Northwest Independent School District v. Carroll Independent School District

02-10-105-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00105-CV

Northwest Independent School District

APPELLANT

V.

Carroll IndEpendent School District

APPELLEE

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FROM THE 141st

District Court OF Tarrant COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM

OPINION [1]

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This

appeal arises from a dispute between Appellant Northwest Independent School District

(NWISD) and Carroll Independent School District (CISD) over their common

boundary line. NWISD filed this interlocutory appeal arguing that the trial

court did not have jurisdiction over CISD’s claims. Because we agree that the

trial court did not have jurisdiction over CISD’s claims, we reverse the trial

court’s denial of NWISD’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss CISD’s claims.

Background

In

1948, voters in the Haslet Common School District No. 97 (situated partly in

Tarrant County and partly in Denton County), Rhome Independent School District

(in Wise County), Roanoke Independent School District (situated partly in

Tarrant County and partly in Denton County), and Justin Rural High School

District (in Denton County) petitioned for an election to consolidate those

districts into one independent school district—NWISD. A majority of qualified

voters in those districts voted in favor of consolidation. The minutes of the

Tarrant County commissioners court reflect an order by the county judge in

accordance with the election, declaring the results of the election and declaring

that the districts be consolidated as NWISD.

The

minutes of the commissioners court for Denton County likewise reflect a

petition by qualified voters of Roanoke Independent School District and of

Justin Rural School District to hold an election for the consolidation. In

accordance with that petition, the commissioners court gave notice of elections

to be held in December 1948 within those districts. The notice stated that

Roanoke ISD was partially in Tarrant County and partially in Denton County. After

the election, the commissioners court entered an order declaring the results of

the election and declaring the districts to be consolidated.

The

order of consolidation, which provides the metes and bounds for the new

district, described part of the boundary as “East to the Northeast corner of

the said R. A. Smith survey; THENCE South to the County Line between Denton

and Tarrant Counties ; THENCE West along said County line to a point

in said line due North of the Northwest corner of the M. Hunt survey in Tarrant

County.” [Emphasis added.] The description concluded by referring to the new

district as

containing a total of 126,062 acres of land more or less,

calculated to be 197 square miles, being a consolidation of all the lands

comprising the school districts known prior to this consolidation as the

Justin Rural High School District in Denton County, [t]he Roanoke Independent

School District in Denton and Tarrant Counties, the Haslet Common School

District in Denton and Tarrant Counties, and the Rhome Independent School

District in Wise County. [Emphasis added.]

Then,

in 1949, qualified voters from the newly-consolidated NWISD “of Denton, Wise[,]

and Tarrant Counties” petitioned for an election to consolidate the district

with Fairview Common School District No. 39 of Wise County. In accordance with

the election results, the commissioners court for Denton County entered an

order declaring the districts to be consolidated. This order described the new

boundaries of the district by metes and bounds. The description included the

same reference to the Denton-Tarrant county line set out above. As with the

description given when the district was first created by consolidation, the

order stated after the metes and bounds description that the consolidated NWISD

is “a consolidation of all the lands comprising the school districts”

that were being consolidated. [Emphasis added.]

The

Wise County commissioners court likewise entered an order of consolidation in

accordance with the consolidation election held in the Fairview district.

In

1959, qualified voters of Carroll Common School District No. 99 voted to become

CISD. In accordance with the election, the county judge ordered the district

incorporated as CISD and entered the order in the minutes of the commissioners

court for Tarrant County. The district boundaries were described by metes and

bounds, “[b]eginning in the North line of Tarrant County at a point directly

north of the most northerly, northwest corner of the John L. Whitman Survey,”

and closing “[n]orth to a point in the North line of Tarrant County ,

Texas; THENCE east in the said Tarrant County North line to the place of

Beginning.” [Emphasis added.]

In

2002, this court decided Tarrant County v. Denton County , in which we

stated that the boundary between those two counties was not definite and

well-defined, and we noted that the counties had entered into an agreement providing

that they had a bona fide dispute over the location of their boundaries. [2]

This court then held that the agreement between the counties to survey the

county line and set the boundary in accordance with that survey was

enforceable. [3] As

a result of this decision, the boundary line between Tarrant County and Denton

County was set at a location north of where the two school districts had previously

considered their common boundary to be (the agreed county line).

