Sanchez v. Canales

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

E. SANCHEZ; R. SANCHEZ; C. 

RODRIGUEZ; S. FIGUEROA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

No. 06-55584

v.

JAMES CANALES, LAPD Sergeant;  D.C. No.

CV-04-09991-ABC

WESLEY WOO; RUBEN GONZALEZ

OPINION

WILLIAM LANTZ; MAX REDE; ALEX

RONQUILLO,

Defendants-Appellants.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Audrey B. Collins, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 21, 2008—Pasadena, California

Filed July 30, 2009

Before: Richard D. Cudahy,* Harry Pregerson and

Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hawkins;

Dissent by Judge Pregerson

*The Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior United States Circuit Judge

for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

9957

9960 SANCHEZ v. CANALES

COUNSEL

Marion R. Yagman (presented oral argument) and Stephen

Yagman (authored brief), Yagman & Yagman & Reichmann,

Venice Beach, California, for the appellees.

Blithe S. Bock, Deputy City Attorney (authored brief and

presented oral argument), Los Angeles, California, for the

appellants.

OPINION

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:

James Canales, Wesley Woo, Ruben Gonzalez, William

Lantz, Max Rede, and Alex Ronquillo (collectively, the “De-

fendants”) appeal the partial denial of qualified immunity in

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, arguing that any detention of

Eva Sanchez, Ruben Sanchez, Carmen Rodriguez, and Maria

Socorro Figueroa (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) was constitu-

tionally reasonable. The sole question on appeal is, assuming

the Plaintiffs were detained during a legal search of their

home, was the detention a violation of their clearly estab-

lished constitutional rights? We conclude it was not and there-

fore reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

“Assuming [the plaintiffs’] version of the material facts is

correct, as we must in the context of an interlocutory appeal

of a qualified immunity decision,” CarePartners, LLC v.

Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 878 (9th Cir. 2008), the record estab-

lishes the following:

SANCHEZ v. CANALES 9961

Due to an increase in robberies in the Wilshire area, Los

Angeles Police Department’s Career Criminal Detail (“CCD”)

began conducting probation compliance checks on probation-

ers with prior arrests for robbery living in the Wilshire area.

As a condition of their release, every probationer in California

is required to “submit his . . . person, property, place of resi-

dence, vehicle, [and] personal effects, to search at any time,

with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reason-

able cause by any probation officer or officer of the law.”

Officer James Canales, a defendant in this case, obtained a

list of such probationers from Deputy Probation Officer Wes-

ley Woo, another defendant. Oscar Sanchez (“Oscar”) was

included in the list because police records indicated he was

still on probation, had committed prior robberies, and lived in

the area. Oscar’s address of record was that of his parents,

Eva and Ruben Sanchez (“Eva” and “Ruben,” respectively).

The CCD officers reviewed and verified the accuracy of the

records and cross-referenced their list against county jail

records, eliminating from the list several probationers who

were incarcerated in county jail. Oscar, it turns out, was incar-

cerated in state prison at the time, but nonetheless remained

on the list because the CCD officers did not have ready access

to state prison records.

Officers Canales and Woo and six other CCD officers (col-

lectively, the “Officers”) arrived at Eva’s and Ruben’s home

around 6:00 a.m. The Officers woke the family by knocking

on the door and shouting at the home’s occupants to open the

door. Eva, Ruben, Oscar’s grandmother (“Carmen”), sister

(“Maria”), and four-year-old nephew (“Ramiro”) were all

inside the residence. Maria began to open the door, but closed

it when she saw that it was the police. The Officers continued

knocking loudly, demanding to see Oscar, and threatening to

break the door down if the family did not cooperate. Eva

repeatedly told the Officers in Spanish that Oscar was in

9962 SANCHEZ v. CANALES

prison. At least one officer spoke Spanish and acted as a

translator.

When Eva finally opened the latch, the Officers pulled the

door open and entered the house. The Officers ordered the

family outside so they could search the home safely, although

they allowed Carmen, who was suffering from cancer, to

remain inside on a couch. The family remained outside in the

small front yard for some time between ten and forty-five

minutes. When the Officers allowed the family back inside

the house, Ruben showed them a letter Oscar had recently

sent the family from prison, as proof he was incarcerated

there. The Officers remained for ten more minutes, and then

departed.

B. Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against the Officers

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming unlawful entry and search,

excessive force, and unlawful detention in violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Following discovery, the

Officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified

immunity from suit on each claim.

