affirming the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer where the plaintiff “did not produce evidence sufficient to show that he was qualified for the superintendent position.”
How later courts described this case
- affirming the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer where the plaintiff “did not produce evidence sufficient to show that he was qualified for the superintendent position.”
- “For starters, no Title VII claim, including a claim for religious discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, could properly be maintained against the individual defendants because they were not [plaintiff’s] employer, and the district court therefore correctly granted summary judgment as to all employment claims against them.”
- “[R]elief under Title VII is available against only the employer[.]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
____________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10261 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 12, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
____________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 08-CV-00011-CDL
JONATHAN J. MACKMUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CAGLE’S INC.,
BRIAN GRAVES,
In his official capacity,
BRANDON CRYAR,
In his official capacity,
ANTHONY INGRAM,
In his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
____________________
(May 12, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan J. MackMuhammad appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of all defendants on his claims of religious discrimination
in employment and hostile work environment, brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, and 2000e, and on his state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.1 On appeal, MackMuhammad essentially re-alleges the claims raised in his
complaint, arguing that he was discriminated against by the defendants because of his
Muslim religion, was subjected to a hostile work environment, and was terminated
for discriminatory reasons. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo, viewing
all of the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Brooks
v. County Comm’n of Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1161-62 (11th Cir.
2006). Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant demonstrates, through
pleadings, interrogatories, admissions, and any affidavits, that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c). “A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there
is no genuine issue of fact.” Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir.
1990) (quotation omitted). “[A] party opposing a properly submitted motion for
1
We do not consider MackMuhammad’s retaliation claim, which he raised for the first
time on appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir.
2004).
2
summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleadings, but
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “All evidence and reasonable factual inferences therefrom must
be viewed against the party seeking summary judgment.” Id. A party’s speculation
or conjecture cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Cordoba v. Dillard’s,
Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). “A mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the nonmoving party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary
judgment.” Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).
First, we are unpersuaded that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on MackMuhammad’s discrimination claim. Title VII makes it unlawful
for an employer “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). When a plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence in
an attempt to prove discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, we apply the burden-
shifting approach articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 975-76 (11th Cir. 2008). Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Crawford, 529 F.3d at 976. To establish a prima facie
3
case, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was
qualified for his job; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4)
his employer treated similarly-situated employees outside his class more favorably
or replaced him with someone outside his class. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div.
of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). “To show
that employees are similarly situated, the plaintiff must show that the employees are
similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc.,
330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
Once the plaintiff has made out the elements of the prima facie case, the
employer must articulate a non-discriminatory basis for its employment action.
Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999).
If non-discriminatory reasons are identified, the plaintiff must then show that the
proffered reasons were pretextual. Id.; Crawford, 529 F.3d at 976.
“[R]elief under Title VII is available against only the employer and not against
individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act,
regardless of whether the employer is a public company or a private company.”
Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original).
On this record, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in
favor of all defendants on MackMuhammad’s claim for religious discrimination. For
4
starters, no Title VII claim, including a claim for religious discrimination, harassment,
or retaliation, could properly be maintained against the individual defendants because
they were not MackMuhammad’s employer, and the district court therefore correctly
granted summary judgment as to all employment claims against them. See id.
Cagle’s Inc. also was entitled to summary judgment on the discrimination
claim, as MackMuhammad has failed to establish a prima facie case. Indeed,
MackMuhammad did not produce evidence sufficient to show that he was qualified
for the superintendent position. He had no experience in the poultry business prior
to beginning work as a chicken packer at Cagle’s, and cited no prior experience in
manufacturing or in the supervision of hundreds of line employees. Cagle’s gave him
an opportunity to demonstrate that he was capable of handling the job
notwithstanding his lack of experience and qualifications, but it found that he was
unable to perform satisfactorily the supervisory duties required. Though he claimed
to be doing a great job, MackMuhammad offered no probative or authenticated
evidence to support that assertion.
MackMuhammad also offered no proof that similarly-situated employees at
Cagle’s who were not Muslim were treated more favorably or that he was replaced
by a non-Muslim. In opposition to summary judgment, MackMuhammad made no
general or specific argument that he had been treated more harshly than
5
similarly-situated employees, and did not identify any comparable employee. In
short, he failed to establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination, and
summary judgment on this claim was proper.
We likewise reject MackMuhammad’s argument that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment on his hostile work environment claim. “A hostile work
environment claim under Title VII is established upon proof that ‘the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment.’” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269,
1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
[A] plaintiff wishing to establish a hostile work
environment claim [must] show: (1) that he belongs to a
protected group; (2) that he has been subject to unwelcome
harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been based
on a protected characteristic of the employee, such as
[religion]; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working
environment; and (5) that the employer is responsible for
such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of
direct liability.