On

March 1, 2005, CISD filed suit against NWISD for trespass to try title, seeking

to have the common boundary line established at the agreed county line, which

would shift to CISD some property and students that have until now been in NWISD.

CISD also sought a declaratory judgment regarding its rights and duties in the

disputed area.

NWISD

filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. [4]

This court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the cause back to the

trial court. [5] On

remand, CISD amended its pleadings, seeking a declaratory judgment that the

districts’ common boundary line is located on the agreed county line and

asserting alternatively a claim for trespass to try title under section 22.001

of the property code.

NWISD

filed another plea to the jurisdiction, and both parties filed for summary

judgment and attached evidence in support. NWISD reasserted some of the same

grounds it had asserted in its previous plea to the jurisdiction and additionally

argued that CISD’s claims were an impermissible attack on the 1948 and 1949

elections creating NWISD. CISD responded in part that it was not challenging

the elections or the commissioners court orders resulting from those elections

and was in fact relying on them.

The

trial court entered an order denying NWISD’s plea to the jurisdiction, granting

summary judgment for NWISD on CISD’s claim for trespass to try title, denying

the remainder of NWISD’s summary judgment motion, and denying CISD’s summary

judgment motion. NWISD then filed this appeal.

Standard

of Review

We

review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. [6]

A plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrate

that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. [7]

A plaintiff asserting a claim against a governmental unit must allege facts

that affirmatively demonstrate that the Legislature has waived immunity for the

claims brought. [8]

In

determining a plea to the jurisdiction that challenges the pleadings, a court looks

at the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings and accepts them as true. [9]

If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a

plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an

opportunity to amend. [10]

If

the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts,

a court must consider the relevant evidence necessary to resolve the

jurisdictional issues raised. [11] When a jurisdictional

challenge also implicates the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, then the trial

court considers the evidence submitted by the parties to determine if a fact

question exists. [12]

Declaratory

Judgments and Governmental Immunity

The

Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA) generally permits a person “whose rights,

status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute [or] municipal

ordinance” to have determined any question of construction or validity arising

under the statute or ordinance “and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or

other legal relations thereunder.” [13] But there is no general

right to sue a governmental entity, such as a school district, [14]

for a declaration of rights. [15] The DJA is not a

general waiver of immunity; the DJA is “merely a procedural device for deciding

cases already within a court’s jurisdiction.” [16] Thus, governmental

immunity will bar a declaratory judgment action if the action has the “effect

of establishing a right to relief against the State for which the Legislature

has not waived . . . immunity.” [17]

Analysis

We

begin by addressing CISD’s assertion that some of NWISD’s arguments are

governed by the law of the case doctrine. The application of that doctrine by

a court of appeals lies within the discretion of that court, depending on the

particular circumstances of the case, and “[o]ur duty to administer justice

under the law, as we conceive it, outweighs our duty to be consistent. [18] Thus, if we

determined that our prior decision was erroneous, we would not be bound by it. [19] In this appeal,

however, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable. Not only did the

parties amend their pleadings on remand and file additional evidence with the

trial court, but the issue on which we decide this appeal is one that was not

raised in the prior appeal. [20]

NWISD

brings three issues on appeal, all asserting that the trial court did not have

jurisdiction over CISD’s claims. In its third issue, it argues that the trial

court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate CISD’s claims because CISD’s lawsuit is

an untimely contest to the election creating NWISD and its boundaries. It contends

that CISD’s claims “lodge an election contest by challenging the results of the

election creating NWISD and setting its then-existing southern boundary” and

that CISD “seeks to avoid the results of the 1948 and 1949 elections.”

A

trial court has jurisdiction over an election contest only to the extent

authorized by statute. [21] If CISD challenges the

boundaries set by the election, then it challenges the results of the election,

and that challenge can only be made in an election contest. [22]

Accordingly, if CISD’s suit challenges the results of the election, the suit would

constitute an improper collateral attack on the election, and, in that case, the

trial court erred by denying NWISD’s plea to the jurisdiction.