The district court granted qualified immunity with respect

to the search and excessive force claims. Citing our recent

decision in Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005),

the court first concluded the Officers had probable cause to

believe Oscar was at home, notwithstanding Eva’s statement

to the contrary at the front door. It then considered whether

the Officers could “conduct the probation search without sus-

picion of wrongdoing,” granting immunity because it had not

been clearly established “what level of suspicion, if any, was

required prior to the . . . search of Plaintiffs’ residence.”1 The

1

The Supreme Court has since clarified that if a parolee has agreed to

submit to warrantless searches as “a condition of release,” subsequent

“suspicionless search[es] by a law enforcement officer [do] not offend the

Fourth Amendment.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006)

(emphasis added).

SANCHEZ v. CANALES 9963

court found additionally that “Plaintiffs have failed to articu-

late any actions by Defendants that would support a finding

that the Defendants acted unreasonably during the search,”

and “no facts show that any of the Officer Defendants used

excessive force against the Plaintiffs.”

The district court denied qualified immunity, however, on

the unconstitutional detention claim. The court first addressed

whether the Officers had seized the Sanchez family within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment, concluding there was

“sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue as to whether,

under the circumstances, a ‘reasonable person would have felt

that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go

about his business.’ ” The court next concluded that Supreme

Court and Ninth Circuit case law did not authorize Officers to

detain “third parties” on the premises while conducting a pro-

bation compliance search, and—without addressing whether

the law was clearly established one way or another—denied

qualified immunity on the detention claim. The Officers

timely appealed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291 to review the partial denial of qualified immu-

nity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985).

The district court’s grant of qualified immunity with

respect to the search and excessive force claims is not inde-

pendently interlocutorily appealable. Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d

692, 694 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Although we may take pendant

jurisdiction to review a grant of qualified immunity on inter-

locutory appeal if it is “inextricably entwined” with a denial

of qualified immunity, Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d

1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998), this is not such a case, nor do the

Plaintiffs argue it is. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review

the district court’s partial grant of qualified immunity on the

9964 SANCHEZ v. CANALES

search and excessive force claims and may consider only the

denial of qualified immunity on the unconstitutional detention

claim.

The district court also concluded that there were triable

issues with respect to whether a detention took place. Our

interlocutory jurisdiction to review a denial of qualified

immunity is limited exclusively to questions of law, which we

review de novo. Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir.

2004). A district court’s determination that the parties’ evi-

dence presents genuine issues of material fact is categorically

not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. Id. (citing Mendocino

Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1291 (9th

Cir. 1999)). “Where disputed facts exist, we assume that the

version of the material facts asserted by Plaintiffs, as the non-

moving party, is correct.” KRL v. Estate of Moore, 512 F.3d

1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

We hold, pursuant to Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005),

that officers may constitutionally detain the occupants of a

home during a parole or probation compliance search.

Accordingly—assuming without deciding, as we must, that

the officers had probable cause to believe Oscar was at home

and the Plaintiffs were detained during the search—we con-

clude that any such detention was not a violation of the Plain-

tiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights.2

We begin with Muehler. There, SWAT officers executed a

search warrant at a private residence occupied by Iris Mena

2

Because we lack jurisdiction to review a grant of qualified immunity,

we neither approve nor criticize any “failure of due diligence on the part

of law enforcement” to verify whether Oscar was at home. See Dissent at

3. The law requires instead that we leave for another panel of this court

the legality of the search, assuming the plaintiffs wish to appeal once the

district court has entered a final judgment. See Krug, 329 F.3d at 694 n.2.

SANCHEZ v. CANALES 9965

and several others. In the process of executing the warrant, the

officers entered Mena’s bedroom and “placed her in hand-

cuffs at gunpoint.” Id. at 96. The SWAT officers then took

Mena and the other occupants into a “converted garage,”

where they “remained in handcuffs” for three hours, under

guard, while the police completed searching the home. Id.

Mena, who had committed no crime, brought suit under

§ 1983, claiming that she had been detained “for an unreason-

able time and in an unreasonable manner” in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. Id. The jury concluded that Mena’s

detention had indeed been unreasonable and awarded dam-

ages. Id. On appeal, we affirmed, concluding that the officers

“should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that

she posed no immediate threat.” Id. (citing Mena v. City of

Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 2003)).

