Deniro Crockett v. State

Opinion

issued October 13, 2011.

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

————————————

NO.

01-10-00467-CR

———————————

Deniro Crockett ,

Appellant

V.

The State of Texas ,

Appellee

On

Appeal from the 180th District Court

Harris

County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1186256

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Deniro Crockett

was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and the jury assessed punishment

at 40 years’ confinement and a $2,000 fine.

In four points of error, Crockett contends that: (1) the evidence is

legally insufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) the trial court erred by

permitting the police officer to testify, over defense objection, that

appellant was guilty of extraneous offenses and that such testimony was

hearsay; (3) the State committed reversible error during argument; and (4) the

trial court erred by refusing to allow appellant to make a bill of exception

regarding potential jury misconduct.

We affirm.

Background

In early October 2008, cashiers Tamara

Grayson and Lataysha Hillsman were counting the money in their registers at a

Houston convenience store/gas station prior to closing at 9:00 p.m. Grayson testified that appellant, Deniro

Crockett, approached her, pulled a big silver handgun from his waistband, and

demanded the cash from her register.

Hillsman testified that Crockett laid the gun on the counter and pointed

it at Grayson while he was robbing Grayson.

After Grayson gave him all the cash in

her register, Crockett then turned to Hillsman, who had the money she was

counting in her hands. Hillsman

testified that Crockett again laid the gun on the counter, leaned on the

counter with the gun pointed at her, and demanded the cash from her register,

as well. She complied. Both Hillsman and Grayson closely observed

Crockett during the robbery. Grayson, in

fact, testified that she would never forget his face.

After getting the cash from both

registers, Crockett left the store.

Hillsman testified that Crockett drove off in a gray four-door car which

she believed was a Grand Am or a Grand Prix.

Grayson or Hillsman then called the police. When Officers Richardson and Hadley arrived,

both cashiers reported the robbery and described the suspect and vehicle.

The following day, Officer Terrell of

the Houston Police Department was dispatched to another robbery at a Family

Dollar store located in the same part of Houston. Keely Bryant, the assistant manager of the

store, testified that while she was counting the cash, an armed man approached

her and demanded it. She described how

he laid the gun on the counter pointed towards her. When she refused to give him the cash, he

fled in a gray Grand Am, the license plate number of which she noted, along

with a description of the vehicle and the man who attempted to rob her. At trial, Bryant identified Crockett as that

man.

Officer Terrell put out a general

broadcast for the getaway vehicle, and later that day, Officer Lopez spotted

the car and followed it. Crockett was

apprehended and arrested when he stopped the car and ran. The following day, Grayson viewed a line-up

of suspects, and after observing and hearing them speak, she immediately

identified Crockett. Hillsman also

identified Crockett in court.

Crockett’s sister, Lynn Harris,

testified that he picked her up from work at about 7:45 on the evening of the

robbery and that she was with him until 4:00 the following morning. Harris also testified that she would lie for

her brother, though she qualified that statement to claim that she would not

lie in a criminal matter.

The jury found Crockett guilty as

charged and assessed punishment at 40 years’ confinement and a $2,000 fine.

Legal Sufficiency

In his first issue, appellant contends

that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his conviction because (1)

there was insufficient evidence of identification to convict, and (2) there was

no evidence that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon.

A.

Standard of Review

The Court of Criminal Appeals has determined

that the test for factual sufficiency is indistinguishable from that of legal

sufficiency. See Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010). But see Ervin v. State ,

331 S.W.3d 49 , 56–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet ref’d) (Jennings,

J., concurring). Our assessment reduces

to a determination of whether, based on all of the record evidence viewed in

the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found the

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson

v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781 , 2788–89 (1979); Swearingen v. State , 101 S.W.3d 89, 95

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Under the Jackson

standard, evidence is insufficient to support a conviction when, considering

all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict,

a fact finder could not have rationally found that each element of the charged

offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson , 443 U. S. at 319 ,

99 S. Ct. at 2789 ; In re Winship , 397

U.S. 358, 361 , 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970); Williams

v. State , 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This standard is met under two circumstances:

(1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence,

probative of an element of the offense; or (2) the evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the verdict, conclusively establishes a reasonable

doubt. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 314 , 318 n.11, 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2319 ,