CISD

responds that rather than challenging the elections, it is relying on them,

because the elections and the orders declaring the election results established

the districts’ boundary at the “county line,” and CISD is merely seeking a

declaration about the location of that line. CISD contends that the argument

that it is trying to move the boundary line is contradicted by the statement in

Tarrant County that the county line had never been located. [23]

That is, a line that does not exist cannot be moved.

CISD

is essentially asserting that the districts’ common boundary line has always

been in dispute, that the school districts have never treated the boundary as

established, and that the trial court’s judgment is needed to settle the

question. CISD is only relying on the election if the result of the election

was the establishment of a school district either with no boundary or with a

boundary that moves according to wherever the county line may be located at any

point in time. That is, CISD apparently reads the language establishing the

district as setting the boundary line as “wherever the county line may be

located, now or at any time in the future.” CISD is correct that this court

held in Tarrant County that the boundary between the two counties was not

definite and well-defined, but that does not necessarily mean that the location

of the county line was not definite for school district purposes. That is, a

later dispute between counties over the location of their boundary

cannot change the boundary of two school districts already in existence.

We

agree with NWISD that CISD is in fact attempting to move the districts’

boundary line because that location was established when NWISD was created by

consolidation. NWISD was created by consolidation of districts that were

already in existence. As noted in the description of the new district created

by consolidation, the new district consisted of all of the lands comprising the

school districts being consolidated. Though such language is not controlling

if the land included in the consolidation can be ascertained by the metes and

bounds provided, this language is evidence that all of the territory of the consolidated

school districts was included in the consolidation. [24]

No allegation has been made that the boundary lines of these consolidated

districts was ever unclear. [25] The districts that

already existed had boundary lines—the location of which CISD does not

challenge. The territory that had been included in those districts became a

part of the new, consolidated NWISD. The voters seeking to establish the new

district clearly intended to and did incorporate the territory that had been in

the consolidated school districts, no more and no less. Those districts had

actual, existing boundaries; the descriptions of the districts referred to an

actual, physical location when they referenced the county line; and the

elections and orders creating NWISD established that location as the actual,

physical boundary.

The

parties have not directed us to any evidence in the record of when the component

school districts of NWISD were created, and we have found none. But we note

that from 1911 until 1917, when creating common school districts containing

territory within more than one county, the commissioners courts of each county (and

from 1917 until at least 1923, the boards of county school trustees) were

required to pass an order describing the district’s territory by metes and

bounds, “giving the course and direction with the exact length of each line

contained in such description and locating each corner called for upon the

ground,” as well as stating “the acres of each survey and parts of surveys of

lands contained in such district, together with a map showing the conditions

upon the ground as described in the field notes” and “giving the number of

acres of land contained in each survey and parts of survey contained in each

county,” and, importantly, “showing the exact position and location of the

county line in the territory created.” [26] The Haslet Common

School District included territory in both Denton and Tarrant County. If that

district were created while that statute was in effect, when the commissioners

or trustees of those two counties passed the orders creating this district,

they were required to give a metes and bounds description, provide a map, and

show the exact position of the county line. [27]

Furthermore,

in 1911, the Legislature provided for the creation of independent school

districts that included territory in more than one county—such as Roanoke

ISD—and provided that in the creation of such a district, a map had to be

provided that showed the correct location and position of the county line. [28]

Thus, presuming that the orders complied with the statutory requirements, [29]

the location indicated by reference to the county line is ascertainable and

therefore certain.

