker did not file a notice of appeal within 30

days of the 2007 judgment.

An appellate court “has jurisdiction over any appeal in

which the appellant files an instrument in a bona fide attempt to invoke the

appellate court’s jurisdiction.” Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 616

(Tex. 1997). “The filing of a notice of

appeal by any party invokes the appellate court’s jurisdiction over all parties

to the trial court’s judgment or order appealed from.” Tex.

R. App. P. 25.1(b). Except for

circumstances not applicable in this appeal, a notice of appeal must be filed

within 30 days after the judgment or appealable order becomes final. See

Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 (setting

30-day deadline for appeal); Lehmann v.

Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) (holding appellate court only

has jurisdiction over final judgments except for mostly statutory exceptions). Failure to file a notice of appeal within the

applicable time period precludes the invocation of an appellate court’s

jurisdiction. Verburgt , 959 S.W.2d at 617 .

Accordingly, as long as Walker filed his notice of appeal within 30 days

of a final judgment or order identified in the notice of appeal, we have

jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

Walker filed a notice of appeal on September 8, 2009, appealing

from “the Trial Court’s May 14, 2007 judgment granting Lucy Traylor’s request

for Attorney’s fees and the Trial Court’s Supplemental Order . . .

signed by the judge on August 31, 2009.”

The August 31, 2009 order determined that Walker had been properly

served with notice of the trial setting and enforced the award of attorneys’

fees from the May 14, 2007 judgment.

As it applies to this case, “[a]ll final orders of any

court exercising original probate jurisdiction shall be appealable to the

courts of appeals.” Act of May 23, 2005,

79th Leg., R.S., ch. 551, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1476 , 1476, repealed by Act of May 31, 2009, R.S.,

ch. 1351, § 12(h), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 4273 , 4279 (former Probate Code

section 5(g)). “A probate order is the

functional equivalent of a judgment when it finally disposes of a particular

issue between parties.” Ajudani v. Walker , 232 S.W.3d 219, 223

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). An order awarding attorneys’ fees is final for

purposes of appeal. Wittner v. Scanlan , 959 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1995, writ denied).

The judgment awarding attorneys’ fees was final when it

was signed in 2007. See id. The order enforcing

the award of attorneys’ fees disposed of all the issues relating to the 2007

judgment and did not raise any other issues that remain unresolved. Accordingly, it was a final order and

appealable. See Ajudani , 232 S.W.3d at 223 .

Walker filed his notice of appeal, referencing the 2009 order, within 30

days after the 2009 order was signed.

Because Walker’s notice of appeal constitutes “a bona fide attempt to

invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction,” we hold we have jurisdiction over

this appeal. Verburgt , 959 S.W.2d at 616 .

Validity of 2007 Judgment

In his four issues on appeal, Walker argues the trial

court erred by denying his request to withdraw the earlier judgment and grant a

new trial because (1) he did not receive appropriate notice of the trial

setting from the probate clerk; (2) Traylor’s attorney was not authorized to

serve notice of the trial setting on Walker; (3) Traylor was not entitled to an

award of attorneys’ fees beyond the original amount requested; and (4) there

was insufficient evidence to support the award of attorneys’ fees. Walker presented these grounds for

challenging the validity of the 2007 judgment in response to Traylor’s motion

to enforce the judgment.

The judgment awarding attorneys’ fees was a final

judgment. See Ajudani , 232 S.W.3d at 223 (holding probate order finally

disposing of particular issue between parties is final); Wittner , 959 S.W.2d at 642 (holding probate order awarding

attorneys’ fees is final). The probate

court’s plenary power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment expired

30 days after it was signed. Ajudani , 232 S.W.3d at 223 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d)). Walker did not challenge the validity of the

judgment within that time period, nor did he file an appeal. See

Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 (setting

deadline for filing appeal). Once the

probate court’s plenary power expired, it lacked the authority to set aside the

judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f).

Once the trial court’s plenary power expires and the time

to bring a regular appeal passes, a party’s options to challenge the validity

of a judgment become more limited. What

options the party has depends on whether the party is challenging the validity

of the judgment in a direct or collateral attack. A direct attack is a proceeding brought to

correct the former judgment and to secure rendition of a single, proper

judgment. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club , 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973). In contrast, “[a] collateral attack on a

judgment is an effort to avoid its binding force in a proceeding, instituted

not for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating it, but in order to

obtain specific relief against which the judgment stands as a bar.” Boudreaux

Civic Ass’n v. Cox , 882 S.W.2d 543, 549 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1994, no writ).

In his response to Traylor’s motion to enforce, Walker

asked the trial court to withdraw its 2007 judgment and grant a new trial. He did not ask the trial court to simply

declare the judgment unenforceable. We

hold that Walker’s challenge was a direct attack on the 2007 judgment.

In Middleton ,

the trial court rendered a “consent judgment” after receiving notice that

certain parties no longer consented. Middleton v. Murff , 689 S.W.2d 212, 213

(Tex. 1985). The parties that withdrew

their consent did not appeal the rendition of the judgment. Id. Instead, the parties later filed a motion to

vacate the consent judgment, which the trial court denied. Id. The court of appeals affirmed holding that,

because the judgment was not void, the parties were required to file a bill of

review. Id. The Texas Supreme Court

held that, even if the judgment was void, in order to set aside a judgment on a

direct attack when the time for appeal has passed, the complaining party must

bring the complaint in a bill of review.

Id.

Walker has brought a direct attack on the validity of the

2007 judgment. He did not, however,

bring it in a bill of review. We

overrule appellant’s four issues. [3]

Conclusion

We affirm the September 8, 2009 order of the trial court,

constituting a final judgment for purposes of this appeal.

Laura

Carter Higley

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Brown.

[1] See Brown v. Traylor ,

210 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

[2] Id. at 678 .

[3] Because we hold that Walker has not properly challenged the

validity of the 2007 judgment, we express no opinion on whether the judgment is

in fact invalid.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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