2789 n.11; Williams , 235 S.W.3d at

750 ; Laster v. State , 275 S.W.3d 512,

518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In applying

the Jackson standard of review, an

appellate court must defer to the responsibility of the fact finder to fairly

resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from the facts. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S. Ct.

at 2789 ; Williams , 235 S.W. 3d at

750 . An appellate court presumes that

the trier of fact resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the

verdict and defers to that resolution, provided that the resolution is

rational. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326 ; 99 S. Ct at 2793 . An appellate court may not re-evaluate the

weight and credibility of the record evidence and thereby substitute its own

judgment for that of the fact finder. Williams , 235 S.W.3d at 750 .

B.

Evidence of Identification

The identity of the person committing

the offense is an element of the crime that must be proved. See

Greene v. State , 124 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,

pet. ref’d) (holding that identity is element of offense and may be proven by

direct or circumstantial evidence).

Courts have found voice identification alone to be legally and factually

sufficient to establish identity. McInturf v. State , 544 S.W.2d 417 ,

418−19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that voice identification

constituted direct evidence of identity when complainant had one 30-minute

encounter with appellant); Davis v. State ,

180 S.W.3d 277, 286 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (holding that

complainant’s voice identification of appellant was legally and factually

sufficient to support conviction when complainant had one 15-minute encounter

with appellant). Likewise, sight

identification may be both legally and factually sufficient to establish

identity. Johnson v. State , 176 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2004, pet. ref’d) (holding eye-witness identification was factually sufficient

to support conviction when complainant saw appellant only on night that he

robbed her, but complainant testified she recognized appellant by his eyes); Walker v. State , 180 S.W.3d 829 ,

832−33 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (holding

identification by only one eye-witness was legally and factually sufficient to

support conviction when appellant robbed complainant at gunpoint and robbery

lasted less than one minute).

Here, both Hillsman and Grayson were

eye-witnesses to the robbery. Both women

testified that they observed appellant for ten to fifteen minutes while the

robbery took place. Additionally, each

gave specific descriptions of appellant and

each positively identified appellant in court as the robber. Grayson testified that she “will never forget

his face.” Hillsman testified that when

“someone pulls a gun on you, you never going to forget that.” Furthermore, at the line-up two days after

the robbery, Grayson was able to hear appellant’s voice as well as see

him. Grayson immediately identified

appellant from the lineup. We hold that

Grayson’s and Hillsman’s identification of appellant as the robber is both

legally and factually sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated

robbery.

We overrule appellant’s first issue on

this point.

C.

Evidence that Appellant Used or Exhibited a Deadly Weapon

Appellant argues there was

insufficient evidence to show he used a deadly weapon, i.e., a firearm.

Aggravated

robbery requires the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon during the commission

of a robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann .

§ 29.03(a)(2) (West 2003). A deadly

weapon is defined as a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or

adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury or

anything that, in the manner of its use or intended use, is capable of causing

death or serious bodily injury. See Tex.

Penal Code Ann . § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (West Supp. 2010).

The

indictment in this case alleges, in pertinent part, that appellant

did then and

there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by

TAMARA GRAYSON and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property,

intentionally and knowingly threaten and place TAMARA GRAYSON in fear of

imminent bodily injury and death, and that the Defendant then and there used

and exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: A FIREARM.

Appellant contends that the proof at

trial was that a “gun” was used, but there is no evidence in the record that the

instrument used was a “firearm.”

According to appellant, since the State indicted him using the

unnecessary descriptive term “firearm,” the State had to prove the descriptive

matters as alleged. See Gomez v. State , 685 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex. Crim. App.

1985). In other words, appellant argues

that the victims’ testimony that he used a “gun” is legally insufficient to

prove “firearm” as alleged in the indictment.

We disagree. “Testimony using any of the terms ‘gun,’

‘pistol’ or revolver’ is sufficient to authorize the jury to find that a deadly

weapon was used.” Wright v. State , 591 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Specifically, testimony of a “gun” has been

held sufficient to prove the use of a “firearm” as alleged in an

indictment. Gomez , 685 S.W.2d at 336 . In

Gomez the indictment, as here,

alleged the defendant used a deadly weapon, “namely a firearm.” Id. And in this case, there was no weapon

produced at trial and the witness identified the instrument as a “gun” or

“revolver.” Id .