CISD

contends that it is not attempting to detach or annex NWISD property (a

proposition we agreed with under the pleadings and the evidence in the previous

interlocutory appeal). [30] We agree that CISD does

not expressly seek to detach or annex NWISD property—any suit of that

nature would require it to recognize that the property it now claims is

currently a part of NWISD and to follow the statutory provisions set out for

detaching or annexing school district property. [31] CISD therefore argues instead

that the true boundary line exists in a place that the voters and commissioners

creating NWISD did not and could not have ever intended the boundary line to

be, for the simple reason that the line had not been surveyed and therefore did

not exist at the time of NWISD’s creation. Wherever the counties might have

believed the county line to be at the time that the school districts were

created, neither Tarrant County nor Denton County could have believed that

their common boundary was at the agreed county line when that line had not been

established by any survey at that time. Further, we note that the

commissioners courts of both Tarrant County and Denton County entered orders

establishing this district with the boundary line complained of by CISD, which

appears to contradict any argument that the counties disputed at the time of

NWISD’s establishment where this part of the county line was, or at least is

evidence that they were in agreement about this part of the line.

NWISD

asserted in its plea to the jurisdiction that the two school districts have

always recognized a boundary line and that the territory CISD wishes to now

include within its boundaries has been considered to be a part of NWISD since

that district’s creation. NWISD asserted that it has taxed the property within

that territory and educated the students within it. CISD has acknowledged that

this assertion is true. Thus, CISD’s argument that it does not attempt to

detach territory from NWISD is essentially semantics. That is, however we

categorize the CISD cause of action or the relief it has requested, the effect

would the same: school children that until now were educated by NWISD, and

property that until now was taxed by NWISD, would now be within CISD’s

territory. [32]

This

court has not been asked to hold that the districts are prohibited from taking

any action that may be provided by law to clarify their boundary if the two

districts have a bona fide boundary dispute, and nothing in this opinion should

be construed as reaching such a holding. We hold only that CISD may not argue

that the 1948 and 1949 elections set the boundary line at the agreed county

line because that line did not exist until it was surveyed and created in

accordance with a 1986 agreement between the counties. [33]

The school district elections set the boundary at an actual, physical point.

CISD may not seek to have that existing point (wherever it may be) abandoned,

and a new boundary set in its place, all based on a subsequent judgment

involving the boundaries of two completely separate entities.

Though

not determinative of the issue, we note that any attempt to create a school

district with a floating, movable boundary line would conflict with the Legislature’s

apparent establishment of a public policy of providing notice to and requiring consent

by district residents to changes to a school district boundary. This policy is

evidenced by statutory requirements that no territory be moved from one

district to another without proper notice and consent of a majority of

qualified voters in the territory unless no children in the transferred

territory are enrolled in the district from which the territory will be

transferred. [34] In other words, the

public policy of this state is that the right of parents to have their children

educated in a particular school district shall not be abrogated by the action

of the school districts acting alone without notice and consent of the voters. [35]

In

summary, we agree with NWISD that CISD is challenging the results of the elections

and is therefore making an impermissible collateral attack on those elections.

Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over CISD’s claims, and we

sustain NWISD’s third issue. Having sustained NWISD’s third issue, we do not

address NWISD’s remaining issues, all of which argue that the trial court did

not have jurisdiction. [36]

In

its sixth attempt at pleading, CISD sought to have the trial court to declare

the school district boundary line to be the agreed county line, and

alternatively sought to establish title to the area in question, and, for the

reasons discussed above, this court has held that the trial court had no

jurisdiction over these claims or to grant such relief. Because CISD cannot

amend its petition so as to give the trial court jurisdiction over these claims,

it is unnecessary for this court to remand the cause to the trial court for another

opportunity for CISD to amend its pleadings. [37]

Conclusion

Having

sustained NWISD’s third issue, we reverse the trial court’s order denying NWISD’s

plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing CISD’s claims.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL:

LIVINGSTON,

C.J.; DAUPHINOT and MCCOY, JJ.

DELIVERED: February 16,

2012

[1] See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

[2] Tarrant

Cnty. v. Denton Cnty. , 87 S.W.3d 159, 173 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet.

denied), disapproved of on other grounds by Martin v. Amerman , 133

S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. 2004).

[3] Id.

at 175.

[4] Carroll

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 245 S.W.3d 620 , 623 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) ( CISD I ).

[5] Id.

at 626.

