Rhoades v. Paskett

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL EZRA RHOADES, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. No. 07-35808

JEFF HENRY, of the Idaho State  D.C. No.

CV-97-00170-S-EJL

Prison;* LAWRENCE WASDEN,

Attorney General of the State of OPINION

Idaho,**

Respondents-Appellees.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 3, 2010—Seattle, Washington

Filed March 8, 2010

Before: Pamela Ann Rymer, Ronald M. Gould and

Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Rymer

*Jeff Henry is substituted for his predecessor, Dave Paskett, of the

Idaho State Prison. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

**Lawrence Wasden is substituted for his predecessor, Alan Lance,

Attorney General of the State of Idaho. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

3595

RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon) 3599

COUNSEL

Oliver W. Loewy, Federal Defender Services of Idaho, Mos-

cow, Idaho, for the petitioner-appellant.

L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, Idaho,

for the respondent-appellees.

OPINION

RYMER, Circuit Judge:

Paul Ezra Rhoades appeals the district court’s denial of his

petition for writ of habeas corpus. He was convicted follow-

ing entry of a conditional Alford plea1 for the 1987 second-

degree murder and robbery of Nolan Haddon.2 He received

two indeterminate life sentences. The Idaho Supreme Court

1

Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (recognizing that a plea

may be accepted for which there is a factual basis even though the defen-

dant asserts his innocence).

2

Rhoades was separately convicted for the shooting deaths of Stacy Bal-

dwin and Susan Michelbacher, both of whom were killed with the same

gun that killed Haddon during the same three-week period in February and

March of 1987. Rhoades was sentenced to death both for killing and for

kidnapping Baldwin, see State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), 820 P.2d 665 (Idaho

1991), and Michelbacher, see State v. Rhoades (Michelbacher), 822 P.2d

960 (Idaho 1991). Appeals from denial of federal habeas relief in both

cases are also before us; we resolve them in separate opinions. Rhoades

v. Henry (Baldwin), No. 07-99022, slip op. (9th Cir. March 8, 2010);

Rhoades v. Henry (Michelbacher), No. 07-99023, slip op. (9th Cir. March

8, 2010).

3600 RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon)

upheld his conviction, sentence, and denial of post-conviction

relief. See State v. Rhoades (Haddon), 809 P.2d 455 (Idaho

1991). We affirm the district court’s judgment.

I

Nolan Haddon worked the night shift at Buck’s conve-

nience store in Idaho Falls, Idaho on March 16, 1987. The

next morning, Buck’s owner found Haddon lying on the floor

in a pool of blood. He had been shot five times. He was still

alive at the time, but unconscious. He died at the hospital. An

inventory of the store showed that some BIC lighters, Marl-

boro cigarettes, and $116 in cash were missing.

The police suspected Rhoades of a string of burglaries,

including one at Lavaunda’s Lingerie, and obtained a warrant

to arrest Rhoades for that burglary on March 23, 1987. They

learned that he was in Nevada when, on March 24, a Nevada

state trooper responded to an accident involving a green Ford

that was reported stolen by Rhoades’s mother, Pauline

Rhoades. The next evening, two Nevada law enforcement

officers arrested Rhoades inside a Wells Casino. They hand-

cuffed him, placed him across the trunk of the police car, and

advised him of his Miranda rights.3

Idaho officials were contacted and went to the Casino. As

the Idaho team approached, Rhoades stated “I did it” without

being questioned by anyone. Officer Victor Rodriguez, from

Idaho, again advised Rhoades of his Miranda rights. Rhoades

was asked if he understood those rights, and said something

to the effect of “I do, yes.” Detective Dennis Shaw, also from

Idaho, searched Rhoades, and found two packages of Marl-

boro cigarettes and five BIC lighters similar to those taken

from the store. Shaw also found a ten dollar bill, a one dollar

3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that the police

inform a person that he has a right to remain silent and the right to an

attorney before custodial interrogation).

RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon) 3601

bill, and a one-hundred dollar bill. He told Rhoades he had

found three dollars, to which Rhoades responded: “It better be

$111.” Rhoades was then taken to the Wells Highway Patrol

substation for booking.

At the station, Shaw remarked that he wished he had

arrested Rhoades on an earlier occasion, and that he would

probably have saved the last victim’s life. Rhoades raised his

head and said, “I did it.”

II

The state filed an amended complaint charging Rhoades

with Haddon’s first degree murder and the robbery at Buck’s

convenience store.4 Rhoades filed a motion to suppress all

statements he made while in custody. Evidence was taken at

the preliminary hearing, and the trial court conducted an evi-

dentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. The court found

that Rhoades’s first “I did it” statement at the arrest scene was

admissible because the statement was spontaneous. It found

that Shaw’s remark at the station was the functional equiva-

lent of interrogation, but that Rhoades had been advised of his

Miranda rights and had not invoked them. The court also

found that Rhoades’s second “I did it” statement at the station

was voluntary because he appeared to understand and com-

prehend the situation.

Rhoades later filed another motion to exclude the “I did it”

statements based on the officers’ failure to tape record them,

failure to record the statements in their police reports in a

timely fashion, and failure of some of the officers present to

hear the statements. Additionally, he argued that the state-

ments were unreliable. The court declined to exclude either

statement, noting that it had the benefit of testimony from the

Michelbacher portion of the case. It found that the first state-

4

The Haddon and Michelbacher murders were originally charged

together, but the court severed them for trial.

3602 RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon)

ment was a spontaneous declaration and the second resulted

from a casual comment; failure to record the statement, it

held, went to weight rather than admissibility.

The state and Rhoades worked out a written plea agreement

by which Rhoades would enter an Alford plea to second

degree murder and robbery; he maintained his innocence but

conceded that a conviction may be had on the charge of first

degree murder; and he preserved the right to appeal denial of

his motions. Pursuant to the plea, Rhoades was sentenced to

indeterminate life for second degree murder and indetermi-

nate life for robbery, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the

Idaho Supreme Court held that the first “I did it” statement

was admissible as a spontaneous statement whether it

occurred before or after Rhoades was read his Miranda rights.

809 P.2d at 462. The Supreme Court also concluded that the

second statement at the station was admissible. Although

there was evidence that Rhoades was heavily influenced by

narcotics at the time of his arrest, the court observed that

Shaw testified he engaged Rhoades in conversation to test his

alertness and found that Rhoades had sufficient capacity to

understand what was going on around him. Id. at 463. The

supreme court determined that Rhoades had been instructed

upon and understood his rights, and there was insufficient evi-

dence that he asserted his right to remain silent. Id. at 462-63.

Rhoades filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

federal district court on April 23, 1997. Therefore, it is subject

to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) which became effective April 24, 1996.5

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 21 (2002) (per curiam).

5

Under AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the

state court’s decision “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)-(2); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003).

RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon) 3603

After other claims were dismissed on procedural grounds, the

state moved for summary judgment on Rhoades’s claims that

the “I did it” statements were obtained in violation of

Miranda, and that the trial judge was biased. In response,

Rhoades sought to file Shaw’s deposition testimony (taken in

federal proceedings in the Baldwin case) and his police report,

or to expand the record with excerpts which would have

shown that en route from the casino to the station, Shaw and

Rhoades engaged in a conversation during which Rhoades

said “I don’t want to talk about it.” The district court granted

summary judgment for the state and denied Rhoades’s motion

to expand the record. However, it made alternative findings

that Rhoades’s statement en route was not an unequivocal

invocation of the right to stop all discussion, and that he

impliedly waived his rights by choosing to reply to Shaw’s

comment. Finally, the court found that Rhoades presented no

evidence to show the sentencing judge was biased. It denied

the petition, as well as Rhoades’s motion to alter and amend

the judgment.