[1] The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “officers

executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority

‘to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search

is conducted’ ” regardless of whether or not the occupants

appear dangerous. Id. at 98 (quoting Michigan v. Summers,

452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)). The court reasoned that in a search

of a private home, “the additional intrusion caused by deten-

tion is slight” while “the justifications for detention are sub-

stantial.” Id. (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-05). Those

justifications include (1) “preventing flight in the event that

incriminating evidence is found”; (2) “minimizing the risk of

harm to the officers”; and (3) “facilitating the orderly comple-

tion of the search . . . [while] avoid[ing] the use of force.” Id.

(quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03) (internal quotations

omitted). Given these underlying interests, officers may

detain occupants of a home they are searching pursuant to a

search warrant: “Mena’s detention for the duration of the

search was reasonable . . . because a warrant existed to search

1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address

at the time of the search.” Id.; see also Los Angeles County

9966 SANCHEZ v. CANALES

v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007) (discussing and reaffirming

Muehler).

The district court held Muehler inapplicable here because

the Sanchez home was subject to a warrantless probation

compliance search, whereas “important to the analysis in

Muehler was the presence of a search warrant.” We are unper-

suaded by this distinction, for two reasons.

[2] First, the three justifications underlying the Supreme

Court’s decision in Muehler appear to be present in every

valid home search, whether or not the search is supported by

a warrant. Either way, “the additional intrusion caused by

detention is slight” and “the justifications for detention are

substantial”: the law should always be concerned to prevent

the flight of criminals, ensure officer safety, and facilitate

orderly completions of valid searches—warrant or no warrant.

See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98.

[3] Second, any reason to think the presence of a warrant

was relevant to the outcome in Muehler is equally present in

warrantless probation and parole compliance searches. In the

first place, “[i]f the evidence that a citizen’s residence is har-

boring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer

that an invasion of the citizen’s privacy is justified, it is con-

stitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while

officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his

home.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05. There is no question,

however, that parole and probation conditions are also cate-

gorically sufficient to justify the invasion of privacy entailed

by a home search. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843,

847 (2006) (where a parolee has agreed to submit to warrant-

less searches as “a condition of release,” subsequent warrant-

less, “suspicionless search[es] by a law enforcement officer

[do] not offend the Fourth Amendment”); see also Motley,

432 F.3d 1072 (same).3

3

Although both Samson and Motley were parole rather than probation

cases, we have “consistently recognized that there is no ‘constitutional dif-

SANCHEZ v. CANALES 9967

[4] Given that police officers may search the home of a

parolee or probationer “without a warrant” and without

“run[ning] afoul of the Fourth Amendment” so long as “the

officers have [probable cause to believe] that they are at the

address where . . . the parolee . . . resides,” Motley, 432 F.3d

at 1079, there is no need to be concerned that a neutral magis-

trate had not approved the reasonableness of the compliance

search. See generally Samson, 547 U.S. at 848 (“[P]arolees

. . . have severely diminished expectations of privacy by vir-

tue of their status alone.”); Motley, 432 F.3d at 1080 (imply-

ing limitations on the “the interest of third parties” who are

co-occupants of a parolee’s home). Just as in a search pursu-

ant to a search warrant, therefore, “it is constitutionally rea-

sonable to require [the occupant of a home] to remain while

officers of the law execute a valid [probation compliance]

search.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05.

The presence of a search warrant was also relevant to Mue-

hler’s analysis “because the probable cause underlying a war-

rant to search a premises gives police reason to suspect that

its occupants are involved in criminal activity.” United States

v. Jennings, 544 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2008). But a search

warrant is not, of course, the only basis for a heightened sus-

picion that a home’s occupants might be involved in criminal

activity. The very same concern applies here: as the Supreme

Court has previously explained, “ ‘parolees . . . are more

likely [than ordinary citizens] to commit future criminal

offenses.’ ” Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (quoting Pennsylvania

Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365

(1998)).

[5] Thus there is no reason to conclude that Muehler means

“officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises

ference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth amend-

ment.’ ” Motley, 432 F.3d at 1083 n.9 (quoting Moreno v. Baca, 400 F.3d

1152, 1168 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005)).