The Gomez court concluded that the testimony as to a deadly

weapon was sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. Id . More recently, this Court has held that,

“[a]bsent any specific indication to the contrary at trial, the jury should be

able to make the reasonable inference, from the victim’s testimony that the

‘gun’ [that] was used in the commission of a crime, was, in fact, a

firearm.” Cruz v. State, 238 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2006, pet. ref’d).

Here, the victim cashiers Hillsman and

Grayson both described the gun in question. From this evidence,

the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun that appellant

threatened them with was a firearm.

We

overrule appellant’s issue on this point.

Testimony Regarding Extraneous

Offenses

In his second issue, appellant

contends that the trial court erred by permitting a police officer to testify,

over objection, that appellant was guilty of extraneous offenses and that such

testimony was hearsay.

This issue is subdivided into two

parts. The first involves a formal

introduction of evidence concerning an extraneous aggravated robbery. The second involves a comment made the

officer in response to a question from appellant’s counsel.

A.

The Extraneous Offense

Appellant

complains first of the State’s introduction of evidence concerning an

aggravated robbery at a Family Dollar store in Acres Homes that occurred the

day after the robbery in question. Keely

Bryant, the cashier of the Family Dollar, testified that appellant came into

the store while she was counting the cash in her drawer, laid a gun pointed at

her on the counter, and demanded cash.

When she refused to give him the money, appellant fled in a gray

Pontiac. When the police arrived, Bryant

gave a description of appellant and the car, as well as the license plate

number of the car. The police spotted

the car the following day and appellant was arrested after he stopped the car

and ran. Bryant identified him on the

day of the offense as the perpetrator and later identified him in court as

well.

1. The Law

We review a trial court’s admission of

extraneous offense evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Page v.

State , 137 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Lane v. State , 933 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Blackwell v. State , 193 S.W.3d 1, 8

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). As long as the trial court’s ruling was within

the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion, and the

ruling must be upheld. Thomas v. State , 126 S.W.3d 138, 143

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d).

Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction

of extraneous offenses to show character conformity. Tex.

R. Evid . 404(b); Page , 137

S.W.3d at 78 ; Moses v. State , 105

S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Blackwell ,

193 S.W.3d at 9 . Extraneous-offense

evidence may be admissible, however, when relevant beyond character conformity,

to show, for example, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Moses ,

105 S.W.3d at 626 ; Blackwell , 193

S.W.3d at 9 . An extraneous offense may

be admissible to prove identity only when the identity of the perpetrator is at

issue in the case. Page v. State , 213 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Lane , 933 S.W.2d at 519 . A defendant may raise the issue of identity

by presenting an alibi defense. Moore v. State , 700 S.W.2d 193, 201

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Hughes v. State ,

962 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d).

“Evidence of a defendant’s particular

modus operandi is a recognized exception to the general rule precluding

extraneous offense evidence, if the modus operandi evidence tends to prove a

material fact at issue, other than propensity.”

Owens v. State , 827 S.W.2d

911, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc); Regan

v. State , 7 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet.

ref’d). When extraneous offense evidence is introduced to prove identity by

comparing common characteristics, the evidence must be so similar to the

charged offense that the offenses illustrate the defendant’s “distinctive and

idiosyncratic manner of committing criminal acts.” Page ,

213 S.W.3d at 336 (quoting Martin v.

State , 173 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Owens , 827 S.W.2d at 915 .

The common characteristics of the offenses must be so similar as to act

as the defendant’s signature. Page , 213 S.W.3d at 336 ; Taylor v. State , 920 S.W.2d 319, 322

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Extraneous

offense evidence that is admitted to show identity must demonstrate a much

higher degree of similarity to the charged offense than extraneous offenses

admitted for other purposes such as intent.