[6] Pakdimounivong v. City of Arlington ,

219 S.W.3d 401, 407 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).

[7] City of Fort Worth v. Robinson , 300

S.W.3d 892, 895 (Tex. App. — Fort

Worth 2009, no pet.).

[8] City of Arlington v. Randall , 301

S.W.3d 896, 906 (Tex. App. — Fort

Worth 2009, pet. denie d).

[9] Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Pakdimounivong , 219

S.W.3d at 407 .

[10] State

v. Lueck , 290 S.W.3d 876 , 884–85 (Tex. 2009); Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at

227 .

[11] Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 227 .

[12] Id.

[13] Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a) (West 2008).

[14] See

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. McKinney , 936 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. 1996)

(noting that the Legislature has defined school districts as political subdivisions

of the State for purposes of sovereign immunity).

[15] See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t

v. Sawyer Trust , 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011)

(agreeing that “there is no general right to sue a state agency for a

declaration of rights”).

[16] Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993).

[17] Sawyer Trust , 354 S.W.3d at 388 .

[18] Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp. , 102 S.W.3d

714 , 71 7 (Tex. 2003).

[19] See id. at 716.

[20] See Hudson v. Wakefield , 711 S.W.2d

628, 630 (Tex. 1986) (stating that the doctrine applies only to questions of

law, not to questions of fact, and that “the doctrine

does not necessarily apply when either the issues or the facts presented at

successive appeals are not substantially the same as those involved on the

first trial” and thus, “when in the second trial or proceeding, one or both of

the parties amend their pleadings, it may be that the issues or facts have

sufficiently changed so that the law of the case no longer applies”).

[21] Nichols v. Seei , 97 S.W.3d 882, 883

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); State ex rel. Kimmons v. City of Azle ,

588 S.W.2d 666, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

[22] See Clary v. Hurst , 104 Tex. 423, 431 ,

138 S.W. 566, 571 (1911) (referring to an election contest as a suit challenging

the validity of the election or the correct ascertainment of the result

thereof); Kincannon v. Mills , 275 S.W. 1083, 1084 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco

1925, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“An election contest may be . . . for the purpose of having the result declared differently from what

it has been declared by the proper authorities.”); see also Nichols ,

97 S.W.3d at 883 (noting that the power of a trial court to hear election

contests exists only to the extent authorized by statute); State v. City

Comm’n of San Angelo , 101 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1937, no

writ) (noting that matters that are properly raised in an election contest

cannot be raised in collateral proceedings).

[23] See

Tarrant Cnty. , 87 S.W.3d at 173 (noting that Denton County and Tarrant

County had a bona fide dispute over their common boundary and that the boundary

was not definite and well-defined).

[24] See

Baleja v. Henderson , 241 S.W. 1080, 1082 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1922,

writ dism’d w.o.j.) (stating that, with respect to sales of land, “[i]t is the rule

in descriptions of land, after giving metes and bounds, to state the number of

acres,” that “unless there is an express covenant that the land conveyed

contains the number of acres mentioned, the mention of the number of acres will

be taken to be merely a part of the description of the land when the amount of

the land can be ascertained by monuments and boundaries,” and that “[t]he

language of the contract of sale must show that it was intended to convey a

specified number of acres, or the mention of the number of acres will be merely

a matter of description”).

[25] See,

e.g., Dist. Trs. of Midway Common Sch. Dist. No. 7 & Leon Cnty. v. Leon Cnty.

Sch. Trs. , 203 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1947, no writ) (holding

that order consolidating two contiguous common school districts was not void

for failure to describe the district by metes and bounds because, there being

no evidence to the contrary, the boundaries of the two districts were presumed

to be described and recorded in the county clerk’s office and, citing the maxim

“[t]hat is certain which is susceptible of being made certain,” holding that

because the metes and bounds of the newly created high school district could be

ascertained by reference to the records in the county clerk’s office, the location

of the boundaries of the two common school districts were presumed to be of

record).

[26] Drake

v. Yawn , 248 S.W. 726, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1923, writ ref’d)

(emphasis added).

[27] See

also Act of Mar. 30, 1927, 40th Leg., R.S., ch 238, § 1, 1927 Tex. Gen.