Rhoades has timely appealed the issue on which the district

court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) — his claim

that the “I did it” statements were obtained in violation of his

Miranda rights, together with the denial of his motion to

expand the record — and argues three others in his opening

brief for which he did not receive a COA.6

6

Circuit Rule 22-1(e) requires petitioners to brief certified and uncerti-

fied issues separately, under headings that distinguish them. Rhoades has

not done this. We may decline on this account to address his uncertified

issues. Advisory Note, Circuit Rule 22-1. As it happens in this case, there

is only one certified issue which means that the uncertified issues stand

out rather clearly. This time we will not dismiss them. Accordingly, we

will consider whether the issues raised are fairly debatable among reason-

able jurists such that a COA should issue. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000).

3604 RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon)

III

Rhoades maintains that the district court erred in denying

for lack of diligence leave to supplement the record with facts

showing that the police continued custodial interrogation after

he invoked his right to silence en route from the casino to the

station. He claims that this was through no fault of his own,

as he first learned of a statement that he made to Shaw when

Shaw’s deposition was taken in 1996 in the federal habeas

proceedings in the Baldwin case. During the deposition Shaw

produced a report he had written sometime after the arrest, in

which he relates:

On the way to the police station I continued to talk

with [Rhoades]. He was very uncomfortable as he

was so large and the car did not give him much

room. I told him I was disappointed in him and he

had lied to me about the burglary. I had tried to

believe him and give him a chance but he had lied

and conned me. I said we need to talk about it now

so that you can get it off your chest. He said, “Aw

bullshit, I don’t want to talk about it.[ ] Get these

fuckin cuffs off me.”

At his deposition, Shaw explained that he was talking about

the Lavaunda’s Lingerie burglary in the car because he

wanted to start chronologically and that’s where his warrant

was. He assumed that when Rhoades said he didn’t want to

talk about it, it was because he was cramped. Once inside the

station, Shaw removed the handcuffs and proceeded to talk.

Rhoades’s counsel were also deposed during the federal

proceeding. Stephen Hart was the primary attorney on discov-

ery and suppression issues. At one point Hart said that he

couldn’t recall reading Shaw’s police report, but he also could

not say it wasn’t provided to him; at another point, he said “I

don’t have a specific recollection as to when I saw this

report.” John Radin, another of Rhoades’s attorneys, testified

RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon) 3605

that he had seen Shaw’s report pretrial. Both Hart and Radin

stated in subsequently filed affidavits that the failure to offer

the “I don’t want to talk about it” statement was most likely

the result of voluminous reports and contrary representations

by Shaw and Rodriguez.

The district court denied Rhoades’s motion to expand the

record because it found a lack of diligence in developing the

factual basis in state court. It noted that Rhoades was pro-

vided a hearing on his motion to suppress before the Michelb-

acher trial during which counsel examined and cross-

examined the police officers, and that he pursued post-

conviction relief in both the Michelbacher and Baldwin mat-

ters. Also, the court concluded that the state courts reasonably

found that Rhoades was aware of the factual circumstances of

his own arrest. Further, the district court found that Rhoades

failed to show that counsel lacked access to the Shaw infor-

mation before the Michelbacher trial. Although it found that

Rhoades did not pursue opportunities to present additional

facts in support of his claim in state court, the court went on

to find that even if the record were expanded, the “I don’t

want to talk about it” statement was an ambiguous or equivo-

cal reference to Rhoades’s right to silence with respect to

questioning about the unrelated Lavaunda’s Lingerie bur-

glary. Thus, Rhoades’s “I don’t want to talk about it” state-

ment did not pertain to the murders, so even if he asserted his

right to silence with respect to interrogation about the bur-

glary of Lavaunda’s Lingerie, it would not affect the validity

of his waiver in relation to the “I did it” statement in response

to Shaw’s comment about the murders.