Id.
We have construed the severity and pervasiveness test to contain both objective
and subjective components, requiring a showing that the behavior at issue created an
6
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and that the
plaintiff himself subjectively found hostile or abusive. Id. at 1276. “In evaluating the
objective severity of the harassment, we consider, among other factors: (1) the
frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether
the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance.” Id.
Further, “Title VII is only implicated in the case of a workplace that is permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult, not where there is the mere
utterance of an . . . epithet.” Id. at 1276-77 (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court properly found that MackMuhammad failed to prove
that the harassment he was subjected to was severe or pervasive, or that he was
affected adversely by the alleged abuse. MackMuhammad’s complaints centered
around references in the workplace to him as “Bin Laden” or “Muhammad-man,”
comments and jokes regarding his religious-based refusal to eat pork, and the serving
of pork products at company functions. But there was no indication in the record that
biased or hostile comments were intimidating or threatening in any way, and
MackMuhammad never claimed to feel threatened by any of the comments he cited.
While admittedly rude, insulting, and insensitive, these comments appear to fall more
in the category of epithets or boorish behavior, which are not actionable under Title
7
VII. See id. With respect to company meals, MackMuhammad conceded that, once
he brought the issue of his dietary restriction to the company’s attention, Cagle’s
made certain to make a non-pork alternative meal available to him. Moreover, as
noted by the district court, MackMuhammad’s post-employment assertions that he
was able to perform his job well despite the comments and bad behavior, indicates
that he did not subjectively find his co-workers’ actions to be severe or pervasive.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that MackMuhammad never submitted
any written complaints of harassment to anyone at Cagle’s, never communicated them
in any form to anyone in human resources, and did not cite any religious harassment
or discrimination in his request for reinstatement. Because MackMuhammad did not
demonstrate that the comments and behavior he cited in support of his claim was
objectively or subjectively severe or abusive, he has failed to establish a prima facie
hostile-work-environment claim, and the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of Cagle’s. See id. at 1276.
Finally, we find no merit in MackMuhammad’s claim that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment on his state-law claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. In Georgia, a plaintiff alleging “[a] claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress must prove four elements: (1) intentional or reckless
conduct (2) that is extreme and outrageous and (3) causes emotional distress (4) that
8
is severe.” Travis Pruitt & Assoc., P.C. v. Hooper, 625 S.E.2d 445, 452 (Ga. Ct. App.
2005). “Whether the required level of extreme and outrageous conduct has been
shown to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is generally
a question of law. But if there is evidence from which a reasonable person could find
severe emotional distress resulting from extreme and outrageous conduct, then the
issue is for the jury.” Id. (citation omitted).
Georgia courts have held that derogatory comments in the employment context
generally do not meet the “extreme and outrageous conduct” element. Jarrard v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 529 S.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (“Comments
made within the context of one’s employment may be horrifying or traumatizing, but
are generally considered a common vicissitude of ordinary life.”) (quotation omitted).
“Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress has been found only where
the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at 147 (quotation omitted). The conduct
“must be of such serious import as to naturally give rise to such intense feelings of
humiliation, embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage as to cause severe emotional
distress.” Peoples v. Guthrie, 404 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in
original). “Such [conduct] does not include mere insults, indignities, threats,
9
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other vicissitudes of daily living. Plaintiffs are
expected to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language and to occasional acts
that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.” Jarrard, 529 S.E.2d at 147.
Here, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of all
defendants on MackMuhammad’s state-law claim, finding that the conduct alleged
did not meet the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. In particular, the district
court’s conclusions in the hostile-work-environment context that the challenged
comments, while clearly rude and insulting, were not intimidating or threatening in
any way, apply equally to MackMuhammad’s intentional-infliction claim, precluding
recovery as a matter of law. Similarly, the remedial actions taken by the company
regarding company meals militate against a determination of outrageous behavior
regarding the earlier serving of pork products at meetings. And, MackMuhammad
admitted in his deposition that he did not cite any religious harassment or
discrimination in his request for reinstatement, did not claim to be hampered in his
performance by any alleged harassment, and never sought treatment for any emotional
distress he allegedly suffered as a result of the harassment and discrimination he
claimed. On this record, the district court’s summary judgment ruling regarding
MackMuhammad’s state tort claim was proper, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
10