Laws 353 , 353 (allowing common school districts to become independent school

districts and providing that a petition to become an independent school

district must contain a definite description by metes and bounds of the

district); Act of Apr. 15, 1905, 29th Leg., R.S., ch. 124, § 53, 1905 Tex. Gen.

Laws 263 , 277 (providing that when creating common school districts, the

commissioners court shall give the metes and bounds of each district “and shall

designate the same carefully by giving the whole surveys and parts of surveys

with acreage of whole surveys and approximate acreage of parts of surveys” and

that the county clerk must record the description), § 55, 1905 Tex. Gen. Laws

at 277–78 (allowing for the creation of county line districts).

[28] Act of

Mar. 23, 1911, 32nd Leg., R.S., ch. 100, § 4, 1911 Tex. Gen. Laws 200 , 202

(allowing the creation of independent school districts that include territory

in more than one county and requiring a map that shows the correct location and

position of the county line involved).

[29] See

Leon Cnty. Sch. Trs. , 203 S.W.2d at 863 .

[30] CISD

I , 245 S.W.3d at 624–25 (considering CISD’s pleadings “and the relevant

jurisdictional evidence submitted by both parties” and holding that CISD did

not seek to detach and annex the disputed area from NWISD, “but seeks only a

judicial determination regarding in which of these districts the [d]isputed [a]rea

is, and always has been, located”).

[31] See,

e.g. , Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 13.051 (West 2006).

[32] See

State ex rel. Beckville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatum Indep. Sch. Dist. , 283

S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that a

specific road had been recognized as the dividing line between two school

districts, taxes had been assessed and paid based on that line, and scholastic

census and school buses operated on that basis, and holding that while the

recognition alone would not be sufficient to establish that road as the

dividing line, it was “certainly a strong circumstance” showing that the road

was the location of the dividing line); see also Mullaly v. Noyes , 26

S.W. 145 , 145–46 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1894, writ ref’d) (holding that,

with respect to property conveyed, the fact that a line had been acquiesced in

for a long time as the true boundary line, “it affords strong evidence that it

was the true line”); Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. of Val Verde Cnty. v. Aldrete ,

398 S.W.2d 597 , 600–01 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1965, writ dism’d) (holding in a

contest of an election consolidating two school districts that, in establishing

who may vote within a district, “where the location of a boundary line is not

certain, the residence of the voters should be determined in accordance with

the recognized line,” and that the boundary line that should have been applied

to the election contest was the line that had been recognized by custom and

usage “and according to which taxes were assessed and paid, the residence of

scholastics established and tuition paid, rather than a new boundary line

located by a survey made subsequent to the election, which had never before

been used and recognized by the school authorities”).

[33] Tarrant

Cnty. , 87 S.W.3d at 166 .

[34] See

Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 13.051 (allowing detachment of territory from one

school district and annexation of that territory to another upon petition by a

majority of qualified residents of the territory, notice provided by the board

of trustees, and a public hearing), 13.153 (providing that notice must be given

of any election to consolidate districts), 13.154 (providing that districts

shall be consolidated if a majority in each district vote in favor), 13.231

(allowing two contiguous school districts to adjust their common boundary by

agreement if no child residing in the transferred territory is enrolled in a

school of the district from which the territory is transferred); see also

Sch. Bd. of City of Marshall v. State by Criminal Dist. Atty. ex rel.

Warbritton , 162 Tex. 9, 11 , 343 S.W.2d 247, 249 (1961) (noting that the

determination of political questions such as the relocation of school district

boundaries is to be made by the Legislature “or in such manner as it directs”).

[35] See,

e.g. , Gabbart v. Johnson , 55 Tex. Civ. App. 181, 183 , 118 S.W. 883,

884 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1909, no writ) (discussing law providing for

method of changing school district boundaries after the districts had been

formed and stating that “[t]he evident purpose of the Legislature was to

prevent disturbance of existing conditions when once lawfully brought about”).

[36] See

Tex. R. App. P. 47.4; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

[37] See

Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 227 (stating that if the pleadings affirmatively

negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be

granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend).