“[T]he 23 decision in Brown v. Plata, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946–47, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he 23 decision in Brown v. Plata, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946–47, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011
- “[T]he 15 decision in Brown v. Plata, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946–47, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 20 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAYMOND EUGENE PEYTON, No. 13-56405
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:13-cv-00424-RGK-JPR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., individual and
official capacity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 13, 2014**
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Raymond Eugene Peyton appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth
Amendment claims related to prison overcrowding. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.
2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,
1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm
in part, vacate in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Peyton’s claims against defendant
Schwartz for sentencing Peyton to an overcrowded California state prison because
Schwartz is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for judicial actions taken in an
official capacity. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en
banc). While such immunity does not extend to actions for prospective injunctive
relief, Peyton’s claim is barred because the relief he seeks—release from an
unauthorized sentence—is not available under § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 486-87, 489 (1994) (precluding § 1983 claims which, if successful,
“would necessarily imply the invalidity” of an inmate’s conviction or sentence).
The district court properly dismissed Peyton’s claims against defendants
Brown and Beard because Peyton failed to allege facts demonstrating that they
personally participated in, directed, or knowingly failed to prevent the alleged
deprivations at issue. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth requirements for establishing supervisory liability under § 1983);
Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (liberal
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interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of a claim
that were not pled). Moreover, the decision in Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910,
1946-47 (2011), requiring the State of California to reduce prison overcrowding to
improve mental health and medical services to inmates, does not give Peyton
cognizable claims for immediate or temporary supervised release merely because
he also alleges deprivations arising from prison overcrowding. Cf., e.g., Pride v.
Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2013) (state may invoke Plata to
preclude duplicative actions for systemic relief, but inmates seeking individual
medical care must proceed as usual under § 1983); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (when a state prisoner seeks immediate or speedier
release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus).
However, the district court should have provided Peyton another opportunity
to amend his claims regarding the allegedly inhumane conditions of his
confinement. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a
pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an
opportunity to amend.”). Accordingly, we vacate dismissal without leave to amend
of these claims solely to allow Peyton to allege facts in support of his claims and
name the correct defendants who participated in or failed to prevent the alleged
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constitutional violations at issue.
Peyton’s request for judicial notice, filed on February 26, 2014, is denied.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
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