Rhoades maintains that his counsel did not have the infor-

mation all along, as the district court thought, rather, the pros-

ecution concealed it. He points out that at the preliminary

hearing, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Shaw about

the “I did it” statement at the scene of the arrest but not at the

station. He notes that Shaw forgot to record the second state-

ment in his report, from which Rhoades infers that Shaw

3606 RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon)

viewed the interrogation in the car and at the station as one

continuous event and thus also forgot to include the “I don’t

want to talk about it” statement which could negate the force

of the second “I did it” statement. Further, Rhoades empha-

sizes that his counsel made clear to the prosecutor at a discov-

ery conference held on April 23, 1987, that the defense

wanted each statement made by their client.7 In sum, Rhoades

submits, it is hard to imagine a lawyer who would miss the

essential nature of either statement, therefore his counsel must

not have seen the report. He believes the district court mis-

construed counsels’ deposition testimony as indicating they

had seen it, given that Hart (who was the primary attorney on

discovery and suppression issues) testified that if he had had

Shaw’s report, he would have used it.

[1] AEDPA constrains when the district court may hold an

evidentiary hearing or expand the record pursuant to Rule 7

of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases if a state prisoner seek-

ing federal habeas relief has failed to develop the factual

record that supports a claim in state court. Holland v. Jackson,

542 U.S. 649, 652-53 (2004) (per curiam); Cooper-Smith v.

Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). Section

7

The conference was recorded and reflects the following exchange:

[Defense counsel]: [In addition to Officer Burgess’ recorded

interrogation of Rhoades] [a]re there any other written or oral

statements made by Mr. Rhoades?

[Prosecuting Attorney]: To my knowledge there are not, other

than those that may be recounted in Detective Shaw’s report of

statements that Rhoades made to him in the course of their con-

tact in Nevada. but those are recounted in the police report that

you have received already.

Like I say, as far as a transcript of recorded statement, that that

[sic] I have referred to is all that I am aware of. There may be one

or two words that are referred to by Detective Shaw in his report,

and you’ll have to glean those from the report. But as far as a

separate statement, there is none.

Discovery Hrg. Tr. at 5 (April 23, 1987).

RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon) 3607

2254(e)(2) only allows new evidence to be considered in the

federal proceeding if, among other requirements, the factual

predicate “could not have been previously discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.”8 “[A] failure to develop the

factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack

of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner

or the prisoner’s counsel.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,

432 (2000). As we have held, a petitioner who “knew of the

existence of [ ] information” at the time of his state court pro-

ceedings, but did not present it until federal habeas proceed-

ings, “failed to develop the factual basis for his claim

diligently.” Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1241.

It is unclear whether our review of a district court decision

not to expand the record is for abuse of discretion or de novo.

Id. at 1241 n.12. Either way, resolution of this issue follows

from Cooper-Smith. There the petitioner sought to buttress his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by an affidavit of

his doctor regarding what the doctor would have testified to

at trial had he been called. Id. at 1241. Cooper-Smith knew of

the information at the time of state court proceedings, yet

failed to present it. As a result, we held that he failed to

8

Section 2254(e)(2) provides in full:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim

in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary

hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that —

(A) the claim relies on —

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for con-

stitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found

the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

3608 RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon)

develop the factual basis for his claim diligently, and there-

fore could not meet the requirements of § 2254(e)(2). Id.

Accordingly, we concluded that the district court properly

declined to expand the record under Rule 7.

[2] We reach the same conclusion here, for the same rea-

son. The deposition testimony and affidavits of both counsel

support the district court’s finding that Rhoades failed to

show this counsel lacked the information contained in the

Shaw report. In addition, Rhoades was a participant in the

conversation and made the statement himself. As the state

courts and the district court found, he was aware of what was

going on around him when he was arrested.9 And the

exchange between his counsel and the prosecutor at the pre-

trial discovery conference, upon which Rhoades relies to

show that he asked for his statements, in fact shows that the

prosecutor thought the Shaw report had been turned over. The

prosecutor confirmed there were no statements “other than

those that may be recounted in Detective Shaw’s report of

statements that Rhoades made to him in the course of their

contact in Nevada. But those are recounted in the police

report that you have received already.” Either counsel had the

report, as the prosecutor believed, or they were alerted to it by

this discussion such that they could have followed up if

indeed they didn’t have it.

[3] For these reasons, we agree with the district court that

Rhoades did not diligently develop the factual predicate for

this claim in state court. Consequently, he failed to satisfy the

9

Rhoades’s argument in reply that he had no memory of invoking his

right to silence is without basis in the record. In any event, the Idaho

Supreme Court acknowledged evidence showing that Rhoades was under

the influence of drugs, but found that he understood what was going on

around him at the time of his arrest. Rhoades (Haddon), 809 P.2d at 463.

As we explain in our opinion in the Baldwin case, this finding is supported

by evidence that Rhoades reacted alertly during his exchange with Shaw

at the arrest scene. See Rhoades (Baldwin), slip op. at 3530-31.

RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon) 3609

core requirement of § 2254(e)(2). As a result, the district court

did not err in failing to expand the record.

IV

Rhoades next challenges the district court’s alternative rul-

ing on the merits that his “I don’t want to talk about it” state-

ment did invoke his Miranda rights with respect to the “I did

it” statement at the station. He argues that the ruling should

not have been made without an evidentiary hearing, and in

any event, was wrong. However, we do not address this issue

given our conclusion that the district court did not err in

declining to expand the record. In light of the district court’s

principal and dispositive ruling, its alternative ruling is just

alternative. There is no need for us to reach it.

V

[4] Rhoades’s remaining issues are uncertified for appeal.

An appeal may not be taken unless the district judge or we

issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A

COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id.

§ 2253(c)(2). This requires Rhoades to establish that “reason-

able jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues pres-

ented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.’ ” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quot-

ing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)). We

are to resolve doubts about the propriety of a COA in the peti-

tioner’s favor. Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1010

(9th Cir. 2002).

A

Sentencing in the Haddon case occurred three weeks after

sentencing in the Michelbacher case. The same judge presided

over both matters. In the course of sentencing Rhoades for the

3610 RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon)

Michelbacher murder, the judge found that Rhoades was

“morally vacant and totally devoid of conscience,” had a pro-

pensity to commit murder, constituted a continuing threat to

society, and had committed an offense that was “extremely

wicked and vile, shockingly evil, and designed to inflict a

high degree of physical and mental pain with utter indiffer-

ence to and with the apparent enjoyment of the suffering.”

Rhoades claims that the judge was biased in the Haddon case

for having made these findings in the Michelbacher case. The

judge himself stated that the findings he made in the Michelb-

acher case were limited to those facts relating to the Michelb-

acher case, and would have nothing to do with the Haddon

portion of the case. In denying Rhoades’s motion to disqual-

ify, the judge also noted that he had no bias or prejudice

toward Rhoades that was either personal or in a judicial

capacity. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that no due

process violation occurred, 809 P.2d at 465, and so did the

district court.

[5] Due process requires that trials be conducted free of

actual bias as well as the appearance of bias. In re Murchison,

349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). There is a strong presumption that

a judge is not biased or prejudiced, Bracy v. Gramley, 520

U.S. 899, 909 (1997), and the Supreme Court made clear in

Liteky v. United States that “[i]t has long been regarded as

normal or proper for a judge to sit . . . in successive trials

involving the same defendant.” 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994). In

that connection, the Court observed that a “judge who pre-

sides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be

exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been

shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person.” Id. at 550-

51. “But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or preju-

dice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were

properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the pro-

ceedings . . . .” Id. at 551. Thus, judicial rulings alone are

almost never sufficient to support a request for recusal. Id. at

555; see also Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th

Cir. 1997).

RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon) 3611

[6] The propriety of the Idaho Supreme Court’s determina-

tion in light of Liteky is not reasonably debatable. The record

supports the trial judge’s own assessment. And as the district

court concluded, Rhoades points to no evidence that the judge

was unable to preside over his case in a fair and impartial

manner.

[7] Accordingly, we decline to issue a certificate of

appealability.

B

[8] AEDPA has a one-year statute of limitations, see 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d), unless claims are “tied to a common core

of operative facts” in the original pleading and thus relate

back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to the initial filing, Mayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005), or the claims are based upon

newly discovered evidence, in which case the one-year period

begins to run from “the date on which the factual predicate of

the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). As direct review in this case was completed

in 1991, Rhoades had a grace period of one year from April

24, 1996, AEDPA’s effective date, within which to submit an

application for habeas relief.

[9] Rhoades’s original filing was timely, but in 2005 he

sought leave to amend his petition to raise three claims that

he contended were newly discovered. These new claims arose

out of alleged misconduct of the prosecutors in the Michelb-

acher case based on testing done by the FBI laboratory before

the Michelbacher trial. Rhoades retained an expert in 2005

who interpreted the FBI results to exclude him as a contribu-

tor of the semen removed from the victim in that case. The

district court found that none of the claims relate back, which

is plainly correct. Rhoades’s original claims involved police

questioning at the time of his arrest, jailhouse informant testi-

mony, and judicial bias.

3612 RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon)

[10] The court denied leave as untimely, because Rhoades

admittedly had the FBI report since the late 1980s and failed

to exercise due diligence to develop the factual predicate of

the claim. As the district court correctly concluded, Rhoades

could have run the FBI report by another expert, and tried to

uncover the factual predicate for these claims, long before he

did. In the face of this record, Rhoades’s suggestion that the

state’s misconduct camouflaged the factual basis of his claim

is clearly unavailing. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004),

upon which he relies, is inapposite as there, the prosecution

never disclosed that one of its key witnesses was an infor-

mant, whereas here, the prosecution did not conceal the FBI

report. See id. at 675-77.

[11] We see nothing debatable about the district court’s

ruling that warrants certification. The claim unquestionably

fails.

C

[12] Finally, Rhoades asserts that the district court erred in

holding that three of his grounds for relief were barred by the

Teague retroactivity doctrine. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

288 (1989), the Court held that a federal court may not apply

a new constitutional rule on collateral review of a state court

judgment, subject to exceptions that are inapplicable here. Id.

at 310. A “new rule” is one that “breaks new ground or

imposes a new obligation” on the state, or was not “dictated

by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction

became final.” Id. at 301. A result is “dictated” when “no

other interpretation was reasonable.” Lambrix v. Singletary,

520 U.S. 518, 538 (1997).

[13] In the district court, Rhoades moved to exclude his “I

did it” statements and the testimony of jailhouse informants,

and to recuse the trial judge, on the footing that evidence in

his capital proceedings must meet a heightened reliability

threshhold before being admitted. The district court ruled that

RHOADES v. HENRY (Haddon) 3613

applying a “heightened standard of reliability” to these guilt-

phase issues would be Teague-barred. It did so because such

a rule was not dictated by precedent at the time Rhoades’s

convictions became final in 1991.

[14] Rhoades argues to the contrary by citing to the long

line of Supreme Court cases that apply enhanced standards of

reliability to capital sentencing procedures. See, e.g., Cald-

well v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985) (noting the

Eighth Amendment’s heightened “need for reliability in the

determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a

specific case”); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99

(1983) (recognizing “the qualitative difference of death from

all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater

degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination”);

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993) (noting “the

Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of the pro-

cess by which capital punishment may be imposed”). How-

ever, Rhoades was urging the district court to apply a

heightened standard to guilt phase issues. Rhoades offers rea-

sons why this should be so, but no precedent that dictates it.

Accordingly, to adopt his proposed rule would inarguably be

to apply a new rule. Reasonable jurists would not debate that

this would offend Teague. Therefore, we decline to issue a

COA.

AFFIRMED.