9968 SANCHEZ v. CANALES

and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search”

only when the search is conducted pursuant to a search war-

rant but not to a probation or parole compliance check. See

Rettele, 127 S. Ct. at 1992.4 To the contrary, Muehler’s under-

lying justifications permitting detentions during home

searches apply with full force here, notwithstanding the

absence of a search warrant. Just as in Muehler, “the addi-

tional intrusion caused by detention is slight” while “the justi-

fications for detention are substantial.” Muehler, 544 U.S. at

98. (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-05). We therefore

conclude—assuming without deciding that the officers had

probable cause to believe Oscar was at home and that a deten-

tion took place—that the detention was constitutionally reason-

able.5

[6] We remand to the district court with instructions to

grant qualified immunity on the unreasonable detention claim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

I agree with District Court Judge Audrey B. Collins’s ulti-

mate disposition of this case, Sanchez v. Bratton, No. CV 04-

9991 ABC (SSX), 2006 WL 802328, at *11-14 (C.D. Cal.,

Mar. 14, 2006), and her conclusion that the “Plaintiffs have

4

Although the district court found it relevant that the officers here were

not “searching for weapons, evidence of gang membership, or contra-

band,” the Muehler Court made clear that “[a]n officer’s authority to

detain incident to a search is categorical,” Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98, and

does not depend on such extraneous circumstances as the motivation for

the search.

5

The Dissent proposes we affirm the denial of qualified immunity for

the detention claim because the search was conducted without “due dili-

gence” and in an inappropriate manner. See Dissent 3. Once again, how-

ever, the legality of the search is not a question presented here.

SANCHEZ v. CANALES 9969

raised a triable issue of fact . . . as to their claim of unlawful

detention, and further, that the Officer Defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.” Id. at *5. I

therefore dissent.

I am also troubled by how law enforcement officers care-

lessly executed the warrantless probation search of the San-

chez residence. The warrantless search took place around 6

a.m. on December 5, 2003, when the Sanchez family was

awakened by eight officers pounding at their door. Oscar San-

chez, the object of the search, was not at home, and Oscar’s

mother, Eva, repeatedly told the officers that Oscar was in

prison. But not a single officer, nor their leader, made any

attempt to verify whether this information was correct.

Instead, the officers ordered the family,1 clad only in their

night clothes, to go outside where they stood in the cold,2 dark3

morning for forty-five minutes4 while the officers searched

their home looking for Oscar.

1

The officers permitted Carmen, Oscar’s grandmother who was recover-

ing from cancer surgery, to remain inside the house on a couch.

2

Eva Sanchez, Oscar’s mother, noted in her deposition that when she

stepped outside her home on December 5, 2003, “[i]t was cold.” Further-

more, according to the charts of the National Climatic Data Center, the

outside temperature in Los Angeles was 49 degrees Fahrenheit at 5:47

a.m. on December 5, 2003, and 50 degrees at 6:47a.m. See National Cli-

matic Data Center, Los Angeles: Downtown L.A./USC Campus, Unedited

Local Climatological Data Hourly Observations Table, http://

cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/ulcd/ULCD (last visited June 16, 2009). I take judicial

notice of these facts. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

3

According to the charts calculated by the United States Naval Observa-

tory, the sun rose in Los Angeles on December 5, 2003 at 6:44 a.m.

See U.S. Naval Observatory, http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/

RS_OneDay.php (last visited June 16, 2009). I take judicial notice of this

fact. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Because the officers began their search around

6 a.m. and the Sanchez family waited for forty-five minutes outside their

home during the search, the family spent much of that time in the dark.

4

There is some ambiguity regarding how long the Sanchez family was

detained outside their home. Because we are considering Defendants’

summary judgment motion on the issue of qualified immunity, we must

view the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Accordingly, we assume

that the detention lasted forty-five minutes, the longest duration asserted

by Eva Sanchez.

9970 SANCHEZ v. CANALES

But as Oscar Sanchez’s mother repeatedly told the officers,

Oscar was behind bars at California’s Tehachapi Correctional

Institution. In fact, he had been in prison during the preceding

ten months, since February 2003. Yet the record fails to show

that any law enforcement officer ever tried to call Oscar’s

probation officer to verify his whereabouts. Nor did any law

enforcement officer run a current rap sheet on Oscar. Nor did

any officer bother to call California prison authorities or the

Department of Corrections’s inmate locator hotline to deter-

mine whether Oscar was in state prison, even though an offi-

cer did check Los Angeles County Jail records to no avail.

Such an egregious failure of due diligence on the part of law

enforcement to the detriment of innocent parties should not be

condoned. Additional investigation would have taken only

minutes, and would have spared the Sanchez family the anxi-

ety of being ordered to stand in their yard, in their night

clothes, in the dark, and in the cold, under the curious eyes of

neighbors for forty-five minutes while the officers searched

their home for Oscar.

I would, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to

deny summary judgment to the officers based on qualified

immunity on the Sanchez family’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful

detention claim. Accordingly, I dissent.