Bishop v. State , 869 S.W.2d

342, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Without

such a high degree of similarity between the offenses, the probative value of

the extraneous offense evidence would be outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id . To determine if the characteristics of the

offenses are similar and distinguishing enough to act as the defendant’s

signature, appellate courts should take into account both the specific

characteristics of the offenses and the time interval between them. Thomas ,

126 S.W.3d at 144 .

2. Discussion

The

record reveals that the two robberies occurred within twenty-four hours of one

another and had the following similarities: (1) both robberies occurred in the

same part of Houston; (2) witnesses from both robberies identified appellant as

the perpetrator of those robberies; (3) in both robberies, appellant fled the

scene in a grey four-door Pontiac; (4) both robberies were of small

convenience-store type businesses; (5) both robberies occurred when the

cashiers were counting money from the register; and (6) in both robberies,

appellant used a gun by laying it on the counter facing the cashier while

demanding money.

As the robberies occurred within

twenty-four hours of each other, the extraneous offense is sufficiently close

in time to allow admission of the evidence as long as there are other

sufficient characteristics. See Page , 213 S.W.3d at 337−38

(holding that “the facts of the charged offense and the extraneous offenses

show a pattern of conduct sufficiently distinctive to constitute a ‘signature’”

when one incident occurred in spring 1997 and another incident occurred

September 1997, and other similarities existed between incidents); Thomas , 126 S.W.3d at 146 (holding time

period of eleven months between charged offense and extraneous offense was not

“so remote in time to be inadmissable” when there were sufficient common

distinguishing characteristics in charged offense and extraneous offense).

The geographical proximity of the two

offenses, both occurring in the same part of Houston, is likewise sufficiently

close as long as there are other common distinguishing characteristics. See

Chavez v. State , 794 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990,

pet. ref’d) (holding that evidence of extraneous offenses was admissible when

charged offense and extraneous offenses all occurred in Rosenberg, Texas, and

there were other distinguishing characteristics common to charged offense and

extraneous offenses).

Evidence that victims in both

robberies identified appellant as the perpetrator in the two robberies,

respectively, is also a factor that weighs in favor of admission of the

extraneous offense evidence. See id . (holding that identification of

appellant as attacker by complainant and two victims of sexual abuse was one

distinguishing characteristic that weighed in favor of admission of extraneous

offense evidence).

The use of the same or similar getaway

vehicles is also a factor that weighs in favor of admission of the extraneous

offense, as is the fact that both robberies were of small convenience-store

type businesses and occurred when the cashiers were counting money from the

register. Most telling, however, is the

use of the gun in both robberies.

Appellant did not flourish a pistol or hold it up in his hand and point

it at the cashier. Instead, in both

robberies appellant displayed a gun by laying it on the counter facing the

cashier while demanding money.

The dissimilarities between the two

robberies include differences in how appellant was dressed and whether he wore

a removable “grill”; the time of day of each robbery; different descriptions of

the gun used; minor discrepancies in the description of the car; and the fact

that appellant walked away from the first robbery with cash while he was

unsuccessful in the second robbery.

We conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the Family Dollar robbery

because it was sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be probative

evidence of appellant’s identity, apart from merely showing character

conformity. See Thomas , 126 S.W.3d at 144, 146 (holding that sufficient

similarity was established between charged offense and extraneous offense “by a

common mode of committing the offenses.” (citing Roberts v. State , 29 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2000, pet. ref’d); Lane , 933 S.W.2d

at 519 )). We hold that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant’s objection under Rule

404(b). See id .

We overrule appellant’s second issue

on this point.

B.

The “Narcotics Transaction”

Appellant

also claims that the trial court erred in permitting an officer to testify

about a “narcotics transaction” in which appellant was allegedly involved. This testimony occurred when counsel for

appellant was cross-examining Officer Nealy concerning the car appellant used

to get away after the robberies. Officer

Nealy testified that he discovered that the vehicle was owned by Kamesha

Waller. Appellant’s counsel inquired if

the police had done any investigation other than trying to call Waller. Officer Nealy said he had done so and further

commented as follows:

(Officer

Nealy): Also, when I continued to do my search on that vehicle, I saw an

offense report from the previous month where some patrol officers — actually

was during the hurricane, where some patrol officers got dispatched out to an

illegal narcotics transaction. The

defendant and another individual were arrested for possession of marijuana —

Mr. Martin:

Objection. Objection. This is —

The Court:

Excuse me. One at a time, please.

Mr. Martin:

First off, it is nonresponsive. I was

talking specifically about Ms. Waller.

Secondly, he is going far afield on anything regarding an extraneous

offense as identified by the State.

The Court:

Listen to the question you are asked, please.

Respond to the question that you were asked.

(Officer Nealy): I’m sorry,

counsel. You asked me did I do any type

of investigation on the license plate and I am just indicating that license

plate led me to another offense report that happened two weeks —

Mr. Martin:

Excuse me, sir. I don’t have a question.

The Court:

Sir. Stop.

Q. (by Mr.

Martin) I don’t have a question before you on that right now. My question to you is simple: The car came

back to somebody other than Mr. Crocket, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Thank you.

Mr. Martin:

Pass.

Appellant argues that this testimony

was hearsay, was not inadvertent and was harmful. According to appellant, “[t]he jurors were

left with the impression that Appellant was an all-round punk criminal.”

Appellant failed, however, to preserve

error on this point. Although he

objected, he failed to obtain a ruling on his objection. Nothing is preserved for our review. See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1( a); Wilson v. State , 71 S.W.3d 346, 349

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (to preserve error for appellate review, complaining

party must make specific objection and obtain ruling on objection).

We overrule appellant’s second issue

on this point.

State’s Closing Argument

In his third issue, appellant claims

that the State committed reversible error during closing argument. Specifically, appellant points to the

following statement as error: “When this happens again, and you know what? Next time he may not leave any witnesses. There may not be any witnesses . . . Next

time he might just shoot somebody.”

Counsel objected to this statement as “far outside the record as to

speculation as to any future crimes” and the trial court overruled this

objection.

A.

The Law

The four general areas for proper jury

argument are (1) summation of the evidence, (2) reasonable deduction from the

evidence, (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel, and (4) plea for law

enforcement. Wesbrook v. State , 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The prosecutor may draw all reasonable

inferences from the facts in evidence that are reasonable, fair, and

legitimate. Allridge v. State , 762 S.W.2d 146, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en

banc). Error exists when facts that are

not supported by the record are interjected in the argument, but such error is

not reversible unless, in light of the record as a whole, the argument is

extreme or manifestly improper. Id. at 155 ; Wright v. State , 178 S.W.3d 905, 929 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).

B.

Discussion

Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s

comments that, “[n]ext time he may not leave any witnesses. There may not be any witnesses . . . Next

time he might just shoot somebody” is outside the record and thus is improper

jury argument. In essence, appellant

complains that the prosecutor went beyond the evidence when he argued that the

next time appellant commits such a crime he might shoot and kill someone.

The prosecutor’s argument concerning

the likelihood of another robbery was supported by the evidence that appellant

committed two such robberies in 24 hours.

While the argument may have invited speculation about what might happen

in a future robbery, such speculation is not necessarily improper if the

argument is a reasonable deduction from the evidence. See

Gonzales v. State , 831 S.W.2d 491, 494

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d) (holding it was proper for

prosecutor to query what would have happened if defendant, who slashed

witness’s hand with knife, had been two steps closer to witness); Hudson v. State , 675 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1984) (holding it was permissible in criminal mischief case to ask

jury to speculate that defendant would have returned to house if police had not

arrived); Porter v. State , 601 S.W.2d

721, 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (holding it was proper for prosecutor to argue

that, “people can be killed in armed robberies” even though no one was killed

in offense). We conclude that, in light

of the two armed robberies appellant committed in two days, the prosecutor’s

comments were reasonable deductions from the evidence.

Furthermore, the prosecutor’s comments

were part of her plea for law enforcement.

Defense counsel asked for the minimum sentence of 15 years; the

prosecutor asked the jury to start its deliberation at 50 years. Her comment that, “next time, he might just

shoot somebody” is part of her argument asking the jury to assess a longer

sentence than it otherwise would have because appellant had committed the crime

at least once before and a long sentence was needed to protect society from appellant. See,

e.g., Miles v. State , 312 S.W.3d 909 , 911−12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (prosecutor’s statement that “when he gets out, based

on [past criminal history], he’s going to be right back in here somewhere” held

proper as plea for law enforcement); Pittman

v. State , 9 S.W.3d 432, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)

(finding, in DWI trial, prosecutor’s multiple statements that jury should

sentence defendant to 20 years because defendant would drive drunk again and kill

someone were proper pleas for law enforcement); Long v. State, 820 S.W.2d 888 , 894–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d) (prosecutor’s plea that jury incarcerate accused for

extended time to prevent appellant from doing same thing again was proper plea

for law enforcement).

We overrule appellant’s third issue.

Trial Court’s Refusal to Allow Bill of Exceptions

Regarding Potential Jury Misconduct

In

his fourth issue, appellant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to

allow appellant’s counsel to make a bill of exception regarding potential jury

misconduct. Counsel for appellant

informed the trial court that appellant’s mother told him that, while she was

in the hall restroom of the courthouse, she overheard Hillsman talking on her

cellphone about the case. Appellant’s

mother also reported that a couple of other women were in the bathroom at the

time, but that she did not pay any attention to who they might be. Appellant’s counsel asked the court to have

the jurors state on record whether they were in the ladies’ restroom at the

time and if they heard the conversation.

The judge refused. Instead, he instructed the bailiff to ask the

female jurors whether they had used the ladies’ restroom in the hall. The bailiff informed the judge that all the

female jurors denied being in the restroom.

Appellant’s counsel re-iterated his request that the court “make inquiry

of the individual female jurors to determine the veracity of the allegations of

improper conduct during the break.” The

court denied the motion. Appellant’s

counsel asked for a mistrial, which the court also denied.

Appellant has, however, waived this

complaint by failing to make a formal bill of exception. See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.2. This rule provides that “[t]o complain

on appeal about a matter that would not otherwise appear in the record, a party

must file a formal bill of exception.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.2. The trial judge must sign the bill and file

it with the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.2 ( c ). In

a criminal case, the bill must be filed not later than 60 or 90 days after the

trial court pronounces or suspends sentence in open court, depending on if a

timely motion for new trial has been filed.

Tex. R. App. P. 33.2

(e)(2)(A), (B). Appellant failed to file

a formal bill of exception and thus has failed to preserve this complaint for

review. See Bobbora v. Unitrin Ins. Servs , 255 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); Clifton v.

State , No. 05-09-00006-CR, 2009 WL 3401980 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009,

no pet.) (“Assuming without deciding, the trial court erred [in denying

appellant opportunity to make an offer of proof], the issue is not properly

preserved for appeal because [appellant] did not file a formal bill of

exception. As such, he is precluded from

complaining on appeal ‘about any matter that would not otherwise appear in the

record.’” (citing Tex. R. App. P. 33.2)) . [1]

Even had this issue been preserved,

however, appellant has not met his burden to show that the trial court’s

refusal to make a bill of exception constituted reversible error. A trial court’s improper refusal to prepare a

bill of exception does not constitute reversible error unless the refusal

denied appellant’s rights to the extent the error was reasonably calculated to

cause, and probably did cause, the trial court to render an improper judgment .

Houston Lighting & Power Co.

v. Russo Props. , Inc ., 710 S.W.2d

711, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (citing State v. Biggers , 360 S.W.2d 516, 517

(Tex. 1962)). Here, appellant has failed

to present any evidence that any juror was actually in the hall restroom at the

time the conversation took place.

Appellant could have presented such evidence in the form of juror

affidavits attached to a motion for new trial, but did not. See

Trout v. State , 702 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (“A motion for

new trial is the proper course to be taken in preserving alleged jury

misconduct error for appeal.”). Nor does

he allege that the error, if any, in refusing to allow him to make a bill of

exception was reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the trial

court to render an improper judgment.

Accordingly, for this reason as well, we conclude that the trial court

did not commit reversible error in refusing to allow counsel to make a bill of

exception.

We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

Conclusion

We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jim Sharp

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices

Sharp and Brown.

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2( b).

[1] Appellant

seeks to avert the force of this argument by his observation that, “as a

practical matter, in criminal cases, the trial records are rarely ready within

60 days.” We cannot, however, ignore the

plain language of a statute in favor of a general statement concerning the

“practicality” of its enforcement.

Instead, we must leave such matters to the legislature for amendment, if

necessary. See State v. Mancuso , 919 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en

banc) (“ It is the duty of the Legislature to make laws, and it is

the function of the Judiciary to interpret those laws.”).